

A NEW LOOK AT THE SOVIET "NEW LOOK"

By Bertram D. Wolfe

THE men who have been ruling the Soviet Union since Stalin's death are *epigons*, "sons," after-comers. They owe their power to an apostolic succession and style themselves disciples of Lenin and comrades-in-arms of Stalin. The structure and dynamics of their rule is dictated by the same philosophy, incorporated in the same single party-police state, it continues to be totalitarian in scope and aim, it is engaged in the same unending war of its own people, the same drive to reshape and control the globe. Still, they are new men, younger men, men with different formative backgrounds, and their regime has a new look.

Lenin's Marxism was so different from that of the West European, nineteenth century Marx that one of Lenin's admirers dubbed it *Marxism on a trotter*. Lenin's associates, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Bukharin, ten to fifteen years younger than he, still belonged to the generation that had made the revolution. After a period of feigned subordination to a "collective leadership," Joseph Stalin established his claim to be "the best disciple of Comrade Lenin." He perfected Lenin's organization machine and monopoly of the organs of persuasion and force, suppressed some of Lenin's doctrines, dogmas and hopes, retained and enlarged others, propounded some of his own. He killed off all of Lenin's close associates, surrounding himself with new and younger men, none of whom had been in Lenin's inner circle. Thus he became at one and the same time father image and voice of the epigons. His Leninism became different from Lenin's, even as the latter's Marxism had been different from that of Marx.

The Malenkovs and Khrushchevs, and men younger still, who now form the post-Stalinist "collective leadership," are the men Stalin gathered around him in his rise to personal dictatorship. They never knew the wide dreams and humane ideals of the nineteenth century intelligentsia, the feverish disputation, hope and wretchedness of the Leninist underground, prison and exile, nor the "heroic days" of the storming of the Winter Palace and the Kremlin. They were wholly formed in the Stalinist light for a monopoly of power, and in the non-age of forced industrialization, forced collectivization and blood-purge. They were brought

up not as underground revolutionaries but under the new régime of bureaucratic totalitarianism.¹

They do not even look like the men who were Lenin's close associates. As one contemplates their pictures lined up on Lenin's, now Stalin's tomb, one cannot but be struck by the fact that they are all fleshy, solid, square and squat - "fat boys," to borrow an old "wobbly" term against labor bureaucrats. Harrison Salisbury has called our attention to a curious detail that none of them is over 5 foot 4 (Stalin's police record gives his height as 5 foot 3 and 3/4 inches) - as if they had been chosen not merely with regard to faction loyalty and party in-fighting and administrative capacity, but also that their height, spiritual and physical, should not dwarf the non-too-tall leader who had perforce to excel in all things. Actually Stalin managed to look taller than they on Lenin's tomb by having a little raised platform built under him.

There is, to be sure, a remnant of Old Bolsheviks among the new "collective leadership." But these older men, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan, owe their places, indeed their very survival, to the fact that they were cronies of Joseph Stalin, second-ranking figures in Lenin's day, from the outset, faction adherents of Stalin rather than Lenin, they came out of the crucible of the purges refashioned, so to speak, as "new men."

What is collective about this collective leadership, and will it continue to be a collective? What can the world expect will be new in the work and ways and aims of these new men who have taken over Stalin's power? And what of continuity? It is these questions that constitute the real problem of the "new look."

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In theory it is conceivable that a committee-government, a *Directorate*, a diumvirate, triumvirate or decemvirate, can wield autocratic, dictatorial and total power. But the whole course of Soviet history, and the whole dynamic of autocracy, dictatorship and totalitarianism, are against it.

Lenin began by creating a party in which the Center selected the local committees, which in turn sent delegates to the conventions that confirmed the Center. He seized power by a minority conspiracy, drained democracy of authority by dispersing the

¹ Lenin was born in 1870, Stalin and Trotsky in 1879, and Kaganovich in 1883. Khushchev was born in 1894, but not until 1929 was he a member of the Party, and he did not take power. Malenkov was born in 1892 and joined the Communist Party only in 1929.

Constituent Assembly, drained the Soviets of authority by outlawing all other parties and deciding all things in the Communist Central Committee and its Fractions, drained the Party of authority by forbidding factional controversy, the Central Committee by setting up the Politburo, and the Politburo by settling matters by telephone, direct wire and personal conversation. Inside the Politburo he never altogether sloughed off the appearance of "collegial" power; at his death he left a will in which he sought in vain to preserve that one last redoubt of collectivity.

It took close to a decade before the "collective leadership," of which Stalin appeared but to be the faithful machine wheelhorse, was openly dissolved in favor of his personal power. With his death his lieutenants are faced with the problem that in a dictatorship there is no legitimacy and no legal succession. These men have been taught in a hard school to make many moves in their head before they touch one piece on the chessboard of power. The bloody list of their dead gives them every reason to combine forces against any man who moves too fast. That they would begin their orphaned rule with the proclamation of a "collective leadership" could have been predicted.

That first holding company included Beria who was nominated by Malenkov, and Malenkov who was nominated by Beria. Within a few weeks after Stalin's death, a newspaper buildup which seemed to portend Malenkov's rise to dominant power was put a stop to by some decision of his associates, and he was "relieved" of the post of Party Secretary "at his own request." That brought Khrushchev into a top ranking position as Party Secretary. Beria's undoing came from his too rapid moves to make the secret police independent of the Party and through it to strengthen his control of certain "republican governments" and the Party machine. This aroused the fears of so many of his associates that, suddenly, they combined against him and there was one "collective leader" less. At this writing, Malenkov would appear to be out in front. But the fact that he has dropped the key organization post in which he was so long Stalin's chief assistant

¹In the first issue of the *American Communist Journal*, *The World Affairs*, published after Stalin's death, of the three funeral addresses of Malenkov, Molotov and Beria only Malenkov's was printed, and with it an article by William Z. Foster entitled "Malenkov is not the one." A month later Mr. Foster had modified this statement in terms of an article of his on "Stalin and Coexistence," but he still had not put the question of the funeral of Malenkov's funeral oration. But when Mr. Foster returned to the theme of "Coexistence" in the issue of August 1, *The World Affairs* felt that he could write that "the successive leadership of the Soviet people: Lenin, Stalin, and Malenkov" have all held the same position on this question.

— the post through which Stalin himself rose to power—and that this post is now in Khrushchev's hands, suggests a temporary system of "checks and balances" on each other by the men who together hold unchecked and absolute power.

As long as the power question is not settled and the pyramid of power is without an apex, these men will jealously watch each other and make promises of returns to their subjects. They will continue Stalin's policy of avoiding either all-out war or all-out peace. They cannot tolerate all-out peace, since the very excuse for the existence of their perpetual state-of-emergency regime is "capitalist encirclement." Like Stalin, they have two reasons for avoiding all-out war. The first is doctrinal: their central belief teaches them that they are the wave of the future, that the capitalist order is in decay, that time is on their side. The other is a readiness to risk war at the periphery, limited engagements, "calculated risks," for in their activist theory History helps only those who help Her, but not to jeopardize their power center, the boss, of which it is all about, in order to change the course of history.

Like Stalin, hesitating though he be no more, as long as the power question is not settled, they are not pat live ammunition and overwhelming force in the hands of the army, lest "Bolshevism" get the credit of power in its own right. Thus we would do well to remember that their present innumerable concessions in foreign policy stem more from their calculation that they may divide the free world, isolate America, and cut off her support from some sector of Europe or Asia, than from a desire to improve their own internal weaknesses. "Collective Leadership" — the Party and the Government — the wise Central Committee, — is in the end most about in want of an overwhelming power symbol that can paralyze the entire command structure and keep all hands and Empire, such as was commanded by the Stalin cult and Stalin's word and rifle. The struggle may be muted and concealed, it may be long or short, it may be compromised and muddled again and again, but the whole dynamic of the total Party and Government, and the entire command and military structure, will be dominated by the government and the military, and the entire structure will be dominated by the government and the military.

The Stalin cult, which had put these men where they are,

the problem of the succession more difficult. By attributing to Stalin all successes, and to themselves and their subordinates all failures, shortcomings or unpleasant consequences, they enlarged his person until it filled the horizon, diminishing their own status to the point of insignificance.

In the case of Stalin the situation was different. He was not only the one who made the decisions, but he was also the one who made them known. He was the one who was responsible for the successes and failures of the Soviet Union. He was the one who was responsible for the lives and deaths of millions of people. He was the one who was responsible for the course of the world. He was the one who was responsible for the future of humanity. He was the one who was responsible for the fate of the world.

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Yezhov's critics of 1927, fell too. At the Nineteenth Congress, Klushcheyev delivered the report on the revision of the party statutes which represented a further tightening of totalitarian controls. Since Stalin's death, he has become First Secretary of the Party, and heads the new drives in agriculture.

As for Premier Malenkov, he began his career as Secretary of the Communist cell of the Moscow Higher Technical School, where he gathered around him the Saburovs, Pervukhins, and Malyshevs who watched like him from engineering to politics, becoming engineer-checkists, party commissars in technology and industry. It is on the entrance of these engineer-checkist associates of Malenkov into the ruling circle that so many commentators have based the contention that party rule is now giving ground to the claims of the new technocracy. But these men are not advocates of party penetration into and control of technology, just as Bulganin is not a military general who has gotten into the Politburo. But a member of the party and the police made Marshal and Minister of Defense to control the army.

In 1934 Malenkov became Chief of the Department of Leading Party Organs, which had charge of placements, appointments, dismissals. In the bloody year of the *Yezhov Zhenit*, he was the factory director of the purges in so far as they had a planned, centralized and systematic party character. As Yezhov advanced, Malenkov was made his deputy in this department, supplying the decisions and the indications as to chain reactions when any leading official fell. In December, 1937, *Pravda* (Soviet Daily), which Malenkov edited, carried the following lead editorial:

"The first leadership of the Stalinist People's Commissar General Yezhov, the Soviet Interior Minister, has finished mercilessly and gloriously. It was in the face of Yezhov that the Soviet people have their first experience of a new type of leadership. The final guardians of socialism, the members of the Central Executive Bureau of the Stalinist People's Commissar General Yezhov will be remembered in the future as those who defended the party against the forces of Bukharinism, bourgeois nationalism, and other enemies of the people for the space of three years. The positive hand of the party and the members of the Central Executive Bureau will be remembered in the future as those who defended the party against the forces of Bukharinism, bourgeois nationalism, and other enemies of the people for the space of three years. The positive hand of the party and the members of the Central Executive Bureau will be remembered in the future as those who defended the party against the forces of Bukharinism, bourgeois nationalism, and other enemies of the people for the space of three years."

The second leadership of the people's leader Joseph Stalin's party and the Soviet Union was maintained by Malenkov, keeper of the door, the apparatus of the Party, the organization and implementation of

staged trials, and Yezhov, apprehender, inquisitor and executioner. When the fury had run its course, Yezhov was made expiatory goat, but Malenkov and Vyshinsky were promoted. The year Yezhov disappeared, Malenkov was made head of the new Administration of Party Cadres which "keeps a strict personal register of every party member and candidate" in some 2,500,000 dossiers on standing, public and private life, friends, talents, vulnerabilities, along with dossiers on perhaps 500,000 specialists in industry and agriculture. It is this key index which Malenkov has now surrendered reluctantly, I would imagine, to Party Secretary Khrushchev. In any case, Malenkov's connection with the Yezhov case should help us to keep our perspective on the "Little Lord Chamberlain."

IV

I think it dangerous not to personalize and to neglect even crimes of the Stalin cult, we are prone to forget that Stalin did not work out his policies alone. When they formed their list of the Stalinist agricultural policy, they think of Khrushchev. When they think of the Stalinist line in literature and intellectual life, they think of Zhdanov, and, after his death, of Malenkov. In short, the Stalinist leadership was also a collective leadership, with the difference that there was one man who must always be credited, could never be blamed, and who had the sometimes arbitrary and capricious and always decisive last word.

Finding all about them the general expectation of change, faced with uncertainty as to their own authority and structure of succession, anxious to prevent "confusion and panic" (as the funeral ceremonies declared), the henchmen of the dead dictator were glad to take advantage of the credit accorded to them on the theory that they were "new" men from whom a "change" could be expected. Yet one of their prime motives in cutting Stalin down to their size was to emphasize that all of them ("the Party and the Central Committee"), not Stalin alone, were the authors of the "great" policies and destinies. They even denied, and we know that they did so rightly, that Stalin was the author of "The Great Course" just published as the work of a collective and then attributed to "himself" (Volume XVI). As I we are compelled to admit that the reputation of Bolshevism rests was in the best "Stalinist" tradition.

The releasing of a few Soviet-born writers, previous toast at

banquets, less seriousness in conversation, repetition, as a rule in the self-same language, of the calculated utterances of Lenin and Stalin on "peaceful coexistence" only on the background of Soviet truculence could this be taken as something significant. And then only if we permit ourselves to forget how many times this old motif in the realization of an unchanging long-range aim has occurred before, either when internal weakness or too quick a march on the resistanceal road, or the desire to cover an offensive with a mantle of peace talk, has prompted Stalin to become a gentle, dove's-cling dove.

This is not the place to go through the long history of "peaceful coexistence" in Soviet history, variously traced back to Lenin's declaration in 1919 that if he got power he would prosecute the bourgeoisie and fight a revolutionary war, to the development of the concept of peaceful coexistence two weeks after they took power.

We desire the speediest peace on the principles of honorable coexistence and cooperation of peoples, we desire the speediest coexistence on the principle of equality, to Lenin's 1923 coexistence statement that the first reporter followed the same year by a warning to the Mensheviks, of leaders kept secret till after his death that as capitalism and socialism exist side by side we cannot but expect a revolution, to Stalin's 1922 proposal of a "proportion of responsibility" at a time when the Soviet Union was secretly trying to make a deal with the Wehrmacht. The whole sequence of the utterances from the first down to Malenkov's amiable chat with Ambassador Bollen and Congressman Wickersham while Miss were shooting down one of our planes, laid down to this side and disarm your opponents while you work unceasingly for their destruction.

Not only are all these "peace" men have so far done that would be the last programmatic utterance on foreign policy by Lenin, Stalin, or Khrushchev. Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. in 1952, in which he urged that through the "peace treaty" the socialist and democratic "people's government" perhaps develop a "movement for the overthrow of capitalism" more actively than between capitalist countries than between the Soviet and the "capitalist" worlds, and isolate the United States, and that to organize Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, and to try to reach his domination and force the world to accept his government as the dominant power.

The main theme of the program was summed up this year

by Marshal Bulganin in his speech delivered on November 7, 1947. "A collective security system in Europe," he continued, "is essential for the peace and stability of the continent." He argued that such a system would prevent any one power from dominating the continent and thus ensuring the security of all. This idea was further developed in the 1950s, particularly in the context of the Cold War. The concept of collective security was seen as a way to maintain a balance of power and prevent the outbreak of a world war. It was a central theme in the work of many international relations scholars of the time, including E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morganthau. The idea was also reflected in the structure of the United Nations, which was designed to provide a forum for the peaceful resolution of international disputes. The Security Council, in particular, was intended to be the primary organ for maintaining international peace and security. The concept of collective security has remained a central theme in international relations ever since.

to be more of a strain jacket than the First Congress held two decades ago. Furious attacks on Pomerantsev for saying the obvious thing that sincerity, honesty, to the truth of his own vision, is the chief virtue of the artist have been followed by rebukes and expulsion for magazine editors, condemnation of critics, expulsion of Stalin Prize writers from the fraternity of their craft, condemnation of all who thought there was a new "thaw." Such is the atmosphere in which is being prepared a Congress which will "systematically combat any deviations from the principles of Socialist Realism . . . any attempts to direct Soviet literature away from topical questions of the policy of the Party and Soviet State . . . any attempt to substitute a moral criterion unrelated to its specific work of time for the ideological, class-social judgments universally recognized in our literature . . . which can have no other interests but those of the people, the interest of the Soviet state."

In Stalin's last and most significant political work, "The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." published in 1952, he lays down the prerequisites for the transformation of the present "socialist" Russia into "socialist Communism." In this work is to be found literally hundreds of formulae in which Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Company are now proceeding. Here is to be found the proposal finally to increase the satisfaction of consumer demand on the basis of "priority in the production of means of production." Here is the outline of the drive to increase labor discipline on the basis of "the control over the amount of labor and the amount of consumption" until labor discipline is transformed into spontaneity itself, i.e., from an obligation into a prime necessity of life. Here, too, is the free-an-isolating America and prison-camp differences in the capitalist camp which we have already examined. The work is scrappy and fragmentary, but bears at least evidence of examining up of algebraic formulae all the traces of thought that were dictating Stalin and his close associates.

In a Stalinist style which has been described as "a mixture of the present-day Soviet Union, the American past, and the American future" and collective farm production, which is said to be "the main task of the present generation of Communist Party members now beginning to fulfill the obligations of the Party."

property to that of state or publicly owned property, and to create thus a "single and united" system. How "the formation of a single and united sector" is to be brought about "whether simply by the swallowing up of the collective-farm sector by the state sector . . . or by the setting up of a single national economic body," Stalin refuses to say. But he is emphatic that it can be done by the pressure of the "superstructure," the state, "upon the relations of production," that it can be done "without upheavals," that it represents a revolution from above, and that it must be undertaken gradually but without delay, that "it is of paramount importance for us," that in the process "the new" will not "simply destroy the old, but integrates it into it, changes its nature and function without smashing its form." Until it is accomplished, the state has not as complete control of agriculture as of industry and is hampered in its precise planning and calculations. It would be unpardonable not to see that these factors are directly damaging to better the potential development of our productive forces since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture. The way, therefore, is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public (state) property.

For this Stalin devotes more space and attention than he does to other agricultural problems. And in this, I think, we can find the theoretical foundation and the emotional force behind the drive of Khrushchev, Malenkov and the other revolution in agriculture. We know the drive to upgrade the collective farms and convert them into aggregates by the end of Stalin's lifetime, but we know that these collective-farm property to the level of public property is a transformation which contains no real function without smashing its form. Does their opposition to what they thought was the proposed program of Khrushchev explain why Beria's drive to convert the grain at day's end help explain why the grain was so short? As it is, and Bagrov, tell with Beria. And so, as the new plowing spot, people picture, many of the new farms in Kazakhstan, Siberia and other districts are not the kind of voluntary farms from the cities, but a new kind of public (state) property, a real, a real collective farm. Take any plowing movement, it has been presented with dissimulation as a fresh attempt to solve the problem of the shortage of grain and meat (cattle) created by the other revolution from

above, the collectivization drive of the thirties. Like that drive it suffers from gigantism, recklessness and lack of preparation. Like the earlier drive its shock troops come not from the farmers but from the cities. These young men and women may have no preparation for farming, but neither have they any loyalty to the collective and the private parcel or any memory of the days of individual farming. What is this mass displacement of young men and women and tractors and seeds to virgin or untilled lands but a gigantic step on the road that bypasses the *kolkhoz* and presents it with a rival in a new congeries of giant *sovkhozes* or state farms?

Of the 32,000,000 acres of virgin soil to be brought under cultivation during 1951-5, 15,500,000 acres are located in Kazakhstan. Without a word being said of it, the over 14,000 workers who have been "volunteered" into the new terrain represent one more invasion in the long war against the Asiatic steppe and its nomadic, cattle-raising, Turkic peoples. This war was not begun by the Bolsheviks but by the Tsars. But the drive for forced collectivization of the early thirties hit hardest in individual-farming Ukraine and in cattle-raising Kazakhstan. In the latter, where the nomads follow the grass on the range, the wholesale slaughter of stock reached catastrophic proportions from which, as Khinskii's reports show, Russia has not yet recovered in more than two decades. According to Khinskii, the number of cattle in the Soviet Union in 1928 was below that of 1910 (last year of the Tsars and in the midst of world war) and less than 1928 (before the collectivization drive began). But since 1928 there has been an enormous increase in population and in area so that the amount of meat, butter, milk, hides, as well as grain, per capita has frightfully diminished.

There is already a serious labor shortage on the old collective farms and a serious shortage of machines. But as in the earlier experiment in gigantism and revolution from above, everything is being thrown into the battle so that the old areas of being stripped of machines, and seed, and technicians, and hands, while the new lack drinking water, irrigation, housing and transport, food, tractors and seed. Lands are being plowed up that, as marginal if the rains are good, this year they have been good, the lands will yield. When bad years come, and it is their semi-aridity that make them *bad* rather than farm areas, they are likely to become *unplowed*. There are deep inconsistencies in the prom-

use of more meat on the one hand and the planned figures for increased cattle breeding on the other, and between both of these and the piling up of the range. But as in the collectivization drive of the early thirties, Khrushchev and Malenkov in the best of intentions are counting that there is "no fortress that the superstitious peasant tradition cannot conquer," that the "superstitious" peasants' determination cannot be broken, that they will "pave the way for the state in 'without-upheaval' love changes in" production relations. While they are in it, they hope to solve the economic problems of the country, to complete the plan for the first five-year plan in the last weeks of 1955, to complete the second five-year plan in the last weeks of 1960, to complete the third five-year plan in the last weeks of 1965, to complete the fourth five-year plan in the last weeks of 1970, to complete the fifth five-year plan in the last weeks of 1975, to complete the sixth five-year plan in the last weeks of 1980, to complete the seventh five-year plan in the last weeks of 1985, to complete the eighth five-year plan in the last weeks of 1990, to complete the ninth five-year plan in the last weeks of 1995, to complete the tenth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2000, to complete the eleventh five-year plan in the last weeks of 2005, to complete the twelfth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2010, to complete the thirteenth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2015, to complete the fourteenth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2020, to complete the fifteenth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2025, to complete the sixteenth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2030, to complete the seventeenth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2035, to complete the eighteenth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2040, to complete the nineteenth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2045, to complete the twentieth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2050, to complete the twenty-first five-year plan in the last weeks of 2055, to complete the twenty-second five-year plan in the last weeks of 2060, to complete the twenty-third five-year plan in the last weeks of 2065, to complete the twenty-fourth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2070, to complete the twenty-fifth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2075, to complete the twenty-sixth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2080, to complete the twenty-seventh five-year plan in the last weeks of 2085, to complete the twenty-eighth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2090, to complete the twenty-ninth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2095, to complete the thirtieth five-year plan in the last weeks of 2100.