

1 6 FEB 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Office of Security Clearance Policy  
Regarding Homosexuals (U)

1. This memorandum is written in response to various conversations with representatives of your Office regarding the policy of this Office with respect to the denial or revocation of a security clearance for employment with this Agency or for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) in cases involving an admitted homosexual and/or where credible evidence indicates the likelihood that an individual will engage in homosexual acts in the future. (U)

2. As a result of long-standing and documented information, we are aware that the modus operandi of hostile intelligence services includes the collection of compromising information regarding known or suspected homosexuals and the subsequent targeting of these individuals for assessment and recruitment.<sup>1</sup> In addition thereto, there are other well-documented reasons that clearly indicate that a homosexual is a security risk.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, this Office has, over the years, followed the policy which was recently described as an "automatic bar" or a "per se denial of access (to SCI or security clearance in the case of applicants for employment with this Agency) to homosexuals..."<sup>3</sup> (C)

3. We do not believe that the above referenced Justice Department memorandum is an accurate description of either our policy or our procedures in regard to the policy of this Office for the following reasons:

a. All applicants for employment or for access to SCI are investigated and appraised in accordance with what we describe as our "whole person" concept.<sup>4</sup>

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b. An investigation is not routinely terminated when allegations of homosexual conduct are developed. Rather the investigation is continued until and unless credible evidence or an admission is obtained and then that information along with all other available information bearing on the individual is appraised. A recommendation is then made for or against the granting of a clearance and/or access to SCI. (U)

4. As a result of the foregoing, we respectfully submit that we do have an articulated basis for our policy that we believe is both reasonable and necessary. Arguably, this may be regarded as an absolute bar notwithstanding the procedures referred to in paragraph three (3) above. If that position is taken, then I further submit that the basis for said policy (as set forth above and further documented in the attached paper) constitute and meet the requirements of the "rational nexus" test enunciated by the courts. (U)

[Redacted signature box]

(b)(3)

Robert W. Gambino

Attachment

1 [Redacted attachment content]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

<sup>2</sup>State Department Homosexual Study, February 1976.

<sup>3</sup>Office of the Attorney General memorandum dated 2 January 1979, with attachment, from J. Michael Kelly to Walter Elder.

<sup>4</sup>See Proposed Annex A to DCID 1/14.

HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

USE OF HOMOSEXUAL ENTRAPMENT

Numerically, few cases are actually available showing hostile foreign intelligence services utilization of homosexual entrapment and threatened compromise to attempt recruitments



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(b)(3)


The Soviet KGB defector, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, has provided information concerning several KGB recruitment cases stemming from homosexual



(b)(3)

compromise. Nosenko has detailed the use of a KGB homosexual agent team, Anatoliy Volkov and Aleksey Nikolayevich Yefremov, who were solely tasked with spotting individuals having homosexual proclivities in the foreign community in Moscow. The spotting was for the purpose of further development for homosexual entrapment/arrest by the KGB. One such case coming very close to the Agency is that of Spencer Eugene Roberts who was a staff employee/agent from February 1948 to September 1950, serving part of this period as an Agency representative in Moscow. In September 1950 Roberts resigned from the Agency, electing employment with the State Department. In February 1953 Roberts was terminated from State for admitted homosexual activity. Nosenko later advised that Roberts was of interest to the KGB for a long time and eventually, when again in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1962, Roberts was recruited by the KGB after an "arrest" involving a homosexual compromise. This KGB recruitment of Roberts was consummated in spite of Roberts' prior homosexual activity admissions to the State Department.

British national security has been heavily hit by Soviet intelligence recruitments based on homosexual compromise, a major case being that of the KGB recruitment of William John Christopher Vassall. Vassall was a British Embassy employee in Moscow from 1955 to 1957 when the recruitment took place, and at the time of his arrest for espionage in the early 1960's by the British, he was serving as a clerk in the British Admiralty. (b)(1) (b)(3)



Yet another case of homosexual compromise/recruitment is that of USAF Master Sergeant Raymond George DeChamplain, arrested by Air Force officials in Bangkok on 2 July 1971 as he was about to deliver four Top Secret documents to the KGB officer, Viktor Vladimir Mizin. After his arrest DeChamplain claimed the Soviets had gained his cooperation, along with other pressures and inducements, by threatening to expose his homosexuality.



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(b)(3)

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