

SECRET MAPOK

19 APR 1956

Chief, SE

Chief of

Albania/OBTUSE/OBTENT

Review of Albanian KUCAGE Activities During 1955
and General Plans for 1956

- Ref: A. SGAA-13393, 3 January 1955
 B. SGAA-7676, 13 December 1954
 C. SGAA-9733, 29 June 1955
 D. SGAA-10927, 16 November 1955

Action Requested: Headquarters comments.

- Synopsis:
1. In 1955 OBTUSE conducted a total of six leaflet and article raids, three raids consisting of two aircraft, making a total of nine overflights into Albania. The increased production of the print shop and the ability of the air crew to drop more leaflets in a shorter period of time resulted in an increase of 10,000 pounds of leaflets and articles dropped although there were four more flights made in 1954.
 2. Under project OBTENT, HTGURBY made four broadcasts daily over two different frequencies. The number of programs written per week varied from four in summer to two in winter. The programs concentrated on interpreting world and internal news in light of its significance and meaning to the Albanian people.
 3. In 1956 the branch will intensify the leaflet program, continue HTGURBY at perhaps a reduced level, and continue a limited mail campaign.

Account of Developments: This review of Albanian Branch KUCAGE plans and activities for 1955 and general plans for 1956 was prepared in January 1956. It has now been reviewed and approved by appropriate officers and has provided the basis for an overall review and program paper which has been forwarded separately. This dispatch is forwarded with substantially greater detail for the benefit of Headquarters staff and desk officers.

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2007

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RESENSITIZED
 per GSN 43-26

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS PLANNED FOR 1955

1. The objectives of the Albanian Branch KUCAGE program for 1955 were set forth primarily in the Albanian Country Plan (SCAA-5428 of 21 July 1954), the overall Guidance for KUCAGE Activities Against the Balkans (SCAA-7231 of 9 November 1954) and Headquarters guidance for project OBTUSE in reference B. The latter summarized the long range objectives as a two-fold effort aimed towards:

(a) The disruption of the Moscow-Tirane relationship, minimizing Albania's contribution to the Soviet position, undermining the regime and diverting Soviet attention from aggressive plans to difficulties within Albania.

(b) The promotion of conditions favorable to the eventual liberation of Albania. Under present conditions this has been interpreted as maintaining the hope of eventual liberation by evidence of continued interest of the West, encouraging a "pressure from below" type of passive resistance, and fostering Albanian nationalism.

2. The principal tasks planned for 1955 in furtherance of these objectives were set forth in reference A. In summary these included:

(a) The production and distribution by clandestine overflights of leaflets, and efforts to use international mail channels for delivery of leaflets and harassment type letters, under project OBTUSE.

(b) The preparation and transmission of clandestine radio broadcasts under project OBTUSE.

During the course of the year references C and D, transmitting the results of two reviews by Headquarters of the Albanian KUCAGE program, provided additional current and more specific task guidance towards accomplishment of our objectives. Receipt by the branch in late fall 1955 of pertinent portions of the Related Mission Directive indicated that basically our 1955 objectives and planned tasks for KUCAGE activities were consistent with the aims set forth in this document. Sub-paragraphs a and b above were in accord with Tasks 1 and 2 under Objective B, Priority I, Section III. Tasks 3 and 4, although not specifically mentioned in our plans for 1955 (reference A) were, in fact, very much a part of our overall branch program. Task 3, cross border operations for collection of information in support of KUCAGE operations, was a definite part of project OBTUSE objectives and covered in the 1955 plans report of the operation section of the Albanian Branch (14093 of 7 April 1955). Task 4, psychological exploitation of selected refugees, was and is a continuing part of our KUCAGE program, usually undertaken locally in cooperation with UNRRA, UNIS, VOA and RFE through various liaisons with those organizations.

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REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES DURING 1955

3. OUTLINE: In pursuance of the foregoing objectives, project OUTLINE conducted a total of six leaflet and article raids, three of which consisted of two aircraft, making a total of nine overflights into Albania during 1955. Attached is a summary of the OUTLINE leaflet raids for 1955 and 1954 to permit a quick comparison between the activities of those two years and our plans for 1955 contained in reference A. During the year flight cancellations due to runway repairs, the Soviet visit to Yugoslavia, poor weather conditions and elimination of some high altitude dark-of-the-moon-raids interfered with the timing of some leaflets and reduced the number of flights we had hoped for. Further, the world news developments and internal Albanian events substantially altered the planned content and production schedule for the leaflets. It will be noted, however, that in accordance with our intention it was possible to increase substantially the gross weight of leaflets dropped, even though the number of flights was reduced. The increased production of the print shop, and the ability of the covert air crew to drop more leaflets in a shorter period of time resulted in an increase of almost ten thousand pounds of leaflets and articles for 1955 over 1954. Another factor working to our advantage was the frequent bad weather prevailing over other country target areas during the moon phases, which made the covert aircraft available for OUTLINE flights. The southern and coastal areas were more heavily hit during 1955 because of the concentration of population in these areas and also because weather conditions cancelled several of our raids on the northern region of Albania.

4. Our dominant theme plans for 1955 were changed when it was soon realized that the clandestine cell instructions, united passive resistance and sabotage instruction leaflets were unrealistic at the present stage of our operations against the Albanian Communists. We were more than adequately compensated for the loss of the above themes by such propaganda bonanzas as the "fall of Malenkov," the bowing of the Soviet leaders to Tito's type of nationalistic communism, the purge of Jakova and Spahiu, and, above all, the OBACID Food Offer and its subsequent renewal, upon which we laid the major emphasis of our 1955 leaflet campaign.

5. The year 1955 marked the first in which all refugees practically unanimously called the leaflets the prime factor in keeping up the morale of the people and stated that in many cases they were the deciding factor in encouraging them to risk their lives in escaping to the Free World. An interesting example was the case of the eleven members of the Musa family who were greatly encouraged by having seen the October 1954 OUTLINE containing a picture and story of the escape of the Kamnice group in 1954. A substantial amount of information indicated that the leaflets are passed from hand to hand

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and thus obtain greater circulation than the general area of the drop zone. Several refugee reports, in one case from an actual eye witness, indicate that the article drops are also well received as evidence of Western efforts to assist the populace. Even though the Sigurimi is usually able to confiscate most of the articles, the resulting popular reaction against the Sigurimi is a positive accomplishment in our efforts to create disaffection with the Communist regime.

6. We are still faced with the problem of greater dispersion of the leaflets from the aircraft itself since tests conducted during the year over OBATLANTIS revealed the leaflets tend to remain in small bunched clusters when dropped from bags and when dropped from boxes through chutes they disperse over a very narrow area during their travel to the earth. The above phenomena possibly accounts for reports by refugees that the Sigurimi is very efficient in blocking off areas and gathering up the leaflets soon after they have fallen. For this reason during the latter part of 1955 we reduced the size of the OSMINE to 6" x 6", almost a third of its former size, in an effort to make the job of picking up the leaflets more difficult for the opposition. The average size of the special leaflets was also reduced to about 4" x 5" for the same reason.

7. Mail Campaign: In furtherance of our attempt to establish a definite mail campaign, we exchanged dispatches with other [] to enlist their aid and determine their capabilities for supporting a limited harassment type mail campaign against selected Communists in Albania. [] indicated an ability to handle up to approximately six letters monthly. We initiated a card file of potential targets which is being kept up-to-date as any information is received. In this connection we are faced with the problem that much of the CE reporting, including biographic data on Albanian targets, originates from other [] and is not available on a regular basis to [] During the year we also suggested that Headquarters might undertake an effective harassment campaign utilizing Albanian-American personalities and the apparently relatively free mail channels between the U.S. and Albania. Through the Berlin Station we made one mailing to a highly placed Communist official using a self developing S/W (when exposed to light) to carry an incriminating message. No results have been observed.

8. Further progress in the mail campaign was limited by lack of necessary intelligence and lack of personnel to devote full time needed for proper management of a specific or broader harassment program. This problem was aggravated by the fact that all of the mailings would have to be effected by dispatch communication with other stations or Headquarters. Although we had hoped that [] would be able to devote a greater portion of his time to this project, his duties as case officer for the operations section and in monitoring OBLIVIOUS activities for [] precluded this possibility.

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per GSN 43-26

9. CONTENT: During 1955 RTORUBRY under project OBTEST has been broadcasting morning, noon, late afternoon and evening over two different frequencies daily. The number of news programs written per week has varied from four in summer to two in winter, because both theory and experience have shown that the summertime is much more favorable for propagation of broadcasts into Albania. RTORUBRY has not concentrated on straight news items since VOA, BBC and other Albanian language broadcasts adequately cover this phase of propaganda. Instead, RTORUBRY has tried to interpret world news in the light of its significance and meaning for the Albanian people following the guidance of reference B. In addition RTORUBRY has attempted to concentrate on Albanian internal activities as learned from Radio Tirane, Albanian publications such as ZERI I POPULLIT (received from fairly regularly during most of 1955), and the refugee interrogations conducted by the OBTEST staff.

10. In order to avoid the disruptive effects of opposition jamming and our evasion tactics, the format of the RTORUBRY broadcasts was changed from 2 or 3 four-minute talks and instructions to the people to 10 or more very brief items and slogans. It is believed that these shorter messages are more likely to be heard in their entirety. In writing scripts the OBTEST staff tried to keep in mind our belief that the majority of our listeners are probably members of the Albanian Communist party who can afford to purchase radios and who, out of curiosity, if nothing else, are motivated to listen to us. The fact that Enver Hoxha himself, as well as Radio Tirane, have attacked RTORUBRY by name on several occasions lends credence to this feeling. Concerning the reception of RTORUBRY by the Albanian people themselves, our past monitoring and reaction reports confirm that RTORUBRY broadcasts are audible in Albania from March to October of the year. Unfortunately, we have had no recent monitoring or reaction reports covering the winter months, but it is probable that reception is not good because of propagation conditions. Although the number of radios in Albania is small, information from the regime itself and some refugees indicates their total number is increasing. It is true that refugee reports this year concerning the awareness of RTORUBRY within Albania have not been very favorable. However, it must be remembered that, whereas possibly one out of three Albanians reside in areas having radios, a much greater proportion of the refugees are from remote rural areas where few if any opportunities exist for access to a radio. Those refugees who have heard, or heard of, RTORUBRY have commented favorably on its appeal and have stated that those who can listen pass the news on to trusted friends (SOAA-17459, 10 September 1955). This, coupled with the indications that the regime is monitoring RTORUBRY, is encouraging.

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11. Great Border Operations in Support of KUCAD: Although no cross border operations were mounted for KUCAD purposes as such, the branch operations section considers its function as that of using such operations to establish assets and provide intelligence for either KUCAD, KUBARK, or KUNOOK purposes. The activities of this section under projects ORBIT, ORBITAL and ORBITANT are being reviewed in a separate report.

12. Photographic Exploitation of Selected Refugees: The Albanian desk has continually cooperated through liaison with various organizations such as VOY, WAF, BAF, WAF and other refugee resettlement organizations by providing leads and information on refugees suitable for overt press and radio exploitation. In addition, the members of the ORBIT/ORBITAL unit have prepared photographs and stories on interesting recent escapes such as the HUNGARIAN. Information on those refugees ready for the above organizations and ORBITAL. Information on those refugees about to depart for resettlement in the United States was also sent to ORBITAL for the purpose of conducting the TIRANE regime's efforts at repatriation of refugees. And, of course, both HUNGARIAN and TIRANE have been utilized for current exploitation.

SECRET ALBANIAN KUCAD AGENTS

13. Personnel: The staff personnel consists of one full time case officer, [] and one part time case officer, [] in order to replace him when he is due to return for headquarters about 29 March 1956. A separate communication to Headquarters will discuss the problem of arranging home leave for [] whose tour ends 12 July 1956. [] has tentatively agreed to extend until 30 July 1956 in an effort to help overcome this problem and provide an Albanian speaker to keep the KUCAD program going. There are three indigenous agents on the payroll with an average experience of about two years each. Two of these - ALBERT and ALBERT - expect to receive assignments of assignment to the U.S. in the near future. Under normal processing they might expect to depart for the U.S. in late summer or fall of 1956. He should be able to delay their move until at least such time as will not prejudice their opportunities for a similar assignment. The other agent, HUNGARIAN, because of his poor physical condition, can only work on a limited basis. However, the two agents who plan to go to the United States have indicated their willingness to return to work for us once they have established residence requirements in the United States. In addition, we will continue to develop leads to other individuals (possibly ALBERT) who appear qualified for the job as indigenous agent on the staff or for the contract agent not mentioned in []-2165 of 25 April 1956.

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14. Support: HOLLIBOX provides C-54 and B-26 aircraft, personnel and equipment for leaflet distribution. The print shop is currently expanding and improving its facilities so that it will be able to handle all of our requests for leaflets. The logistics branch provides trucks used in transporting leaflets from the print shop to the storage depot and to the aircraft. KUCLOB provides transmitting facilities including the simultaneous use of two 2.5 KW shortwave transmitters for approximately three hours daily and technicians for the repair and maintenance of recording and monitoring equipment.

15. Physical: A secure safehouse under NTREIGH cover which is used for PW interrogation of refugees and another safehouse used as an office for writing radio scripts, recording programs on tape and monitoring various other radio programs for PW information. KUCLOB has recording and monitoring equipment presently located at the safehouse, and also at our disposal is the recently purchased spare recording and monitoring equipment conveniently packed in small trunks for greater security in replacement and repair.

ALBANIAN KUCAGE PLANS FOR 1956

16. Objectives and Tasks for 1956: Objectives for the coming year will be geared to the requirements of the Related Mission Directive - the Mission of Section II C and the Tasks and Current Objectives of Section III B. These are substantially identical with our aims for 1955 as set forth in paragraph 2 above.

17. Several recent communications from Headquarters, particularly SCAW-10927 of 16 November 1955, have indicated that because of budgetary and personnel considerations "KUCAGE operations against Albania should be curtailed" and that such curtailment affects project COTEST. Pending receipt of more specific directives for cutting back, and in an effort to demonstrate the feasibility of pursuing our KUCAGE program in accordance with presently assigned objectives, we are basing our 1956 plans on the tasks we expect to achieve with current personnel, support and physical assets as listed above. It is our feeling that short of terminating the entire program, elimination of any portion, such as COTEST, would result in relatively minor budgetary savings and possibly no reduction in personnel.

18. COTEST: We share Headquarters views in reference D that the leaflet program should be intensified. The increasing ability of the print shop to produce more leaflets and the acquisition of a C-54 aircraft equipped for wind-drift missions will certainly help us toward our goal. However, a permanent discontinuance of the dark-of-the-moon flights over Albania might possibly more

than negate the effect of the positive factors mentioned above. The attached summary by SGLINSON of the estimated number and weight of leaflets that can be delivered into Albania during the fiscal year 1956 when extended through the calendar year is less than what was actually accomplished during 1955. In addition it should be noted that this estimate was made on the basis of continuing the dark-of-the-moon raids. These raids had the merit of avoiding competition with higher priority Rumanian and Bulgarian leaflet raids during the light-of-the-moon periods. If dark-of-the-moon raids are cut out for Albania, it is evident that leaflet deliveries may substantially decrease rather than increase unless more wind drift missions can be planned.

19. The dominant theme to be used during 1956 will be "pressure from below" as explained in paragraph 6 of [] 11156 of 16 December 1955. Naturally we will attempt to use all possible intelligence to pinpoint specific situations within Albania which can be exploited by means of a "pressure from below" type of leaflet.

20. Another topic which we hope to utilize in a major "pressure from below" campaign is the Medicine Offer described in SCAA-14179, 16 February 1955, and SCAA-15305, 30 April 1955. We hope Headquarters will soon be able to take the necessary action to initiate this project.

21. Other situations which we hope to exploit include the forced youth labor gangs; the study of the Russian language in many of the schools; lack of freedom of religion, press and assembly; the quota labor system; forced collectivization; Soviet exploitation of Albanian raw materials; etc.

22. Another objective we plan to concentrate on will be the defection of Communist Party members by helping to convince them that Communism has failed as a system, that its total destruction is inevitable and that freedom, safety and economic security await them in the Free World. We are hopeful that better cooperation from the Greek authorities and improvement in the economic aid and emigration facilities will bolster our chances for success in our appeals for defection.

23. The experience of 1955 showed that it is not feasible to try to predict the title and number of each leaflet planned to drop during the year because of changing guidance and overflight policy and news events. In general we plan to print the GREEN in a six by six inch leaflet containing the latest news on a quarterly basis. Although we recognize the value of getting the latest news to the Albanian people, we feel this type of leaflet is somewhat of a luxury in relation to the costs and risk of overflights. In addition, although refugees have commented favorably on the GREEN, few of them could remember more than one or two out of

the six or more major news items featured in any ORIENT. We definitely feel that the smaller special leaflet that has one major theme or point to make is much more effective. Consequently, we hope to be able to produce at least ten special leaflets, the majority of which will be based on "pressure from below", defection and other themes as mentioned above.

24. Since evaluations on article drops have been for the most part favorable, and also since we have over 15,000 pounds of articles as well as a number of paracutes and cans in stock, we plan to continue, and, if possible, increase our article drops. We do not plan to purchase new stocks or automatic packaging and labeling equipment this year unless there is favorable enough evaluation to warrant such expense.

25. Reaction reporting will receive greater stress not only to determine the type of distribution we are achieving but also to serve as a guide for improving the leaflets. In addition to closely interrogating every possible refugee for PW material and reaction to leaflets and radio, we plan to show selected refugees copies of our old leaflets (presumably brought by other refugees) in an attempt to obtain information on their preferences in such matters as format, print type, cartoons, and language style, as well as the theme and content. We are hopeful that Headquarters will meet with some success in its efforts to procure reaction information from the French and Italian missions in Tirane. On his visits to [] [] has urged that station to pursue this subject through its liaison and through interrogation of Italian repatriates and refugees.

26. Mail Campaign: Our plans for 1956 call for a continuation of the limited program conducted the previous year. We hope to utilize the information collected thus far on potential targets and use the services of the various [] [] named in paragraph 7 to mail for us. However, it is our feeling that any campaign will have to be largely conducted on a broad rather than specific harassment level and necessarily on a time available basis due to personnel and intelligence limitations.

27. ORIENT: In spite of the scarcity of reaction reports on the effect and popularity of HTGURBY within Albania, we feel that project ORIENT should continue, although perhaps at a reduced level, for the following reasons:

a. The direct attack on HTGURBY by Radio Tirane on 17 December 1955 and several refugee reports would seem to support the possibility that HTGURBY is both a thorn in the side of the regime and is still regularly heard by those anti-Communist Albanians who have the means to do so.

b. The number of radios inside Albania will continue to grow whereas the leaflet raids, for reasons mentioned previously, may actually decrease.

c. Monitoring reports and other intelligence available indicates that in spite of enemy jamming HTORUNNY is audible from at least the beginning of March until the end of October.

d. Since a minimum of one Psych case officer and one indigenous agent (or one contract employee) would be needed for the leaflet program, the actual additional expense for continuing HTORUNNY, with possibly fewer new programs per week, would be one additional indigenous agent at salary and expenses of not over \$2,500 per year. The safehouse would be required for the leaflet production by indigenous help and the recording and monitoring equipment with adequate spares is already on hand.

e. Even if QKIVOSY should resume broadcasts to Albania, HTORUNNY could continue with a presentation, interpretation and content which could not be done under QKIVOSY sponsorship. Or, after a brief period off the air, broadcasts could be resumed under noational or no specific attribution, or even on a blacker basis, possibly as some type of noational Communist radio.

28. Dominant themes used on HTORUNNY will continue under the general guidance of reference B. We will pursue the same topics as those mentioned under project QRTUSE except that, since most of our audience are probably Communist Party members, we will emphasize the disaffection and defection themes more than "pressure from below" and, of course, tie in these themes with external and internal news developments as they occur.

29. As mentioned under project QRTUSE, efforts to obtain more complete evaluations on HTORUNNY will be made both in our interrogations of refugees as well as by monitoring from the Bari-Brindisi areas and selected points on the Greek-Albanian border. We are also hopeful that some useful information will result from Headquarters efforts to obtain monitoring and perhaps reaction reports from the Italian and French Ministries in Albania.

30. Cross Border Operations in Support of KUCAGE: The operations section of the branch is preparing a separate review of its activities in 1955 and plans for 1956 which will discuss possible cross border operations. These missions into Albania are at this stage planned primarily for the establishment of resident support and agent assets within the country to be utilized for any purposes required by the Related Mission Directive including actual KUCAGE activity and procurement of intelligence in support of this activity.

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31. Psychological Exploitation of Selected Refugees: Through various liaisons with other agencies such as UNIS, USEP, VOA and non-official organizations such as NFE, the local press, news wire services, and voluntary resettlement agencies, we plan to continue our efforts to exploit selected refugees and whenever possible also assist in expediting their resettlement. The latter when given appropriate publicity by both overt and covert media is considered to have a very valuable effect in encouraging further defections and escapes from denied areas and in countering the present re-defection program being pursued by the Soviets and Satellites.

CONCLUSION

32. Since preparation of the foregoing report, the [] has received [] 11175 of 30 December 1955 forwarding Guidance for KUCAGE Activities. This will be a valuable aid to us in pursuing our 1956 program, providing as it does such a comprehensive roundup of PDRDOR policy and thorough analysis of KUBARK's and NE Division's responsibilities and courses of action. A preliminary review indicates that our objectives are substantially in accord with those set forth in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this paper; that our 1956 program can be developed in tune with most of the themes suggested in the courses of action for which KUBARK has responsibility in paragraph 14; but that, as Headquarters points out, many of the authorized operations in paragraph 15 are presently not feasible and cannot be incorporated into our current plans. We are definitely in accord with paragraph 18 on the value of leaflet programs and feel that for some time we have been making progress toward refinement of the leaflets themselves along the lines suggested in sub-paragraphs d(1) through d(5). Parenthetically, we suggest that the negative effects of terminating the leaflet program (sub-paragraph 18a) are in large measure applicable to HUGHESBY in the case of Albania, although admittedly a smaller proportion of the population would be affected.

33. We will appreciate Headquarters comments on this report and welcome further specific suggestions and guidance for our 1956 program. We are aware of the budgetary and personnel limitations confronting you but are hopeful that a careful re-appraisal will lead you to share our conclusions that we can and should carry out our KUCAGE program against Albania in accord with the general scope and pace set forth above.

HAL/HOO/HYOM/ctf

16 April 1956

Attachments:

2 charts

Distribution:

- 2-Wash w/atts in trip
- 1-Vital Documents w/atts
- 1-Chrome w/atts
- 1 [] w/atts
- 1-IO w/atts (2 ret)

SETTIME LEAFLET SALES 1954 AND 1955

Attachment No. 1
to SC-1-
Dated 20297

<u>Month</u>	<u>Type of Aircraft Used</u>	<u>Number of Leaflets</u>	<u>Number of Articles</u>	<u>Wt. of Leaflets</u>	<u>Wt. of Articles</u>
<u>1954</u>					
Jan	C-47	450,000	525 cans of food	1,500 lbs.	200 lbs.
Feb	C-47	30,000	—	1,000	—
March	Two C-47's	1,465,000	—	4,000	—
April	C-47	225,000	—	750	—
May	C-47	239,000	300 pkgs. of articles	750	—
June	C-47	676,000	—	2,500	—
July	C-47	300,000	—	1,000	—
Aug	C-54	1,000,000	—	3,500	—
Sept	C-54	300,000	22,000 pkgs. of articles	1,000	500
Oct	C-54	750,000	—	2,500	—
Nov	C-54	6,000,000	2,100 pkgs. of articles	5,000	125
Dec	C-54	10,100,000	1,800 pkgs. of articles	5,000	100
TOTAL	13 flights	23,350,000	25,000	28,500	950
<u>1955</u>					
Jan	C-54	7,400,000	4,500 pkgs. of articles	7,000	500
Apr	C-54	2,750,000	—	5,000	—
July	C-54 & B-26	5,050,000	—	10,000	—
Aug	C-54	1,700,000	1,000 pkgs. of articles	3,500	500
Nov	C-54 & B-26	3,500,000	2,000 pkgs. of articles	7,000	750
Dec	C-54 & B-26	4,750,000	2,000 pkgs. of articles	4,250	1,000
TOTAL	9 flights	25,150,000	9,500	36,750	2,750

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Attachment No. 2
 to SGA- 20297
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BUDGETARY ESTIMATE OF
ORTHOGE MISSIONS AND LEAFLETS FOR FISCAL 1950

Quarter	C-54		B-26		Wind Drift		Total	
	Missions	Leaflets	Missions	Leaflets	Missions	Leaflets	Missions	Leaflets
1	2	6,200,000	1	750,000	0	0	3	6,950,000
2	1	3,750,000	2	2,700,000	0	0	3	6,450,000
3	0	0	2	2,700,000	1	3,750,000	3	6,450,000
4	1	3,750,000	2	2,700,000	0	0	3	6,450,000
TOTAL	4	13,700,000	7	6,850,000	1	3,750,000	12	26,300,000

Notes: 1. The average weight load is as follows:

C-54: 5,000 lbs. (3,750,000 6" x 4" leaflets)
 B-26: 1,800 lbs. (1,350,000 6" x 4" leaflets)
 W/D: 5,000 lbs. (3,750,000 6" x 4" leaflets)

2. The total number of leaflets (26,300,000) will weigh approximately 35,000 lbs.

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 GPO: 1950 O-225