

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA _____
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. SCAW 3280
~~KAPOK 256~~

SECRET
Security Information

TO : Senior Representative,
ATTN:
FROM Chief, SE

DATE 19 NOV 1953

SUBJECT { GENERAL - OBOPUS/Intel
SPECIFIC - Security Review of WILLOW Team Operations

1. Forwarded under separate cover in split-pouch memorandum form is Headquarters' security review of WILLOW team operations, in accordance with Field Regulation 50-20.
2. It will be appreciated if you will forward your review in compliance with the above field regulation as soon as possible so that Headquarters can complete its analysis of the security of this operation.

SECRET

Chief, SE

29 October 1953
Athens: 1 w/attachments (3) (Forwarded u.s.c. as A, B, and C.)
SE-1/RJStevens/acf/672

Distribution:
STC : 1
Vital Documents : 1
SE-1 : 1
SE/EX : Dummy

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

/SE SE/EL/CE CFI/CPS
(Coordinating officer) E/CPF
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
Security Information

WASH-CIA-PRO-83E

SECRET
Security Information

Attachment A
to SGAW 3280

~~KAPOK~~ 256

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Security Review of TEAM Operations

BACKGROUND

1. TEAM infiltrated into Albania overland from northern Greece three times in 1952, and once in 1953. The primary objective of the first infiltration mission was to establish a chain of dead-drops, and that of the other missions was to service this established chain. The team was to make contact with secure Albanians who could provide information to be placed in agreed upon dead-drops.

The first infiltration mission of 14 June 1952 of three team members and one guide was considered to be successful in that TEAM was able to establish a chain of dead-drops for passing of intelligence. On its exfiltration to Greece on 9 July 1952, the team brought out with them a cousin of one of the team members because his life was in danger at the hands of the Sigurimi.

For the second infiltration mission of 25 August 1952, the team added another member to the group and replaced the first guide with another. TEAM was able to service the main pick-up point, but missed two scheduled pick-ups and exfiltrated prior to completion of the mission due to a gun battle which the team was engaged in with Albanian Communists.

On 16 October 1952, TEAM infiltrated into Albania for the third time. This was the last infiltration for the operational year of 1952. The team was able to procure PW material and operational information, and on 27 October 1952, TEAM successfully exfiltrated to Greece.

The fourth and last infiltration of TEAM took place on 5 July 1953. The team's mission was generally the same as outlined above. However, the team was to review the security of its operation and loyalty of its contacts. Upon its successful exfiltration on 26 July 1953, the team reported that Albania had increased its security controls, but that the team's contacts and operation remained secure and the team was able to pursue its mission successfully.

PERSONNEL

2. The following is a list of the personnel involved in this operation and the roles they played:

Staff -



- Chief of OBOPUS Project
- Chief of OBOPUS Field Operations
- Supported this operation; aided in recruiting and interpreting
- Supported this operation; interrogation

SECRET
Security Information

Headquarters' files do not show other names of staff personnel who participated in this operation and the part they played.

Agents -

RNORDAIN - Agent, leader. Operational clearance granted 9 April 1952.
AIRSHIP - Agent. Operational clearance granted 14 July 1952.
AIRSLACK - Agent. Operational clearance granted 26 August 1952.
AIRWORTHY - Agent. Operational clearance granted 14 July 1952.
AIRSPRAY - Guide. See past security reviews.
RNDEPLOY - Agent, guide. Operational clearance granted 7 December 1951.
RNDOSAGE - Agent. (Not used on mission - see recommendation para 21 f.)
RNDIGEST - Agent. (Not used on mission - see recommendation para 21 f.)

Listed below are members of the net inside the country:

Identity 1 - Principal agent.
Identity 2 - Sub-agent.
Identity 3 - Sub-agent.
Identity 4 - Sub-agent.
Identity 5 - Sub-agent.
Identity 6 - Cut-out.
Identity 7 - Cut-out.

Information at Headquarters reveals that RNOrdain, Airship, Airslack, Airworthy, and RNDeploy were interviewed and carriage-tested in September-October 1952; the results were fairly reliable for all agents concerned. Furthermore, there is no adverse information in Headquarters' files on the above named agents. It should be noted that Headquarters does not have sufficient information concerning the recruitment of team members to carefully analyze the security of their recruitment. In addition, it is not known where the recruits were held between the time of selection and training.

OPERATION

3. In December 1951 plans were made by the field for a 3 or 4-man quick round-trip overland mission to Korce area, to ascertain the results of BGBegood and bring out material for HTGrubby. The team, composed of leader RNOrdain, RNDeploy, RNDigest, and RNDosage, was "organized, equipped, trained, and briefed" and then sent to northern Greece on 7 January 1952, according to a field dispatch. At the frontier area the team members awaited a break in the winter weather to enable them to perform their quick round trip mission to the Korce area. However, after several unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate due to the poor weather conditions, TEAM was returned to Athens, there to await better weather conditions before mounting the mission.

However, RNDosage and RNDigest refused to continue with RNOrdain as leader. The field suggests that it was apparently caused by Albanian differences of political opinion.

SECRET
Security Information

3

Attachment A
to SGAW 3280

KAPOK 256

Other than the above related data, Headquarters' files do not show any information on the methods of selection and recruitment, training, equipment, compartmentation, safehouses used, transportation, etc.. It is requested that the field forward to Headquarters all pertinent information and background data on above, to also include information on the termination and disposal of RNDosage and RNDigest.

4. On 27 May 1952 a four-man TEAM, composed of RNOrdain, Airship, Airslack, and Airworthy, was assembled and installed at OBOPUS safehouse outside Athens. On 28 May, the team members were briefed by [] and subsequently were issued clothing and arms in preparation for their dispatch to the northern Greek border. However, on 2 June word was received that the guide assigned to TEAM by the Greek service would not be available for several days; consequently, the TEAM members were removed to Loutraki to await developments.

On 10 June, [] advised that TEAM's guide, Airspray, was again available, provided a Greek team also infiltrated with TEAM; this necessitated a withdrawal of one man from each team to keep the party to a manageable size. In accepting the offer, Airworthy was dropped from TEAM and held in Athens, to rejoin TEAM when the latter was prepared to enter Albania for the second time. It should be noted that to refuse [] offer would have meant waiting at least another month before TEAM could have been infiltrated.

Headquarters' files do not show what the guide, Airspray, was told regarding the TEAM mission and how he was selected to guide the joint teams. Furthermore, the field is requested to advise Headquarters of the relationship with Greek liaison in obtaining the guide; what facts the field has regarding the Greek team; what contact, if any, the Greek team had with TEAM members prior to the actual border crossing; and if the Greek team knew anything of TEAM's objectives or identity of TEAM's members.

On 10 June 1952, TEAM, now composed of RNOrdain, Airship, and Airslack, was returned to the safehouse outside Athens and on 11 June received final briefing from [] and []. At 0830 hours on 12 June, the three-member TEAM was delivered to the Greek service at Kastoria, northern Greek frontier area, and there awaited a favorable opportunity for infiltration into Albania. On 14 June 1952 the team crossed the border and proceeded toward their operational area, Korce-Goce-Pogradec.

5. The team's mission was: (a) to establish an intelligence network and dead-drops in the regions of Korce and Pogradec, with a base at Goce, which lies between the two regions; (b) to contact one or two trusted friends who would undertake to work as guides for the infiltration of future teams; (c) to locate a safe area in which a permanent W/T base could be established at a later date; and (d) to determine and report the results of BGBegood and BGFlume leaflet drops. After accomplishing the above, the team was to exfiltrate and later reenter Albania at 6-8 week intervals in order to bring out material collected through the intelligence network and deposited at dead-drops.

6. Training and Briefing: TEAM received instructions in firing of weapons, map reading and familiarization with HTRegale coordinate system, First Aid, use of concentrated rations, and a general review of pertinent intelligence to be collected. The team also was given survival problems with daily marches in mountainous area carrying field equipment. It is not known at Headquarters where the training took place. The team was briefed on the general situation within the country, controls,

SECRET
Security Information


permanent border fortifications, security partols, and friendly contacts. The final briefing gave special emphasis to security and procurement of documents. The team members were given a code name to be used on exfiltration, and a special code name to be used for other than team members whom the team might wish to send out. Headquarters does not know what these code names were. Furthermore, Headquarters files do not show where and when training took place, nor the names of the staff personnel that trained the men.

7. On 9 July 1952 TEAM successfully exfiltrated into Greece in good physical condition and high morale. Due to bad weather, the team members were not moved from the border area to the safehouse outside Athens until 14 July 1952. On 16 July, after being debriefed, TEAM was moved to Khalkis to rest and await the staging of their reinfiltration. Headquarters' files do not show who kept the team at the border, what cover was used to disguise its activity, and how it was transported to the safehouse.

8. The first infiltration operation was considered successful. The highlights of the first infiltration were:

- (a) The team procured OB material, newspapers, samples of currency, postage stamps, local stationery, and three rolls of film taken of subjects having propaganda value.
- (b) The team confirmed the fact that HTGrubby was audible in Korce.
- (c) The team established a chain of dead-drops for passing of intelligence.

(Diagram of Net)



Headquarters does not have sufficient information to determine the security of this net. However, from available information, it must be noted that a possibility of agent compromise does exist insofar as both Identity 3 and Identity 7 service the same dead-drop area, Mali Goces. It is requested that all available information on the net (personalities, workability, details of net arrangement) be forwarded to Headquarters. It is not clear how the net was set up; the field is advised to furnish Headquarters with specifics as to how this was done. Did the team members contact the sub-agents and cut-outs or was this done by the principal agent, Identity 1? In addition, does Identity 4 have sufficient natural cover to afford him mobility and thus service the dead-drop "2nd Mocan" without the use of cut-out Identity 6? Furthermore, it is recommended that efforts be made to obtain information on Identity 7, on whom no biographical information has been forthcoming as yet, and also to obtain more specific information on the principal agent and others of the net. Another question raised is the relationship of Identities 7 and 4 and the knowledge they may have of each other's participation in the net.

Headquarters has run traces on the network members and has received negative results. No clearances have been instituted since sufficient information is lacking on individuals of the net.

It is likewise recommended that TEAM members receive more instructions on the use of safety, danger, recognition signals and on net operation, with emphasis on security. For example, a piece of white paper placed on a tree branch by TEAM to indicate its presence in the area to TEAM's contacts, is a poor medium for obvious reasons. The limited information on the arrangement of the net indicates that consideration should be given to providing TEAM members with more basic instructions on the principles of security and net operation.

(d) TEAM brought out from Albania Identity 8, cousin of team member Airship. Subject's interrogation by [] on 16 July 1952 revealed a certain amount of information regarding activities in Shkoze and the surrounding area. In addition, subject claimed that in May 1952 he was held by Sigurimi for 27 hours and questioned on the whereabouts of his cousin Airship; the latter was expected by Sigurimi to infiltrate into Albania. Subject added however, that anyone escaping from Albania was automatically placed in the category of potential infiltrates. Identity 8 claimed that he was told by Sigurimi his life would be spared if he found Airship and made his whereabouts known to the proper authorities. He was to report to Sigurimi every 15 days. When TEAM infiltrated into Albania, subject contacted Airship and having explained his plight, asked to be taken along on the team's return trip to Greece. The [] reports show that this meeting came about in the following manner: According to Identity 8, his brother and two nephews saw several men nearby and not knowing who they were at the time, ignored them. Later in the day, they informed Identity 8 of the strangers and he immediately thought of Airship. Identity 8 then contacted Airship's brother and asked if he could arrange a meeting if Airship was in the area. The brother claimed that he knew nothing of Airship's whereabouts, but after several days instructed Identity 8 to work in a nearby field at a certain time. There Identity 8 met Airship, and having explained his plight, asked to be taken along on the team's return trip to Greece. On 17 July 1952 Identity 8 was carriage-tested and the results were favorable. Thereupon he was placed at OKDimple as a refugee. However, it was concluded that, due to his low mental calibre, subject would be of no further use to OBOPUS. It should be noted that, as a security precaution, the team was obliged to bring out the subject.

SECRET
Security Information

Attachment B
to SGAW 3280

~~SECRET~~ 256

6

It is not known whether subject is still at QKDimple and what he knows of the net in Albania.

9. RNOrdain reported that Airspray, who was hired as a guide for the mission, failed to perform his duties. Airspray refused to lead the team along the route TEAM had anticipated; when infiltration began, subject refused to lead the team across, but desired to be placed in the middle of the file. Upon crossing the Albanian border, TEAM was halted by Albanian border guards, who stated that "they were aware of the team's activity" and had no desire to hinder their journey. In the opinion of RNOrdain, this incident was a result of Airspray's refusal to cross where the team had desired. The field has not furnished an adequate analysis of this incident and Headquarters has had no explanation given it for the unusual conduct of the border guards.

10. RNOrdain was told by one of his contacts in Albania that Airwise, a member of APPLE team, upon passing through this area, had stated that he, Airwise, was sent to this area as representative of the ODYOKE and that contacts should not be made with other groups entering the country, as Airwise was captain of this area. Although Albanian mentality is appreciated at Headquarters, nevertheless we feel certain that the field will continually attempt to arrive at a common understanding with its agents, especially where it concerns questions of areas of responsibility and of ODYOKE representation.

11. TEAM was held at Khalkis up to 14 August 1952, at which time it was returned to the safehouse outside [] to be briefed and equipped for the second infiltration into Albania. The team added Airworthy on this mission and substituted RNDeploy for Airspray as guide. On 23 August 1952, TEAM was dispatched to the northern Greek border and on 25 August was infiltrated into Albania.

The primary mission of the second infiltration was to service the dead-drops established on the first trip. Other objectives were: (a) to locate a safe area for a permanent W/T base to be established at a later date; (b) to gather all information concerning Russian, Bulgarian, or other satellite military or civilian advisors, including any increase or decrease in number of advisors, any information concerning replacement of Russian by Bulgars, when, where, and in what numbers; (c) to gather all information regarding high level Soviet advisors, their actions, movements, associates, personal habits; (d) to distribute BGFlume material, to determine and report results of BGBegood and BGFlume drops; and (e) to contact trusted friends who would undertake to work as guides for the infiltration of future teams.

12. On 12 September 1952, TEAM exfiltrated to Greece intact, and on 16 September was moved to an [] safehouse for debriefing. The team was forced to exfiltrate 10 days ahead of schedule and prior to completing its work, because the security forces were alerted in Floq-Kamenik area after TEAM had a gun battle with two armed civilian volunteers on 9 September, and a similar fight with two officers on 10 September. TEAM wounded one man in each action, but the team suffered no casualties. Prior to these engagements, the team had time to service the main pick-up point, but due to the skirmishes related above, was unable to make two more pick-ups scheduled for 11 and 12 September 1952. Except for these two missing contacts, the pick-up system worked satisfactorily.

SECRET
Security Information

It is not known whether the material for the last two scheduled pick-ups was later picked up by the team on the next mission, whether it was retrieved by the sub-agents who deposited it, or whether it is missing.

The route in and out of Albania was similar to the original route used on the first infiltration of 14 June 1952. Until the team exfiltrated, the following were contacted:

- Identity 9 (Kamenice, Korce)
- Identity 10 (Kamenice, Korce)
- Identity 11 (Kamenice, Korce)
- Identity 12 (Kamenice, Korce)
- Identity 13 (Kamenice, Korce)
- Identity 14 (Ravonik)
- Identity 15 (Dresnik)
- Identity 16 (Floq)

The field has not furnished the reasons for these contacts. Traces were run on the above individuals and results were negative.

Other highlights of this second infiltration were: (a) Intelligence and P/W material was brought out; (b) A Russian Colonel, stationed in Korce, was spotted by TEAM's contacts. They learned something of his pattern of movement, for a possible abduction operation. (Note: FIG team was also instructed to determine the name of the ranking Russian official in Korce through Identity 17. FIG was also to find out if Identity 17 was capable of abducting this official and of delivering him to the Greek border.)

13. On 11 October 1952, after being briefed and equipped, the same five-man TEAM was dispatched from Athens to the northern Greek border for its third infiltration. (Headquarters' files do not show whether the team members were held in the same safehouse from 16 September to 11 October.) Due to weather conditions, the team did not infiltrate into Albania until 16 October 1952. The team's mission remained unchanged, except for the following additions: (a) to recheck information on persons who could be called upon in the event of an uprising, on the type of arms and amount of ammunition on hand, and on the availability of safe storage facilities for additional arms, ammunition, food, medicine; (b) to attempt to bring out information about the Russian Colonel spotted on the previous mission.

14. On 27 October 1952, the team exfiltrated into Greece successfully and intact. This was TEAM's last trip for the 1952 operational season. In the debriefing it was learned that the team had contacted the following:

- Identity 18 - for information and P/W material (Kamenice, Korce)
- Identity 9 - for food and information (Kamenice, Korce)
- Identity 12 - for information and P/W material (Kamenice, Korce)
- Family of team member Airworthy, for food (Voskop). Here the team left a letter for Identity 19 and Identity 20 for a contact with them. The password to be used would be "It is I, the river."
- Identity 21 - for information (Kamenice, Korce)
- Identity 22 - for information (Kamenice, Korce)

An abortive attempt was made to contact Identity 23. The field suggests that this contact was not possible; however, no explanation is given. No other information is contained in Headquarters' files on the above named agents. Headquarters ran traces on same and results were negative.

SECRET
Security Information

Attachment B
to SGAW 3280

KAPOK 256

8

The scope of the 1952 mission assigned to TEAM was limited due to the caliber of its members. However, the team did provide valuable positive operational and P/W information. The team furthermore recruited informers and established a chain of dead-drops for communication of information. It also identified an abduction possibility and a potential informer within the ranks of the Sigurimi. The team also contacted leaders who are prepared to provide a total of 70 men in the event of an insurrection. The field commented that bravery, resourcefulness, and loyalty were shown by the team members in the performance of their duties.

15. TEAM members were "sustained" on the Greek economy pending their next assignment. On 2 July 1953, the same five-man TEAM was dispatched to the northern Greek border, and on 5 July infiltrated into Albania at Gobel. The mission was generally the same as outlined above. The briefing stressed these points: (a) to gather all available information regarding teams in TEAM's general area of operation (in the hope of gaining knowledge of the fate of APPLE/3); (b) to bring out at least two bills of each denomination of local Albanian currency; (c) to acquire information on commanders, strength, location, disposition, equipment, and organization of military units; (d) to report any changes in party organization, and possibilities existing for defection; (e) to review the security of the team's operation, and loyalty of friends and contacts; (f) to report on any changes in documents, and attempt to bring out examples of various documents; (g) to turn over the new HITGrubby broadcast schedule to friends, and attempt to determine the effectiveness of the radio; (h) to acquire information on Soviet and satellite military and civilian advisors; (i) to attempt to locate a safe area for establishing W/T base.

TEAM received a short period of training consisting of PT, hiking, map reading and compass, First Aid, weapons, and agent training. The team members showed an extremely high degree of morale and interest. Again, it is not known where training took place and who conducted such training.

16. TEAM exfiltrated to Greece on 26 July 1953, and on 29 July the team was returned to Athens. In the debriefing, the team reported that security controls were being increased in Albania and that security forces were being helped by all military units and armed civilians when the need arose.

Furthermore, TEAM reported that all border units were to be alerted for six-day periods from the date a reactionary group was reported inside the country.

The following were the TEAM's contacts, and the services each provided to the team:

- Identity 24 (Kamenice) - supplied team with newspapers, food, and information.
- Identity 12 (Kamenice) - supplied team with leks, food, and information.
- Identity 22 (Kamenice) - supplied team with bread, newspapers, and information.
- Identity 25 (Kamenice) - supplied team with a newspaper and some information.
- Home of Airworthy (Voskop) - supplied team with food.
- Identity 26 (Shkoze) - supplied team with food and made contact possible with Identity 27.
- Identity 27 (Kamenice) - supplied team with information, books and made contact possible with Identity 28, a potential source of intelligence.
- Identity 29

SECRET
Security Information

Identity 30
Identity 1 - supplied team with information.
Identity 31 (Goskove) - supplied team with food and information.
Identity 32 (Accidental contact - "...subject was known to the team and it was felt that subject could be trusted not to talk")
Identity 33

Other highlights were the following: (a) the team procured examples of local currency; (b) the team brought out P/W material; (c) the team obtained a valid Identity card for study; (d) operational information was obtained which in turn will aid the FIG team, which operates close to TEAM's area. In addition, the team was able to definitely ascertain that Identity 34, the potential informer within the Sigurimi ranks that had been spotted during the third infiltration mission, was not to be trusted.

17. There is no information available at Headquarters regarding the security and mode of transportation to and from holding area, safehouse, border areas.

18. There is no information available at Headquarters regarding the security of safehouses used.

19. There is not sufficient data available at Headquarters regarding the security of TEAM's handling between missions. Furthermore, other than the fact that the team members were sustained on the Greek economy there is no information on the conditions under which they lived nor the controls maintained after their third mission and prior to their fourth.

20. There is no information available at Headquarters as to the present status and location of team members.

RECOMMENDATIONS

21. It is recommended that the field:
- a. Provide more data on the manner of agent selection and recruitment.
 - b. Make available to Headquarters information as to where recruits were held between the time of selection and training.
 - c. Provide data on the security of safehouses, holding areas, and training site for each mission.
 - d. Make available to Headquarters information on data and security of transportation used in all missions of this operation to and from holding areas, training site, border areas, and safehouses.
 - e. List all other staff personnel that have participated in the support of this operation and the role each has played.
 - f. Forward to Headquarters all pertinent information regarding plans for a round trip mission to Korce as per para 3, and information on termination and disposal of RNDosage and RNDigest.
 - g. Provide more information on the incident where TEAM was involved with Albanian border guards on its first infiltration into Albania, para 9.

- h. Provide more data on the security of the net established by TEAM and more information on personalities of the net, workability and details of net arrangement.
- i. Furnish Headquarters with information as to whether the net is still operating as shown in diagram.
- j. Give TEAM members more instructions on net operations with emphasis on net security.
- k. Provide data regarding the field's handling of TEAM between missions, controls maintained, and conditions under which the team members lived on the Greek economy.
- l. Provide data on individuals contacted during the second infiltration, re para 12, and furnish information on all internal contacts mentioned in the report, including the purpose of such contacts.
- m. Provide data regarding the security aspects of the liaison effected with the Greeks, particularly in assisting in infiltration and exfiltration of teams.
- n. Make available to Headquarters information on the present status and location of TEAM members.
- o. Furnish Headquarters with information regarding the disposition made of Identity 8, who is last reported as being at QKDimple.
- p. Furnish the desired information wherever Headquarters has indicated in the report that it has little or no information regarding various phases of the operation, in addition to those specifically noted down.

Although some of the above points of recommendation may prove to be repetitive, nonetheless, Headquarters lists them for the sake of clarity and completeness.

SECRET
Security Information

Attachment C
to SGAW 3280

~~KAPOK~~ 256

IDENTITIES:

1. Adem Zenel AGOLLI
2. Vasil SKODRA
3. Nago LERO
4. Seladin Zaim TRESOVA
5. Hasan Seit SKAMBI
6. Zhemal KAPADINI
7. Ramadan TRESOVA
8. Ali PETRIT
9. Zenel MEHMETI
10. Hysen MEHMETI
11. Besim AHMETI
12. Istref METKA
13. Cusi VANILI
14. Sabre REXHEP
15. Lazi FEMI
16. Bato ISMAILI
17. Shefqet GEGHA
18. Shefket ISLAMI
19. Alush PRIZAN
20. Hysen LUBONIA
21. Sul ASLANI
22. Halil Reza SELIMI
23. Bektash ALIU
24. Mehmet ALI
25. Shefik ASSLANI
26. Ferit PETRIT
27. Skender Mahamut SHEHU
28. Capt 2nd Class Qerim TSANO
29. Ramadan BAJRAMI
30. Qemal HOXHA
31. Gani MUHARREM
32. Sherif KALO
33. Zenel ALIU
34. Sabadin GJONOMATH

SECRET
Security Information