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SCAW-4297  
KAPOK-314

12 April 1954

ATTN:

AC/SE

OBOPUS

Security Review of FIG Team Operations

1. Forwarded under separate cover in split-pouch memorandum form is Headquarters' security review of FIG team operations, in accordance with Field Regulation 50-20.
2. It will be appreciated if you will forward your review in compliance with the above field regulation as soon as possible so that Headquarters can complete its analysis of the security of this operation.

SE/1-mal  
15 March 1954

Distribution:

- 3 w/attachments (3) (Forwarded u.s.c. as A, B, and C)
- 1 - STC w/attachments
- 1 - Vital Documents
- 2 - SE/1
- (Dummy) - SE/EX
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SGAW-4297  
KAPOK-314  
Attachment A

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Security Review of TEAM Operations

BACKGROUND

1. TEAM, composed of five members, was infiltrated overland into Albania on 23 September 1952. Its principal mission was to establish a suitable winter W/T base in the Tresova area and to contact resistance leaders in their area of operations. The TEAM was detected by an Albanian patrol shortly after infiltration and forced to retreat. Two members of the Albanian patrol were killed in the ensuing gun battle, but all members of TEAM successfully exfiltrated to Greece.

On 3 October 1952, the same five-man team successfully infiltrated into Albania and reached its operational area without mishap. TEAM was unable to find suitable quarters for the W/T set, but was able to contact various resistance leaders who placed themselves at TEAM's disposal. TEAM successfully exfiltrated on 13 November 1952, bringing out OB information and intelligence pertinent to its mission requirements.

TEAM remained inactive until August 1953 when again it was reactivated and dispatched to northern Greece for infiltration into Albania. This mission was substantially the same as the previous year's but with the following additions: a) to attempt to determine the fate of Iden<sup>1</sup> (Apple/3) and to assist in the exfiltration of Iden<sup>2</sup> (Apple/2); and b) to attempt to set up an E & E net. TEAM infiltrated overland into Albania on 10 August 1953 but was ambushed at the border two hours later. Two team members exfiltrated in good order and without mishap on the same day. On 17 August the remainder of TEAM exfiltrated with no casualties. TEAM lost one rucksack in the process of retreating to safety.

On 7 September 1953 TEAM successfully infiltrated the target area. The team renewed many of its 1952 contacts and established new ones. TEAM, however, was betrayed by one of its local contacts and was subsequently ambushed. All team members eventually managed to cross into Greece, but as a whole, in poor physical condition.

PERSONNEL

2. The following is a list of the personnel involved in this operation and the principal roles they played:

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SGAW-4297  
KAPOK-314  
Attachement B

- 2 -

Staff Personnel involved in 1952 TEAM Operation:

- Field Chief of OBOPUS project.
- Operations Officer: instructed in reporting techniques; gave security, general and final briefings.
- Assistant Operations Officer: instructed in message writing and reporting; assisted in the general briefing.
- Radio Training Officer: gave all commo instructions and commo briefing; conducted commo field problems.
- Support Officer: assisted in giving instructions in map reading, compass, field problems, and hiking, plus performing general support duties.
- Training Officer: gave instructions in map reading, compass, field hygiene, and weapons; assisted in field work.
- Support Officer: assisted in field problems; handled household support duties; assisted in equipping.
- Commo Operations Officer: conducted final commo briefing.
- Commo Operations Officer: assisted in final commo briefing.

Staff Personnel involved in 1953 TEAM Operation:

- Field Chief External Operations.
- Field Chief of OBOPUS project.
- Operations Officer: gave security and final briefing; instructed in message writing, reporting, and reception committee procedure.
- Training Officer: gave instructions in map reading, compass, first aid, hiking, field hygiene, and weapons.
- Radio Training Officer: gave all commo instructions, conducted commo field problems, and assisted in the final commo briefing.
- Training Officer: assisted in field problems and in equipping team.
- Support Officer: assisted in field problems; carried out general support functions, and was responsible for equipping the team.

- [ ] [ ] - Support Officer: assisted in weapons training and field activities; acted as conducting officer for the trip to the border.
- [ ] [ ] - Commo Operations Officer: conducted final commo briefing.
- [ ] [ ] - Commo Operations Officer: assisted in the final commo briefing.

Agents:

- AIRWISE - Agent and leader of Team. Operational clearance granted 17 July 1952.
- RNDOLLAR - Agent and W/T operator. Operational clearance granted 26 October 1950.
- AIRBRAKE - Agent. Operational clearance granted 14 Dec 1952.
- AIRBRED - Agent. Operational clearance granted 14 Nov 1952.
- AIRBORNE - Agent. Operational clearance granted 6 Oct 1952.
- AIBASH - Guide. Operational clearance granted 12 Aug 1953.
- AIRSPRAY - Guide. Operational clearance granted 20 July 1953.

a. AIRWISE was first picked up by the GREEK IS in 1949 and used by them in the THUNDERSTORM operations. Upon termination of this operation subject was allowed to move to the village of Menidhi. Subject was recommended for operations to KUBARK by RNPULOG. After local traces and headquarters checks were made, subject was allowed to live in Menidhi until called up for use in the APPLE operation as a guide. When subject returned from this operation he volunteered to lead a mission to the Maliq-Pogradec area where he believed he would be able to establish a permanent W/T base. Consequently, he was again maintained on the OBOPUS payroll while living in Menidhi until called up to act as the leader of the TEAM.

b. RNDOLLAR was a member of JBPARSON and was recruited there in 1950 by the Military Junta (Military leaders in HTNEIGH) and was sent to Wagness Estate where he received his W/T and other operational training. He was transferred to Athens in the summer of 1951 for infiltration during that operational season. When the remainder of the 1951 operations were called off due to the failure of previous teams to contact the base by radio, Subject was held in the Farm training site with about 15 or 17 other agents, most of whom were sent to JBPARSON about January 1952 until other arrangements could be made for their housing.

The Farm training site was approximately 10 miles from Athens, in the lightly populated area of Voula. The training area was approximately 125 yards long and 45 yards wide. The area was completely surrounded by a 4½ foot high wire fence (heavy duty type). The front and sides of the site were

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- 4 -

shielded by closely placed cedar trees about 30 feet in height. The enclosed area contained three houses; (1) the main house where agents were quartered; (2) a second house some 50 yards behind the first which had a garage and kitchen attached and was used by the training officers as living quarters; and (3) a third house situated about 15 yards behind the second. This house consisted of two rooms. It was used by the caretaker and his wife who were KUBARK-cleared personnel. The house was rented by [ ] who passed as a Swiss businessman who desired to use the location for himself and his friends. As far as the caretaker and his wife were concerned, the guests (agents) were Brazilian friends of [ ] who came to Greece for business and rest. At no time during the period that OBOPUS used the area did the owner visit the area without first calling [ ] friend, [ ], and being accompanied to the area by him, and only during those periods when no agents were being kept in the area. The Farm was given up upon the termination of the lease in December 1952.

In December 1951 RNDOLLAR was placed in a hotel until suitable arrangements could be made to continue his W/T training. Subject was moved to the Kifissia House #1 and was held there for his training until he was moved to the Ranch training area for his final operational training. (See section 3, Training, for a description of the Ranch area.) With respect to Kifissia House #1, it was picked in conjunction with the responsible commo training officer. The house was situated about 15 miles from Athens in a lightly populated area. The house contained a basement with three rooms and a main floor with four rooms. The basement was occupied by an elderly woman who was related in some way to the owner. Because RNDOLLAR had a good command of the Italian language he introduced himself to the woman as being an Italian. The woman was cleared by the GREEK IS. To our best knowledge she was never told of his connection with the Americans and we believe that he maintained good security throughout his stay at this house. The commo training officer also spoke Italian so it was felt that some degree of language security was maintained while training was conducted at that house. Subject was allowed to leave the area unaccompanied during those times when he was not actually studying.

c. AIRBRAKE is the brother of AIRWISE. He was originally employed by the Greeks in the THUNDERSTORM operations and was recommended by his brother for use in this operation. Subject was allowed to live at his home in Memidhi until final arrangements were made for this operation. Subject was then moved in the company of the other team members from Memidhi to the Ranch.

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- 5 -

d. AIRBRED was recommended for this operation by AIRWISE. Subject had been employed by the GREEK IS in the THUNDERSTORM operations in the 1949-1950 seasons. Subject was allowed to remain at his home from the time he was recruited until training began for the operation. Subject was then moved from the area of Menidhi to the Ranch training site.

e. AIRBORNE was recommended for this operation by AIRWISE. Subject was a former member of the THUNDERSTORM operations run during the 1949-1950 seasons. Subject lived at his home in Menidhi until called up for training in regards to this operation. Subject was then moved along with the remaining members of the team to the Ranch training site.

f. AIRBASH was first recommended for operations as a guide by AIRWISE. Subject was interviewed by [ ] and [ ]. After local traces and headquarters clearances had been received subject was hired and allowed to live in Athens until called up for this operation.

#### Training and Briefing:

3. On 12 September 1952, TEAM, composed of AIRWISE, RNDOLLAR, AIRBRAKE, AIRBRED, and AIRBORNE, was assembled and moved to the OBOPUS Ranch safe-house for training and briefing. The team members living in Menidhi were picked up at a pre-arranged spot outside the town by [ ] and transported to the Ranch site in a panel truck.

The Ranch training site was about seven miles from Athens. The area was approximately 75 yards long and 50 yards wide. It was fenced in on all sides by a heavy duty type wire. The front side was shielded by trees and bushes which rose to a height of 15 feet. In the enclosed area were three small houses; (1) a house by the main gate used to quarter the caretaker and also used as a dining room for the agents; (2) a second house about ten yards to the rear of the first house was used for classrooms and for storage of C rations and other supplies; and (3) a main house situated in the middle of the area used by the agents as sleeping quarters. The location of this house was far from ideal because several houses were near by, but it satisfied enough of the field's training requirements to justify its use. The Ranch was situated at the end of a seldom-used street which led to a small range of hills. The area behind the Ranch was used for field problems, forced marches, and as a firing area.

The field took the following steps to insure the security of the training area:

- a. Prohibited movements of agents outside the grounds unless accompanied by a training officer.

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SGAW-4297  
KAPOK-314  
Attachment B

~~SECRET~~  
- 6 -

- b. Limited the cars that entered the area.
- c. Limited the number of officers who had contact with the team.
- d. Limited the traffic to and from the training site.
- e. Briefed agents so that they were able to answer any unexpected inquiries intelligently.
- f. Had the case officer make spot checks of the training area in the evening to insure that none of the agents were outside the limits of the area.

TEAM members participated in an 8-day training course which consisted of: map and compass problems; firing, assembling and disassembling of weapons; daily marches overland in mountainous areas carrying field equipment; survival problems; first aid and field hygiene; use of concentrated rations; setting up and operating a radio set in the field and establishing contact with base; a general review of types of intelligence of particular interest to base; problems in observation and intelligence reporting; and selections of D/Z's for body and supply drops.

A general briefing was given to TEAM over a two-day period, bringing the team up to date on the present condition within Albania. Special attention was given to border crossing, since TEAM was infiltrating without a guide. The code name "TEAM" was given for use as a password only in the event of re-crossing into Greece; any runners sent out would use "TEAM SPECIAL" as code. Team members were issued identity and HINEIGH cards, using aliases. In the event no radio contact was made within 10 days, TEAM was to send runners to the base with information on drop dates and D/Z's. A Field dispatch indicated that TEAM was in excellent physical condition and morale was extremely high.

Mission

4. TEAM's mission was: (a) to establish a winter W/T base in the area of Tresova; (b) to conduct reconnaissance and determine conditions within Albania; (c) to send out intelligence by W/T; and (d) to contact resistance leaders in the area of operations. TEAM leader, AIRWISE, would attempt to contact Iden 4 to determine what assistance his Korce net could give to TEAM. Traces were run by the field on Iden 4 but no information was found in the Athens Station files. TEAM was instructed to establish radio contact with base immediately upon clearing the border area within Albania. In addition, TEAM was instructed not to remain intact throughout the winter months. The leader, W/T operator, and one other team member were to stay in the country, the remaining two members were to exfiltrate to Greece.
5. On 22 September 1952, upon completion of their training, the five-man team was moved out of the Ranch training area by means of a weapons-carrier. TEAM was delivered to the Athens airport approximately one hour before military personnel reported for work so that the loading of the aircraft could be carried out with as few people present as possible. At 0730 hours the C-47 aircraft carrying TEAM, with [ ] and [ ] as

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- 7 -

conducting officers, took off for the flight to the Kastoria airfield. The group was met at the airdrome by one of the GREEK IS border officers and a driver who escorted the group to the GREEK IS safe house outside the city limits of Kastoria. After the current border situation had been reviewed and the latest information received from the Greek border units on activity around the area of infiltration, TEAM was turned over to the GREEK IS for transportation to the border area. TEAM, accompanied by the border officer and five armed soldiers, was moved to the border outpost at Kalavichta by weapons-carrier. TEAM was held at this outpost until the hours of darkness and then allowed to make its penetration of the Albanian mainland on foot. Its immediate destination was the general area of Tresova. In addition to the Greek border officer and the five soldiers mentioned above, all of the men at the Greek border outpost were able to see the team members; however, they were not allowed to talk to them or have any contact with them whatsoever. (The security hazard that exists at the outpost is of course serious, because at times there have been men from the Greek border unit who have gone over to the Albanians. However, this has been an exception rather than the rule. It is impossible to avoid having the team come in contact with members of the border unit on overland infiltrations.).

TEAM was not accompanied by a guide during the border crossing due to the inability of GADVENT's office to supply one at this time. TEAM's journey was unhampered until three hours after the infiltration, when TEAM was detected and challenged by an Albanian patrol of unknown size in the area below Bilisht. Firing commenced immediately and lasted for an hour and a half until TEAM reached the safety of the frontier.

Immediately after the outbreak, seven vehicles were seen by the TEAM coming from Tresova, heading for the troubled area. According to a field dispatch, this fact was confirmed by Greek authorities; however, the field suggested it was unlikely that the vehicles were dispatched as a result of the outbreak, due to the large number of vehicles involved.

During the fight, although two members of the Albanian patrol were killed, TEAM suffered no serious injuries. AIRWISE suffered only minor cuts which were treated by Greek authorities. However, TEAM lost 60 per cent of its personal equipment, including the radio set. According to TEAM, the loss of the RS-5 could not have been avoided. RNDOLLAR, the W/T operator, reported that a fire grenade hit his radio bag, forcing him to throw the rucksack containing the radio and other equipment into a ditch which lay a short distance from the spot where the bag had been hit. Equipment lost in the rucksack included personal clothing, toilet articles, a rifle, writing pads, pencils, cipher pads, three batteries, cigarette, tobacco, and food. The signal plan was destroyed by the W/T operator, who tore it into small bits and dispersed it piece-meal over the exfiltration route.



- 8 -

The field suggested the following possibilities to account for the presence of an Albanian patrol: a) word leaked out that an infiltration was to be effected in the area; b) recent arrests in the general area caused Albanian authorities to increase their activities; and c) a supply depot of some type may be in the vicinity and this would possibly explain the question of vehicle movements. The field further indicated that it was significant that TEAM met opposition further inside Albania than the usual frontier zone and that the enemy used smoke and fire grenades. Use of the latter rather than fragmentation grenades may have been indicative of patrol maneuvers in the area. Furthermore, field stated that the successful exfiltration of TEAM was attributed to the quality of the team and AIRWISE's excellent leadership.

TEAMS's morale was high, the general condition was good, and the team was determined to carry on. Accordingly, TEAM was re-outfitted at Kastoria with a new set of crypto pads, crystals, RS-5 radio equipment and signal plan, all of which were rushed to northern Greece by plane on 27 September 1952. Plans were formulated with Greek authorities to reinfiltrate TEAM on or about 2 October 1952. GREEK IS participation in the operation at this stage was limited to supplying transportation to and from the border. They were not present during the debriefing or re-equipping of the team.

6. On the night of 3-4 October 1952, the same 5-member TEAM was infiltrated into Albania. On 9 October, base established W/T contact with TEAM and the latter reported that it was located beyond the border zone and was proceeding northward. Although the field had not expected that a guide would be available to TEAM at this time, AIRSPRAY served as guide, a fact which field learned after the event. AIRSPRAY had been provided by the GREEK IS after TEAM had been turned over to the latter by our case officers for infiltration support. AIRSPRAY separated from TEAM and returned to Greece, reporting back directly to the Greek border unit for whom he worked, after completing his cross-border guiding duties. Since then he has been placed by the Greeks on one of the Greek islands, ostensibly as a security risk. Actually he is believed by the field to have been so placed to prevent his working for KUBARK, inasmuch as he had expressed a desire to work exclusively for KUBARK.

Contacts were subsequently made between TEAM and base on 11 and 14 October, and TEAM indicated that it was proceeding to its area of operation where it was to set up a permanent W/T base. On 20 October, TEAM relayed a W/T message which indicated that the team was with friends and its work was progressing well.

7. TEAM exfiltrated in good order to Greece at 1400 hours 13 November 1952. TEAM was forced to exfiltrate due to the lack of suitable winter quarters for the radio installation, and also to difficulty encountered in making contacts with base.

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SCAW-4297  
KAPOK-314  
Attachment A

- 9 -

During the period 13-18 November TEAM was held at the GREEK IS safe house where they had been taken by weapons-carrier from the border. The delay in getting TEAM to Athens was due in part to delay in being notified by the GREEK IS of the team's safe arrival and secondly to weather preventing our aircraft from flying to the Kastoria airfield.

TEAM returned to Athens for debriefing on 18 November 1952.

8. Highlights of TEAM's operations:

- a. TEAM received information from one of its sources that the Albanian Government was preparing for war and that material was being moved to more defensible depots outside towns;
- b. TEAM acquired OB information;
- c. "host forces apparently made up a group which posed as a nationalist agent team and succeeded in identifying one of TEAM's bases in Krushove."

[Field monthly survey report, dated 17 November 1952.] Field is requested to clarify and forward detailed information on the above point (c.).

TEAM had 200 adherents in the Gore area, all in need of weapons and ammunition, but ready to take to the mountains or exfiltrate to Greece. TEAM was advised to prevent any mass defection, as time and weather were not right. In the debriefing, TEAM reported that its net was secure since each of the individuals listed below was contacted separately and was not informed of other contacts. The leaders were reported willing to undertake overt action within a 24 hour's notice.

TEAM reported the following contacts in Albania:

- |            |  |
|------------|--|
| Identity 5 | - employed at Maliq Sugar factory.   |
| Identity 6 | - Army captain studying in Tirana.   |
| Identity 7 | - Medical officer.   |
| " 8        | - Police captain; supplied TEAM with information.                                  |
| " 9        | - Can raise 60 men; TEAM lived at his home between 11-16 October and 1-5 November. |
| " 10       | - Can raise 17 men; supplied TEAM with food and information.                       |
| " 11       | - Can raise 16 men; aided TEAM with food.  |
| " 12       | - Can raise 35 men.  |
| " 13       | - Can raise 40 men.  |
| " 14       | - Can raise 22 men; TEAM lived at his home between 5-10 November.                  |
| " 15       | - Can raise a large unspecified group in the event of open conflict.               |

TEAM in addition reported that Identities 16, 17, 18, 19 with whom TEAM had had only indirect contact, could raise a force of men in the event of open conflict. Traces were run on all names reported by TEAM with negative results.

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KAPOK

SGAW-4297  
KAPOK-314  
Attachment B

- 10 -

All possible information on contacts was obtained during the debriefing, but in most cases TEAM members were only able to give the name of the individuals and their towns, a physical description, and some information as to what aid they had given the various team members in the past.

The field made this observation regarding TEAM's contacts, "If the loyalty of TEAM's contacts were questionable, numerous opportunities existed for them to make TEAM's presence known to the government." The field was satisfied with the performance of TEAM, the information gathered, and the established net.

At the end of the debriefing the TEAM members were released and were allowed to live in Menidhi until preparations were made to re-infiltrate the team in 1953. During this period each man was given expense money in accordance with the provision of his contract. During the periods when TEAM members were inactive they were under surveillance by the Aliens Office. In addition, they were required to be available for caseofficer visits at two prearranged periods each day.

9. By August 1953, the same 5-member TEAM was ready for re-infiltration into Albania. Its mission was to be: a) to contact resistance leaders in the area of operations; b) to conduct reconnaissance and determine conditions within the country; c) to send out intelligence by W/T; d) to attempt to establish a winter W/T base within Albania; e) to locate D/Z's for personnel and supply drops; f) to attempt to extend the net developed in 1952; and g) to attempt to set up a chain of persons from the border to the area of operations which could be used for establishment of an E & E net.

TEAM was also to attempt to determine the true fate of Identity 1 and subsequently link up with Identity 2. The latter, still operating in Albania, would then be exfiltrated through TEAM, once TEAM had established itself in its operational area. This plan was considered to be the most practicable since TEAM was to operate within contact distance of Identity 2 and TEAM leader know the leader and personnel of Identity 2.

COMMENT: Though such a plan was to be used only in the event that no other means were available to the field for making some contact with Identities 1 and 2, it would appear to have been undesirable to have instructed TEAM to attempt such contacts given the questionable operational history of Identities 1 and 2.

10. TEAM was brought to the Ranch training site in the latter part of July 1953 from its members' various places of residence and given two weeks of refresher training consisting of: map and compass problems; firing, assembling, and disassembling of weapons; marches overland in mountainous areas carrying field equipment; first aid; use of concentrated rations; setting up and operating the radio set in the field and establishing contact with base. In addition the TEAM was given a thorough review of the preparation of D/Z's for drops, setting up of reception committees, and storing of arms and equipment.

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- 11 -

TEAM members were briefed on the general conditions in their area of operations, and all essential operational information gathered by Identity 2 was disseminated to them. TEAM was cautioned against creating any uprising in its area and was informed that no derogatory propaganda should be passed out regarding other BTNEIGH teams. TEAM was briefed to collect all information regarding military units, Sigurimi, security patrols, economic conditions, general unrest among the population, identification of supply depots with exact locations, and defection possibilities. In the event that some high-level personage desired to leave the country, TEAM was instructed to break up and two members were to escort the defector. The code name for exfiltration was "TEAM" and anyone crossing as a result of contact with the team would use "TEAM SPECIAL", if unaccompanied by any team member.

11. On 12 August 1953 the same 5-member TEAM was dispatched in the same manner as in 1952 (see Section 5) to the northern Greek frontier area. TEAM infiltrated into Albania overland without a guide on the night of 16-17 August 1953. TEAM was ambushed at the border two hours later but exfiltrated without any casualties, in good order and with high morale; however, one rucksack containing non-compromising personal equipment was lost. Field is requested to forward all significant details on the ambush incident. After this aborted attempt, TEAM members were returned to the Athens area where they were debriefed by the Operations Section. New plans were formulated for the second infiltration attempt, and while waiting for the end of the moon period, TEAM was given a refresher course at the Ranch site in map, compass, physical training, first aid, message writing, reporting, and weapons.

12. TEAM left the Athens area for the border area on 4 September 1953 and was successfully infiltrated into Albania without a guide on the night of 7-8 September. The same transportation and infiltration system described in Section 5 was used. The Greek unit remained in the general area for approximately three hours to ensure that all necessary support would be afforded the team.

TEAM's contacts on this last mission, along with TEAM's comments on each contact, were as follows:

- "Many of the persons listed in Para 3 of [ ]2145".  
(i.e. many of identities 8, 13 and 15-18.)
- Identity 21 - Has linked up with Identity 22. The two men can raise a force of 60 men; the former supplied team with food and information.
- Identity 23 - Can raise 30 men.
- " 24 - Supplied TEAM with information and cooperation.
- " 25 - Village guard.

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- 12 -

- AIRBORNE's wife - Supplied TEAM with food and acted as a contact for TEAM.
- Wife of Identity 26 - Acted as a contact for TEAM.
- Identity 9 - Gave services to TEAM and information on travel.
- Identity 19 - Assisted TEAM and supplied information.
- " 27 - Leader of a 200-man force.
- " 28 - Supplied TEAM with tobacco and bread.
- " 29 - Supplied TEAM with food and lek.
- " 30 - Supplied TEAM with food.
- " 31 - Contracted for the purpose of procuring lek.
- " 32 - Of past service to TEAM.
- " 33 - Of past service to TEAM.
- " 34 - Provided food and care for AIRBRAKE during latter's illness.

Traces were run on all names of contacts reported by TEAM with negative results.

COMMENT: The procedure followed throughout the operation, i.e. of running a post-mission debriefing of TEAM for contacts made, and then running traces on same, does not seem to have been operationally desirable. If a team was sufficiently debriefed on its potential contacts before a mission, so that both field and Headquarters' traces could be run, operational security would probably be enhanced. If a team had no potential contacts, but was relying on contacts supplied by the field, this procedure, of course, would not be applicable. It is recognized also that when operational exigencies do not allow sufficient time for such traces, the operation may have to go ahead without the benefit of such CE support.

TEAM Betrayal by Identity 29 and the Ambush

13. TEAM's first contact with Identity 29 on this infiltration mission, took place on 28 September 1953. Identity 29 inquired if he and AIRSLACK's wife (AIRSLACK was a member of Identity 20) could accompany the team to Greece when the latter was ready to exfiltrate. The team's leader's reply was in the negative insofar as AIRSLACK's wife was concerned and in the positive for Identity 29 if base approved. Subject then asked if Identity 35 could be offered assistance in escaping to Greece. He further inquired if AIRSLACK was expected to return. The date for the next meeting with subject was set for 11 October.

Identity 29 had been contacted by TEAM leader during the periods when he (TEAM leader) was employed in the THUNDERSTORM operations. Identity 29 had at that time offered food and other assistance to the team and was believed to be a strong nationalist. How Identity 29 came in contact with AIRSLACK's wife is not known.

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- 13 -

According to TEAM, Identity 29 was known to Identity 9 team but to what degree is not known. With respect to Identity 29's knowledge of TEAM operations, to the field's best knowledge Identity 29 was never told anything by TEAM about other contacts or the plan of operation.

Field states that TEAM made numerous contacts and renewed many of its contacts from the 1952 operation in the Tresova area during the period of 28 September - 11 October. Between these dates, Identity 9 warned TEAM to avoid contact with Identity 29 but TEAM leader discounted the warning because of his past associations with Identity 29 as discussed above.

The planned contact with Identity 29 on 11 October did not take place due to Identity 29's failure to appear at the prearranged location.

On 13 October contact was made with Identity 29, after all security precautions had been taken. Identity 29 stated that he had spotted soldiers moving in the general area but there was no need for worry because he could see that the team held a strong position. Identity 29 also stated that he would return on 15 October. In this contact and in the subsequent 15 October contact with Identity 29, TEAM set up guards and look-outs in positions which would command the general area. In addition they arranged that one member of the team would meet Identity 29 and after blindfolding him, lead him to the area where the contact was to be made. TEAM stated during its debriefings that they were certain that no one had followed Identity 29 and throughout the conversation with him two of the team members remained on guard.

Identity 29's knowledge of the team's position was that which could have been gained by anyone through general observation. Identity 29 was allowed to set the date for the next meeting at each contact because he had to make arrangements to get transportation to Korce and then return. Although this was not the ideal way for setting up arrangements, under the circumstances the team had no alternative.

Identity 29 returned to TEAM's position at 1100 hours on 15 October. Identity 29 again assured the team it was safe in its present position, and that he would return in 3 or 4 days. Between 1200 and 1400 hours, TEAM observed trucks carrying soldiers, civilians, and police coming toward their position. Later that same day between 1700 and 1900 hours TEAM was surrounded and ambushed in the general area of Tresova. AIRBRED separated from the group and after three days wandering in the general area, was able to exfiltrate into Greece on 19 October. The remainder of TEAM was ambushed again on 20 October and AIRWISE became separated from the other three. They exfiltrated successfully on 20 October, and AIRWISE was able to cross the Greek border on 21 October.

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- 14 -

TEAM's belief was that Identity 29 was the cause of their betrayal. The field case officer believes, however, that the team's charge is based on circumstantial evidence and that if Identity 29 actually did finger TEAM, the security forces would have deployed themselves more effectively and TEAM would not have been able to escape without loss of a man.

The CASE of Guide AIRBASH

14. AIRBASH was assigned as a guide to TEAM during the latter's infiltration attempt on the night of 16-17 August 1953. Subject was assigned to TEAM upon AIRWISE's request because of AIRBASH's familiarity with the border area and team leader's feeling that a new route was desirable, thus necessitating the use of a guide. Although AIRBASH had no previous border crossing experience insofar as agent operations were concerned, he claimed to have crossed the border often prior to the war and displayed a great deal of knowledge concerning it. However, AIRBASH did not accompany the team on the infiltration attempt for the following reasons:

- a. Upon reaching the border, AIRBASH pretended not to know the proposed infiltration area.
- b. AIRBASH told TEAM, and TEAM members in their debriefing confirmed his making of the statement, that he had been promised 40 gold pounds to take the team across and since he had not received it he would not guide the team. It should be noted that all TEAM members showed no reaction in the LCFLUTTER when asked if AIRBASH made the above statement and results were favorable. On the other hand, AIRBASH reacted when questioned about the 40 pounds. (OBOPUS operations staff had only promised AIRBASH his keep when not on operations, and \$50 per month while in Albania.)
- c. AIRBASH told TEAM that if captured on his exfiltration he would tell all he knew concerning the team. When questioned as to why he would allow himself to fall into enemy hands alive, AIRBASH was unable to answer.
- d. On the night of 14 August, AIRWISE found 7-8 live rifle shells stuck in the ground. According to the field, it is common belief among many Albanians that when a man places live ammunition into the ground, he is so afraid that he would not even defend himself with a weapon. AIRWISE questioned all the team members regarding this act and it became evident that AIRBASH was the responsible party.

Following the above developments, AIRWISE left the border area and handed AIRBASH over to the Greek border unit commander at Pilcatit with a note to [ ] explaining loss of courage as the reason for AIRBASH's action.

SECRET

SGAW-4297  
Kapak-314  
Attachment B

- 15 -

AIBASH was returned to Athens with TEAM members, but was separated from them upon arrival at the Athens airfield. Subject was conducted to a detention area where he was debriefed and given an LCFLUTTER. AIBASH was left under constant guard until his final disposition because TEAM was to attempt reinfiltration at a later date. Arrangements were made with [ ] office to place AIBASH on one of the small Greek islands under the control of Greek police authorities and on 18 September AIBASH was shipped to one of the islands.

### CONCLUSIONS

15. The team was ambushed three times: (1) three hours after an attempted infiltration without guide on 22 September 1952; (2) two hours after an attempted infiltration without guide on the night of 16-17 August 1953; and (3) after one and one-half months in the country on 15 October 1953.

The first two ambushes may have been the result of accidental encounters with opposition patrols or may have been due to foreknowledge; there is no conclusive evidence. Since four of the five men were veterans of the THUNDER-STORM operations and lived in the same village when not used operationally, they could have come to the prior attention of the opposition, particularly if they had been indiscreet in their conversations. The fifth man, RNDOLLAR, had lived at the Farm with 15 to 17 agents in 1951 and thus also was well known. Both abortive black-border crossing attempts were exposed to the security hazard involved in all such attempts, i.e., prior exposure to the Greek Services and particularly to a Greek border outpost (See page 7).

However, the first ambush may also have been due to: (a) increased Albanian activity due to recent arrests in the general area, or (b) accidental encounter with patrol maneuvers in the area (deduced from the use of smoke and fire grenades rather than fragmentation grenades) (See page 8).

There are no details available with respect to the second ambush to enable a particularized discussion to be made of it. Three general comments may be applicable, however, with respect to the two ambushes:

(a) It would seem desirable, whenever feasible, to run such missions with the aid of cross-border guides.

(b) In view of the many inherent difficulties involved in a team's being able to remain unnoticed by the opposition, a two-week training period would seem insufficient and to be likely to be conducive to later insecurities. A longer training period would seem more desirable.



- 16 -

(c) with respect to the handling of agents when there is a period or several months between missions, since the principal objective naturally is to cut down the chances for the operation to be blown, it would appear desirable, despite the added costs, to remove the agents to an area where their opportunity for contacts with fellow countrymen would be eliminated as much as possible. In the case of Albanian operations, this would seem to require the removal of such agents from Athens and other Greek areas where there are Albanians to such other areas where there are no or very few Albanians, i.e., Crete, Rhodes, Mitylene, Salonika, Kavalla, Tripolis, etc. Mail and long distance telephone controls, cop-on-the-beat type observation and periodic case officer visits would continue to be among the desirable controls over the agents at such a time.

With respect to the third ambush, there is no conclusive evidence that Identity 29 was responsible for betraying the team. Although it appears probable that he was, since he was the last outsider to contact the team and had been the subject of a previous warning by Identity 9, this does not preclude an accidental encounter with an opposition patrol.

16. As stated on page 10, it would appear to have been undesirable to have instructed TEAM to contact Identity 2 given the questionable operational history of Identities 1 and 2.

17. As stated on page 12, it would appear to be desirable, when operational exigencies do not prevent, to obtain the names of, and information about, potential contacts from team members before a mission, and to run field and Headquarters traces beforehand.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

18. In addition to following, when applicable, the recommendations in paragraphs 15a, 15b, and 17 above, the field is requested:

a. To furnish Headquarters with background data on Olga Garzouni, the elderly woman who occupied Kifissia House # 1 (page 4).

b. To forward any further obtainable information regarding the reason for AIRSPRAY'S classification by the Greeks as a security risk (paragraph 6, page 8).

c. To clarify and forward detailed information on the questions raised in paragraph 8 regarding (1) the opposition group which posed as a nationalist agent team, and (2) the identification of one of the team's bases.

~~KAPOK~~  
- 17 -

d. To forward all significant details on the ambush incident during the night of 16-17 August 1953, particularly whether the patrol encountered was larger than usual or any other indications of prior disclosure of the infiltration plan (paragraph 11, page 11).

ADDENDUM

19. With respect to the surveillance of, and contact with TEAM members during their residence at Menidhi between missions from about November 1952 to July 1953, the following information is in amplification of that already given in paragraph 8, page 10.

a. The Alien's Office surveillance was a cop-on-the-beat type observation of the men's activities.

b. The requirement that the men be available at specific locations for case officer visits at two prearranged periods each day was established to provide an emergency channel of communication to them since they did not have telephones. This emergency meeting system was never used.

c. The regular meeting system consisted of the team leader's coming to Athens from Menidhi, about 15 miles away, to meet his case officer at approximately 10 day intervals. The initial contacts were made at some public meeting place and the conversations were often continued during subsequent automobile drives. At these meetings arrangements were made, when desired, for particular other team members to come to Athens for a meeting with the case officer or to be picked up at night by car on the outskirts of Menidhi for such a meeting. The emergency communication channel from the team leader to the case officer was for the former to use a public telephone to call an operational number.

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IDENTITIES

Identity	1	- APPLE/3
"	2	- APPLE/2
"	3	- APPLE TEAM
"	4	- Shefket GEGA
"	5	- Petrit AGOLLI
"	6	- Vait QERIMI, Capt.
"	7	- Colonel BASHO (fnu)
"	8	- Hysen IBRAHIM (of Korce)
"	9	- Rapush AGOLLI (of Mogan)
"	10	- Sallten HALILI (of Krushove)
"	11	- Hysen ASAN (of Kempteker)
"	12	- Marko IRAKLIU (of Zvirin)
"	13	- Tosum MANCE (of Libonik)
"	14	- Istref HISEN (of Manastire)
"	15	- Dilaver HIMETY (of Qencke)
"	16	- Harif NURIV (of Babjen)
"	17	- Ifram MUCO (of Cesina)
"	18	- Brahim DAMJANEC
"	19	- Dilaver ALI (of Zvarisht) or Dilaver Ali ZVARISHT
"	20	- WILLOW TEAM
"	21	- Elmas Ramani SOKALLARI
"	22	- Taip Tafil ZBOGI (of Zbog)

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SGAW-4297  
KAFOK-314  
Attachment C

- 10 -

IDENTITIES Cont'd

Identity	23	- Bajram BEKTASHI (of Tresova)
"	24	- Nise Koco POLENA (of Polena)
"	25	- Vasil Koco POLENA (of Polena)
"	26	- Tosun HOKHA
"	27	- Ribyan CHASMA
"	28	- Hysen Qerim SPAHUA
"	29	- Adem ZENELI
"	30	- Caush OSMANI
"	31	- Safer BEKTASH
"	32	- Shef SHAHINIT
"	33	- Xhefer KODHELIT
"	34	- Bektash Demir ZBOGI
"	35	- Mihal FURGEU