

FIEND/VALUABLE CONFERENCE

RECORD OF AGREED ACTION

The following is a record of the action required to be taken as a result of decisions mutually agreed at the FIEND/VALUABLE Conference, Minutes of which are attached.

1. Propaganda Activities

(a) "Useful Articles" (Para. 14)

C.I.A. to look at their stocks of "useful articles" to determine whether they would like any of S.I.S. stocks, if S.I.S. should for any reason not be able to drop them themselves.

(b) Leaflets (Paras. 15, 17, and 18)

Leaflets and C.I.A. News Digests to be mutually discussed in advance in Rome or Athens as appropriate, as also timings of drops.

2. N.C.F.A.

(a) Reorganisation (Paras. 19 - 24)

Messrs [] and [] to meet in Rome on 9th November, 1953 finally to agree names of proposed new Consultative Committee and to decide when and how best the N.C.F.A. should be informed of our future plans.

DOSTI to be informed of the changes 24 hours in advance of our formal notification of the N.C.F.A. The Italian and Greek authorities also to be informed of our intentions in advance, method to be decided. Every effort to be made by the Rome representatives to retain the B.K. within the re-organised Committee.

(b) Security (Para. 25)

S.I.S. not in future to inform the N.C.F.A. of the composition of their operational parties.

3. PRIZREN Committee (Para. 29)

Mutual exchange of information obtained on this Committee.

4. Intelligence (Para. 30 - 31)

Mutual exchanges of summaries of all source information on Albania on 1st May and 1st November each year, C.I.A. to prepare a summary shortly.

S.I.S. to pass C.I.A. personality information on request.

5. Hile SHLLAKU Organisation (Paras. 34-35)

Both Services to keep each other informed of developments and C.I.A. to inform S.I.S. [] of steps being taken to contact the group.

S.I.S. to inform C.I.A. of Albanian refugees arriving in the British Zone of Austria and to facilitate C.I.A. interrogation of interesting characters.

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FIEND/VALUABLE CONFERENCE

21st-22nd October, 1953

MINUTES

Present: S.I.S.

C.I.A.

Chairman

(London)
(London)
(London)
(London)

(Washington)

(Washington)

(London)
(London)

*Carding
re attendance
at this meeting*

1. [] opened the Conference by welcoming the C.I.A. representatives and apologised for the many changes of date which had prevented an earlier meeting.

I. CURRENT S.I.S./C.I.A. DIRECTIVES

2. [] outlined the 1953 directive in accordance with which S.I.S. had operated this year, its major requirements being as follows:

- (a) Intelligence gathering in conformity with briefs supplied.
- (b) Support for N.C.F.A. in collaboration with C.I.A.
- (c) Leaflet raids on the scale of approximately one every three months.

3. [] then said that the S.I.S. directive for 1954 would probably be very similar to the one given them for 1953 and that it was highly unlikely at the moment that the Foreign Office would require S.I.S. to step up their Cold War activities in Albania. The Foreign Office had recently been asked for guidance in view of the Fiend/Valuable meeting and had included the following paragraph in their reply:

"The danger is that an internal upheaval of whatsoever nature in Albania might be accompanied by the intervention either of members of the Prizren Committee or, less probably, of the National Committee for a Free Albania, either with or without invitation from within Albania itself. Intervention by either alone might be interpreted by Italy or Yugoslavia as the case may be, and perhaps by Greece, as a threat to vital national interests. Especially in view of Italy's and Yugoslavia's quarrel about Trieste we can do without another large bone of contention. The conclusion is that it would probably be better that there should be no change of regime in Albania for the present, - at least until the Trieste question has been solved. We are reasonably content with the declarations by Albania's neighbours and by Turkey and wish to avoid stirring up fresh controversies by speculation or by inviting interested parties to "discuss the Albanian problem". In other words, we favour a "go slow" policy for the time being."

4. [] said C.I.A. had no new directive in writing but that the U.S. Government's view was that Albania was an important psychological target and that efforts to detach it from the Communist orbit must not be reduced, although at the moment no para-military solution was contemplated. C.I.A. aimed at

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Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness henceforth in their Albanian operations.

5. It was agreed that the main divergence between the C.I.A. and S.I.S. policies as a result of these directives was that C.I.A. are prepared to adopt a more forward policy than that allowed S.I.S. by the Foreign Office; but it was also agreed that this divergence would not in fact be great in practice and would not affect the Services working together.

II REVIEW OF FIEND/VALUABLE 1953 INFILTRATION OPERATIONS

(a) Targets and Methods of Infiltration

6. []o said that S.I.S. had had no direct S.O. brief for this year's VALUABLE operations, but that three S.I. operations had been planned. The first party for VALONA was never formed owing to agent difficulties and the second party for TIRANA was infiltrated overland from Greece in July (LUCID I). It was not a great success and returned to Greece. Under new leadership however it was re-infiltrated in August (LUCID II) and is still in the country with W/T. The third team which was for Northern Albania was the best team yet recruited but the operation had to be abandoned owing to S.I.S. eventual inability to carry out either sea or air infiltration. The team is being kept on ice for next year. [] said S.I.S. had no teams left over in Albania from 1952.

7. [] said that C.I.A. infiltration operations had been against the same targets as previously, but had been more widespread. They aimed at establishing permanent resistance nuclei inside the country, maintaining operations towards the eventual detachment of Albania from the Communist orbit, establishing contact with high level Albanians to encourage them to defect, and gathering intelligence on the main targets. Operations had been reduced in order to send in agents of a higher quality, but it was agreed by S.I.S. and C.I.A. that on the whole the calibre of agents left much to be desired. A five man team which had been in last year was re-infiltrated in July this year and stayed in for three weeks (WILLOW to the KORCE area, mainly on a P/W brief); they re-established contacts made last year. A two man team was infiltrated in early August to SARANDE (THROTTLER) and stayed in the country three weeks. A third team, used in previous years, was infiltrated successfully and is still in the country and in W/T contact with C.I.A. (FIG to POGRADETZ area). Two teams parachuted into central Albania during the summer have not been heard of since infiltration; and a further setback occurred in the loss of an exfiltrating party which included both the leader of a team which had been operating in the MATI area for over a year and the team which had been dropped into Albania to exfiltrate this key agent.

(b) Quality of Agents

8. Both C.I.A. and S.I.S. were agreed about the low calibre of agents available for recruitment in Greece. Very few refugees from Albania are arriving in Greece and any higher calibre escapees normally do not wish to go back to live in the mountains. C.I.A. said they were encouraging teams to establish resident sources in Albania rather than suggesting any contacts they might make should come out, as the number of operations to be mounted is so limited. Leaflets might be used in order to encourage higher calibre Albanians to come out.

to say.

16. [] mentioned that a defector inducement leaflet had been dropped, so far with no success, but he hoped in the long run to get one or two Albanians in the Communist hierarchy to defect. [] agreed that this was well worth trying but experience should warn us against over-optimism. In addition to these defector leaflets C.I.A. had put out defector broadcasts over the V.O.F.A. (jamming of the programmes had started at this time, which might perhaps indicate that the appeal hit a sensitive spot).

17. C.I.A. programme for 1954 aims at a maximum of 24 Digest drops, combined with food and article drops, and up to six leaflet drops. S.I.S. for their part aim at six leaflet drops. They planned to improve the context of their leaflets, those so far used having insufficient popular appeal; pure propaganda does not seem to be going down very well and they intend to introduce more hard news. It was agreed that with proper co-ordination this would not cut across C.I.A.'s idea of a News Digest. If and when S.I.S. article drops took place they would be combined with leaflet drops. C.I.A. said that they had used leaflet drops as cover for agent dropping.

18. It was agreed that leaflets and timings of drops would be mutually discussed in advance in [] or [] as appropriate.

IV N.C.F.A.

19. It was agreed to discuss the Executive Committee position and the C.I.A. reorganisation proposal together. [] said that from the evidence available S.I.S. and C.I.A. appeared in close agreement. C.I.A. wanted to broaden and re-organise the N.C.F.A. and intended to effect certain economies. It was hoped to establish a camp in Italy to house the Albanians there and only the members of the Executive Committee should receive salaries in future, but a Consultative Committee of 30 members should be formed. Discussion then took place as to whether the Executive Committee should consist of 5 or 9 members and whether the Consultative Committee should elect the Executive Committee or whether N.C.F.A. should be presented with our joint choice of names as a fait accompli. S.I.S. expressed the view that if an ultimatum on broadening and re-organising were given the Albanians some might walk out and then there might be difficulty in maintaining a Committee at all. S.I.S. also said they would like to see the members appointed as individuals and not as party members. A sub-committee of S.I.S. and C.I.A. representatives was then set up to discuss the position further and report back with concrete proposals including agreed names. Meanwhile it was generally agreed by S.I.S. and C.I.A. that the Committee must be broadened to include representatives of the B.K.I. and KLISSURA groups. S.I.S. said that they would not like to see any notorious Quislings on the new Committee.

20. The sub-committee later reported its findings to the Conference. They had agreed, and the Conference approved, that [] and [] should meet again in Rome on November 9th when they would consider in more detail the tactics of the approach to the Albanians and finally agree the names of the Consultative Committee members to be proposed to the Albanians. Dosti in New York would be given 24 hours advance notice of the changes to be effected. Official notification would also be given to the Greeks and Italians since it was felt that both would then adopt a more benevolent attitude to the broadened Committee. Timing for this to be

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proposed by the Rome representatives!

21. The Conference also agreed that there should be a Consultative Committee of about 40 members composed as follows:-

10	members	of	the	Balli	Kombetar
10	"	"	"	Legalitet	
5	"	"	"	Said Kryeziu's party	
5	"	"	"	Klissura Group	
5	"	"	"	B.K.I.	
5	Independents				

These men to be picked as individuals and not party members, and none of them to be paid salaries.

22. An Executive Committee of 7 members to be made up as follows:-

Hasan Dosti (Chairman)	(BK)
Abas Kupi	(Leg)
Zef Pali or preferably Abas Ermenje	(BK)
Ali Klissura	(BKO)
Ndue Markagjoni	(BKI)
Muharrem Bajraktar	(Ind)
Said Kryeziu	(Agrarian)

Dosti would be a non-voting member except in case of deadlock.

23. The Executive Committee will sit in Rome, with its Chairman Dosti in New York and two secretaries one in New York (Toptani) and one in Rome (Kotta), all members of this Committee and the secretaries to be paid salaries. All other committees would be abolished as part of the C.I.A. economy campaign.

24. A discussion then took place as to which party should be given preference if members would not join the committees as laid down by C.I.A. and S.I.S. It was generally agreed that the whole of the Balli Kombetar Agrarians should be kept within the Committee if possible.

Security and Extent N.C.F.A. informed of Operations

25. There was a divergence of opinion between S.I.S. and C.I.A. on whether or not clearance was required from the N.C.F.A. before parties were infiltrated into Albania. S.I.S. had hitherto been obtaining N.C.F.A. clearance. They felt that agents like to have N.C.F.A. backing, and the details the N.C.F.A. produced on the agents' background were useful in assessing their qualities. C.I.A. maintained that the security risk of letting N.C.F.A. know beforehand was too great and they had been successfully operating without N.C.F.A. clearance and would continue to do so. After discussion it was agreed that S.I.S. would in future also follow this line. A suggestion was made that the Committee should be told after the agents had gone in, but was turned down on the grounds that the agents' operating area could easily be deduced by the N.C.F.A. from their knowledge of their background, and leakage could spell disaster. The question was then raised of whether not telling the Committee of our operations would worsen our relations with them, but this was thought to be solved by the fact that in the new re-organisation there will be no Military Junta.

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Review of N.C.F.A. Activities

26. [] reviewed N.C.F.A. activities in Rome and said they could be divided into two categories:

- (i) Psychological Warfare, which covered leaflets, the News Digest (which though not actually printed was edited in Rome), news bulletins and the monitoring station in Bari; he mentioned trouble with jamming of V.O.F.A. which C.I.A. technicians believed might be coming from Bulgaria.
- (ii) The N.C.F.A. itself, which sends representatives to U.N. meetings on Slave Labour Camps and to the "Free Jurists" gatherings.

27. [] said there was excellent co-operation between [] and himself in Rome. [] agreed and said there was nothing to add from his side.

V PRIZREN COMMITTEE

28. [] said that when the Committee was first set up C.I.A. had been extremely interested, but from later information from both S.I.S. and C.I.A. sources it turned out that the Committee is completely under Yugoslav domination and is mainly used as a cover for U.D.B. agent operations into Albania. There are very few prominent Albanian names on the Prizren Committee and C.I.A. felt that if a change of government in Albania were effected, Yugoslavia, through the Committee, would try to set up a government on Titoist lines. [] said he was in agreement with the C.I.A. view. He said that although there had been a tentative approach from the Prizren Committee to the N.C.F.A. he considered it would be a long time before anything concrete materialised and certainly not till there was an improvement in Yugoslav/Italian relations.

antecedent?

29. S.I.S. and C.I.A. were in general agreement over their attitude to the Committee and on the fact that the Trieste situation at present prevented the establishment of liaison between it and the N.C.F.A. S.I.S. was making a study of the Committee and would pass it to C.I.A. as soon as it was complete. C.I.A. in return agreed to pass any further information they got on the Committee to S.I.S.

VI INTELLIGENCE

30. [] said that from time to time in the past S.I.S. had summarized all their source information on Albania and passed it to C.I.A. and that he would be grateful if C.I.A. could reciprocate. [] agreed to this. It was agreed that this should be done on a six monthly basis, on 1st November and 1st May each year. As S.I.S. had passed a report of this kind to C.I.A. last week they would not produce anything further till next May, but C.I.A. would start working on their November summary at once.

31. [] asked if it were possible for S.I.S. to give them personality information. [] agreed to do this.

VII HILE SHLLAKU ORGANISATION

32. [] gave C.I.A.'s views on this organisation. He said they were still in doubt as to whether this organisation existed and certainly as to whether it really was 35,000 strong. They had tried to make contact, had flown over an island rendez-vous in August when no recognition signals were received and again in September when they saw fires. They are exploring further, as they feel if this organisation does exist it would be potentially of great value. [] explained that now S.I.S. were in possession of all the known facts concerning the SHLLAKU organisation they had modified their initial views and felt that the group might well exist and might well wish to put itself at the disposal of the Free West. Since, however, the very size (alleged) of the organisation made it a potential threat to the TIRANA Government and since Yugoslavian interests were also involved, S.I.S. asked that future C.I.A. moves should be discussed in advance with S.I.S. []

33. [] said that there were only three Albanian refugees who appeared to know anything about the organisation. KORCA, who was a close friend of Hile SHLLAKU, disclosed that he had been sent out by SHLLAKU to make contact with the West [] thought that there was every chance that such an organisation did exist in fairly large numbers, anyway 15,000 or 20,000. SHLLAKU had been a Gendarmerie officer before and during the war and travelled a lot round the mountains where he would have made many contacts. He was later arrested and escaped again to the mountains, so he was in a position to be in touch with many chiefs in the northwest and as far south as Tirana. [] said from what he had heard the organisation would still be intact as it was worked in water-tight groups. According to KORCA they have no arms at the moment, though they thought they would get them from the Yugoslavs, and an actual Yugoslav coup had been prepared for this year but had been called off.

34. [] said that both sides had only reached the exploratory stage at the moment and we must find out all the facts possible. He asked C.I.A. to keep S.I.S. informed of anything they heard on the subject. S.I.S. were of course required to keep the F.O. informed, as this organisation might be a major political factor in the Albanian situation in future. [] agreed that C.I.A. would keep S.I.S. informed.

35. [] asked if S.I.S. would keep C.I.A. informed of any Albanian refugees who come out from Yugoslavia into the British Zone of Austria as they might have information on the SHLLAKU organisation. [] said that he would brief the S.I.S. office in Vienna to do this as far as possible. [] then asked if C.I.A. could send an interrogator if a likely looking refugee came out. This was also agreed. [] summed up by saying that this appeared to be an operation of potential political importance and significance and S.I.S. and C.I.A. should keep each other fully informed of any developments, confirming or refuting the existence of such a resistance group.

VIII FUTURE OPERATIONS (1954)

36. [] said that as far as S.I.S. were concerned they had only one firm operation planned for 1954; the team for Northern Albania which had been cancelled this year. The party

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had useful looking contacts in the North and it was proposed to put them in by air in June. He was not aiming at putting in more than a couple of other teams and had not yet looked into the intelligence priorities so did not know which areas particularly wanted covering. Difficulty was being experienced with operators of the right calibre. Some left over from past operations were willing to go again, but in most cases they were blown and the recruiting position in Greece was poor, as already mentioned.

37. [] said that in view of the interest their Government expressed in Albania they were going to continue operations at the same tempo as before, their main interests being information on the Hile SHLLAKU organisation and the hope of a high level defection. He did not detail the number of operations planned. Later [] said C.I.A. expected to have a boat available for operations into Albania and asked if S.I.S. had found it necessary for sea infiltration to use agents with a knowledge of the coast. [] said S.I.S. had previously managed successfully with agents having no special knowledge of the coast. S.I.S. did not think that they would be mounting sea infiltration operations in 1954.

38. [] said that he had heard from returning agents that they were not well received in the countryside and put forward the opinion that it was not worth sending them in unless they had some definite intelligence target.

IX DISPOSAL PROBLEMS

39. [] said that most of our agents for disposal were still in the U.K. but one or two had gone to the U.S.A. Now the Home Office would not allow any more into this country. [] asked C.I.A. if they could help over the U.S.A. visa problem. [] said he would look into the matter but he was afraid there would be little he could do as the authorities always insisted that immigrants should wait their turn. [] outlined the various disposal channels used by C.I.A. [] World Council of Churches; P.E.P; a farming scheme in France; South America; Canada. They had not really found any real difficulty in disposing of them. He mentioned that the U.S. Army were taking in 12,500 refugees from satellite countries between the ages of 18-35 as long as they were single, physically fit and answered the security requirements. [] said the main trouble for S.I.S. was that their disposal cases were not fit. [] said we could not reach a policy decision on this now but suggested that those concerned might consult together during the next two days and pool their ideas.

X CONCLUSION

40. At the close of the meeting both sides expressed their satisfaction at the general agreement which had been reached.

III REVIEW OF 1953 LEAFLET RAIDS AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

(a) Frequency of Future Raids.

9. [] told the meeting that S.I.S. had been carrying out leaflet raids on the scale of one every three months; March August and early October, approximately half a million leaflets each time.

10. S.I.S. had used one aircraft in March, two in August and one again in October. F.O. directive forbade S.I.S. to fly over A.A. defended areas but by taking stock of the wind direction S.I.S. had managed to get the leaflets over TIRANA and other towns in March, towns throughout the country in August and in October villages and roads in the North. Leaflets had been prepared in Rome. The question then arose of whether to concentrate on towns, where the leaflets might be picked up by the Security Forces before the population had time to read them, or on villages. It was felt that no hard and fast decision could be made.

11. [] asked if S.I.S. were considering stepping up their raids. [] replied that he thought next year S.I.S. would probably aim at six. They did not think it advisable to do more as they were afraid of working up the spirit of resistance too much when there was no hope at the present of liberation for the country.

12. [] said that C.I.A. had carried out four leaflet raids this year, March, July, August and September, averaging half a million leaflets each time. They had covered more or less all Albania, but had not concentrated on larger towns so much as on town outskirts and highways. C.I.A. planned next year to continue publication of the News Digest, which would be dropped at least monthly and if possible twice a month. It was generally agreed that such news publications probably did more good than purely propaganda or incitement.

(b) Article and Food Drops

13. The S.I.S. view was that food drops laid us open to charges of bacteriological warfare and were therefore not worth carrying out. C.I.A. held that proper instructions sent with the containers and careful packing should help to avoid this and they proposed to resume food drops until small existing stocks in Athens were exhausted, after which time the position would be reviewed.

14. Article drops were agreed by S.I.S. and C.I.A. as useful, though S.I.S. were unable yet to say whether policy clearance would be forthcoming. S.I.S. offered C.I.A. some of their stocks for next year, if available and if for policy reasons they were unable to drop them themselves. C.I.A. thanked them and said they would look into their own stock position.

(c) Future Content of Propaganda Material

15. C.I.A. are setting up their own printing press in Athens for both the News Digest and leaflets. This material would in future be discussed with the S.I.S. [] C.I.A. would welcome S.I.S. suggestions for the News Digest. In addition they propose to make propaganda leaflet drops alternating with S.I.S. and also hoped to put out special leaflets to cover any sudden incident or special emergency, these to be printed and dropped as quickly as possible. C.I.A. said they did not intend to drop leaflets just because they were scheduled to do so, but only if they had something of interest

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X CONCLUSION

40. At the close of the meeting both sides expressed their satisfaction at the general agreement which had been reached and looked forward to continuing close co-operation in 1954. C.I.A. expressed their appreciation of the very cordial reception they had received and of the friendly atmosphere which characterised the talks.

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