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SECURITY INFORMATION

1220-CLEWU

18 March 1952

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Minutes - BGFIEND

TO: CHIEF, DYCluck
Washington, D. C.

INFO: Chief, DYCluck

ATTN: []

REFERENCE: LOND-1894

Forwarded under separate cover are Minutes of the
Fiend/Valuable Meeting held in London 12-13 March 1952.

Attachment (s.c.)
Washington - Copies No. 1 and No. 2
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A G E N D A .

- A. Agree interpretation of 1952 Foreign Office and State Department Directives.
- B. Discuss FIEND/VALUABLE programme in light of A.
 - (i) Support of Committee.
 - (ii) Propaganda.
 - (iii) Operations.
- C. C.I.A./S.I.S. attitude to individual political parties both within and outside the Committee.
- D. Broadening of Committee and formation of sub-committees.
- E. Operational co-ordination in Athens.
- F. Division of responsibility for leaflet and article drops as also proposed system for numbering leaflets.
- G. FIEND/VALUABLE attitude towards Italians and position of Rome representatives.
- H. Economic Warfare.
- I. Attitude towards Yugoslav Committee.
- J. Progress Report by C.I.A. on Rome defection.
- K. Long-term planning and considerations.
- L. Discussion of any mutual points of divergence.

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LONDON MARCH CONFERENCE

C.I.A./S.I.S. (FIEND/VALUABLE).

Present:- S.I.S.

C.I.A.

Observers

1. It was generally agreed that the meeting should confine itself to any policy matters which appeared to need clarification and that detailed operational matters should be discussed either in Athens or outside the framework of this conference.

A. Interpretation of State Department and Foreign Office Directives.

2. S.I.S. thought that the main cause of apparent divergences of opinion between FIEND/VALUABLE during the past few months could be attributed to differences in interpretation of directives received from their respective masters.
3. A comparison of the two directives was then made, and while they were found substantially the same, it was evident that there was a slight difference in interpretation.

VALUABLE considered that they were not permitted to hold out any further hope of liberation in the minds of either the N.C.F.A. or the people of Albania. This did not mean that the ultimate aim of liberation had been abandoned, but the Foreign Office had ordered the holding of the status quo until the position had been reviewed again at the end of 1952. In view of this, S.I.S. considered that it would be bad policy to continue to stress the idea of liberation when there appeared to be no immediate prospect of this since such a policy would inevitably lead to eventual disillusionment and apathy

apathy on the part of the Albanians.

4. FIEND, on the other hand, while wishing to maintain the status quo during 1952, were directed by the State Department to continue to foster the idea of liberation provided they did not precipitate events of a revolutionary nature before it is considered desirable to develop such a situation.
5. They were instructed to harrass the present regime in so far as possible without danger of reprisals upon the population.
6. It was agreed on both sides that the different interpretation of directives was a matter of the degree of momentary emphasis and timing. This had led within the last two or three months to suspicions on the part of the British that the Americans were attempting to forge on too fast, while the Americans felt that the British were unnecessarily trying to restrain FIEND activities.
7. Discussion had shown that there was no basic difference, and no substantial re-orientation of British policy. S.I.S. stated that VALUABLE had hoped for a more aggressive policy on the part of the Foreign Office, and would reconsider the situation when matters came up for review at the end of this year. The better intelligence which it was hoped to gather this year would, it was felt, strengthen the argument for a more active policy.
8. European Movement.
S.I.S. confirmed that they in no way sponsored, or had any connection with the European Movement. Mr. MacMillan's appearance at the recent E.E.C. held in London was, if anything, an embarrassment to H.M.G.

B. FIEND/VALUABLE Programme.

(iii) Operational Engagement.

9. In reply to C.I.A.'s question as to whether there was any other basic principle in CIA/SIS relationship which gave cause for concern, S.I.S. raised the question of the degree of operational engagement. At the time of the Wisner talks S.I.S. had prepared a paper advocating a much closer operational engagement. S.I.S. held that owing to the size of the country, the meagre agent resources, and the few high grade contacts within the country itself, far closer operation co-operation was necessary if we are to avoid duplication of effort and unfortunate overlapping in the field.
10. C.I.A. stated that a reply to S.I.S.'s paper would shortly be handed to their representative in Washington. C.I.A. felt that the present degree of engagement was fully adequate to safeguard each other's interests. As regards O.S.O. operations, S.I.S. would be informed of O.S.O. operations in general terms, adequate to ensure against clashes. S.I.S. did not consider present arrangements satisfactory, and stated that they were willing to put all their cards on the table, and that it was up to C.I.A. to determine the degree of engagement to be enforced.
11. S.I.S. stated that in the past they had made available to O.F.C. all intelligence covered on Albania, whether it be the result of VALUABLE operations, or from other sources. Until recently FIEND had only reciprocated with the somewhat meagre intelligence obtained from their own operations. C.I.A. confirmed that in future they hoped to give S.I.S. a digest of all C.I.A. intelligence on Albania. 598685

12. After further discussion, it was agreed that areas, dates, and operational intentions would be disclosed in general terms in Athens, but should this disclosure reveal the chances of a clash in the field, then sufficient details would have to be exchanged to eliminate this danger.

(ii) Propaganda.

(a) Leaflets and Article Scatter.

13. It was clear that there was a difference of opinion as to the number of flights which should be made over Albanian territory.

14. S.I.S. said that the agreed minutes of the Rome Conference implied that there should only be seven to eight leaflet raids during 1952, but did not set any limit to the number of article scatter raids.

15. Despite the impression given it was, however, the Foreign Office policy that the number of flights over the country should not be stepped up, be these for leaflet or article scatter purposes.

16. C.I.A. confirmed that they on their side were not limited in this respect, and were empowered to carry out as many article scatter raids over and above the leaflet raids as they felt were prudent.

17. C.I.A. pointed out that FIEND and VALUABLE had no evidence of any sort that the Albanian people judged the degree of Western support by the mere number of flights made. In any case article scattering could hardly be taken as a sign of more aggressive Western policy.

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18. S.I.S. stated that in the light of the American attitude he would take up this point again with the Foreign Office in an attempt to get Foreign Office thinking in line with State Department.

(b) Control of Propaganda.

19. A misunderstanding that S.I.S. wished to take the control and vetting of day-to-day propaganda activities out of the hands of their Rome representative was cleared up. S.I.S. H.Q. in no way wanted to interfere in day-to-day propaganda control; all that was suggested was a system of identification of individual leaflets and propaganda themes. This would enable everyone to know which pamphlets were being referred to in any particular instance.

20. C.I.A. confirmed that such a system had now been introduced to the satisfaction of all concerned.

C. C.I.A./S.I.S. attitude to individual political parties both within and outside the Committee.

21. C.I.A. and S.I.S. agreed that their attitude to the Committee was basically to treat the Committee as a whole, and not to deal individually with any one particular party, and to avoid showing favour to any party at the expense of another.

22. After some discussion it was also agreed in fact, if not in theory, that attention should be paid to the utterances and desires of any party in accordance with the power and efficacy of that party both inside and outside Albania. Thus proposals emanating from the Legalitet or Ballekombetar should carry more weight than one put forward by the Agrarians.

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23. This did not mean that the basic principles of democracy should be overruled, or that the opinions of any one party should not receive fair attention.
24. It was further agreed that the maintenance of the N.C.F.A. in being is of primary importance, and that no attempt should be made to force the Committee unwillingly to include other parties unless there is good reason to suppose that such inclusion should strengthen the power of the Committee as a whole, and widen its influence in Albania.
25. S.I.S. stated that they saw no Albanian influence outside the Committee which conformed to these latter requirements.
26. C.I.A., on the other hand, could not associate with this opinion. They held the view that both the B.K.I. and Klissura group held within their ranks personalities who had significant following in Albania, and they considered ~~significant~~ that such individuals should in some way or another be represented on the N.C.F.A. This representation should not imply party representation.
27. C.I.A. stated that while their attitude was to some extent influenced by O.S.O's past operational liaison with the B.K.I., their main reason for wishing to broaden the Committee was a genuine desire to tap what they thought considerable potential support within the country. S.I.S. were not convinced that the B.K.I. and Klissura enjoyed any great degree of support within Albania, but it was admitted on both sides that the lack of intelligence on such matters was a serious stumbling block on reaching agreement. They further feared that the collaborationist record of the B.K.I. provided Tirana Radio with first-class propaganda material for smearing the N.C.F.A. as a whole.

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28. C.I.A. felt that Tirana Radio could not go further than it had done already in abusing the N.C.F.A., and considered that it was wrong to flog the dead cat of Fascism when the live tiger of Communism was rampant abroad today.
29. In order to gain B.K.I. support within the country C.I.A. put forward the name of Ndue Markogjoni as a candidate member of the Committee. They consider that his name would serve as a rallying point for B.K.I. supporters, while he himself has never actively been tarred with the B.K.I. association.
30. S.I.S. stated that they did not actively object to him, their main point was, as always, that any attempt to broaden the Committee should not precipitate the walking out of either of the two main parties.
31. C.I.A. stated that they hoped shortly to produce evidence of the support enjoyed by the B.K.I. and Klissura with which to satisfy S.I.S. on this question.
32. S.I.S. were of the opinion that neither C.I.A. nor S.I.S. should indulge in activities with Albanian groups outside the framework of the Committee.
33. C.I.A. could not agree to this, although they stressed that any contact with groups outside the Committee would be on an operational plane for intelligence purposes only.
34. S.I.S. considered that any operational co-operation was inevitably taken by Albanians to imply political support as well.
35. S.I.S. stated that they would reserve the right to employ any individual Albanian not represented on the Committee, but would never treat with groups outside the N.C.F.A.

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D. Broadening of the Committee and formation of sub-committees.

36. S.I.S. stated that their views had not changed since the Rome meeting and that they were still of the opinion that the "closed shop" policy of the Executive Committee should be broken. It was only a question of method.
37. C.I.A. then proposed to the conference a re-organisation scheme for the Committee: the introduction of an administrative committee between the general committee and the four sub-committees.
38. S.I.S. stated that they were not in agreement with this proposal which they felt was far too complicated. Their attitude was that in any case it would be a difficult task to bring about a change, and that therefore we should keep our proposals as simple as possible. S.I.S. put forward a counter proposal whereby the executive committee and general committee were merged to form one committee consisting of about 10-12 members and be known as the National Committee for Free Albania. Four sub-committees, namely, Plans Committee, Propaganda Committee, Recruitment Committee and Civil Affairs and Welfare Committee. S.I.S. stated that they would despatch to their representative in Rome during the following week, a full description of the functions of these committees as they envisaged them. This proposal would be a subject for discussion between the FIEND/VALUABLE representatives.
39. C.I.A. accepted the simpler committee organisation as proposed by S.I.S.

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40. It was agreed that the FIEND/VALUABLE Rome representatives should attempt to broaden the Committee on their own. Should serious difficulties be encountered, representatives would be despatched from Washington and London.
41. It was further agreed that the Rome representatives should if they considered it necessary, be in a position to call a staff meeting of the four chairmen of the above-mentioned sub-committees.
42. It was also agreed that an attempt should be made to rotate the chairmanship of these committees to avoid the power remaining continuously in the hands of one particular party.

E. Operational Co-ordination in Athens.

43. C.I.A. stated that their Maison with S.I.S. in Athens was on a friendly and efficient basis and that they were entirely satisfied. S.I.S. noted this fact with gratitude.

F. Division of responsibility for leaflet and article drops as also proposed system for numbering leaflets.

44. Detailed discussions on this point are contained in para.B(ii).

G. FIEND/VALUABLE attitude towards Italians and position of Rome representatives.

45. S.I.S. outlined their attitude towards the Italians, namely, that they wish to remain on friendly terms with them and if possible to enter into closer collaboration. On the other hand, with the exception of the provision of intelligence, they saw no way in which the Italians could be of service to FIEND/VALUABLE.

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46. C.I.A. asked whether S.I.S. had any intention of collaborating so far with the Italians that they would be brought into any partnership with regard to our activities in Albania.
47. S.I.S. stated that this was definitely not their intention.
48. C.I.A.'s explanation of their relationship with the Italians was very much in conformity with that of S.I.S. C.I.A. felt that Albania's immediate neighbours, namely, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia, would inevitably play a role with regard to the future of that country and hoped that S.I.S. would join with them in their endeavours to bring this fact to the notice of the State Department and the Foreign Office in order that in the first place the Italians and Greeks, and secondly the Yugoslavs, might be made aware of Anglo-American policy regarding the independence of Albania.
49. It was mutually agreed that this was a matter which could only be dealt with by the State Department and Foreign Office, but that S.I.S. would certainly support the C.I.A. proposal.
50. C.I.A. expressed fears regarding the proposed change in status of the VALUABLE representative in Rome. S.I.S. explained to them that no change in status vis-a-vis the Albanians or other outside elements was contemplated. The S.I.S. proposal to enable [] to enjoy the working facilities afforded by the Embassy, was an internal tradecraft arrangement which in no way affected his status.
51. C.I.A. stated that their fears on this matter had been allayed by the S.I.S. explanation.

52. C.I.A. stated that they saw no danger of O.S.O. collaborating with the Italians causing embarrassment to FIEND/VALUABLE.

H. Economic Warfare.

53. C.I.A. stated that they had accomplished nothing so far in their economic action against Albania but they hoped through the propaganda medium and also through action in Trieste that something might be done.

54. S.I.S. stated that they remained of the opinion that the paucity of Albanian external trade did not merit the effort which would have to be put into any economic action. S.I.S. also stated that they had recently reviewed the Albanian economy and had produced a paper on the subject. At C.I.A.'s request they promised to let them have a copy of their memorandum.

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I. Attitude towards Yugoslav Committee.

55. A general review of the activities of this Committee was carried out. S.I.S. stated that recent interrogations had revealed that the Yugoslavs were treating the Albanian minority generously.

Furthermore, that there had been no manifestation of increased activity on the part of the Committee.

56. It was mutually agreed that no change in our attitude was necessary.

57. C.I.A. stated that they considered that if a diplomatic approach on Albania would be made to Italy and Greece in the first place, this would facilitate an approach to the Yugoslavs on the question of the Committee. Instances were recounted by [] of individual contact between the members of the N.C.F.A. and the Yugoslav Committee.

58. It was agreed that we should endeavour to ensure that any possible dealings between members of the N.C.F.A. and members of the Yugoslav Committee should be made in the name of the N.C.F.A. and not in the name of an individual party within the same.

J. Progress Report by C.I.A. on Rome defection.

59. C.I.A. stated that two attempts had been made to promote the defection of the Albanian Charge d'Affaires in Rome. These had been unsuccessful. A further attempt would be made in which C.I.A. had greater confidence of success after a lapse of two months. They stated that during this period, if S.I.S. wished to attempt this defection they were at liberty to do so.

60. S.I.S. stated they would review their connection with this defector and inform C.I.A. as soon as possible whether they would make this attempt or not.

61. S.I.S. asked C.I.A. if they were in agreement that this defection was only worth while if the subject "worked his passage home".

62. C.I.A. stated that they were aiming at this but would accept the defection if necessary without this proviso.

K. Long-term Planning and Considerations.

63. C.I.A. stated that at the Rome Conference it was mutually agreed that both sides would work out a plan outlining what would be required to ensure the liberation of Albania. C.I.A. had been actively working on this plan.

64. S.I.S. stated that whereas in Rome they felt that such a plan would be worthwhile, the definite directive which they had received from the Foreign Office would never accept a plan which involved a

follow-up-force. The question of Albania would be reviewed again by the Foreign Office as the result of S.I.S. activities in 1952. S.I.S. hoped that by that time sufficient information might be obtained regarding the disaffection of the armed forces and Sigurimi as would form the basis for a more realistic appreciation than could be formed at the moment.

65. C.I.A. considered that the production of a plan served a useful purpose in that it prevented idle thought regarding the simplicity of the operation and that in working out the detail of the plan it would make it evident that considerable effort would be involved.
66. S.I.S. agreed with this attitude on the part of C.I.A. and would discuss the preparation of a plan with their Planning Section.
67. C.I.A. stated that it was their intention to maintain in existence the Guard Company, but foresaw possible difficulty in keeping it in Germany owing to the change in the status of that country. They asked how far S.I.S. had progressed in developing the idea of forming an International Brigade.
68. S.I.S. replied that they were still actively pursuing this project and they had hopes of reaching a satisfactory conclusion in approximately three months. This International Brigade would be under the control of S.I.S., it included an Albanian contingent and would therefore form a pool upon which FIEND/ VALUABLE could draw.

L. Discussion of any mutual points of divergence.

69. Various points of minor divergence were discussed under this heading. Any major points have been dealt with in previous paragraphs in these minutes. 59869

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