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*for file 11/16*  
*Return to P. Smith*

I. POLITICAL (EXTERNAL)

a. State Department and Foreign Office Attitude  
Toward Valuable-Friend

(1) It is the feeling of SS that the year of 1952 must be the year of decision in the operations as the spring of 1953 well may be the limit for the maintenance of the present level of morale within the country, and failure to take decisive action by that time will probably result in serious deterioration of the will to resist the present regime. The Foreign Office has committed itself to the policy decision that a free and independent Albania is desirable, and has so informed the Department of State. SS is awaiting a statement from the Foreign Office recognizing the urgent necessity for action and authorizing the necessary step-up in activity. It will be two or three months before a final statement of the Foreign Office policy toward Albania becomes available. In anticipation of the possible desirability of creating a follow-up force to bring about a revolution within Albania, <sup>SS hopes to be able to benefit from a scheme under which</sup> the British Government will authorize the formation of an Albanian battalion within an International Brigade to be incorporated in the British Army. This battalion will provide a pool of trained Albanians rather similar to the one created through the expansion of the Fier Albanian Guard Company.

(2) The ~~OPC~~ position with regard to Albania as a policy statement from the Department of State is analogous to that of SS. It has been <sup>impossible</sup> difficult to the Department down to any firm decision concerning range U.S. desires or intentions respecting Albania. However, there is growing realization within the

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Department that such a decision is necessary and ~~off~~ is doing everything it can to promote one. There are indications that the Department favors a free and independent Albania. Pending the formulation of a more specific U.S. policy the Department has agreed to an interim policy comprising the maintenance of U.S. clandestine operations against Albania at approximately the present ~~present~~ level. These operations ~~will~~ include the following activities:

- (a) The continuance of propaganda activities in line with the propaganda directive approved by SIS and ~~CIA~~ (CPC), utilizing the National Committee for Free Albania as a front.
- (b) Occasional leaflet drops and drops of the Committee newspaper over Albania.
- (c) The continuance of agent operations with a view to the establishment of contact with existing resistance groups, the development of a nuclei for a coordinated underground resistance movement and the collection of operational intelligence, etc.
- (d) The continuance of gray and black propaganda radio broadcasts in the name of the National Committee for Free Albania.
- (e) The continuation of efforts to improve the effectiveness of the present psychological warfare program including the employment of such means as the use of agents and such devices as air drops of certain scarce supplies.
- (f) The development of a man power pool of approximately 500 Albanians through expansion of the Guard Company in Germany with a view to creating a reserve of trained men which can be used as a source of agents and in the event of large-scale operations directed toward the overthrow of the present Albanian regime.

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b. The Yugoslav-Sponsored Committee of Free Albanians and Yugoslav Intentions.

(1) According to SS, the new British Ambassador to Yugoslavia is to be instructed to make the following statement to Tito:

(a) Great Britain favors a free and independent Albania.

(b) The true objectives of the Yugoslav-sponsored Committee of Albanians are not understood, and clarification of these objectives is desirable, and,

(c) If the objectives of the Yugoslav-sponsored group are similar to those of the British- and American-sponsored National Committee for Free Albania it may be desirable to bring about an understanding and a degree of cooperation between these two Committees.

SS feels that such a frank representation to Tito should be made in concert with the U.S. and that it is conceivable that sufficient benefits may derive from cooperation with the Yugoslav group to justify a change in the name of the National Committee for Free Albania if such a superficial <sup>concession</sup> change is required to ensure Yugoslav good will.

(2) ~~SS~~ <sup>and SS agree</sup> GPC believes that basically the Yugoslav Government desires only enough of a change in the present Albanian regime to renounce the Cominform tie and permit the conversion of the present Albanian Government into a nationalist Communist government friendly toward Belgrade. As a second choice Tito might prefer an Albania oriented toward the West. In any case, Yugoslav support of a free and independent Alb-Communist state could be secured only through persuasion on the part of Yugoslav Government since such support would be contrary to Yugoslav interests.

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It is agreed by SS and ~~OPC~~ OPC that as a preliminary to any action toward using or cooperating with the Yugoslav-sponsored Albanian group, the Department of State and the Foreign Office must inform Tito of the joint U.S.-British stand relating to Albania's independence. Furthermore, before any large-scale action is initiated against Albania, statements must be secured from Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia affirming the fact that these countries will take no armed action against Albania to settle any territorial claims and that any claims of this type will be settled through the machinery established for handling such disputes in the U.N. Unless a firm policy is provided that will allow an all-out operation against the Hoxha regime, no operating agreement between the National Committee for Free Albania and the Yugoslav Committee will suffice.

c. Italian attitude toward Albania.

SS has informed the Italians on the Service level that Britain stands for the independence of Albania. The Italians expressed relief that Britain did not favor the partition of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia and indicated that Italy would be pleased to leave the solution of the Albanian problem to the British and Americans. The Italians have no territorial ambitions toward Albania and at present are operating only a few minor intelligence missions into that country.

d. Greek Situation.

It is agreed that conditions in Greece remain favorable for the conducting of all operations except those involving BK party members. It is further agreed that it would be desirable if the restrictions on the use of BK personnel were eliminated, but it is realized that, at least for the present, the Northern Epirote Society wields such influence as to preclude this.

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e. Maintenance of Good Relations with Greece.

It is agreed that current operations, including the relatively frequent flights over Albania, are not endangering the good relations which must be maintained with the Greeks.

II. PROPAGANDA

a. Need to Maintain Morale in Albania.

It is agreed that it is necessary to sustain the will to resist among the Albanian people but, at the same time, to prevent raising the morale prematurely to such a point that failure to develop an active resistance movement in the immediate future will result in disillusionment and apathy. *Because of great* Care must be exercised in preparing material for the usual forms of propaganda. Leaflet drops at intervals of approximately eight weeks will be made and also supply drops for propaganda purposes, as well as miniature edition newspaper drops as cover for and during re-supply and body dropping operations. In addition it would be desirable to arrange several *coup-de-main* operations intended to create incidents which will raise morale *within the* and will provide material for propaganda use.

b. Support of Units Within the National Committee for Free Albania.

It is agreed that every effort must be made jointly to ensure unity within the National Committee for Free Albania, and to urge the Committee members to act in the name of the Committee rather than in the name of the individual component parties.

c. Extent of Leaflet Raids.

It is agreed that propaganda leaflet raids will be continued at intervals of approximately eight weeks.

d. Guidance to External Agencies - BBC, VOA, RFE.

(1) It is agreed that efforts will be made to prevent ~~divergent~~ *the appearance of* or otherwise undesirable *Albanian material* broadcasts *in the press* and *and RFE.* over the BBC, ~~and the~~ VOA, SS pointed out that the VOA

made frequent references to BKI sources in presenting Albanian material, thus providing the BKI with publicity and possibly thereby suggesting that the BKI is receiving American support. It was agreed that ~~OPA~~ would see what could be done to correct this matter and arrange for more publicity for the NCPA.

(2) It was also agreed that efforts would be made to secure better publicity for the Committee through the American, British and foreign press, including the press in such countries as Italy, Greece, Turkey, Australia, etc., where colonies of Albanians are known to exist.

e. Attitude Toward the Yugoslav-Sponsored Committee for Free Albania.

It is agreed that the propaganda line relating to the Yugoslav-sponsored committee will be as non-provocative and restrained as is consistent with presenting the idea that the National Committee for Free Albania does regard the Yugoslav Committee with suspicion because its true motives and objectives are unknown and because it often appears to speak in language very similar to that of Radio Tirana. The Yugoslav Committee will not be attacked but in the event that it itself returns to a violent and hostile attitude toward the NCPA, appropriate propaganda reprisals will be taken. SS indicated that a non-provocative attitude toward the Yugoslav group is desirable because it is possible that collaboration with the Yugoslav group may become useful and practicable in the future.

f. Revision of the Joint Valuable-Friend Propaganda Directive.

It is agreed that the Rome representatives of Friend and Valuable will draft a proposed revision to the Propaganda Directive in order to bring the Directive in line with the current policy toward the Yugoslav-sponsored Committee. This revision will make appropriate provision for counter action in the event the Yugoslav Committee attempts to discredit the NCPA or lower its prestige in any way.

g. The Voice of Free Albania.

It is agreed that Fiend will review and reconsider its propaganda policy for the Voice of Free Albania whenever ~~Valuable~~ **SS** draws attention to deviations from Valuable's interpretation of the joint Propaganda Directive. It is agreed that the Voice of Free Albania will maintain the same propaganda line as the other Fiend and Valuable propaganda operations.

h. Leaflet Raid at the End of December 1951.

It is agreed that a suitable leaflet should be prepared for air drop at the end of December 1951. Propaganda material for leaflets must emphasize a positive approach to the problem of resistance to the Communist regime rather than harp on the painful conditions under which the Albanians live and which are so familiar to them already. Leaflets should keep editorial material short, and should make extensive use of cartoons. Furthermore it is agreed that the propaganda mailing campaign into Albania must be expanded, that a slogan and resistance sign should be developed, and <sup>that</sup> methods must be investigated for introducing propaganda material into goods shipments destined for Albania.

i. Publicity for the National Committee for Free Albania.

It is agreed that further efforts must be made to create greater publicity for the National Committee for Free Albania, particularly in the realm of action which would result in reference to the Committee in the world press. Such action will include Committee manifestos, letters to the Secretary General of the U.N., letters to the heads of Western Governments and major departments of such Governments, etc.

j. Distribution of Useful Articles.

It is agreed that the distribution of certain useful articles by air drop and other means can have great propaganda value and should be undertaken. Items to be distributed will

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include such things as razor blades, needles, flour, soap, thread, etc. Fiend and Valuable will conduct such operations independently but will exchange all available information and technical data in order to improve the effectiveness of this type of propaganda. It is agreed that the distribution of food and medical supplies presents a special problem because of the opportunity ~~such items present~~ <sup>thus created</sup> for possible counter action through the distribution of poisoned supplies by the enemy.

### III. FOLLOW-UP PREPARATIONS

#### a. General Ideas.

(1) It is estimated that the following are required in order to permit the overthrow of the Hoxha regime through a major action precipitated by the introduction of a follow-up force into Albania.

(a) The follow-up force should consist of approximately 1000 trained men equipped with arms suitable for guerrilla warfare.

(b) Arms and ammunition for 10,000-15,000 men will have to be assembled somewhere outside the country prior to the action and introduced in the initial phases for distribution by the follow-up force to the Albanian civilian population.

(c) The active cooperation of the USAF and the ~~RAF~~ <sup>will be needed</sup> in moving part of the follow-up force into Albania and in delivering the bulk of the arms and ammunition for the 10,000-15,000 men.

(d) The active cooperation of Greece <sup>will be needed</sup> in permitting the overland movement into Albania of part of the follow-up force.

(e) At least the benevolent neutrality of Yugoslavia, but preferably active cooperation <sup>will be required</sup> in permitting the overland movement into Albania of part of the follow-up force.



(f) Field rations for the support of a force of 10,000-15,000 men during a two-week period will have to be stockpiled in advance and introduced into Albania principally by air during the initial phases of the action.

(g) <sup>(9)</sup> ~~Certain~~ naval support will be needed for a landing on the Albanian coast.

(2) It is agreed that the effort initiated through the introduction of the follow-up force can succeed only if large-scale defections take place within the Albanian armed forces as a result of the disturbance created by the follow-up force and the civilian population among whom arms will be distributed by the shock force. It is envisioned that the shock force will be split into approximately three units, each one being introduced into a predetermined area to establish "free zones" or isolated bridgeheads that would operate to arm the ready civilians and call out the sympathetic elements of the Albanian armed forces. One such bridgehead based on a unit of, say, 300 men could be established by a movement from Greece into Southern Albania; another in Northern Albania by air drop or movement from Yugoslavia; and a third by a landing on the coast of Central Albania. Such an operation would have to be carried out swiftly and the creation of the three bridgeheads would have to be simultaneous and should not even be undertaken unless complete success is assured. It is essential that the Albanian people realize that this action really represents the big liberation push and the necessary psychological situation would have to be developed by intensive leaflet raids which would precede the actual operation by only a few days. Once the subversion of the Albanian armed forces becomes effective the whole movement will take on the character of an internal revolution rather than an invasion from the outside. Adequate communications will have to be provided and sizeable communication teams would have to be established in each of the three initial free zones in order to permit the effective distribution of supplies and reserves, and to permit the expansion of the communication system as the action progresses.

(3) In anticipation of the possibility that a large-scale operation may be undertaken, Valuable proposes to begin the training of from 30-40 officers at Kalta in the immediate future. Furthermore a plan is under consideration by the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff for the creation of an International Brigade which will include an Albanian Battalion. This Battalion would provide approximately half the follow-up force, the remaining half being provided from the two American-controlled Guard Companies. On the British side clearances from the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff would be required before funds become available for the creation of the Battalion and the stockpiling of weapons and other materiel.

(4) It is agreed that the follow-up operation cannot be undertaken before the spring of 1953 and that approximately one year would be required to prepare for this operation after it has been authorized.

b. Attitude Toward the Committee.

It is agreed that the National Committee for Free Albania must not be given an opportunity or grounds to build itself into an emigre government or the government representing the post-liberation regime. The NCFEA should be brought around to favoring a U.N.-supervised election following the termination of the military phase of the operation. The NCFEA must not be allowed to feel that it is running the operation, merely that it is supporting it, and ~~the NCFEA~~ should be introduced into the picture only after the follow-up force is in and the action is well on the way toward completion. The notorious insecurity of the NCFEA should be borne in mind at all times in connection with this operation.

c. Planning.

(1) It is agreed that the planning of the follow-up operation should be conducted as follows:

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(a) Separate Fiend and Valuable plans will be drawn up and the two versions combined into a single jointly approved plan.

(b) The joint plan will be presented to the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, provided the Department of State and the Foreign Office approve the more aggressive line toward Albania.

(c) After any changes decided by the U.S. and British Joint Chiefs of Staff have been effected the joint plan will be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the presence of SS and CPC consultants.

(d) It is agreed that the general base from which the operation will be mounted should be in North Africa where arms, food supplies and other equipment can be assembled. The advance base should be in Greece from where the operation as a whole would be conducted.

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#### IV. INTELLIGENCE

##### A. Improvements in Exchange Arrangements.

1. It is agreed that little can be done to improve the quality and quantity of the intelligence being currently received from the Greeks. This intelligence is fuzzy and not exactly of the type required by Fiend-Valuable. Some of the difficulties could be overcome if interrogations of refugees were conducted sooner after exfiltration than is possible under the existing system. It is agreed that Fiend and Valuable arrange for the posting of an interrogator in northern Greece to catch the refugees as soon after their entry into Greece as possible. The establishment of this interrogation station is to be undertaken by the station chiefs in Athens.

2. It is the feeling of the British that the intelligence forthcoming from Italian sources is not what it should be, and they feel that not all Italian intelligence made available to the Americans is passed on to the British. The American reaction to this comment was that presumably the Italians are not in a position to obtain much useful information. Furthermore, the exchange of operational intelligence with the British is complete insofar as such intelligence stems from sources under Fiend control. Should the British feel that the exchange of information is not as full as it should be, the question should be raised at the forthcoming London meeting, at which Mr. Wisner will be present. It was agreed that the intelligence situation may improve greatly as soon as better agents are operating into Albania and that a very useful purpose would be served by defecting a few high level Albanians who occupy important positions within the government.

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B. Exploitation of Potential Embassy Defector.

1. It was agreed that defection of the potential defector in the Rome Embassy should be encouraged provided he is able to serve some useful intelligence purpose. A decision on whether the initiative in handling the case should be assumed by the British or by the Americans will have to be made outside the present meeting because of certain factors beyond the control of those present. SS will be informed of the American position promptly.

C. Intelligence for Propaganda Purposes.

1. The British agree to assist Fiend in collecting such intelligence as may be useful for radio propaganda purposes.

V. POLITICAL (Internal - NCFB)

A. Committee Re-organization.

1. It is agreed that it would be desirable to re-organize the Committee in such a manner as to prevent its complete domination by the Balli Kombetar, the Legitimists, or a combination of the two. The British position is that the Committee could be re-organized to increase its power and general appeal; to prevent it from becoming a two-party organ; and to make it a capable committee rather than merely a loose group of people. The true functions of the Committee are agreed to be as follows:

- (a) Cover for Fiend and Valuable activities;
- (b) Welfare activities among the Albanian refugees; and
- (c) A propaganda source and instrument.

It was unanimously held that under no circumstances should operational matters be considered as properly falling within the province of the NCFB.

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B. Comments on the Re-organization Plan Submitted by the Valuable-Friend Representatives in Rome.

1. It is the British view that the proposed re-organization plan provides for more activities through sub-committees than desirable, since the re-organized Committee should devote itself to propaganda and welfare matters, and, hence, Propaganda and Welfare Sub-Committees should suffice. It is the American view that, since the members of the National Committee regard themselves as statesmen determined to mold their country's future, they will engage in various long-range planning activities whether we desire them to do so or not and that through the creation of the sub-committees proposed in the [ ] plan we shall be better able to observe and control such activities. Complete agreement on the desirability of creating these additional sub-committees was not reached, and the British reserved judgment on this question until a later date.

2. It was agreed that a re-organization is in order and that the re-organized Committee would result in the replacement of the Executive and General Committees by one single committee and that the membership of this single committee would be drawn from the existing Executive and General Committees. No agreement on the persons to be included in the revised Committee was reached, but it was agreed that if the re-organization takes place it will be accepted as a fact that the composition of the Committee is not a constant quantity and that new members may be included should it become desirable to do so.

3. It was also agreed that the Military Junta should remain, but as a clandestine offshoot of the National Committee, and that Friend will no longer consult the Junta in connection with operational matters.

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C. Disloyalty of Said Kryeziu.

1. It is agreed that Said Kryeziu is untrustworthy in that he will promote his own interests in preference to those of the Committee whenever he feels that he has a chance of successfully doing so. In view of the evidence on hand, he should be censured in a severe manner; no attempt should be made to remove him from the Committee.

D. Influence Within the Country.

1. It is agreed that, although the present prestige of the HCPA is high within Albania, it is likely to deteriorate unless action to liberate the country is forthcoming in the relatively near future. The fact that the Committee has Anglo-American backing protects it from more severe criticism from within the country. Such criticism arises from the popular dissatisfaction with the ineffective presentation of the Committee illustrated by the low calibre infiltrates; the Committee's promises of action, whereas no action takes place; and the mistaken concept of operations reflected in the activities of agents infiltrated in the past.

VI. OPERATIONAL (Past)

A. Exchange of Operational Experience.

1. Fiend: A resume of Fiend operations was given. 39 bodies infiltrated - 12 remaining, of which two are known to be effectively operating. Five leaflet missions. 31 covert flights, totalling 46 hours, over Albania. Re-supply drops, totalling 8,200 pounds of arms and supplies. 23 overt Commo flights. 33 of 39 bodies infiltrated went by air. 17 exfiltrated. Seven defected to Tito. Four were captured and are on trial. Of the remaining 12 bodies, three W/T operators are inside for each of the three teams (Pine, Chestnut, and Walnut). No contact reported as of the beginning of this conference.

2. Valuable: Four teams were infiltrated and one equipped with a/T made contact with base. All teams are out at present. All infiltrations were made by sea, and one successful sea exfiltration was executed. One of the most successful operations involved a two-man intelligence team, which was able to carry out its mission and establish contacts within the country, without having its presence becoming known during the entire period when it was inside. It is the British view that the use of low level agents in teams has been more harmful than useful and that, partly as a result of the use of such agents, party interests have been promoted by the agents in preference to national or ECPA interests. Furthermore, in view of the small size of Albania, it is essential to maintain the closest operational co-ordination to prevent mutual interference on the part of British and American teams.

B. Use of the Greek Frontier.

1. It is agreed that the Greek frontier will continue to be usable in both directions, <sup>with possible continuing difficulties in regard to the use</sup> ~~except for~~ members of the Balli Kombetar. It would be desirable to overcome this limitation, ~~but it is unlikely that this can be accomplished in the near future.~~

C. Exfiltration by Sea.

1. Valuable effected a successful sea exfiltration, and it is believed that this method can be used with success in the future. Under certain operational conditions, SS will assist Fiend through the use of their facilities for this purpose. The sea operations are backed by the Royal Navy, and the Royal Navy is actually willing to make a vessel available for infiltration and exfiltration purposes. ~~Hitherto, the operations have been conducted through the use of an SS MTB vessel.~~

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## D. Number of Infiltrates.

1. It was agreed that it is essential to avoid endangering security by attempting to infiltrate too many parties into a small country during a limited operational season.

## VII. OPERATIONAL (Future)

## A. Plans for 1952.

## 1. Fiend intentions:

(a) To train eight or ten W/T operators by 1 June, 1952;

(b) To launch a number of short-term missions during the operational season in 1952 in order to establish contact with known personalities (pre-~~ferably~~ ~~currently~~ in the armed forces) and to establish, if possible, permanent W/T stations;

(c) To launch short-term missions with limited special assignments, such as the defections of specified individuals, intelligence of specified kinds, and coup de main operations to provide incidents of propaganda and psychological warfare value;

(d) To continue air re-supply missions and leaflet raids;

(e) To abandon the use of agents recruited through the Guard Company and to employ high-type agents recruited through other sources; and

(f) To make operations more secure and covert than has been the case hitherto.

2. Valuable intentions: In principle, Valuable intentions are the same as those of Fiend for 1952. Since the field of endeavor has been narrowed, it is the British view that there is a need for the closest co-ordination.

3. Mounting of high level intelligence operations: It was agreed that both Friend and Valuable should mount high level intelligence operations directed toward the establishment of contact with certain specific individuals in Albanian government and army circles. In order to execute these missions effectively, it is essential that they be co-ordinated to the extent <sup>that</sup> there is full exchange of information concerning the individuals involved.

4. Review of operational co-ordination: It is the British view that the degree of co-ordination reached in the past is inadequate for future plans, although it represented about the limit of co-ordination possible under the policy of "operational disengagement". It was agreed that the closest co-ordination practicable must be maintained, but it was the American view that the principle of operational disengagement should not be altered at this time.

#### VIII. SECURITY

##### A. Investigation into the Causes of Leakages.

1. It is agreed that leakages of information on operational activities have occurred because of insecurity within the National Committee and as a result of the Albanian propensity for letter-writing. The exchange of letters between members of the Committee, Guard Company members selected by the Committee for operational use, and agents undergoing training, are resulting in security violations and the transmission of information to Italian, Greek, and possibly German services, through the interception of correspondence.

2. As a corrective measure, all operational intelligence will be kept from the NCFB, and agent material will not be recruited from the Guard Company in Germany. It is agreed that there is little that can be done to impress

the importance of security on agents selected and that little can be done to control correspondence. The only solution is to limit the amount of information available to those engaged in letter-writing.

B. Advisability of Bulk Recruiting.

1. It is agreed that bulk recruiting represents a <sup>certain</sup> security danger ~~and that~~ <sup>for operations of an essentially clandestine nature</sup> although it is unavoidable as a means of recruiting personnel for the Guard Company, it cannot be used for recruiting agents for 1952 operations.

C. Security of the Guard Company.

1. It is agreed that all Albanians in the Guard Company are, in a sense, "blown", since their identities and the fact that they represent a pool of potential agents are known to the enemy.

**IX. TRAINING**

## X. DISPOSAL

A. The British reports that they have been successful in using the British Farm Labor Scheme as a means for the disposal of agents in a manner affording considerable security and meeting the moral obligations. The problem has been simplified substantially by the fact that no families are involved. This Farm Labor Scheme permits the retention of desirable men within easy reach should they be needed later for the Albanian battalion and the follow-up force. SS indicated that they would be willing to assist Fiend in the disposal of agents through the use of the British Farm Labor Scheme, provided the Fiend agents are suitable for inclusion in the scheme and provided all other disposal channels have been investigated and found to be unusable.

B. It was decided that an investigation would be made to determine the practicability of securing a plantation or large farm in some part of the world, where disposal cases could be sent. This arrangement would at least allow the Albanians to contribute to their support, or even become self-supporting.

C. The means of disposal available to Fiend at the present time are the I.R.O., which is to be liquidated in the very near future, and certain limited assistance from the Greeks. Both are entirely inadequate and unsatisfactory.

## XI. MATERIAL AID

A. It is agreed that Fiend and Valuable will assist each other, insofar as practicable, through the use of the aircraft and boats available to them. It was pointed out by SS that the R.A.F. is in a position to provide air support, both for propaganda and personnel drops, and that need for assistance to Valuable in the form of Fiend aircraft will arise only in the event of unforeseen emergencies.

## XII. ECONOMIC WARFARE

A. It was agreed that an effort will be made to obtain

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whatever information is available concerning commercial companies outside the Iron Curtain countries which are dealing with Albania. This information will be used for ~~whatever~~<sup>such</sup> economic or psychological warfare measures ~~that~~<sup>as</sup> may appear practicable.

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