


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MINUTES FIEND/VALUABLE CONFERENCE

ROME, 22-24 OCTOBER 1951

SS

OPC



1. POLITICAL (EXTERNAL)

a. State Department and Foreign Office Attitude Toward VALUABLE/FIEND.

Both [] and [] outlined the attitude of their respective Governments toward VALUABLE/FIEND operations. [] stated that as a result of recent approaches it was hoped that a more definite statement would be shortly forthcoming. [] stated he also expected as a result of a meeting in July that FIEND also would have a more definite idea as to their ultimate objective. It was agreed that the recent decision of the Foreign Office and the anticipated decision of the Department of State regarding the independence of Albania will be a useful step forward but that full value could not be obtained unless such a policy was imparted officially to Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy.

b. The Yugoslav-Sponsored Committee for Free Albanians and Yugoslav Intentions.

(1) The British envisage that their new Ambassador to Yugoslavia is to be instructed to make the following statement to Tito:

(a) Great Britain favors a free and independent Albania.

(b) The true objectives of the Yugoslav-sponsored Committee of Albanians are not understood, and clarification of these objectives is desirable, and,

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(c) If the objectives of the Yugoslav-sponsored group are similar to those of the British- and American-sponsored National Committee for Free Albania it may be desirable to bring about an understanding and a degree of cooperation between these two Committees.

SS feels that such a frank representation to Tito should be made in concert with the U.S. and that it is conceivable that sufficient benefits may derive from cooperation with the Yugoslav group to justify a change in the name of the National Committee for Free Albania if such a superficial concession is required to ensure Yugoslav good will.

(2) OPC and SS agree that basically the Yugoslav Government desires only enough of a change in the present Albanian regime to renounce the Cominform tie and permit the conversion of the present Albanian Government into a nationalist Communist government friendly toward Belgrade. As a second choice Tito might prefer an Albania oriented toward the West. In any case, Yugoslav support of a free and independent non-Communist state could be secured only through pressure on the present Yugoslav Government since such support would be contrary to Yugoslavia's basic desires. It is agreed by SS and OPC that as a preliminary to any action toward using or cooperating with the Yugoslav-sponsored Albanian group, the Department of State and the Foreign Office must inform Tito of the joint U.S./U.K. stand relating to Albania's independence. Furthermore, before any large-scale action is initiated against Albania, statements must be secured from Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia affirming the fact that these countries will take no armed action against Albania to settle any territorial claims, and that any claims of this type will be settled through the machinery established for handling such disputes in the U.N. Unless a firm policy is provided that will allow an all-out operation against ✓ the Hoxha regime, no operating agreement between the National Committee for Free Albania and the Yugoslav Committee will suffice.

c. The Italian Attitude Toward Albania.

SS has informed the Italians on the Service level that Britain stands for the independence of Albania. The Italians expressed relief that Britain did not favor the partition of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia and indicated that Italy would be pleased to leave the solution of the Albanian problem to the British and Americans. The Italians have no territorial ambitions toward Albania and at present are operating only a few minor intelligence missions into that country. It was

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agreed that a definition of U.S./U.K. policy towards Albania as outlined in l.a. would go a long way towards allaying Italian fears and obtaining Italian friendly cooperation if such were desired. It was further agreed that Italian interests in Albania would always have to receive due consideration. The SS raised the question of OSO collaboration with the Italians but it was considered that this problem was outside of the competence of the meeting and could more usefully be discussed in the forthcoming CIA/SS discussions in London.

d. Greek Situation.

It was agreed that the situation in Greece remained favorable for FIEND/VALUABLE activities. The meeting took cognizance of the fact that the use of BK elements within Greece might be detrimental but it was felt that this may be overcome. A declaration by the U.S./U.K. Governments regarding their desire for an independent Albania was agreed to be of great benefit to FIEND/VALUABLE operations.

e. Maintenance of Good Relations with Greece.

It is agreed that current operations, including the relatively frequent flights over Albania, are not at present endangering the good relations which must be maintained with the Greeks, but this situation may change as a result of unforeseen political or other circumstances.

2. PROPAGANDA

a. Need to Maintain Morale in Albania.

It is agreed that it is necessary to sustain the will to resist among the Albanian people but, at the same time, to prevent raising the morale prematurely to such a point that failure to develop an active resistance movement in the immediate future will result in disillusionment and apathy. Because of this, great care must be exercised in preparing material for the usual forms of propaganda. Leaflet drops at intervals of approximately eight weeks will be made and also supply drops for propaganda purposes, as well as miniature edition newspaper drops as cover for and during re-supply and body dropping operations. In addition it would be desirable to arrange several coup-de-main operations intended to create incidents which, without adversely affecting the local population, will raise morale within the country and will provide material for propaganda use. ✓

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b. Support of Unity Within the National Committee for Free Albania.

It is agreed that every effort must be made jointly to ensure unity within the National Committee for Free Albania, and to urge the Committee members to act in the name of the Committee rather than in the name of the individual component parties.

c. Extent of Leaflet Raids.

It was considered that a cessation of leaflet raids would promote a feeling within Albania that they had been abandoned by the Committee and the West. Leaflet raids should continue at the rate of approximately every six to eight weeks.

d. Guidance to External Agencies, BBC, VOA, RFE.

(1) It is agreed that efforts will be made to prevent the appearance of divergent or otherwise undesirable Albanian material in the press and over the BBC, VOA, and RFE. SS pointed out that the VOA made frequent references to BKI sources in presenting Albanian material, thus providing the BKI with publicity and possibly thereby suggesting that the BKI is receiving American support. It was agreed that OPC would see what could be done to correct this matter and arrange for more publicity for the NCFa.

(2) It was also agreed that efforts would be made to secure better publicity for the Committee through the American, British and foreign press, including the press in such countries as Italy, Greece, Turkey, Australia, etc., where colonies of Albanians are known to exist.

e. Attitude Toward the Yugoslav-Sponsored Committee for Free Albania.

It is agreed that the propaganda line relating to the Yugoslav-sponsored Committee will be as non-provocative and restrained as is consistent with presenting the idea that the National Committee for Free Albania does regard the Yugoslav Committee with suspicion because its true motives and objectives are unknown and because it often appears to speak in language very similar to that of Radio Tirana. The Yugoslav Committee will not be attacked but in the event that it itself returns to a violent and hostile attitude toward the NCFa, appropriate propaganda reprisals will be taken. SS indicated that a non-provocative attitude toward the Yugoslav group is desirable because it is possible that collaboration with the Yugoslav group may become useful and practicable in the future.

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f. Revision of the Joint VALUABLE/FIEND Propaganda Directive.

It was agreed that the existing Propaganda Directive was out-dated and should be revised in accordance with the new situation which has arisen in Yugoslavia.

g. The Voice of Free Albania.

It is agreed that FIEND will review and reconsider its propaganda policy for the Voice of Free Albania whenever SS draws attention to deviations from VALUABLE'S interpretation of the Joint Propaganda Directive. It is agreed that the Voice of Free Albania will maintain the same propaganda line as the other FIEND and VALUABLE propaganda operations.

h. Leaflet Raid at the End of December 1951.

It is agreed that a suitable leaflet should be prepared for air drop at the end of December 1951. Propaganda material for leaflets must emphasize a positive approach to the problem of resistance to the Communist regime rather than harp on the painful conditions under which the Albanians live and which are so familiar to them already. Leaflets should keep editorial material short, and should make extensive use of cartoons. Furthermore, it is agreed that the propaganda mailing campaign into Albania must be expanded, that a slogan and resistance sign should be developed, and that methods must be investigated for introducing propaganda material into goods shipments destined for Albania. ✓

i. Publicity for the National Committee for Free Albania.

It is agreed that further efforts must be made to create greater publicity for the National Committee for Free Albania, particularly in the realm of action which would result in reference to the Committee in the world press. Such action will include Committee manifestos, letters to the Secretary General of the U.N., letters to the heads of Western Governments and major departments of such Governments, etc.

j. Distribution of Useful Articles.

It was agreed that the delivery into Albania of such articles as razor blades, wool, soap, needles, etc. would considerably enhance the standing of the NCEA within the country and that both OPC and SS would pursue this activity independently and with energy. An exchange of technical and operational details was agreed upon.

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3. FOLLOW-UP PREPARATIONS

a. General Ideas.

The meeting considered that the use of a follow-up force was dependent upon directives yet to be received by OPC and SS from their respective authorities. In the meantime certain preparatory steps were being taken by OPC in the formation of a guard company and the limited stockpiling of arms. SS reported that they hope shortly that legislation would be introduced whereby a form of Foreign Legion, to include Albanians, would be created. SS stated that they considered that the planning necessary for the deployment of a follow-up force should be the responsibility of the military authorities. They considered that a rough outline plan should envisage the formation of two or more "free zones" or isolated bridgeheads within Albania to which the army and people could rally. A definite prerequisite of such action should be an accurate assessment of the disaffection of the Albanian armed forces. OPC agreed that the question of the Albanian military disaffection was a vital factor. SS and OPC will prepare a jointly approved plan which in turn will be presented to their respective military authorities. It was mutually agreed that the overthrow of the present regime in Albania could not be achieved internally by the people of that country without some form of external support. It was agreed that it should be possible to cover external support as action taken in support of an internal rising. In other words, every effort should be made to disguise the follow-up force as a small party in support of a spontaneous internal revolution.

b. Attitude Toward the Committee.

It is agreed that the National Committee for Free Albania must not be given an opportunity or grounds to build itself into an emigre government or the government representing the post-liberation regime. The NCFEA should be brought around to favoring a U.N.-supervised election following the termination of the military phase of the operation. The NCFEA must not be allowed to feel that it is running the operation, merely that it is supporting it, and should be introduced into the picture only after the follow-up force is in and the action is well on the way toward completion. The notorious insecurity of the NCFEA should be borne in mind at all times in connection with this operation.

4. INTELLIGENCE

a. Improvements in Exchange Arrangements.

It was considered that greater efforts should be made to obtain

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intelligence relating to Albania from both the Greeks and Italians. In Greece it was considered that the establishment of an interrogation center in Jannina was highly desirable. In Italy it was considered that the Italians had more information than they were passing to us. The British raised the point that this intelligence was most probably available to OSO but OPC stated that they were not competent to comment on this matter which should be taken up at the forthcoming talks in London. SS pointed out that the intelligence which they passed to FIEND was derived from all available sources, whereas the material passed from FIEND to VALUABLE was exclusively derived from FIEND sources only.

b. Exploitation of Potential Legation Defector.

It was agreed that defection of the potential defector in the Rome Legation should be encouraged provided he is able to serve some useful intelligence purpose. A decision on whether the initiative in handling the case should be assumed by the British or by the Americans will have to be made outside the present meeting because of certain factors beyond the control of those present. SS will be informed of the American position promptly.

c. Intelligence for Propaganda Purposes.

OPC considered that attention should be given to the production of intelligence for propaganda purposes. SS agreed.

5. POLITICAL (INTERNAL - NCFE)

a. Committee Reorganization.

It was mutually agreed that some form of reorganization of the NCFE was desirable. SS considered that within the narrow limits of the Executive Committee there was no room for political maneuver, and that the two large political parties, Legitimist and Balli Kombetar, were too finely balanced. They proposed the formation of one Committee known as the NCFE and the liquidation of the present system comprising executive and general committees. It was mutually agreed that a reconstruction of the Committee within itself would pave the way to a broadening of the Committee to include such elements outside the Committee which would be of value as potential assets in the event of armed insurrection. It was agreed that in support of the reorganized NCFE certain sub-committees should be formed, namely, propaganda and welfare. OPC expressed the view that the formation of other committees was desirable if only to employ the members on useful commitments, such as future planning, civil affairs, etc. SS disagreed and considered the

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sponsorship as tantamount to unofficial recognition of the NCFAs as an emigre government. OPC pointed out that this proposal was in conformity with the practice of other emigre committees. SS remained firm in their disagreement toward this proposal.

It was agreed that the U.K./U.S. representatives in Rome should prepare concrete proposals for the reconstruction of the Committee, and the formation of the necessary sub-committees without delay, and that this reconstruction should be definitely forced on the NCFAs to ensure a realization of U.K./U.S. rights to alter the structure in accordance with the changing situation.

b. See a. above.

c. Disloyalty of Said Kryeziu.

It was agreed that Said Kryeziu had shown considerable disloyalty to the Committee, but that it would not be in the interests of FIEND/VALUABLE to expel him.

d. Influence Within the Country.

It was decided to promote the influence of the NCFAs within the country by carrying out such activities as those mentioned under 2.j.

e. Future of the NCFAs.

It was unanimously agreed that the NCFAs should be supported by propaganda and all possible means to become an effective entity.

6. OPERATIONAL (PAST)

a. Exchange of Operational Experience.

A full exchange of operational experiences between FIEND and VALUABLE operations representatives took place.

b. Use of the Greek Frontier.

It is agreed that the Greek frontier will continue to be usable in both directions, with possible continuing difficulties in regard to the use of members of the Balli Kombetar. It would be desirable to overcome this limitation.

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c. Exfiltration by Sea.

VALUABLE effected a successful sea exfiltration, and it is believed that this method can be used with success in the future. Under certain operational conditions, SS will assist FIEND through the use of their facilities for this purpose. The sea operations are backed by the Royal Navy, and the Royal Navy is actually willing to make a vessel available for infiltration and exfiltration purposes.

d. Number of Infiltrates.

It was agreed that it is essential to avoid endangering security by attempting to infiltrate too many parties into a small country during a limited operational season.

7. OPERATIONAL (FUTURE)

a. Plans for 1952.

(1) FIEND gave a resume of their operational intentions for 1952.

(2) VALUABLE stated that FIEND proposals for 1952 were exactly similar to those entertained by SS.

(3) Mounting of high level intelligence operations: It was agreed that both SS and OPC should mount high level intelligence operations directed toward the establishment of contact with certain specific individuals in Albanian Government and army circles. In order to execute these missions effectively, it is essential that they be coordinated to the extent that there is full exchange of information concerning the individuals involved.

(4) It was agreed that a complete reorientation of operational procedure was necessary and that in 1952 our operations into Albania should take the form of high grade activities having a definite project in view and employing a more clandestine technique than heretofore. The SS foresaw a danger in connection with this in that there would be competition for recruitment and need for closer coordination of our mutual activities within Albania. OPC stated that in view of the past and continuing policy of "operational disengagement" it was their feeling that the two Services had gone as far as they possibly could have gone up to now in the exchange of operational information. It was agreed that an even closer exchange of such information in the future was highly desirable but that it was beyond the competence of this meeting to alter the present policy of "operational disengagement".

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8. SECURITY

a. Investigation Into the Causes of Leakages.

(1) It is agreed that leakages of information on operational activities have occurred because of insecurity within the National Committee and as a result of the Albanian propensity for letter writing. The exchange of letters between members of the Committee, Guard Company members selected by the Committee for operational use, and agents undergoing training, are resulting in security violations and the transmission of information to Greek, Italian and possibly German Services, through the interception of correspondence.

(2) As a corrective measure, all operational intelligence will be kept from the NCFR, and agent material will not be recruited from the Guard Company in Germany. It is agreed that there is little that can be done to impress the importance of security on agents selected and that little can be done to control correspondence. The only solution is to limit the amount of information available to those engaged in letter writing.

b. Advisability of Bulk Recruiting.

(1) It is agreed that bulk recruiting represents a certain security danger for operations of an essentially clandestine nature and that although it is unavoidable as a means of recruiting personnel for the Guard Company, it should preferably not be used for recruiting agents for 1952 operations.

c. Security of the Guard Company.

SS stated that they considered all their present operators "blown", and it was their intention to discharge every Albanian with whom they had worked in the past. OPC stated that in the future their recruitment would take place outside the Guard Company as far as possible.

9. TRAINING

a. Exchange of Ideas and Experience.

Opportunity was taken for the FIEND/VALUABLE training officers to exchange mutual experiences and ideas. SS pointed out that they were exceedingly perturbed at the ease with which their field parties were ambushed, and that they felt that their previous conception of Albanian

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ability to move in his own country without capture, was over-estimated. The necessary readjustment in future training would be carried out. OPC stated that they had suffered similar experiences and hoped that the interchange of training methods would prove of value.

10. DISPOSAL

a. The SS reported that they have been successful in using the British Farm Labor Scheme as a means for the disposal of agents in a manner affording considerable security and meeting the moral obligations. The problem has been simplified substantially by the fact that no families are involved. This Farm Labor Scheme permits the retention of desirable men within easy reach should they be needed later for the Albanian battalion and the follow-up force. SS indicated that they would be willing to assist FIEND in the disposal of agents through the use of the British Farm Labor Scheme, provided the FIEND agents are suitable for inclusion in the Scheme and provided all other disposal channels have been investigated and found to be unusable.

b. It was decided that an investigation would be made to determine the practicability of securing a plantation or large farm in some part of the world, where disposal cases could be sent. This arrangement would at least allow the Albanians to contribute to their support, or even become self-supporting.

c. The means of disposal available to OPC at the present time are the I.R.O., which is to be liquidated in the very near future, and certain limited assistance from the Greeks. Both are entirely inadequate and unsatisfactory.

11. MATERIAL AID

It is agreed that OPC and SS will assist each other insofar as practicable through the use of the aircraft and boats available to them. It was pointed out by SS that the RAF is in a position to furnish air support for both propaganda and personnel drops and that consequently the necessity for recourse to OPC aircraft will probably arise only in the event of unforeseen emergencies. It was indicated by OPC that more than one aircraft would probably be available for 1952 clandestine air operations. SS stated that next year they hoped to be operating with two vessels in the Mediterranean and, in addition, they could call on support from the Royal Navy. Given the necessary detailed operational coordination, their vessels would be available for such exfiltration operations as OPC might require.

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12. ECONOMIC WARFARE

It was agreed that an effort will be made to obtain whatever information is available concerning commercial companies outside the Iron Curtain countries which are dealing with Albania. This information will be used for such economic or psychological warfare measures as may appear practicable.

13. FUTURE CONFERENCES

It was mutually considered that the conference had been of value and should recur every twelve months. Should the proposed degree of operational integration be agreed, it was considered that the previously conceived quarterly exchange of ideas by the field personnel would be superfluous. The OPC operations officer extended an invitation to his SS counterpart to attend the FIEND Operations Conference which is held possibly once every three months.

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