

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

EE-I

REPORT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE QUARTER ENDED

30 JUNE 1951

1. Synopsis

All active EE-I Projects registered progress during the second quarter of 1951 despite occasional setbacks and delays. Particularly encouraging results were obtained in the Bulgarian Project, with 17 agents infiltrated into Bulgaria during May and of the 11 who have safely exfiltrated back into Greece, 8 are now being prepared for reinfiltration. The Albanian Project has also moved forward with the air-dropping of a two-man team and initial supplies in support of the Kukës team. Recruitment and training of agents for both projects have advanced to a point where the infiltration of trained agents into both Albania and Bulgaria can be significantly increased, beginning in July 1951. Stress is being placed on acquiring a higher type of indigenous personnel than were employed previously. Numerous indications have been received that PW operations against Albania and Bulgaria have had a marked effect on the morale of the peoples of both countries. During the past quarter, coordination between the overseas stations and Headquarters has been improved by a joint [] representatives conference held early in May in [] and by an extensive three-week field survey trip undertaken in mid-June by []

Pending final approval of the Covert Military Assistance Program for Yugoslavia, the original plan in revised form was personally conveyed to CINCHLEM by [] for coordination and incorporation into CINCHLEM's war planning for clandestine operations. As a follow-up to the first token arms shipment to Yugoslavia which sailed on 1 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State have recommended that a second delivery of arms and supplies be executed by CIA/OPC on a modified covert basis by 6 August 1951.

Planning on other EE-I Projects, such as [] JBEDICT political and stay-behind activities in Greece, and Aegean holding center for Balkan guerrilla trainees, was initiated and developed during the period under review. The completed Rumanian Project Outline was submitted for approval on 31 May.

2. Approved Projects:

a. CKSTAIR

(1) This Project, approved on 19 April 1950, has as its purpose the strengthening of the Bulgarian People's will to resist further []

RECEIVED
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
JUL 1 1951
CLASIFIED BY DD []

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 6 7
60918-A

Communisation, the establishment and development inside Bulgaria of underground reconnaissance and resistance nets, the recruitment and training of an indigenous shock-force for eventual activation of large-scale guerrilla resistance, and, through the progressive deployment of available assets, to prevent or minimize Soviet utilization of Bulgarian resources and territory for aggressive action.

(2) This is a direct OPC undertaking, whose program comprises subversive (paramilitary), PW-propaganda, political, economic and support operations. There is no coordination with the British Services regarding policy or operations.

(3) The following progress is noted in the above program categories:

(a) Subversive - Paramilitary

Between 16 May and 28 May a total of 17 agents were infiltrated into Bulgaria. This number included the 15 agents trained in Germany during March and April, plus two others recruited in Greece for specific one-shot missions. The total number was broken down into six teams, five of which had Motorola sets for ground-air communications, and two individuals who operated alone. Their missions included the following: contacting resistance groups, establishing safe-houses and safe-routes, dissemination of propaganda material including Freedom Brotherhood stickers, and location of operations bases and suitable air-drop areas. In addition, one man was given the mission of locating and bringing out one agent of the group infiltrated in December, who was still in Bulgaria.

According to reports received by the end of June, the following is the present status of the 17 agents infiltrated during May: Three agents remain in Bulgaria, eleven have returned to Greece and are now being prepared for re-infiltration. One of the eleven had been captured by the Bulgarians and forced to establish Motorola contact with the OPC covert aircraft, but was permitted to escape, for reasons which are now being investigated. One of the 17 agents was killed in ambush by Bulgarian soldiers while returning to Greece with one of his team-mates and four recruits, two of whom were also killed. Two agents defected to the Communists; another two are being treated as rejects because of a demonstrated lack of operational ability. According to a report received by one of the infiltrees, the agent who had been in Bulgaria since

SECRET
EE/BK
22 DEC 60
CFF

December was captured by the Communists while trying to recruit new agents to return to Greece.

In evaluating the results of the first month of operations since the initial unproductive infiltrations in December 1950, it can be stated that the month has proven to be extremely productive and encouraging in terms of operational experience gained by the agents themselves as well as by the OPC staff running the operations. Specifically, the following positive results have been achieved:

(1) One team established a means for contacting a large resistance group in the mountains near the city of Sliven and plans were made by this team for fulfilling their objective of contacting resistance elements in the Fetevan area through the Sliven resistance group.

(2) Valuable internal contacts were made at various points in Southern Bulgaria and tangible evidence given the Bulgarians in the area that an externally-supported resistance movement exists in Bulgaria.

(3) Propaganda material including Freedom Brotherhood stickers was distributed in widely scattered areas, thereby disseminating in convincing fashion the names and objectives of the Brotherhood.

(4) At least one potential air supply area has been pinpointed in the Petrich region.

(5) The morale and motivation of returning agents, with the exception of the rejects, have greatly improved as a result of their contacts with the people inside Bulgaria and particularly after seeing one of their own members killed and his body desecrated by Communist authorities. In addition, first-hand knowledge was gained regarding the misery and fear endured by the Bulgarian people and the feelings of insecurity and terror on the part of many Communist officials themselves.

(6) Several valuable items of intelligence were obtained.

(7) The utility and value of improved Motorola ground-air communications were demonstrated by several successful contacts between the covert aircraft and the teams. In this connection, the modifications made in the field on the Motorola after its complete failure in the December and January operations have transformed it into a useful instrument for special operations where repeated contacts over a long period of time are not needed. The certainty that the Bulgarian authorities are now familiar with the Motorola and its operation, as well as the vulnerability of the Commo plane to attack by hostile aircraft, one of which was seen during a flight in June, indicates that this type of communication cannot be relied on either exclusively or routinely for agent communication.

(b) PW - Propaganda Activities

Because of the obvious success of Radio Gorianin even with its present limited facilities and because of the need to circumvent the extensive jamming efforts of the Bulgarian Government, two new 500-watt transmitters, similar to the two now operating, have been procured and shipped to Greece. The technique of interrupted and irregular broadcasts is being used in order to lend greater credence to the claim that the radio is broadcasting on Bulgarian soil.

The third leaflet drop scheduled for early June has been postponed, pending reconsideration of this aspect of OKSTAIR by the [redacted]. One million copies of the leaflet have been printed and are in the field awaiting distribution. The field has prepared flight routes for the next three leaflet drops with a view to avoiding the course of any previous drop and making the coverage of the country nearly complete.

As noted in Paragraph (3)-(a) above, black propaganda material was carried directly into the country for distribution and posting as a tangible sign of the Freedom Brotherhood's existence on Bulgarian soil. Such evidence will strengthen materially the appeal of Radio Gorianin as the clandestine voice of an indigenous resistance movement. In addition, the mailing campaign directed at selected Bulgarian Communists and initiated in March from various points outside of Bulgaria has continued on a regular basis. The letters contain material compromising to the recipients and other Communist personalities.

(c) Political

Continued delays in obtaining U. S. visas for the four members of the Executive Council of the National Committee for a Free Bulgaria residing in Paris - Messrs. Milev, Shopov, Petkov, and N. Balibanov - are proving to be a serious obstacle to the necessary enlargement of the NNC into a more representative and democratic group. Five prominent Bulgarians, including Kiosseivanov and General Velchev - who were invited to the United States last year as candidates for the enlarged Committee, are still awaiting visas.

With the passage of time, the personal animosities, mutual recriminations and jockeying for position among leading Bulgarian exiles appear to be mounting rather than subsiding.

Although somewhat suspicious of the intentions of his American friends towards himself, Dr. G. M. Dimitrov continues to cooperate with our out-out, whom he has furnished with the names of all his supporters in Europe whom he recommends as agent material. He has also supplied the names of several former Bulgarian army officers available for staffing contemplated operations. In addition, Dr. Dimitrov has provided letters to be used in recruiting future agents.

Dimitar A. Dimitrov, the Bulgarian political refugee leader in Greece through whom agent trainees have so far been recruited, is presently being held in prison by the Greek Intelligence Service at OPC request. Because of "Diko's" instability, megalomania and reported intention to sell out his knowledge of OPC operations to the French, it has proved necessary to dispose of him temporarily. The method of a more permanent disposal of D. A. Dimitrov outside of Greece is under advisement. It is felt that Dimitrov's elimination from the refugee political scene in Greece will have a beneficial effect on his refugee political organization The Democratic Bloc, insofar as its operations will be taken over by a more honest and capable leadership.

(d) Economic Operations

Economic themes, such as encouragement to hoard, are now being used in broadcasts to the Bulgarian peasants. Large-scale economic warfare programs in the interior of Bulgaria will depend on the establishment of well-integrated operating nets of underground agents.

(c) Support Operations

(1) Training and Recruitment

Fifteen Bulgarian agents were trained in Germany from 19 March to 25 April in guerrilla warfare subjects and Motorola communications. In order to greatly reduce our dependence on ground-air communications with infiltrated agents and to ensure regular communication channels, the W/T training of seven other agents was begun in Germany on 16 March and is scheduled for completion by 15 July 1951. The 15 guerrilla warfare agents were trained at the BOFIEND covert training school in Germany. Although the training of the seven W/T agent operators was begun at this school, it is being completed at a specially procured W/T house in order to avoid simultaneous use of the training site by both QKSTAIR and BOFIEND agents.

A new group of approximately 20 Bulgarian agents, including W/T trainees, is now being recruited from refugees in Greece and readied for despatch to Germany during July to begin their training.

Preparations, which include the clearing of cut-outs and the procurement of special recruiting letters, have been made to begin recruiting members of the Agrarian Union Party of Dr. George M. Dimitrov. In order to facilitate this recruitment, the establishment of a Bulgarian Guard Company in Germany on the model of the one already operating for Albanians under BOFIEND is being expedited. During the month of April, the QKSTAIR Field Chief traveled to various points in Europe to survey the sources of recruits for the Guard Company and to determine the most practicable method of recruitment.

(2) Assignment of Personnel

During the second quarter, additional personnel have been assigned to the field as instructors. Thirteen trainees are being trained and processed for the field during the next quarter, seven of these being Commo personnel who will be sent to Greece in July on a permanent basis. In connection with Radio Geriznia, two commo engineers are to be sent to Athens in the very near future on TDY to set up the two new transmitters. In general, the QKSTAIR instructor and

medium-level operational staffs are, or will be shortly, sufficient for current operational requirements. Major deficiencies exist in filling top level slots.

(3) Facilities and Installations

Two new 500-watt transmitters, similar to the two already operating but not mounted on trucks, have been procured and shipped to Greece to augment the effectiveness of Radio Goraninig. It is planned that these additional transmitters will be installed in July.

Further action in assigning the 50 KW Medium Band transmitter under Project LCSREAM to the EE-I area for broadcasts to Bulgaria and other Balkan targets is in abeyance pending final decision regarding its feasibility.

The construction of TPWEAPON, which was originally intended as the QKSTAIR covert training site in Germany, but which has been placed under the operational control of the Chief of Station for Germany, has been completed. Opening of the school is awaiting only proper staffing and the development of satisfactory cover. An interim staff for the school is ready to proceed to TPWEAPON as soon as instructions are received from the field. Upon the recommendation of the acting QKSTAIR Deputy for Germany and with the concurrence of the German Chief of Station, it has been decided to put the QKSTAIR covert school under Army cover consistent with ADPC's modification of operational security standards of NSC 10/2 for OPC training and supply projects.

(4) Coordination

The QKSTAIR Field Chief made a survey tour of Rome, Trieste, Austria, and Germany in April to discuss problems connected with the establishment of a Bulgarian Guard Company in Germany.

[redacted], during two extensive field surveys, has discussed the current QKSTAIR situation with [redacted] and reviewed the problem of future activities against Bulgaria.

Through the intermediary of C/SF, efforts have been exerted to speed up the issuance of entry visas to a number of prominent Bulgarians abroad, particularly in Paris, in order to proceed with plans for the enlargement of the Bulgarian National Committee in New York.

The approval of Mr. Donald Kingsley, the Director General of IRO, has been obtained regarding a proposal for the joint establishment by OPC and IRO of several reception centers, a general holding camp and a special operational holding camp for Bulgarian refugees in Greece. The purpose of these centers and camps, insofar as OPC is directly concerned, is to provide a continuous supply of the most qualified Bulgarian refugees for operations inside Bulgaria. The project Field Chief has been instructed to send a representative from Athens to Geneva to discuss with Mr. Kingsley the plan and procedure for setting up and operating the centers and camps. The present intention is to work through the Chief of IRO in Greece for whom clearance is now being obtained.

(5) Planning Operations

A basic Propaganda Guidance for Radio Gericinin was completed in June and will be sent to the field in the beginning of July. An extract of this Guidance is also being sent to C/SP for transmittal to Radio Free Europe.

b. BOFIEND

(1) Approved on 22 June 1949, this Project was originally conceived to have as its minimum objective the reduction of Albanian capabilities for supporting guerrilla activities in the Greek civil war, and as its maximum objective, the overthrow of the Hoxha regime. On 6 September 1949, it was agreed that the maximum objective should be temporarily abandoned. The purpose of the Project as it now stands is the maintenance of popular resistance through covert media, the development of NCPA political strength and OPC underground nets inside Albania in order to be able to exploit effectively any large-scale resistance movement against the Hoxha regime. The necessary assets for clandestine wartime operations in Albania are also to be established in the event of a Soviet-Satellite aggression in the Balkans. Due to the complexity of international factors involved, the maximum cold-war objective of the Project is under continuous review.

(2) This is a direct OPC undertaking, whose program comprised subversive paramilitary, PW-propaganda, political, economic warfare and support operations. Policy is coordinated with the British Services, but operations are determined and conducted independently.

(3) During the second quarter of 1951, the following progress was made in each program category:

(a) Subversive-paramilitary operations

Recent letters from the survivors of the original three teams sent into Albania in November 1950 indicate that all of the "Kukes" team are still operating on the Albanian-Yugoslav border.

On May 18/19, following a series of unsuccessful tries due to adverse weather conditions, a two-man resupply team was dropped in the area of Kukes, and it is hoped that these reinforcements will be able to contact the original team. One of the members of the Dibra team also remains in letter contact with the NCFA via Yugoslavia, but he reports that the team is badly scattered and that he remains the sole operative.

The letters received to date indicate a positive reaction on the part of the Albanian people toward the NCFA, confirming other reports that NCFA propaganda has had a favorable effect on the morale of the Albanian people. The agents report considerable good will towards themselves in their contacts with the local population, as well as a willingness to provide recruits. In this connection, the NCFA received in May an offer from an Albanian Army Captain to defect with 60 of his men to join the "forces of the NCFA", but the Captain has been encouraged to remain in the country where his services may be of greater ultimate value. The reporting agents participated in the spring disorders which evoked counteraction by Pursuit Brigades led by Mehmet Shehu, Minister of the Interior.

A fifth and final attempt made on the night of June 6/7 to contact the two-man resupply team infiltrated on 18/19 May by ground-air radio failed. No further attempts are scheduled, inasmuch as there was only slight hope that the Motorola being used by the team would prove successful as a means of communication. New infiltrees are to be given URC-4's for ground-air communication, and W/T transmissions will be possible as soon as the operators now in training are infiltrated late in the summer (September).

On 18/19 June, the first effort to resupply this two-man team failed because of an inability to establish contact through prearranged signals. On the following night, a second attempt was made and also failed due to an inopportune ground fire pattern, which was probably set out incorrectly by the team. Another attempt is scheduled for July.

The OPC covert aircraft was again used on 23 June to infiltrate seven OSO agents into the Peqin area.

(b) PW and Propaganda Activities

In conformity with the State Department ban on leaflet drops over Albania early in the second quarter of 1951, no such operations were undertaken. However, during the resupply mission of 18/19 May and again during the body drop on the night of 23 June, permission was granted to drop several thousand leaflets on each occasion as a deceptive measure. Some of the leaflets which had been specially executed following the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Tirana in February were included in the deceptive drops. A cartoon leaflet labeled "Our Government Holds a Meeting" was completed in June and sent to Athens. In view of the large number of leaflets waiting in Athens to be dropped (2,500,000) after the ban has been lifted, additional final texts have not been sent to Washington for processing, but the Propaganda Workshop in Rome is continuing to produce material for future use. The two men resupply team sent in on 18/19 May was provided with propaganda material to be mailed inside the country.

Due to technical difficulties, the ROPFEND Radio Vessel did not go into operation in June as originally planned. It is hoped, however, that in July regular clandestine broadcasts in Albanian can be initiated successfully.

The National Committee for a Free Albania has continued to issue its newspaper Shqipëria on a scheduled fortnightly basis as scheduled. Five thousand copies of the newspaper have been printed in small format and are being sent to the field with the manner of distribution as yet undecided. The format and substance of the Albanian newspaper are being studied with a view to its marked improvement.

The ROPFEND [] is [] and [] are closely cooperating with Radio Free Europe, which began its Albanian broadcasts on 1 June 1951. Arrangements have been made for the continuous exchange of information between RFE and the CPD []

(c) Political Activity

On 24 May 1951, the Executive Council of the NCFE was presented with an NCFE aide-memoire, drawn up in accordance with the views of EE-I Headquarters stressing the necessity for broadening the Committee to achieve a more representative character. Although the three members of the Council presently in New York (Mr. Hasan Dosti, Mr. Said Kryeziu, and

TOP SECRET

SENSIT

- 11 -

Mr. Nuci Kotta) expressed complete agreement with the aide-memoire in principle; the Committee Chairman, Mr. Desti of the Balli Kombetar, asked for a delay in which to consult his party in Rome. The meeting scheduled for 15 June to vote on the issue was subsequently postponed in order to permit further consultation between EE-I, its field representatives, and the British Services regarding the composition of the enlarged Committee. A brief tour has been arranged for Mr. Kryesia, whose current trip to the U. S. was apparently made in order to add lustre to his personal prestige among the refugees, and for Mr. Kotta. Hasan Desti's suggestion that Abas Kupa and Kef Pali be invited to the U. S. to participate in the vote on broadening the Committee is under consideration. Former King Zog has planned a "non-political" trip to the U. S. in July, reportedly to establish permanent residence in the United States.

The formation of a Yugoslav-sponsored League of Albanian Refugees in Prizren early in May represents a serious potential threat to the NCFA and is under close surveillance. The League is reported to have between three to five thousand refugees organized into militant groups, and a recent report claims that it has up to 100 active agents in Albania. Preliminary steps have been taken to parry the threat. The NCFA has been instructed to adopt an attitude of scepticism towards the Prizren Proclamation calling for a "Free, Independent and Republican Albania", without launching into an exchange of polemics with the Yugoslav League. The feasibility of a meeting at Trieste between Abas Kupa and Nik Sokoli, a leader of the Yugoslav-sponsored League (at which EE-I would be represented in the background) is under consideration, primarily with a view to obtaining some light on the intentions of the League and possibly to lay the groundwork for a limited form of cooperation. Although such cooperation with the Yugoslav-sponsored group would offer certain obvious advantages, the inherent opportunities for ultimate Yugoslav domination of the liberation movement necessitate extreme care in approaching the problem. At OPC's request, the State Department has instructed Ambassador Allen in Belgrade to point out to the Yugoslavs the inconsistency between the Government's alleged concern over the Soviet reaction to subversion of Albania and its own activities in that respect. It is anticipated that the Yugoslavs, without attempting the overthrow of the Hoxha regime for the present, will continue their organizational, subversive and espionage activities in Albania as a counterforce to NCFA successes. The preponderance of potential and tangible assets available to the Yugoslav Government indicates the need for continued strengthening of the NCFA with BOFIEND support.

TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE

COPY 6 OF 7 COPIES
60918-A

(d). Economic Warfare Operations

Interference with the transiting of goods between the Central European Satellites and Albania is still largely dependent on the establishment of an OP []

(e). Support Operations

(1) Training and Recruitment

During the month of April, the CIA field assessment team screened over 200 men in the Albanian Guard Company in Germany and selected 66 individuals judged best qualified for agent infiltration. In May the assessment team paid a visit to the IRO Lavrien Camp in Greece, where it selected 63 prospects for operational training. Also during May a list of candidates for the next training class was approved by the National Committee for Free Albania, but training was delayed because of the presence of Bulgarian trainees in the center. Since 11 June, 16 Albanians have been undergoing guerrilla warfare training in the BOFIEND covert school in Germany. Following completion of the training, which is scheduled for about 12 July, these agents will be moved to Greece. Fourteen Albanians are currently undergoing W/T training for operations in the late summer.

(2) Assignment of Personnel

A number of personnel are in training and process for immediate assignment overseas. Their addition to the BOFIEND staff, which was augmented in June to strengthen the BOFIEND Broadcasting Vessel staff and the training staff of the covert school in Germany, will virtually complete the BOFIEND Table of Organization.

(3) Facilities and Installations

With the acquisition on 3 April of a new training center in Germany as an addition to the Hambuechen Estate, EE-I training facilities have been considerably improved. The training center has been placed under the administrative control of EE-3. Albanian and Bulgarian training classes must alternate in using the available facilities, but it is considered that these are adequate for BOFIEND purposes. Some consideration has been given to moving the BOFIEND training center to Greece, but as yet no decision has been made.

The BOFIEND Radio Broadcasting Vessel, Juanita, was forced to delay trial operations until mid-May largely as a result of damages incurred during the trans-Atlantic crossing. After fifteen days of test cruising in the Ionian sea, it was decided by the [] to suspend operations until a number of technical difficulties could be overcome and a system of operation [] the visit to Athens of [] and [] late in June.

(4) Agreements with Friendly Powers

In April, a general plan for the infiltration of Albanians over the Greek border was agreed upon by British, Greek and OPC representatives in Athens.

During [] recent stay in London, he discussed with the British Services on an exploratory basis the entire Albanian situation and in particular the question of broadening the Albanian National Committee. These conversations will be renewed on his return visit from the Eastern Mediterranean in the hope that early agreement regarding our future joint policy on Albania will be reached.

(5) Coordination

On 7 April a meeting of key BOFIEND field officers in Germany was called by the Branch Chief to explore avenues of action regarding Albania during the coming months. It was decided to extend considerably the original plan for the infiltration of eight to ten four-man teams plus several smaller teams for special tasks.

A conference of BOFIEND personnel was held in Athens on 7-8 May to review the present status of activities between the []

[] together with [] undertook in June an extensive field survey trip with the aim of discussing policies and the 1951 operation schedule with our representatives in the field and to improve further coordination between Headquarters and the [] BOFIEND activities comprised an important aspect of [] agenda.

During the period, EE-I Headquarters strengthened its coordination with the NCFE with respect to the latter's direction of the National Committee for a Free Albania through a number of visits to New York by Headquarters personnel. The necessary prerequisite that Headquarters guidance for the NCFE must be dependent on close policy coordination with both the Department of State and the British Services represents a serious difficulty in establishing smooth and rapid coordination between Washington and the NCFE. Establishment of the NCFE Washington office in June has already resulted in some improvement in controlling the NCFE's understandable impatience.

(6) Planning

A study on the implications of Yugoslav maneuvers in Albania with respect to our own policies was prepared in June by the Branch Plans Section to serve as a basis for a current evaluation of Yugoslav intentions toward the Hoxha Government and the NCFE.

An exchange of views took place in June between the State Department and EE-I regarding the possibility that an UNSCOB investigation of subversive operations against Albania from Greece might cause embarrassment to both the U. S. and Greek Governments. Although a growing interest in such activities on the part of certain members of the UNSCOB team in Greece constitutes a real danger to OPC operations, it is the opinion of [] that the situation is not yet critical. [] The State Department has been asked, however, to block any serious investigation and to consider the possibility of discontinuing UNSCOB.

A detailed study on the nature, functions, and control mechanism of the National Committees, with specific reference to the Albanian National Committee, was completed during the period and is now serving as a guide with respect to Committee matters.

e. JBEDICT

(1) The purpose of this Project is to establish an OPC command, guidance, survey and logistical support []

[] In addition to providing advance support for operations conducted against the Balkan Satellites, [] also has the responsibility for assisting in safeguarding U. S. strategic and political interests in Greece itself.

(2) This is a direct OPC undertaking, primarily operational-support in character but involving also subversive-paramilitary, PW-propaganda, political and economic-warfare operations, especially those of a continuing nature. Coordination with the British and Greek Intelligence Services is conducted on a tripartite basis.

(3) During the second quarter of 1951, the following progress was made in fulfilling the JBEDICT missions:

(a) Subversive-Paramilitary

The JBEDICT [] afforded extensive support to QKSTAIR and BOFIELD operations during the period.

The establishment of a stay-behind organization to function in the event that Greece is overrun is in the advanced planning stage. A series of three meetings of the TRIPARTITE Subcommittee on Stay-Behind Operations (consisting of one representative each from the U. S., British, and Greek Services) was held during the month of May to decide on the organizational, security, recruitment, training, and policy questions involved. The Greek Services, which have the executive responsibility for implementing "Plan K", have already worked out tentative solutions for many aspects of the problem. The Greek Plan calls for 2,500 men to conduct guerrilla operations, organized into 135 groups of which 31 will be so-called organizing groups and the remainder, "satellite" groups. For sabotage operations, the Greek General Staff tentatively estimates ten groups of no fixed strength, located in the major towns and cities, to be sufficient, and similarly, ten groups for propaganda purposes. It was the opinion of the Greek representative that both covert and overt propaganda activity should be initiated immediately. The resistance groups, whose command personnel will be selected from among the officers of the Home Defense Battalions, will be entirely separate from Army units and will be supplementary to the regular Army (Commando) groups operating behind the enemy's lines.

Surveys are being conducted with respect to the establishment on Greek territory of a training and holding area for two to three thousand Balkan personnel. A suitable island is being sought, and Greek concurrence on the project is presently being explored. The decision to set up such an area in Greece may, however, be reviewed as a result of tentatively encouraging developments elsewhere.

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

COPY 6 OF 7 COPIES
60918 -A

(b) PW-Propaganda Activity

Preliminary action has been taken with respect to the establishment of a news agency with a branch office in Athens. This agency

and will have business connections with private U. S. news gathering agencies

The agency will go under the name of the "European News Service" and will be connected with RFE in New York.

As a supplement to its psychological warfare activities, KR-I is presently exploring the possibilities of aiding a religious broadcasting company to establish a station in Greece for religious and cultural broadcasts beamed to the Balkan and Eastern European Satellites. This company has been operating for some time in the Far East with a highly effective propaganda line.

(c) Political Activity

OPC has been informed by Ambassador Peurifey in Greece, while the latter was in Washington, that he planned to ask for OPC assistance in connection with the Greek elections, tentatively slated for this fall. Recent developments in Greece suggest that the elections, for which no definite date has been set, may be precipitated and that emergency support from the OPC will be required.

Preparations have already been initiated for anti-Communist operations in the Greek labor and youth organizations, particularly in industrial and leftist areas in Greece.

(d) Economic Warfare

There has been no requirement for this activity in the past, but some effort along this line may be required to combat growing dissatisfaction among civil workers and agricultural producers.

(e) Support Operations

The steady increment of facilities and installations required to support the BCFLIND and QKSTAIR projects are adding to the administrative responsibilities of JBEDICT.

In this connection, progress has been made during this period toward completion of the staffing of the JMBDICT [] Additional quarters space have been rented to provide adequate office room.

[] entered on duty 27 April as []

One secretary has been added to the [] staff, and two indigenous persons, a letter drop and a W/T operator, have been granted clearance. Two other staff employees have arrived [] Other service personnel have been added.

Aside from the [] primary function as an advance support [] for operations into the Balkans, the specifically Greek operations [] are still largely in the planning and coordinating stage.

4. LCBUNNY

(1) The purpose of the Project is to ensure delivery of certain elements of assistance to support 35,000 guerrillas in Yugoslavia, with corollary operations in Albania and Northern Greece, in the event of a Soviet-Satellite attack and the collapse of organized Yugoslav defenses. The Project specifies the creation of a stockpile of 11,000 tons of arms and equipment at a North Africa base to be air and sea-lifted to the Yugoslav forces, and calls for the creation of a trained personnel pool to be utilized in the protection of U. S. strategic and political interests with respect to Yugoslavia in the event of an aggression.

(2) This Project, if approved, will be incorporated in CINCMEDM war planning for covert operations in the Eastern Mediterranean Area, with operational responsibility assigned to OPC. The Department of Defense will, in that event, contribute direct operational support in the form of an arms stockpile of U. S. origin, Naval assistance, and direct Air support for the air-lift through the intermediary of the [] AS yet, no coordination with the British Services is envisaged.

(3) Because of the Project's scope, approval by the Director of CIA has been held in abeyance until a decision is reached by the proper authorities regarding the magnitude of OPC operations to be undertaken. Meanwhile, the Project is being closely coordinated with the Department of Defense, and a revised version has been conveyed to CINCMEDM by [] for further coordination.

(4) Anticipating the Project's approval, but without making a definite commitment, EE-I has drawn up a Table of Organization and initiated a number of clearances.

e. BOSPEED

(1) This is a subproject under BOFIEND and calls for the purchase, equipping and operation of a vessel to be used for radio broadcasting beamed at Albania.

(2) This is a direct OPC undertaking, whose program comprises the preparation, editorial processing, and transmitting of black propaganda to Albania.

(3) As indicated under BOFIEND, the BOSPEED vessel has been forced to delay operations until further trial runs are conducted and a number of technical difficulties are eliminated. It is still hoped that the vessel can begin regular broadcasts in July.

f. FJMBDAL

(1) The purpose of this Project is the subsidization of the Trieste newspaper DEMOKRACIJA in the Slovene language, published in Trieste and designed to combat Communist influences in Trieste.

(2) This is an EE-I subsidy.

g. PBRUNNER

(1) The original Project, which called for the covert delivery to the Yugoslav Government of approximately \$1,200,000 worth of arms and supplies, was successfully completed on 1 May 1951, when the delivery left the United States aboard a Yugoslav vessel.

(2) On 21 June, an amendment to the original Project was submitted to OPC pursuant to a joint recommendation by the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff calling for a second shipment of arms and supplies to Yugoslavia on a covert basis, as envisaged in the original Project. Due to the publicity arising from the first shipment, it was decided to proceed on a modified covert basis, with two thirds of the shipment going out under regular U. S. Army packing, and the entire cost to be borne by the Department of Defense. The method of delivering the arms and supplies earmarked for the second covert shipment is presently under review as a result of further newspaper publicity.

h. CKBROLL

(1) Submitted for approval on 31 May 1951, this Project envisages the initiation of the Rumanian program along lines generally corresponding to CKSTAIR.

(2) This will be a direct OPC undertaking, whose program comprises subversive-paramilitary, PW-propaganda, political, economic warfare and support operations similar to those of CKSTAIR.

(3) Prior to final approval, no field operations have been undertaken. In the political field, which constitutes a vital prerequisite of the PW operations contemplated and which will have a significant influence on the recruitment of personnel and other support activities of a covert nature, continuing efforts are being made to unify the Rumanian refugee organizations into an effective political front and covert support arm. Although negotiations with the King proved fruitless in February, efforts to unite the secessionist Association for Free Rumanians and the royal-sponsored rump National Committee were made on several occasions in April and May through the intermediary of non-political emigres and interested Americans. A meeting was finally arranged on 1 June between Constantin Visoianu, president of the Committee, and Grigore Gafencu, one of the leaders of the Association. Although some progress has been achieved, each faction continues to hold essentially to its original position and as yet there is little evidence of any spirit of compromise. Major differences have been: (1) the position of each faction in any reconstituted Committee, (2) the role of the King in determining policies, and (3) the standing of opposition leaders in the proposed merger of the two bodies. Personality questions such as the inclusion of Carlos Davila have proved a serious stumbling block, but impressed by the urgency of impending operations, the rival factions appear inclined to minimize to some extent the strictly personal question. Other issues, such as the custodianship of the Committee funds and the relative political weight each faction will wield in any merger, appear of more serious consequences. Both factions have been invited to submit proposals regarding the form and composition of a future National Committee, whether under the present name or some neutral designation.

An important aspect of the present effort to establish a viable political front is the role and intentions of the King. Latest reports indicate that he has contacted the British Services and intends to spend at least the summer in England. The possibility of a developing rivalry between the British and U. S. services for the King's support, which would be reflected in the political attitudes of the two factions in the U. S., is presently receiving

serious consideration. Such a split would have considerable adverse effects on OPC's program for Rumanian operations, which are due to begin in the second half of 1951.

Establishment by the NCFE of a branch office in Washington has already proved valuable in permitting more frequent direct contacts with the President of the Rumanian National Committee, whose mistrust of the earlier NCFE attitude toward the King's Committee appears well-grounded. Coordination between EE-I and the NCFE representatives dealing with the Rumanian question has been greatly strengthened during the month of June.

In anticipation of final approval, the QIBROIL staff have begun the recruitment and selection of personnel. Two staff employees, one Intelligence Officer, and one Operations officer have reported for duty and are in training. Clearances have been obtained for two other operations officers, a communications instructor, the chief of the broadcast staff, three spotter-recruiters, and one translator. Present plans call for despatching the three broadcast staff personnel to Greece in the latter part of July to inaugurate PW activity. The first contingent of Operations and Intelligence Staff personnel is scheduled to depart in September. Recruitment of agents and establishment of the QIBROIL training school will follow as soon as the Rumanian refugee factions are organized into a covert support arm to screen, propose and recruit personnel. The need for high-calibre indigenous Rumanian operational personnel has already become apparent.

1. LCSCREAM

(1) This Project, which recommends the reinforcement of the BOPIEND-QKSTAIR by the addition of high-powered transmitting facilities capable of delivering an effective signal throughout the Balkan area and extending into the Ukraine and Caucasian Republics of the USSR, has been held in abeyance until a final decision has been reached regarding its feasibility in Greece.

(2) If approved, this Project would be a direct OPC undertaking for Psychological Warfare Radio transmissions. Coordination with the Greek Intelligence Service would be necessary; tentative Greek approval of the Project has already been obtained.

(3) Major obstacles to the implementation of this Project are: (a) the difficulty if not impossibility of providing cover for the extensive installation required, and (b) the lack of adequate available personnel to service a propaganda establishment of the scope required.

(4) The problems connected with LCSCREAM have been discussed with the [redacted] during [redacted] current sojourn in Athens.