

~~2~~
412

2nd August, 1950

To: []

From: []

I attach a copy of the draft minutes of your meetings in London during your recent visit. For the purposes of the record my Headquarters would like to have your agreement to them; alternatively, it would welcome corrections if the draft does not correspond with your understanding of any of the items involved.

[]

f
s.
it
nnel
up
ed

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Rome.

- 5. OGC's present intention is that, if and when the National Committee move, the propaganda sub-committee should move with them.
- 6. AGREED: In view of the above, that the present status quo should continue for the time being.

ECONOMIC WARFARE


- 7. [] pointed out that such methods as pre-emptive purchase are not possible in view of the fact that Albania's trade is confined to exchanges with the iron curtain countries. It would therefore be necessary to adopt more direct methods which could only be centred in Trieste. The possibilities are now being examined by a SIS representative. Some difficulty is foreseen in persuading General AIRBY to permit

/any form

100

VALUABLE

Summary of Conclusions reached at a Meeting held on 13th July, 1950,
at which were present:



TRAINING FACILITIES IN GERMANY

1. The arrangements made to date by OFC were explained. In view of the undertakings given to the American High Commissioner, direct contact between SIS representative and the Holding Camp from which parties for future infiltration are to be recruited will not be possible. It was pointed out to OFC representatives that we require as soon as possible up to fifteen recruits to be trained by us. [] explained that their own requirements do not make it possible for OFC to undertake the training commitment on our behalf. To facilitate the selection of recruits, a complete list of the personnel in the Holding Camp has been prepared, which will shortly be followed up by the detailed particulars of each individual.
2. OFC stated that their own training establishment would be ready to accept their own trainees towards the end of August.
3. AGREED: That the information mentioned in paragraph 1 above be supplied to SIS at an early date, and that the latter will send to Germany an officer to take physical possession of the recruits to be infiltrated by SIS after their selection, screening and medical examination, if operational conditions permit such infiltration this season.

LOCATION OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE for FREE ALBANIA

4. OFC feel that Rome is, for various reasons, not a satisfactory headquarters for the National Committee and SIS agree. No decision however as to where the National Committee should move to, if they do, can be arrived at for at least one month. SIS are doubtful whether any alternative site would not present even greater disadvantages than Rome.
5. OFC's present intention is that, if and when the National Committee move, the propaganda sub-committee should move with them.
6. AGREED: In view of the above, that the present status quo should continue for the time being.

ECONOMIC WARFARE

7. [] pointed out that such methods as pre-emptive purchase are not possible in view of the fact that Albania's trade is confined to exchanges with the iron curtain countries. It would therefore be necessary to adopt more direct methods which could only be centred in Trieste. The possibilities are now being examined by a SIS representative. Some difficulty is foreseen in persuading General ABBY to permit

/any form

any form of direct action, even with the sanction of higher authority, but when the situation has been more closely investigated an approach to him may become necessary. It was agreed that any action aimed at embarrassing and interfering with Albania's trade through Trieste would have to be carried out with the unofficial knowledge of AMG, by low level agents who would mostly be Italians.

8. AGREED: That further discussion of this subject should take place when more information has been collected.

The point will have to be borne in mind that the effect on the Albanian economy which such action might have may not in any case be very serious and may be outweighed by the difficulties likely to be encountered vis a vis AMG.

PROPAGANDA

9. It is still OFC's intention to appoint a propaganda expert to guide and stimulate the propaganda sub-committee. SIS requested that this appointment might be expedited.
10. The meeting was informed that OFC were setting up during the latter part of 1950 a black broadcasting station in Greece, working to a great extent on material to be supplied by the propaganda sub-committee. This project has been discussed by OFC with NIKOLOPOULOS and the Greek Army authorities, but not with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
11. It would be the propaganda sub-committee's task to provide material for:
- (a) The black broadcasting station.
 - (b) The leaflets on themes to be suggested by the joint OFC/SIS representatives with the National Committee for Free Albania.
 - (c) Manifestoes to foreign governments, UNO, etc.
- The sub-committee has already been asked to tackle (b) above (leaflets) and [] is in touch with a cartoonist in MILAN.
12. OFC's present intention is to use [] in connection with propaganda wherever he will be of most value. They welcome our giving him a short course of training in the basic principles of Communism and propaganda.
13. The urgent need for the text of a fourth leaflet was pointed out. It was explained that SIS propose to launch their first operation for distributing leaflets by balloon towards the end of this month and that at present material for one side of a leaflet only is available for a second operation.
14. AGREED:
- (a) That SIS pursue the recruitment of a cartoonist in order that we may have a second string available.
 - (b) That a subject for the fourth text referred to above be telegraphed to [] in Rome to ask the propaganda sub-committee to produce a text without delay.
 - (c) OFC and SIS will each print their own leaflets, whether in the form of printed text or cartoon, independently. Their efforts in this respect to be closely co-ordinated.

15. Various other forms of propaganda were discussed, such as the slipping of leaflets into consignments of goods going from Trieste into Albania; leaflets to be included with catalogues and other trade literature going into Albania from countries outside, which might be posted to addressees whose names would be supplied by the Committee and also be culled from, for example, telephone directories. It was agreed that the former type of addressee would require rather more special treatment than the latter. The advantage of this form of action might be to force the Albanian Government to establish a full censorship.
16. Another idea would be to stencil on containers of goods going to Albania some special device suitably symbolising the aims of the National Committee to liberate their country from the Communist yoke.
17. The points still outstanding in regard to the Propaganda Directive to be issued to [] and [] were discussed and finally settled. [] said that, immediately on his return to Washington, he would despatch to London copies of the Directive as finally agreed.

---ooo0ooo---

The Meeting was continued in the afternoon and was joined by [] and []

POLICY

18. [] remarked that there were two points of policy calling for discussion:-
- (a) The future of VALUABLE generally and the formulation of an operational plan.
 - (b) Policy in Greece in view of recent developments.
19. It was generally agreed that operational co-ordination was essential although as stated by [] VALUABLE and FIEND should be considered as separate operations, which were co-ordinated but not jointly conducted. It is understood, however, that each side will lend to the other such assistance as it may be able to give. For example, the Dakota to be used by OFC for infiltration by air might also carry out leaflet dropping raids; similarly the vessel to be used by SIS for infiltration by sea might be put at the disposal of OFC for sea operations.
20. It was common ground that [] and [] who are respectively responsible for the conduct of the operations, should be in the closest practicable contact and that meetings between them should take place at frequent intervals. [] stressed that in principle he desires to remain alongside the Committee wherever it may be located.
21. As regards an Operational Plan, OFC have asked the various groups within the military junta to submit a plan, the object of which would be to ensure that the whole of Albania will be effectively covered by the parties to be infiltrated. [] remarked that so far no time limit for VALUABLE/FIEND had been set by the Foreign Office or the State Department and that, if there were any serious intention of following up the present operations, the aim of which is mainly the collection of information, due warning would have to be given. since preparations for such larger follow-up would take time. [] said that the aim of our operations is to establish an

/internal


integral network of agents and to create conditions which would permit the exploitation of any situation which may seem favourable (at some unspecified future date) to the overthrow of the Communist or, rather, the Hoxha regime. Therefore the idea of a follow-up had never been completely abandoned by the Americans, and they have in fact initiated steps for the collection of arms and for the preparation of a census of Albanians who might be available in various countries for such a force. After some discussion of the requirements which a follow-up would entail,

22. IT WAS AGREED:

- (a) That [] will obtain a decision in Washington as to whether OFC propose to ask SIS what contribution the British could make towards GUSH. Such a request would enable SIS to approach the Foreign Office for a ruling on this larger question. Meanwhile, OFC and SIS will consider in greater detail what would be the military and naval requirements.
- (b) SIS will prepare an appreciation of the present situation as regards TITO vis a vis the Committee on the one hand, and the Hoxha regime on the other, as an aid in assessing the advantages and disadvantages of starting a larger follow-up operation.

---ooo0ooo---

A further Meeting took place on Friday morning, July 14th, at which were present:



23. [] gave an account of the recent events in Greece which have resulted in the postponement of the infiltration of the first two British sponsored parties of Albanians across the Greek/Albanian frontier. The Northern Epirote faction having learned through a leakage in Greek circles that this operation was on the point of being carried out, announced their determination to prevent it on the grounds that the men composing the two parties were enemies of Greece.

24. [] recounted interviews he had then had with General PAPAGOS on two occasions and with NIKOLOPOULOS in an attempt to clear this obstacle from which it became clear that the former fears the influence which the Northern Epirote faction wields in Greek politics and anticipates awkward questions being asked in the Greek Parliament about VALUABLE. [] had pointed out to him that objection to the infiltration or so-called "enemies of Greece" would in practice preclude the use of any Ballé Kombetar followers, one of the most important anti-Communist groups comprised within the Committee. The upshot of these interviews was that General PAPAGOS spoke to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who expressed the intention of discussing the matter with H.M. Ambassador.

25. It also emerged from these interviews that both General PAPAGOS and NIKOLOPOULOS were anxious to find out to what extent operations in Albania were jointly undertaken by the Americans and the British and how closely they were co-ordinated between the two. With the concurrence of [redacted] EC representative in Greece [redacted] told General PAPAGOS that close co-ordination existed. Both the latter and [redacted] NIKOLOPOULOS expressed the wish to have a talk with [redacted] and [redacted] together at some future date.

---oooOooo---