

3 May 1950

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Outstanding Issues of Operations, **REFINED-RESTAIR**

REFERENCE: 25 April 1950 Agenda on Outstanding Issues of Operations
REFINED-RESTAIR

- 1. The following persons attended subject meeting on 25 April:
- 2. All points on reference agenda were covered generally in the order outlined. All the significant developments and decisions are summarized below, including designations of offices responsible for continuing action.

RESTAIR

1. [] Apparatus

a. It was decided that it is somewhat premature at the present time to consider the means of testing [] apparatus, as the relationship with him has not been firmly established. [] pointed out for future consideration that OSO has offered to cross-check whatever OPC may ask [] to do.

b. The procurement of cut-outs to [] main agents abroad is under consideration at the present time by PB-1.

2. **PH Program**

a. Shortwave broadcasts and leaflet drops

(1) [] stated that the first mobile station to go on the air will be the one for broadcasts to the peasants. He also pointed out that the name of a fictitious organization as sponsor of the broadcasts was not desirable, since eventually the Hungarians will want some concrete proof of the existence of the organization. It was generally agreed that the sponsor should have some connection with the peasant movement, that the station should be presented as an action arm of some larger organization, and that exact identification with the MCFE or the

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Bulgarian National Committee would lead to unnecessary complications via a via [] It was therefore decided tentatively to use a name such as "Action Arm of the Committee for a Free Bulgaria". This name will not be the same as the existing Bulgarian Committee, but it will be close enough for Bulgarians to make the necessary inference.

In respect to the station which will broadcast the national communist line, the name "Radio Station Traicho Kostov" was suggested and approved. No attempt was made to tie this station in with an existing organization. If necessary this can be done at a later date.

[] will discuss this problem of sponsorship further with SADO.

(2) It was quickly agreed that the initial leaflets for KOSTAER should be prepared in the same name as the broadcasts by the radio station for the peasants. After considerable discussion it was likewise agreed that the first leaflet drop should be made subsequent to the first broadcasts in order to avoid telegraphing our punches. [] suggested that the problem of attracting the attention of the Bulgarian listening audience can easily be solved by putting our mobile stations on a frequency close to that of popular Bulgarian radio programs.

(3) In respect to the printing of these leaflets, it was decided that this should be done at first in the United States where facilities are available. Since this has been done in the past for other countries, there is no reason why it can not be done now for Bulgaria. When feasible, the printing may be shifted to Greece. [] agreed to look into the technical problems of doing this, particularly that of scheduling the printing.

As to the writing of the leaflets, general agreement was reached that the best way would be to have a capable Bulgarian do this, instead of having PH-II prepare the material in English and then have it translated. [] will look into this further.

All approved a tentative figure of 500,000 as the number of leaflets to be printed initially. However, [] will make further recommendations on this, if necessary, from the field. It was agreed that the first drops should be from chutes and not by bomb because it was felt that this kind of drop would be more convincing.

(4) The whole problem of procurement of the mobile transmitters for the clandestine broadcasts into Bulgaria was brought up and considerable dissatisfaction was expressed with the rate of progress. It was decided that the

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following steps will be taken to expedite the matter.

(a) An attempt will be made to establish top priority for procurement of this broadcasting equipment through OSO facilities. [] will immediately submit requirements on this material, including specifications not only on the most desirable equipment but also on alternative equipment which would be adequate for the job. [] will then write a memo to ADBSO for []'s signature requesting that top priority among all OFC projects be given by OSO to the procurement and assembling of this equipment for ESTAIR. As a result of this memo a direct channel will be established between [] of OSO and [] and OSO will be able to give a 'realistic' estimate of how long it will take to get the equipment ready for shipment.

(b) If this top priority cannot be established, or if the OSO 'realistic' estimate involves too long a time for procuring the equipment, then [] will explore the possibility of procuring satisfactory equipment more quickly through the Army Signal Corps or the Navy. All agreed that the only satisfactory and speedy way to work through the Army or Navy would be by high level contact with the appropriate office of the Department of Defense. It was generally felt that there is some likelihood that adequate equipment might be available in whole or in part in Greece at present, but that no attempt will be made to go into this until OSO has come up with its estimate.

b. All heartily agreed that a mailing and rumor campaign, including character assassination, is both feasible and desirable. It was suggested that this means, as well as leaflet drops and radio, could be utilized for creating economic warfare pressures against Bulgaria. [] of FD-VI was requested to follow up this suggestion and make recommendations.

c. General agreement was reached that it would be an excellent idea for VOA, when the time comes, to announce that its monitors have picked up a new short wave station in Bulgaria. FD-II and FD-I will explore how VOA's cooperation has been secured in the past.

d. It was agreed that research will be undertaken on the

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desirability of using medium wave broadcasts as quickly as possible and simultaneously with the laying on of shortwave broadcasts.

a. [] stated that he will explore the present status of HCFE broadcasts with SABC.

3. WFC Hubs

a. For the next few months a decision of an overt holding area for Bulgarians will be held in abeyance, as no one thought that it would be necessary to procure such an area for the selection and training of the initial agents to be sent into Bulgaria. It was agreed that small safe houses in Greece will be sufficient in the first stages of the operation. [] saw no reason why such houses could not be readily procured, and stated that his main problem would be getting a good Bulgarian to aid him in recruiting agents.

b. [] raised the problem of getting agents into Greece from other countries, such as France. No solution was reached. [] suggested that an overt holding area would give justification for the movement of Bulgarians into Greece. It was suggested that U. S. passports might be used, but it was pointed out that this had never been done in the past. Previously Bulgarians have been given IRO passports.

The problem of communicating with infiltrated agents was raised. Because of the technical difficulties involved, it was decided that air-ground radios should not be used, except possibly for border crossings. [] pointed out that the need for this equipment should be included in the memo to SABC mentioned above.

c. The desirability of using Yeev is now being explored, and PB-1 is waiting to receive the OSO files on him. [] stated that the matter of contacting Velchev has been settled and that an approach to him will be made in the next week or so. It was understood that we will let Velchev operate in the way best for him, which will probably be among the military.

4. Economic Warfare

a. [] stated that PB-VI is looking into what might be done against Bulgaria in the near future, but is unable to recommend any specific measures which would not depend upon the establishment of a net first. PB-VI will, however, submit some suggestions pertinent to economic warfare. [] pointed out previously, PB-VI was asked to consider the use of [] channels for economic warfare purposes.

5. Other

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a. There was very little discussion of the Palestine Bulgarian newspaper proposal. [] commented that he did not feel the Bulgarian emigres in Palestine were likely to be of much operational use to UFG. AMB-I will explore this matter further with SADO and OSG.

b. It was agreed that there is no necessity to go into detail now on the problem of liaison with the Greek and Turkish services. [] will explore the issue of contacting the Greeks when he arrives. [] and AMB-I will determine what progress Messers. [] and [] made with the Turkish services.

c. The problem of Tite is a very complex one and is being explored by AMB-I. Consideration of cooperation with Tite is premature at this time.

d. [] said that the procurement of necessary documents and operational equipment should be possible. No further discussion was necessary.

e. No new field personnel have been signed up, but some contacts have been made.

REFINED

1. [] commenced the discussion of the REFINED agenda by stating that OSG had shown him a copy of the Greek plan for operations into Albania. He summarized the main points of significance in the plan and said that OSG would make most of the details available through channels. No general agreement was reached as to whether the Greek plan throws a completely new light on Albanian operations, although [] felt that it might affect them significantly.

2. [] stated that the problem of planes for air drops was now primarily a matter of finding our own landing strip and that [] feels that the most secure plan for using the planes is to have them take off and land at the same field. It was agreed that the sterilized air-drop planes should be based in Greece, except possibly in the case of the air-drop of agents into Albania. In that case, it was felt that it would be wiser for political reasons to have the plane take off from an Italian field. This could be arranged by having the sterilized plane fly from its base in Greece to a suitable base in Italy. There it would pick up the agents, make the drop, and then return to its field in Greece. OSG has indicated that it might be able to make arrangements for an adequate field in Italy in a very short time. The Island of Rhodes was suggested as a possible base in Greece.

The problem of crews was discussed in some detail and agreement

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was reached that, for security reasons, it will not be desirable to use Polish crews recommended by the British. Instead, the possibility of using Yugoslav flyers, such as the ones who used to fly in the U. S. air corps, will be explored by ABB-I. A list of possible flyers will be prepared for FB-I by [redacted]. The possibility of using a sterilized American crew was suggested, but it was decided that this should be explored only as a last resort. One complicating factor which will have to be kept in mind is the necessity to 'check in' flyers who have not flown for some time.

It was decided that ABB-I should investigate the problem of cutting in the top Air Force officers in Greece on our air operations there against Albania and Bulgaria, and that FB-I should take up the problem of sterilizing the aircraft with [redacted].

3. In relation to the problem of training Pixies, it was agreed that Germany is the logical place for this. The main problem in training is the procurement of instructors. It was suggested that one way to solve this might be to send qualified personnel from Washington Headquarters on detached service for six weeks to do the training. FB-I will study this suggestion further.

Other important problems include the procurement of such material as packing containers, parachutes, and small arms. [redacted] pointed out that [redacted] told him General Van Fleet in Greece has a cache of small arms under his control. [redacted] will take this up in the field. FB-I will study the problem of procurement of packing containers, parachutes etc.

4. [redacted] stated that FB-VI has nothing in mind yet for economic warfare measures against Albania. [redacted] suggested that one-time sabotage operations in Trieste could be arranged, and ABB-I agreed to take immediate action on [redacted] proposal to send [redacted] there to sabotage Albanian ships.

5. In respect to the publication of an Albanian newspaper, it was agreed that ABB-I will continue to explore this matter.

6. [redacted] supplied FB-I with the name of a possible ship captain who has Panamanian papers and who says he can get a crew. It was felt that it might be both feasible and desirable to have the broadest ship fly the flag of Panama. It was agreed that the ship should be based in Greece and not in Italy. The problem of the difficulty of port clearance for commercial ships was pointed out, but there was little discussion of this point.

[redacted] raised strong objections to making any broadcasts from Italy to Albania. It was agreed that putting a shortwave transmitter on the boat in addition to the medium wave transmitter, seemed sound and should be included in the plans. [redacted] said the

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technical problem of doing this was only a matter of the size of the
best. [] It that PB-II would look into the matter of
PB themes for this shortwave transmitter.

7. [] pointed out that the French and Italians already
have representatives in Albania who might be able to check on the effects
of the broadcasts to that country.

8. It was agreed that the Italians should not be cut in on
these OPC operations beyond what is necessary to order to obtain
necessary facilities in Italy.

9. In relation to the Albanian leaflet drops, it was pointed
out that the first British drops are supposed to be in about three weeks.

JSS/CPA/asf

Distribution:

1 - # JSS
2 - # PB-I
3 - # PB-II
4 - # PB-VI
5 - # ANS/I File
6 - # ANS/I File
7 - # Registry
8 - # Registry

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