

TOP SECRET

15 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: GOP

1. The attached documents represent the results of conferences held with the British, for the purpose of planning with respect to Operation BOFIEND, from December 3 to December 7. The following documents are included:

a. Memorandum on general policy of FIEND Operation for transmission to the Department of State and the Foreign Office, dated December 6, 1949, drafted by [] and [], and revised by GOP, GPP and ADPC.

b. Comment by Mr. Joyce on a. above in transmitting Department of State approval.

c. Notes on operational plan for FIEND.

(1) Annex A (Infiltration), drafted [] and [].

(a) Addendum to Annex A (Fiend Operational Plan), drafted by [].

(2) Annex B (Propaganda), drafted by [].

(3) Annex C (Economic Action), not yet drafted.

d. FIEND Personnel Needs, drafted by [].

2. These documents, together with the proposal for the holding area in Germany and the base study, both yet to be drafted, constitute the new operational plan for BOFIEND.

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TOP SECRET

6 December 1949

MEMORANDUM

1. It has been agreed between the British and American Services that a reexamination of the status, objectives and conduct of the **FIEND-VALUABLE** Operation is timely and necessary.

2. As originally conceived and approved the **FIEND-VALUABLE** Operation had as its minimum objective the development of internal conflict in Albania sufficient to reduce materially the ability of Albania to support the Greek guerrillas. The maximum objective was the overthrow of the present Haxha Government. The maximum objective was considered to be desirable because:

- a. It would eliminate Albania as a base for the Greek guerrillas;
- b. It would deny to the Soviet military, air and naval forces bases in the Mediterranean;
- c. It would serve as a considerable psychological stimulus to other Eastern Europeans by demonstrating the possibility of removing a securely entrenched Communist dictatorship.

3. Since the initiation of the **FIEND-VALUABLE** Operation and the original formulation of its objectives, two major changes in the factors bearing on the operation and its objectives have occurred. The first is the cessation, for the moment at least, of guerrilla warfare in Greece and the second is the intensification of pressure by the Cominform upon the Tito regime, together with the corresponding shift in United States-British policy toward Tito directed to maintaining that regime as a stumbling block to further Soviet expansionist designs. In addition, the existence of such an operation and the fact of British and American interest therein has become widely known.

4. The above-mentioned major changes do not, of course, affect the desirability of the objectives set forth in sub-paragraphs b. and c. under 2. above. They do bring Albania into new focus, however, because its future is inextricably bound up with that of Yugoslavia as much as it is with that of Greece.

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TOP SECRET

- 2 -

5. These new factors do create additional dangers, notably the possibility that widening knowledge of the existence of FIEND in its original concept may lead to very considerable conflict between Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, and possibly France, as to the nature of any regime which might be set up in Albania should the maximum objective of FIEND be achieved. Pending the development of overall policy in respect to the nature of a regime to replace the Hoxha regime, the United States and British Governments would not be able to present any program vis-a-vis other interested governments which might minimize such conflicts.

6. At the present time, we have in existence a Committee for Free Albania, which has so far embarked on no activities in support of the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation. The announcement of its formation in August 1949, however, created a considerable stir on the Albanian scene and its continued existence constitutes a factor of some importance. Propaganda activities to date have been confined to BBC and VOA broadcasts on a limited scale. During the past six months the British Service trained and infiltrated into the southern portion of Albania six teams of Albanian refugee agents whose primary function was to obtain information as to conditions inside Albania upon which we could base decisions for future operations. The results of this reconnaissance suggest that continued infiltrations of agents, particularly into Central and Northern Albania, would have reasonable prospects of success in terms of survival and of profit in terms of reconnaissance and potential political action.

7. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that the objectives and future conduct of the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation be reformulated to take account of new developments, as follows:

a. Objectives

(1) We have so far carried out certain limited operational reconnaissances in Albania intended to discover the prospects of upsetting the present Soviet-dominated regime. Our activities should now be directed in such manner as will best enable us to exploit the new situation created by the Tito/Cominform dispute to our advantage. Our primary objective with respect to Albania is, therefore, the establishment and maintenance, both inside and outside Albania, of capabilities which will allow us maneuverability in a developing situation and which will permit us to exploit any developments which may occur with respect to either Yugoslavia or Albania.

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COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES

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TOP SECRET

- 3 -

(2) Action taken with respect to Albania should be designed to weaken or eliminate the usefulness to the Securiform of Albania as a base of operations against Yugoslavia, always bearing in mind the possible repercussions in Yugoslavia of such action. The operation should be continuously reviewed in the light of such considerations.

b. Operations

(1) Future operations should be conducted so as to give the impression that they are undertaken for intelligence purposes, adopted as a matter of necessity in view of the long record of the Albanian Government of violations of international law and equity and her refusal to cooperate with other nations in preserving peace.

(2) We should continue to support and guide the Committee for Free Albania as a potential factor in the Albanian political scene, as a rallying point for opposition to the Hoxha Government, and as a front for propaganda and other operational activities.

(3) We should immediately undertake propaganda activities by all possible channels, including our agents in Albania, clandestine broadcasts in the name of the Committee for Free Albania, occasional leaflet drops, deception rumors, and overt press activity.

(4) We should immediately undertake action in the economic field to exacerbate the already difficult economic situation in Albania, and consequently weaken the hold of Government on the Albanian people and reduce its ability to support operations into neighboring countries. Such operations would include measures to further restrict the flow of supplies into Albania from outside countries and would be supported by psychological warfare activities designed to worsen the internal economic situation.

(5) We should recruit, under conditions of proper security, a small reserve of Albanian manpower, from among the Albanian refugees, for continued use as may become necessary.

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COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES
35484/1

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

(6) We should abandon any concept of "shock-force" for eventual use in creating resistance.

(7) We should continue the infiltration of agents into Albania, particularly into the central and northern portions of the country, for the primary purpose of gaining operational information and establishing contacts, and for ultimate use in exploiting the situation inside Albania in the light of future developments. The personnel for this activity should be drawn from the reserve mentioned in sub-paragraph (5).

(8) Our experience to date, particularly in connection with the problems of base location and of operational security, suggests that we must examine the problem of participation by certain other Governments in the FIBRE-VALUABLE Operation. It may be necessary in technical support of these operations to seek the cooperation of the [redacted], presenting the operations, in accordance with 7. b., sub-paragraph (1), as designed to procure intelligence.

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COMMENT WRITTEN BY MR. JOYCE ON "Memorandum on FIELD-VALUABLE
Operation, dated 6 December 1949" (CIA Control Number 35484/1).

"We are in general agreement with the attached paper. With
reference to paragraph 8, we suggest that any approach to the
[] and [] be made on a technical level with respect to
technical projects. Our Mission Chiefs in these countries should,
of course, be prepared, if questioned, to state that the operation
is confined to obtaining intelligence."

/s/ NPJ

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COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES

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TOP SECRET

NOTES FOR

AN OUTLINE PLAN FOR FUTURE CONDUCT OF FLEND/VALUABLE

INTRODUCTION

1. We note that the general policy for the future conduct of operations as set out in our paper TS 35484/1, dated 6 December 1949, is approved. The policy envisages action under these heads:

- (a) Infiltration of further operational reconnaissance parties.
- (b) Propaganda.
- (c) Economic action.

2. We deal with the above in the three attached annexes.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES

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Serial 8

TOP SECRET

ANNEX "A"

INFILTRATION OF OPERATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PARTIES

A. Operational Concept -

1. We envisage the establishment of a holding camp for a maximum of 300 agents. This camp would be overt and would have a proportion of agents' families in it.

2. From this holding camp we would propose to extract small operational parties of from four to six agents for training in selected training bases.

3. Parties would be infiltrated into Albania from these training bases either direct or through some intermediary staging base. The existence of such a staging base depends on the proximity of the training base to Albania and the means of infiltration, i.e., whether by sea or by air.

4. The number of parties to be trained and infiltrated over any given period would be determined in accordance with circumstances prevailing at the time. The duration of the operation cannot now be estimated, and any dates arrived at in connection with operational planning for the number of parties to be infiltrated into Albania at any one time bear no relation to the culmination of disruptive action, but rather to morale and other considerations affecting the agents.

B. Holding Camp -

1. A holding camp will be established in the American Zone of Germany subject to review by the American authorities in their Zone. The preparation of a scheme to this end will be an American responsibility.

2. We should aim at establishing this camp for 20-30 agents by 31 January 1950.

C. Training Bases -

1. The present Malta base will become available again by about the end of March 1950 provided we can remove the 15-20 Albanians now there (these are four of the parties originally infiltrated during the autumn of 1949). The organization and running of this base will be a British responsibility.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES

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2. One training base is not enough. A decision has therefore got to be taken without delay on where other training bases are to be established. The possibilities are:

- (a) The U. S. Zone of Germany,
- (b) French North African territories and Corsica,
- (c) Italy and
- (d) Greece.

There is also the possibility of using certain British controlled territories in East Africa. These are, however, very removed from the scene of operations and will involve considerable commitments in maintenance, transportation and final infiltration.

3. The study of where these additional training bases should be will be undertaken in the first instance by the Americans. As soon as tentative proposals are evolved, the study and subsequent planning should be undertaken jointly.

D. Infiltration -

1. We have at present only one means of infiltrating parties into Albania, i.e., a small and slow yacht. Depending where the operational bases are finally established, we shall require either, or both, aircraft and a fast M.T.B. type craft. An early decision is required on the procurement of these vessels since crews have got to be recruited and trained. There are now only some three months left before the operational season begins.

E. Communications between Base and Field -

1. Communications between field and base should be by W/T. It will take from three to six months to train Albanian field operators in W/T. We should therefore begin now.

2. As an alternative means of communication we should arrange for the operation of V.H.P. This will entail the use of two aircraft additional to any used for infiltration.

BEFRIEND OPERATIONAL PLAN

A. Factors On Which Operational Plan Must Be Based -

1. It must be assumed that neither the Albanian leaders nor the Albanian agents can be trusted to keep any information of any sort secret.
2. Operational training must be conducted in part at least by Americans or British.
3. Individual Albanians will not allow themselves to be trained or infiltrated into the country without the knowledge and approval of their own leaders.
4. The knowledge that the United States is supporting the operation is a source of considerable pride to the Albanians participating in the operation and it is certain that Albanians infiltrated into the country will use American and British sponsorship as a major inducement in getting indigenous^s Albanians to support their operation.

B. Security Requirements -

1. The operation must be set up in a manner which will prevent any documentary evidence of any sort concerning American or British participation falling into the hands of the Communists.
2. Adequate operational security must be provided in order to protect to the maximum extent possible the operations going on within the country.

C. Proposal -

1. A holding area will be set up in the U. S. Zone of Germany capable of handling up to three hundred Albanians. No operational training will be conducted at this area and it must be run in such a way that complete access to reporters and other investigators can safely be given on a moments notice. It must be assumed that the camp will be penetrated by Communist agents. The purpose of this camp will be primarily to provide a holding area so that operational bodies can be readily available for training and infiltration as required. The camp will also provide the opportunity

TOP SECRET

to observe and evaluate individuals for future use. Certain types of general political indoctrination can be conducted informally.

2. Operational training will be conducted on a completely clandestine basis. Individual parties of not more than five each will be trained intensively for two or three weeks in isolated houses in Germany and possibly Austria. These Albanians would be under constant surveillance and would not be permitted to leave the training house. Training would be conducted by one or more American or British trainers in civilian clothing, together with one Albanian interpreter. After training is completed the party will be moved directly to an air field where they will be loaded at night into an aircraft for shipment to Malta for sea infiltration or direct drop into Albania. If drop-off operation is to be run, aircraft will be unmarked and piloted by Polish crews. British will be asked for landing facilities in Klagenfurt if refueling is necessary.

D. Implication of Security Regulations -

1. In the event Albanian agents are captured, it must be assumed that they will tell all they know. They will state that they have American and British support and, in order to substantiate this, they will describe the location of the overt holding area and will identify the men operating it. They will attempt to describe the location of the covert training house and will attempt to identify the individuals who conducted the training. They will attempt to describe the transportation from Germany to Albania and the route followed.

2. In this event, we should be perfectly willing to admit the location of the holding area and to allow anyone to inspect the area. However, there should be no way of locating the covert training house. If it is discovered, it will be by that time completely empty and the identity of the British and American officers who conducted the training cannot be known. United States reply would in general be that Albanians are being held in a camp in Germany but that no illegal activities of any sort are taking place there. United States should deny all further charges as being complete fiction.

TOP SECRET

COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES

35482 Serial 72

TOP SECRET

7 December 1949

ANNEX B.

THE EXECUTION OF PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST ALBANIA

I. Methods

- a. The activities of the Free Albania Committee should be guided and exploited by a public relations expert who should assist the Committee in:
 - (1) Issuing statements on its activities;
 - (2) Giving publicity to meetings, trips, and interviews which Committee members may undertake;
 - (3) Attempting to reorient and influence the Mosha elements among the Albanian communities outside Albania.
- b. A continual series of Albanian-language BBC broadcasts should be focused on the work of the Free Albania Committee. At the same time, VOA should be furnished material on Albania suitable for exploitation by the existing Voice broadcasts to eastern European nations.
- c. A craft carrying a clandestine medium-wave radio transmitter should broadcast from the Adriatic two to three times daily for approximately 15 minutes, to be repeated for one to three hours, in the name of the Free Albania Committee. The announcer's voice should be from records in order to avoid any possible deviation from the script and to insure the greatest degree of security. The broadcasts should be news-casts with emphasis on Albania, the Balkans, and Europe. Commentaries and musical programs may be sent whenever necessitated by circumstances.
- d. A series of leaflet drops over strategic points in Albania should be arranged. These leaflets should give the latest news and should create the impression that the Free Albania Committee is a well-organized, efficiently functioning body whose efforts are thoroughly planned and amply supported.
- e. The possibility of leaflet drops coordinated with supply drops to our agents and co-workers in Albania should be kept in mind and reviewed thoroughly at a time when such activity may become feasible.

TOP SECRET

COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES

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II. Organization

- a. The exploitation of the Free Albania Committee by the public relations expert should be undertaken at its headquarters under the guidance and supervision of the US/UK Joint Policy Committee in Washington.
- b. An Executive Centre should be established in Athens, Greece, under the general direction and control of the US/UK Joint Policy Committee and under the direct responsibility of the US/UK field-chiefs for the operation. The Joint Policy Committee should furnish these chiefs with a statement as to the general PW objectives and themes, and the timing required in relation to the overall operation SOFLEND. It is assumed that provision is made below for a minimum effective job. Expansion of activities can be expected to follow proven effectiveness. The Centre should have the following functions:
 - (1) To furnish daily guidance to the writer/editor aboard the radio ship.
 - (2) To prepare transcribed broadcasts based on all available sources of information such as Albanian newspapers, reports received from our teams, and monitored radio broadcasts. The recordings of these broadcasts in the form of commentaries may also include musical entertainment. They should be picked up by the craft on its visits to the base and be used to complement the daily broadcasts produced aboard the ship.
 - (3) To prepare and print such leaflets, pamphlets and other publications as necessary.
 - (4) To monitor broadcasts emanating from the radio craft, broadcasts from satellite sources, and to monitor and evaluate other sources such as newspapers, journals or periodicals.
 - (5) To transmit expeditiously to the Joint Policy Committee weekly reports on broadcasts and other PW activities which should include an outline of the prepaganda lines used and an evaluation of their effectiveness.
- c. Aboard the craft, daily broadcasts should be written by a writer/editor guided by daily instructions from the Executive Centre, and using, in addition, monitored information.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

III. Operational Requirements

- a. **The Free Albania Committee:** A public relations expert should be recruited by the U.S. and assigned to the Committee.
- b. **The Executive Centre:** Personnel for this unit should consist of:
 - 1 editor - to be recruited by the United States.
 - 1 assistant editor - to be recruited by the British.
 - 2 sub-editor/announcers (English-speaking Albanians) - one each to be recruited by the U.S. and the British.
 - 2 monitors (Albanian-speaking) - to be recruited by the U.S.
 - 1 clerk - to be recruited by the British.
 - 2 typists - to be recruited by the Free Albania Committee. (?)
 - 2 multilith press operators - to be recruited by the U.S.

The following equipment should be available in the Centre:

2 wire recordings and complete play-back sets.

Radio receiving equipment.

2 multilith presses (type 1250).

Paper and ink supplies for leaflet printing.

The exact types of this equipment should be discussed with the technical experts in Washington.

- a. **The Radio Craft:** The following personnel (excluding the crew) are needed for the craft:
 - 1 editor/writer to be recruited by
 - 1 assistant editor/announcer (English-speaking Albanian) to be recruited by
 - 2 code clerk to be recruited by
 - 2 operator/maintenance technicians to be recruited by the U.S.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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TOP SECRET

The following equipment should be installed aboard the craft:

A medium-wave transmitter.

Receiving equipment.

Wire recording and play back equipment.

Power generator.

The details pertaining to the type of equipment should be discussed with the technical expert in Washington.

d. Miscellaneous

The field-chiefs at the Executive Centre should be regularly supplied with Albanian newspapers, monitored reports from our teams, and reports on interrogations of Albanian refugees.


TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

BGFLEND PERSONNEL NEEDS

The following is a sketch outline of requirements, personnel and material for Project BGFLEND.

A. PERSONNEL



Chief

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Operations Officer
Commo Officer
Air Officer | Intelligence Officer
Supply Officer
Administrative Officer
Handyman
Secretary |
| 2. Political Officer
Propaganda Staff | |

Welfare Camp

U. S. Administrative Officer

Pixie Staff

Training Camps

W/T School

Administrative Officer
Instructor
Interpreter-Instructor
Cook

Two Agents Schools

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 1. UHF: | Administrator
Commo Instructor
Interpreter-Instructor
Airborne Pixie speaker
Cook |
| 2. GENERAL: | Administrative Officer
Two Instructors
Interpreter
Cook |

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES

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TOP SECRET

- B. LIAISON
 - * Malta
 - * Klagenfurt (?)
- C. COMMO PLANES
 - USAF Crews (2)
 - Commo Maintenance
 - Pixie speakers (2) - (Will it be necessary to have a Commo man on each flight in addition to the Pixie Operator?)
- D. PROPAGANDA BOAT
 - Crew (British)
 - Editor-writer
 - Pixie speaker
 - Commo man
 - Codist
- E. DROPPING PLANE
 - Crews (Polish)
 - Air Officer (British - ?)
 - Packer-supply sergeant (British)
 - U.S. Liaison - conducting Officer
- F. SEA INFILTRATION
 - Crews (British)
 - * U. S. Liaison - conducting Officer
- G. COMMITTEE
 - U. S. Liaison
- H. COMMO SHT.
 - UHF Equipment
 - Operational and Training
 - W/T Equipment
 - Operational and Training
 - W/T School and Instructor
 - UHF School and Instructor
 - Base station for W/T Training
 - Plane and Airfield for UHF Training

TOP SECRET

Base station for W/T Operators
Base [] for UHF Equipment and Personnel
Comm staff Officers []
Signal plans for UHF and W/T
Communication with Propaganda Boat
Receiving sets (For BBC and Clandestine station)

I. SUPPLY SECT.

Concentrated foods
Weapons, German and Italian (personal)
Maps
Money
Matches, indigenous
Clothing
Knives, flashlights
Needles, thread, matches, etc.
Arms and explosives for Propaganda boat

J. DOCUMENTS SECT.

Identity cards
Work permits
Ration stamps

K. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING

Weapons
Map reading
Supply and personnel drop reception
Local intelligence briefing
Reporting
Organization
Exfiltration rendezvous

L. BRIEFING

Disaster Signal
Exfiltration
Specific Targets
Specific Contacts

M. PLANNING, OPERATIONAL

Recruiting schedule
Areas to be covered
Training schedule

TOP SECRET

Briefing

General

Specific (contacts, individual, etc.)

Exfiltration, individual

Exfiltration, general

LGFLAKE catch-all

M. PLANNING, POLITICAL

Committee

Military question

Participation, operational and propaganda

Propaganda

Themes, concepts

-4-

~~TOP SECRET~~

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