

7 September 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: GCP
FROM: DCG
SUBJECT: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [] []
Cover Review and Recommendations.

1. Following a meeting on 3 September 1949 of a panel for ~~TOP SECRET~~ composed of Messrs. [] [] it was requested by [] [] that a review be prepared on the above subject.

2. In this connection attention is called to the project outline for ~~TOP SECRET~~ in which the basic cover and security requisite is stated: "The means to be employed in the accomplishment of the objectives -- are all subject to the restriction that U. S. participation shall not be provable."

3. [] [] cover for phase #1 of ~~TOP SECRET~~ had as its objective the explanation of his presence and identity in Mediterranean countries and the []
The cover story to satisfy these objectives was [] []

4. At the time [] [] received operation/control from [] [], relations with certain Albanians had reached the stage at which U. S. Government interest was apparent. For that reason disguise of this fact was determined to be impracticable. Instead, emphasis was to be placed on the reliability and security of eventual committee members.

5. During the course of the development of phase #1, [] [] responsibilities, because of the necessity of expediting action and because of lack of assistance in the field, increased his activities to a degree not wholly in harmony with his cover story. At times his contacts with Albanians and on the other hand with official U. S. persons reached such a degree of frequency as to impair the credibility of his cover story. Unforeseen problems in forming the committee, of which Leg was not the smallest, required vigorous methods which, in fact, confirmed to the Albanians [] [] U. S. Government backing; and its rumor was broadcast among refugees Albanians by telephone, letter and word of mouth. However, without this confirmation the [] [] [] [] not have acted.

6. Since Washington policy would not permit the direct use of the New York Committee for Free Europe as sponsor in order to dissuade U. S. Government interest in the event of a challenge, the implication of official support was inevitable.

7. Withholding proof of this implication was ~~TOP SECRET~~ and ~~TOP SECRET~~ Cardinal [] [] cover and security requirement for ~~TOP SECRET~~. To support this it ~~TOP SECRET~~ necessary

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to deny proof of any connection between phase #1 and phase #2 (Valuable) activities. [] constitutes a most available point for proving contact between BOPIED and the U. S. Government. In the event of charges being made in the press and through official channels, righteous denial of such charges by us would not be sufficient for we may be sure that convincing evidence will not be introduced until the American line of denial is committed. Thus, it is imperative that [] cover story be strengthened and that his subsequent activities be such as will neither by fact nor by logical implication deny its validity.

3. At present a definitive evaluation of [] security situation vis-a-vis BOPIED and the U. S. Government is not possible because of incomplete information. Such an appreciation will be prepared from the three pertinent sources: FB I's cable and operational file, OSO's C.E. sources, and [] report on his return. Pending such a report it is, however, reasonable, now that phase #1 is completed, to establish the following resolutions in support of confirming [] cover story.

a. That [] while in Washington have no overt contact with CIA representatives and that his contacts with other branches of the government be scaled to what might []: [] [] based on his recent sojourn in Italy and Greece, and seeking official approval for publication.

b. That he not become CIA's contact with members of the Albanian National Committee.

c. That [] be separated from BOPIED. Inasmuch as BOPIED now enters the more active phase #2 it is desirable that phase #2's activities not be associated with []. His absence from the Mediterranean Area, [] may be expected to confuse observers, strengthen his cover and withdraw the Americans from phase #2 since Valuable type operations are to be conducted under British cover and since it is hoped that defected or captured team members will not be able to prove U. S. implication.

d. []

e. [] is essential to his cover. His early appearance as a staff member at CIA, Washington or with a CIA agency in the field in a semi-covert status, or with a [] would inevitably connect his past activities with CIA or with the U. S. Government. His covert use by CIA is not practicable for he is by now sufficiently known to the British, French, Greek and Italian services to attract their interest and attention wherever he might appear.

3.

f. That in order not to forfeit his knowledge and experience, he be maintained [] on a consultant basis in confirmation with an operational security plan.

[DCO]

cc: FB I
DCO

DCO/[]/md