SECRET

12 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Final Report on the JUANITA's Mission.

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The Broadcasts

1. Separate from all consideration of the Juanita's ability to execute its assignment, base men concerned with propaganda into Albania questioned the wisdom of the Juanita's embarking on her broadcasts. One factor lay at the bottom of this doubt. The field's experience had taught them that the Albanians interpret any anti-Communist propaganda which reaches them as an assurance of pending large scale assistance, and further, as an exhortation to physical resistance.

2. The danger therefore exists that the institution of regular broadcasts into Albania might work against the overall objective, i.e. to keep the Albanian population at the bubbling point of restiveness, thereby preventing the Communist regime from consolidating its control over the country, without provoking premature physical resistance and its resultant tragedies.

3. These thoughts were fully discussed. They did not, however, delay action in testing the Juanita's equipment, which was the first necessity on my arrival.

Theory

1. At the time the JUANITA was purchased there was no certainty that permission would be granted by any country for her to operate within that country's coastal waters. It was understood, therefore, that the broadcasts might have to be conducted from open sea, that the vessel obtained for this role would have to be sufficiently seaworthy for open sea operations, and the equipment capable of broadcasting from a considerable distance at sea.

2. The JUANITA was equipped, accordingly, to broadcast medium wave into Albania, utilizing skip wave. (This skip wave, unlike the ground wave which exists both day and night, becomes effective as darkness falls and the ionosphere descends, and becomes ineffective as the sun rises and the ionosphere ascends.) During the night

hours

hours the beam from the antenna strikes the ionosphere and bounces back to earth, permitting reception much farther from the transmitter than is normally possible by ground wave--which follows the ground sixty or seventy miles or so, depending on terrain, and grounds out.)

3. Washington Communications office estimated that for strongest reception the JUANITA should broadcast 175 to 300 miles from its target.

4. This fact, that the JUANITA was intended to broadcast medium wave--skip wave into its target from a distance of 175-300 miles, came to light during a meeting with Washington commo men two days before my departure for Athens, and was cabled immediately [redacted] On arrival in Athens I found that the men [redacted] (both operations and commo) had apparently been unacquainted with this intention till the arrival of the cable. They expressed surprise, in fact, that Washington intended to depend on skip wave, for they believed skip wave had never been depended on before for medium wave broadcast.

Communications equipment

1. The communications equipment aboard the Juanita, I am told, was of the highest order. The camouflage of the installation was excellent. Organization personnel who knew the equipment was aboard have been unable to locate it after examining the vessel from stem to stern. The space occupied by the concealed transmitting room has never been noticed by inspecting customs officials. In fact the only person who ever inquired about it is a shipyard worker in the United States who had worked on the yacht several years before, remembered that the space had been a dining salon, and wanted the room opened in order to secure bolts which were run through the bulkhead. (He was told to secure his bolts in another way, that the room was packed to the overhead with food stuffs for the ocean crossing, and could not be unpacked.) The antennas were so blended with the rigging that deck inspection did not reveal them.

2. The equipment was built for shore installation, however, which permits immovable foundation. The rolling, pitching, and constant vibration of the vessel caused abuse to the equipment which it was not built to take.

Testing -- U.S.A.

1. Washington Communications officers conducted medium wave--skip wave tests from the Juanita off the east coast of the United States.

States. Washington receivers picked up their signal "five by five". The conditions under which these tests were conducted, however, differ from the conditions in the field.

2. The noise level, for example, of the Greek--Albanian area is greater than the noise level off the U.S. east coast. Radio stations in the Balkans make a Babel of voices, move up and down the dial (trying to cut each other out), and operate with many times the power the Juanita was given. While Washington tests were conducted in cool weather at the approach of winter, which I understand improves reception, we tested the mid-summer heat of Greece.

Testing--Greece

1. The Commo men explained that they wanted (ideally) for this operation a triangle of sheltered coves, not far from each other, nearly due south of Albania, and close enough to Patras that the run to home base could be made without interrupting a broadcasting schedule. We would broadcast for a week from one base, then move to the second, and so to the third. This system would make DFing most difficult, and would assist maintainance of cover, for in each cove we could lay out our nets and tend them from the launches, a process which would not only impress the islanders but provide a diversion for the staff.

2. Further important qualifications of each cove were -- that there be deep water room for the ship to swing at anchor, that holding ground be adequate, that there be protection from prevailing winds, that harbor entrance permit emergency exit under storm conditions, that surrounding hills be low enough and distant enough to permit the beam from the antenna to pass over them, and that the coves be the proper distance from the target.

3. After careful study of charts and pilot books, and survey by ship, launch, vehicle, and foot, we selected a triangle which appeared to meet all demands -- St. Euphemia on the Island of Cephalonia, Zante on the Island of Zante, and Katakolo Bay on the Peloponnesus.

4. Although the JUANITA arrived in Greece on 25 March, and although four to six thousand dollars per month are required to maintain vessel and crew, no tests to determine the ability of her equipment were conducted until 9 June--for which there appears to be no explanation in the field or at headquarters.

5. We traveled

5. We traveled two thousand miles, testing the JUANITA's equipment under every condition but the worst. We broadcasted from sheltered coves and open sea -- both calm and rough. We beamed our signal along an open seaway to our target, and we aimed over patterns of mountainous islands. We swung the ship during transmission. We operated the equipment at what the commo men called its maximum efficiency. We have been on the air early in the evening and late at night. And we beamed our tone into the [ ] 1/ from the following positions:

Distance 2/ (miles)	Location	Result
300	at sea 36° 05' 03" N; 29° 14' 03" E	Not heard
275	at sea 36° 16' 06" N; 28° 46' 04" E	Not heard
240	Lindos, Rhodes	Not heard
208	Sitia, Crete	Not heard
175-191	at sea in the Dodecanese enroute to Crete	Not heard
155 (approx)	St. Euphemia, Cephalonia Zante, Zante Katakolo Bay (Peloponnesus)	Not heard
137-139	at sea 36° 19' N; 25° 32' E	Station believed they heard signal for 5 minutes on SP600 at or below noise level. Classified "unreadable" unreadable
116-120	at sea 36° 23' N; 25° 09' E	Not Heard

1/ [ ] listened for our signal with three receivers, SX28, S 38, and SP 600 - the SP 600 having a 500 foot antenna strung between two 50 foot towers.

2/ Distances are measured from the breakwater of the main harbor of Piraeus.

6. Our testing

6. Our testing revealed the following:

a. that the communications equipment is incapable of performing its task in the area.

(1) Although the JAUNITA's medium wave signal was heard "five by five" by Washington receivers in tests conducted by commo headquarters, and although we were advised that the medium signal would be strongest in an area 175 to 250 miles from the transmitter, tests in the field (where the noise level is greater) demonstrated that the transmitter is incapable of delivering a medium wave signal of readable strength at any distance from 110 to 300 miles.

(2) Commo men, both those assigned to the area and those visiting from headquarters, agreed further that the JUANITA's equipment cannot broadcast thus from any distance, nor would it be adequate even if it were installed on a naval cruiser.

b. that the vessel is not adequately seaworthy, despite the fact that she was taken across the Atlantic in February.

(1) The JUANITA was designed for coastal yachting, not for constant Mediterranean service. The duty to which she has been subjected, not so strenuous as actual operations, has already rendered her temporarily inoperative.

(2) Rolling and pitching, her bows under even in mild seas, made the operation of her equipment difficult and dangerous.

(3) The chance, everpresent in open sea operation, of a wave through the wheelhouse door or through the hatch over the transmitting room threatened to fry the commo men at their posts and disable the equipment permanently.

c. that winter operations would be difficult, if possible.

(1) The JUANITA could not function during the winter months (approximately 1 November to 1 March) in the same

manner as

manner as during the summer; that is, operating from a triangle of sheltered coves with resupply runs to our base at Patras. For St. Euphemia (or the little harbor of Sami nearby), Zante, and Katakolo Bay do not promise shelter from the winds and seas of the Ionian winter; and the run to Patras would be frequently impossible.

(2) It is possible that the JUANITA could only function during the winter by lying in a single sheltered cove; though operation from a single location is deemed by the commo men hazardous beyond justification. We studied the charts and pilot books of the entire archipelago, and selected for future survey six possible winter operating bases, of which only one appears satisfactory.

(3) Greek Navy men and island fishermen agree that navigating Greek waters under storm and winter conditions is extremely hazardous, and that the winter seas are fiercer than the Atlantic.

(4) It is possible, despite winter conditions and an inadequate vessel, that the JUANITA could have carried on -- IF the transmitting equipment had been equal to its task and the broadcasts begun. If squalls interrupted our broadcasts, if rough seas kept us off the air for a week, if our last spare tube were blown and we had to wait days for calm weather to make our run back to Patras, the effectiveness of our broadcasts would not necessarily be reduced; for no clandestine station (which we would have purported to be) operating within Albania could be expected to maintain a rigid schedule. Field men have found that interrupted schedules and periods off the air are "good" rather than "bad", since they convince the listening audience of the authenticity of the source. They have found it necessary, in fact, with land based transmitters capable of fixed schedules, to interrupt schedules with pretended troubles (power failure, time off to fight pitched battles with security police, etc.), for the regularity of broadcasts shattered credibility.

d. that apart from

d. that apart from seaworthiness, the vessel is inadequate as a carrier of medium wave transmitting equipment.

(1) The distance between masts does not permit reasonable antenna length.

(2) While the space allowed for sleeping quarters is more than ample, the space allowed for commo operation is so small that it denies the operators minimum movement. There is no ventilation in the transmitting room. The heat and smell when the equipment is in operation is intense enough to cause sickness, a condition aggravated by semi-tropic weather and the violent movement of the ship.

(3) Rigging and handrails become electrified during transmission endangering the life of all men topside.

(4) The vessel's house-type wiring causes repeated fires.

(5) Generator power is insufficient both for communications operation and for ship's housekeeping.

e. that in addition to the dangers already mentioned (electrocution of the commo operators, electrocution of anyone topside during broadcasting, and fires caused by poor wiring), the following also exist:

(1) loss of vessel and staff, or compromise of operation, through salvage. A vessel requiring assistance is compelled to go to the port selected by the vessel giving assistance. When the JUANITA required assistance off Corfu, she might easily have been towed to Albania, a few miles away. On our last test run we were on the coastal limits of Turkey. Assistance from a Turkish ship (had it been needed) would have terminated in thorough inspection by Turkish authorities.

(2) loss of vessel. (On this it is necessary to speculate, for the elements have been kind to us since 9 June.) Despite vigilance, a sudden Mediterranean squall can force a ship onto the beach, particularly in a small "sheltered" cove, before she can get underway. Winter seas and storms have already been discussed. Greek naval

officers said

officers said to Captain Holmes, "Don't think that crossing the Atlantic in February qualifies your vessel for winter cruising in the Adriatic and Ionian seas." The routine dangers of navigation in the archipelago are considerable. Navigational charts of the Hydrographic Office and the British Admiralty are frequently based on surveys of the last century. There are numerous uncharted rocks and shoals. Lights are frequently found too weak to be seen the listed distances, if they are lighted at all. The risk of the loss of the vessel would be less important if the vessel were the best in design and condition. For any vessel in these waters the risk exists. For a black broadcasting ship seeking secluded coves on outlying islands the risk is accentuated.

f. that contrary to some earlier reports, it is physically possible to operate the equipment in open sea and rough weather, despite dangers.

(1) One cannot cut broadcast tapes at sea, for the sound of the engines is transcribed on the tape along with the announcer's voice. (The heading of this vessel cannot be maintained under sail alone. Consequently the engines cannot be stopped.) But tapes already made can be run through the transmitter when the vessel is underway,--heat, smell, rolling, and pitching notwithstanding.

(2) There is, furthermore, no reason why tapes should not be cut at anchor, where no difficulty would be encountered, and the broadcasting be done at sea.

g. that the JUANITA in operation is somewhat less than inconspicuous.

(1) At anchor in a sheltered island cove, one finds oneself but a few hundred yards from village dwellings. After fall of darkness the large white yacht, whose presence has brought excitement to the otherwise dreary existence of the islanders, lights up (when transmitting) like a Christmas tree. Spreader lights and running lights begin to glow, and brilliant flashes play about the rigging.

(2) Villagers have trouble getting music on their radios, for the JUANITA's signal blares through, up and down the dial.

(3) A rigorous daily schedule of "preventive maintenance", which included regular cleaning of antenna connections, etc., reduced the sporadic fireworks, but did not eliminate them.

7. The complete failure of the broadcasting equipment, rather than the inadequacy of the vessel, has caused the end of the mission. Were the transmitting equipment capable of its task, the broadcasts would have begun, despite the many difficulties presented by the unsuitability of the JUANITA as a broadcast vessel.

Corfu expedition

Before my arrival in Greece the JUANITA was ordered to the Corfu area to survey the coastline for a sheltered cove suitable as a permanent operating base for medium wave-ground wave broadcasts into Albania. YET --

a. It was the intention of Washington commo that the Juanita broadcast skip wave into Albania from a distance of 175 to 300 miles from the target, thereby covering a large area of the country.

b. Broadcast close to the southwest border of Albania was not contemplated, since the results would be too limited and the danger too great. (The ground wave would probably ground out on the coastal mountain ranges, permitting coverage of only a small strip along the coast.)

c. To broadcast continuously from a single location, as above noted, has been generally condemned by the commo experts as hazardous beyond justification. DFing could easily pinpoint the transmitter for jamming and destruction.

d. The Corfu survey necessitated 28 hour passage through a mined area, 14 hours through Greek and Albanian mine fields,[1] and passage through a channel ½ mile from the Albanian coast.

e. The Greek naval authorities originally forbade and later strongly advised against the passage, disclaiming all responsibility for the loss of the vessel.

f. The Juanita went aground off Corfu -- at a point where the chart (BA 206) showed 29 fathoms of water. Pertinent to grounding, as noted above, a vessel lending assistance to a vessel in trouble has the right to tow her to any port of the salvager's choosing. In this case it might easily have been Albania, several miles away.

g. The British gave up a similar propaganda broadcast

1/ As a matter of interest, the rudder went out in the middle of the mine field, necessitating 20 minutes repair.

attempt (with Corfu land-based transmitter) after local police fought a pitched battle with an Albanian sabotage team sent to get them.

Security

1. Captain Holmes obtained from the Minister of Finance immunity to customs inspection throughout Greece for the JUANITA and all shipments received by her.[1] This extraordinary permission made it possible for us to take abroad or remove everything from food to machine guns.

2. At all times there was at least one CIA man aboard. On [ ] advice we tightened security measures on 25 June. From that date till the removal of the equipment, no one but the ship's complement was permitted aboard without permission of Captain Holmes or [ ]. Deck watches were stood (by all Americans) from 2000 to 0800. We installed a general alarm bell in the wheelhouse. A .45 calabre pistol was logged out to the night deck watch (to be kept out of sight).

3. Small arms were issued to CIA personnel. Larger weapons and bulk ammunition were kept under lock and key.

4. There was no one aboard trained in the use of demolition plastics, nor was there "time to train one" between testing voyages. This would have been necessary before commencing operations. The destruction of the vessel, therefore, had it been necessary, would have been accomplished by fire -- not the best way.

5. Further security measures, such as examination of all items before they were permitted aboard, were planned for the beginning of actual operations.

Cover

1. The marine expedition cover is excellent though complicated and costly. We sporadically encountered marine biologists and marine biological survey ships. These encounters were sometimes a bit painful, since no one aboard is a marine biologist. But we survived them, for the professors had "just left," or were "expected any day", or the specimens and "just been mailed", or "our last voyage was a survey for sheltered coves to lay out our nets in". (The rum helped too.)

1/ Also immunity to customs charges for all shipments received at Patras.

2. A group of Americans on a yacht in foreign waters can always appear to be in quest of their own pleasure, nothing else. While such would have been a far cheaper, and in some ways easier cover to maintain, special invaluable privileges (obtained without [ ] help), such as customs immunity and Greek Navy advice, would probably have never been extended.

3. Even without a marine biologist aboard we could have embarked on legitimate oceanographic research. We could have laid our nets, and collected the specimens. We could have dragged the plankton sampler and pickled the stuff that came out of it, keeping records of the amount of plankton taken from a given volume of water at a certain depth in a certain location. Our survey operations could thereby have come to pass scientific scrutiny.

Panamanian registry

1. There seem to be two recognized reasons for an American yacht to be sailing under the Panamanian flag -- (1) that she is engaged in an illicit operation, or (2) that the owners wish to underpay the crew.

2. When pressed by a local official for an explanation of the Panamanian registry, Captain Holmes produced the answer we adopted. "During the last war the American government grounded all yachts, forbidding them passage outside the inland waterways of the United States. The Institute, having made a large investment in the vessel and its expedition, feared that pending war might bring the same restrictions, and paralyze their operations."

3. Although there were reasons for thinking Panamanian registry might be desirable, the flag served to draw suspicion to the ship. The last inquiry the flag stimulated was by the American Coast Guard Commander, resident in the harbor of Piraeus. Our "grounding" line seemed to quell his suspicions, which he admitted. He did not return.

Support

1. A vessel afloat requires extensive shore support. Needs vary according to mission and location, and can be scaled from necessity to convenience. Ours were as follows:

a. Radio communications [ ] was listening at all times for our call. Specific schedules

schedules (three times a day) were established for sending or receiving messages. Because of the distance betwee[redacted] and the lack of transportation or extra personnel for the run between the two, the ship could not expect an answer to a message sent in late morning till the next day.

b. Emergency assistance Since seeking assistance from the nearest vessel at hand is risky when one's ship is engaged in black operations, particularly when she is carrying equipment which must be guarded from discovery, it is advisable if not necessary to have a secure means of receiving help. Though it was never tested, OPC's [redacted] could probably have sent us help by the US Air Force or the Greek Navy. Such arrangements, where possible, should be established. When one needs help on a black marine mission one probably needs it immediately, not in 8 or 24 hours.

c. Supplies Food, fuel, and water were purchased ashore by the ship's crew, Spare parts for engines, for the deck and rigging, etc. frequently demand days of searching. Finding qualified workmen to perform repairs beyond the ability of the crew is frequently difficult and time consuming. Getting shipments (spare parts, food stuffs, etc. from the States) out of Customs is also difficult and time consuming. It took M[redacted] three days to get the Institute's plankton net, which had been air shipped to Greece, from the customs house. These purchases, the obtaining of services, and wrangling with customs officers can hold a ship in port for many days when it should be operating at sea. The more these things can be done by shore based personnel the more efficiently the ship can operate.

d. Banking To make a simple withdrawal from one's own account in the Bank of Greece may require a half day. Service charges, incidentally, on every bank action are prohibitive.

e. Clearances Turnover in Greek help -- cook, steward, engine wiper -- inflicted [redacted]ith sporadic

requests

requests for field clearances.

f. Technical supplies Spare parts for the communications equipment aboard the ship were frequently needed from the base.

g. Medical assistance Hospital facilities, as well as general medical assistance, are so poor in Greece that the station helped us by making U.S. Navy medical care available when necessary.

h. Transportation A car is a near necessity for ship's business ashore. Transport was a problem also to the base station, when for example, the vessel at Patras needed commo spare parts from Athens.

2. A shore based representative of the Institute was sent to Greece to carry out such tasks as those listed above. There were not enough tasks to occupy him full time, yet they demanded too much time for other men in the field who are already filling full time jobs.

3. Washington support sometimes went awry. A radar set, weighing 4,288 pounds (not including cable, weighing an estimated 500-600 pounds), was purchased for the JUANITA at a cost of $15,000. The set was air freighted in thirteen crates to Greece at a cost of $1,500. Men sent from headquarters, whose mission included installation of the radar, found the set to be large enough for a Navy Light Cruiser. It was not suitable for the JUANITA. We also received an enormous outboard motor, probably twenty horsepower, for our six foot dinghy.

Briefing

1. It was demonstrated by the JUANITA's experience that inadequate briefing and mysterious treatment of the members of such a mission can have serious results.

2. It seemed necessary to put the Captain and crew to work on the vessel before the clearance came through. They were, therefore, ignorant of the true nature of their jobs. When the JUANITA was being fitted out in Baltimore, the crew noticed that different

vehicles

vehicles bringing men and equipment to the ship carried the same license plates or swapped license plates, that material came aboard in boxes with government stamps visible though painted over, that at least one man who came aboard was introduced to them by different names on successive visits, that strange men walked aboard and began to install equipment without seeking the Captain's permission, and that the Captain did not seem to be responsible to a single person. Captain Holmes told me he suspected he had been hired for an illicit operation, being run by a group with high placed contacts --perhaps pro-Communist -- in the U. S. Government; and that he remained with the job in order to expose it to U. S. military intelligence.

3. By the time the JUANITA's staff set sail across the Atlantic, they had been led to believe many things they should never have been told. (Passing of time and repeated telling may have exaggerated these things in the men's minds,)

a. that this was not to be a mission of hazard. (It was.)

b. that they could call a U.S. Naval vessel "just across the horizon" for help during the ocean crossing. (There was no such vessel.)

c. that they would be escorted by a submarine from Gibralter to Patras. (They were not.)

d. that they could send for their wives and children. (This was not reasonable.)

e. that they could rent a house at Patras for rest and pleasure between voyages. (This too was out of the question. Rooms were maintained for a while in a Patras hotel, but return trips to Patras were so short and infrequent that the rooms were ultimately cancelled.)

f. that a cleared American cook would be waiting for them at Patras on arrival. (There was none.)

g. that a special plane would fly parts to them from the States, if necessary. (Engine parts requested from the States in March were received in late July.)

4. OPC men have suggested that crew of the JUANITA were too much accustomed to the luxury of yachting for the hardship of the duty intended for the JUANITA. Captain Leslie Holmes, E. C. Handy, and J. Paul Michie are most able men. They were an excellent choice.

The basis

The basis for the belief that these men were unwilling to accept the unpleasantnesses of this type operation is twofold--(1) their hiring and briefing had not prepared them for this type of duty. (2) they understood before others the limitations of the vessel they had to work with. It appears from the experience of the JUANITA operation that the best manner for hiring mariners for this type duty is the following. Solicit them for confidential maritime work for the government. Demand they conceal the fact that they have been approached. When their clearance is announced, hire them as staff agents, explain the mission, provide the cover, and, their willingness expressed, send them out. To hire men through a cover organization for one type of work, tell them later that they are agents of American intelligence, on another type of work, and let them learn when they arrive abroad that they are on a mission of hazard, invites trouble.

The unloading

The following excerpts from daily notes tell the story of the unloading of the communications equipment from the JUANITA.

Monday, 6 August

The necessity of calling the water barge alongside 2½ days after filling the tanks revealed that the tank leaks, reported by Captain Holmes some months before, had suddenly become worse. To repair or replace them would require removal of equipment from the transmitting room. With tanks in present condition, the ship is unfit for sea, even for short runs.

Having just received [ ] decision that the engines be repaired forthwith, I visited him in the afternoon with Captain Holmes and [ ] and described these conditions in detail. [ ] accordingly ordered the equipment removed. Anticipating the possibility of removal, Captain Holmes and I had evolved a plan for doing it without outside assistance. Although [ ] agreed our plan would probably succeed. he said he preferred to arrange it with Greek intelligence. [ ] suggested 10 August as our target deadline, since that was to be the departure date of commo men visiting from headquarters. We agreed we could have the equipment ready for removal Thursday evening (9 August).

Tuesday

Tuesday, 7 August

Today sixteen large baskets, containing most of the smaller commo items -- parts, tubes, tools, typewriters, etc. -- were packed and stacked in the wardroom ready for unloading. At 0900 tomorrow [redacted] will come aboard with another man to show us the location for the transfer of material from ship to truck.

Wednesday, 8 August

We have been notified to unload at the Greek Navy yard (Piraeus) in accordance with arrangements made by the base, and that three trucks -- one of the Greek Army and two of our own -- will arrive at the unloading berth at 0930.

The time has been changed to 0830. It is imperative we not be late. We may stand small stuff (covered) on the Navy dock before the arrival of the trucks.

We have filled thirty-six baskets, thus completing the packing of small commo material to be removed in the morning.

We gave the Greeks (steward, cook, and engine wiper) the evening off. After fall of darkness we set to work removing the forward hatch (over the transmitting room) and the section of deck attached to it, to permit raising the 20K, the HT4G, and the teletype. With great effort but no real trouble, we raised the hatch by means of hemp and steel halyards, and laid it atop the wheelhouse. We then raised various items from the transmitting room, laid them on the fore-deck, covered them immediately with canvas, and rigged a sling under the transmitter, leaving for the morning only the hoisting of the 20K and the HT4G.

The work was completed by 0130. Deck guard was posted over the equipment till sailing time.

Thursday, 9 August

0645 -- cast off lines. 0700 -- alongside prescribed berth. 0715 -- commenced unloading. Placed baskets on ground 10 yards off stern to be received by first truck. Moved pieces from foredeck to dock next to bow to be received by second truck, leaving space amidships for transfer of transmitter

to third

to third truck without interference. Raising and swinging the 20K onto the truck demanded all hands, but was accomplished without difficulty. Each item was listed as it left the ship. The base man supervising the loading of the trucks receipted our lists, a copy of which was given to him.

Transfer of all material was completed in one hour, thirty minutes. As soon as the last piece was placed on the truck, the JUANITA pulled out of the yard and returned to her berth.

The Greek military commander secured the area during the operation. A base translator with a representative of Greek intelligence were present to observe.

Current condition

1. The JUANITA is now lying in the harbor of Piraeus with one engine gone, the other engine half-gone, dry rot under the galley, wiring that causes fires, water tanks ready to collapse into the bilge, and a winch which, endangering the fingers of the man who uses it, will raise only the starboard anchor. Repairs would demand an estimated twenty to thirty thousand dollars and two months in Greek shipyards.

Other missions

1. Unseaworthiness, slow speed (8.5 knots on flank), and conspicuous appearance render the JUANITA unsuitable for other missions, i.e. infiltration, exfiltration, or evacuation, in the area.

Conclusions

1. It was not necessary to buy a yacht, equip her, man her, sail her across the Atlantic, and maintain her in Greece for half a year to demonstrate that her transmitting equipment would not work.

2. Had it been understood that the communications men did not KNOW the equipment would broadcast a readable medium wave signal into Albania, a simple form of testing should have been decided upon. A comparable transmitter could have been fired up at [redacted]. A commo man could have been sent out by jeep, mule, or caique to points varying distances from the station to listen for the station's signal on a portable receiving set. The same conclusion would have been reached -- that equipment of this capacity

cannot

cannot broadcast medium wave--skip wave into a target in this area from a distance greater than 65 miles.

3. For this type of project, it is imperative that at least one operations officer, though he be neither technician nor mariner, learn the basic facts of the communications plan on one hand and the basic problems of marine operation on the other. Had this understanding been acquired early in the development of this project, the vessel would not have been bought, equipped, manned, nor sent abroad; and a great sum of money would have been saved. Had this understanding been acquired later, OPC would not have been content with Washington commo tests. Still later, the trip to Corfu, risking the men, the vessel, and the operation, would never have been ordered; nor would the JUANITA have been permitted to remain in Greece untested from 25 March till 9 June.

4. The planning of the JUANITA's mission suffered poor communications guidance, poor marine guidance, and a lack (perhaps unavoidable) of continuity of supervision.

Recommendation

Because of the failure of the transmitting equipment and the unsuitability of the vessel, there is no reason to reinstall the transmitter on the JUANITA. Since no other mission is contemplated by the field station for which she might be used, the JUANITA should be made available to other divisions of this organization. If other divisions find no use for her, she might best be sold in the field.