

June 1951
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SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Project BGSPEED 1B-10.1

- REFERENCES:
- (a) Project Outline BGSPEED 1B-10.1
 - (b) [] (IN 43512)
 - (c) [] (IN 43954)
 - (d) [] (IN 44704)
 - (e) Memorandum to ADPC through Chief, EE/OPC from Chief, Communications Division dated 7 June '51. Subject: Technical Fitness of BGFIEND Installation. (Two enclosures)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. In response to a request by EAD, the enclosed report has been prepared for your consideration. This memorandum summarizes the salient points found in the enclosed detailed discussion of the problems presented in references (b), (c) and (d).

2. It is apparent that the communications from the field questioning the practicability and feasibility of the referenced project are based on one major misunderstanding. The arguments that (a) the vessel can only put an audible signal into the target area in positions that will jeopardize her safety and (b) that the vessel cannot broadcast from the open sea because of the technical difficulties presented by heavy weather are predicated on the false assumption that the site of broadcast must be in close proximity to the target area. In reality, the KMHYMNAL can put her strongest signal into Albania at a distance of from 200 to 400 miles away from the target area. At under 200 miles, her signal will very likely diminish in strength. Given the capacity of the KMHYMNAL to broadcast from anywhere within the area defined above, regardless of intervening land masses, her crew may select almost unlimited broadcasting sites from among the Ionian Islands, and in fair weather, from any portion of the Ionian Sea. (see attachment Number 2 for a map showing broadcasting area and optimum range of Albanian naval craft.)

3. The crossing of the Atlantic in adverse weather conditions has proven the seaworthiness of the vessel. The broadcasting tests made in heavy weather were remarkably successful. To quote from attachment (A) of reference (e), "salt spray and heavy seas at no time handicapped the radiation efficiency of the installation". No problem concerning the implimentation of the project has presented itself to date that has not been anticipated and solved. No valid objections to the commencement of the broadcasting phase of this operation have been presented.

4. [] and [] and [] are to depart soon [] where they will attend a meeting scheduled for a discussion of project BGSPEED. It is urgently hoped that these

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officers will be authorized to direct the initiation of broadcasts into Albania from the KMHYMNAL. With the proper operational spirit and the necessary discipline and cooperative attitude of mind there is no reason why a thorough and conclusive field test of the capabilities of this type of propaganda vessel should not be successfully carried out. It is believed that the implementation of this sub-project will make a substantial contribution toward realizing the objectives of project BGFRIEND.

[
C
Chief, EE
/ /

Enclosure:

1. Report on the Capabilities of the KMHYMNAL
2. Map Depicting Broadcasting Area
3. Project Outline BGSPEED 1B-10.1
4. E } (IN 43512)
5. E } (IN 43954)
6. C } (IN 44704)
7. Memo to ADPC from Chief, Commo Div., 7 June '51


Distribution:

Addressee - orig & 1
EE-1 - 3
SD/RE - 2

This memo is a little too strong. However, all of the attached technical opinion ~~is~~ tends to refute the arguments advanced by the field. [] and I will explore the disagreements thoroughly [] and attempt to work out on the spot the best solution.

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REPORT ON CAPABILITIES OF THE KMHYMNAL

1. There have been three recent cables from the [] [] expressing grave doubts concerning the ability of the OPC covert broadcasting vessel KMHYMNAL to successfully implement project BGSPEED. For the sake of simplicity, this report will cite each of the three cables in turn, discussing each argument presented by the field in the order in which it appears in the cables. In instances where reasons for doubt are reiterated in a subsequent cable, the second citation will be ignored in this paper.

2. [] [] (IN 43512)

Paragraph 2

"A. RECORDING EQUIPMENT CANNOT BE OPERATED WITH ENGINES RUNNING, AND CONTROL OF VESSEL CANNOT BE MAINTAINED WITH ENGINES OFF." The Communications Division informs us in enclosure (a) to reference (e) that "It is a fact that the recorders cannot be operated as recorders while the engines are in operation due to the background noise picked up by the microphones, but they can be used for playback purposes with no effect from the ship's engines. It is necessary to make all recordings with engines off, or receive program material on tape from the base studio in Athens." In other words, one method of broadcasting is to record a broadcast while the vessel is in port with engines off, then put out and broadcast the recorded program. This system permits the use of the boat's engines to maintain a position while the broadcast is in progress because the background noise of the engines is not broadcast if a tape is used. If live broadcasts are required, the ketch-rigged vessel can be kept under control by the use of her sails alone. As a sailing vessel, she is capable of any maneuver in all but the heaviest weather or in a dead calm. The ketch-rig is a flexible one, permitting various combinations of sail as dictated by the weather encountered.

"B. SALT SPRAY ON HOT ANTENNA CUTS TRANSMITTER OFF AIR." Paragraph (2) of enclosure (a) to reference (e) states that: "Tests were conducted by engineering branch personnel on very rough seas with no difficulty experienced from salt spray. It is the understanding of all personnel in Washington that the transmitter has not been in operation since the above mentioned tests, so, it is felt that this statement is an assumption made only by visual inspection of the project." For the report of the tests mentioned above, see enclosure (b) of reference (e).

"C. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT SEASICK ANNOUNCER MAKES BAD IMPRESSION." As explained in answer to paragraph (2)(a) above, tape recordings can be used in broadcasts when the weather is too heavy for the comfort of the Albanian announcers.

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"D. TECHNICIAN CANNOT OPERATE TRANSMITTER CONTROLS IN HEAVY SEAS." In paragraph (1) of reference (e), [Chief, Communications Division, states that: "By coincidence, the shakedown tests were made in near gale conditions off Cape Hatteras with heavy seas running, which did not reduce the effectiveness of the broadcast."

"E. VERY HEAVY WEATHER THESE SEAS BEGIN AUGUST." Available weather data suggests that July and August are the two calmest months of the year in the Eastern Mediterranean area. In instances where heavy seas are encountered, the shelter of innumerable Ionian Islands may be sought as broadcasting sites.

"F. EVEN IN MILD SEAS VESSEL ROLLS BADLY DUE BAD BALANCE AND LACK OF BALLAST." (See (D) above).

Paragraph 3

To paraphrase paragraph (3), the vessel cannot broadcast from the shelter of Greek islands between latitude 38 north and latitude 40 north because the small islands in this area do not provide sufficient shelter from the weather and the large islands are either too far away from the target, or present terrain obstacles that would cut off medium wave broadcasts. Paragraph (3)(c) of enclosure (a) to reference (e) states in part, "It is evident that with the listener using a very poor grade receiver, the (KMHYMNAL's) signal would be sufficient to produce full output 90% of the broadcasting time, with the transmitter operating at a distance up to 400 miles." Because the transmitting plans for the KMHYMNAL are based on the use of sky wave transmission, intervening land masses do not present obstacles to putting broadcasts into the target area.

Paragraph 4

This paragraph questions the practicability of scheduling broadcasts each night for a period of two weeks followed by one week off the air, due to the physical limitations of the vessel and her crew. It is difficult to understand the reasoning behind this statement unless it is predicated on the assumption that the vessel must remain at sea for 14 days at a time. It is not anticipated that this will be necessary.

Paragraph 5

"THESE FACTORS NARROW ALTERNATIVES TO ONE: A SHELTERED COVE NORTH COAST CORFU WHERE BOAT WILL STAY AND BROADCAST PERMANENTLY." The Communications Division informs us that not only is broadcasting in such close proximity to the target area unnecessary, but there is a strong probability that the signal strength in the target area will diminish in proportion to proximity under 200 miles.

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(Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 require no discussion here, as the answers to the objections cited above negate their pertinence.)

3. [] (IN 43954)

This cable "confirms facts and agrees with reasoning" of [] discussed above, and suggests abandonment of "medium wave concept" and broadcasting from more "secure waters". Communications Division advises us that the frequency range of the vessel's broadcasting equipment is between 850 and 1500 kilocycles, and that their figures on the capacity of this broadcasting equipment apply to any frequency within this range. It is therefore possible for the KMHYMNAL to broadcast effectively from a distance of 400 miles at 850 kilocycles, the lowest possible wave length.

4. [] (IN 44704)

Paragraph 2

"B. VULNERABILITY TO PHYSICAL COUNTERACTION PRESENT GRAVE HAZARDS TO EQUIPMENT AND CREW." As can be seen in enclosure (2) of this report, the optimum range of Albanian naval craft precludes any possibility of physical counteractions against the KMHYMNAL if she is operating within the area designated by the Communications Division as being the most effective.

"C. HIGH OVERHEAD EXPENSES IN CASH AND STAFF MAN-HOURS" is suggested as a reason for abandoning project BGSPEED. An acknowledgement of the validity of these expenditures is implicit in the project's approval. This point requires no further consideration.

"D. SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF RESUPPLY AND OF MAINTAINING CREW MORALE" is cited as an additional reason for a review of the feasibility of this project. The KMHYMNAL has a berth at Patras within 200 yards of a storehouse built specifically to store the supplies required for her operation.

[] has retained a ship's chandler in Patras to provide the necessary support on a long range basis for the KMHYMNAL's cruises. A year's supply of food is on hand at the storehouse, the communications men aboard the vessel have access to the Athens communications equipment stock, and an agent is being dispatched to Greece this month to assume responsibility for shore support of the vessel. The officers in charge of project BGSPEED need only make their requirements known, and they will be fulfilled.

"F. SLOW SPEED FOR GET-AWAYS" is another reason stated for abandoning KMHYMNAL broadcasts. With the exception of possible military aircraft based in Tirana, there is no information available suggesting that the KMHYMNAL will have anything to get away from.

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"G. (THERE ARE) INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES ABOARD FOR CREW LARGE ENOUGH TO STAND NECESSARY FOUR AROUND-THE-CLOCK WATCHES." A complement of 14 men, four of whom are qualified to be officer of the watch, is an ample number for the operation of the vessel on a 24-hour basis when necessary.

(Paragraphs 3 and 4 of [] are based on the premises that the vessel must broadcast at a point too close to Albania for safety, or too far away to deliver an audible signal into that country. Both these premises have been refuted above.)


Paragraph 6

"DECISION TO ABANDON (THE PROJECT) WOULD NOT BE TOTAL LOSS INASMUCH AS EQUIPMENT SALVAGABLE FOR OTHER USES, AND CRAFT PROBABLY CAN BE SOLD LOCALLY FOR GOOD PRICE." This is the unkindest cut of all.

5. [], recently returned senior OPC officer aboard the KMHYMNAL has stated that: "While as well aware of the difficulties involved in Hymnal as anyone could be I feel very strongly that this project should be given a fair chance. Much of the discouragement of recent weeks undoubtedly arose from what seems to have been a misapprehension concerning the range of the equipment, and from some misunderstanding about the tests made off Hatteras last December. When this misunderstanding is dispelled it should change considerably the thinking in the field about the entire undertaking."

6. This division can find no valid reason in the cables discussed above, for revisions in or the abandonment of project BGSPEED. All possible measures are being taken to dispell the misunderstandings in the field concerning the capabilities of the KMHYMNAL and her broadcasting equipment. This division will also take immediate remedial measures if it is determined by personal inquiries in Athens that reasons other than ignorance of the equipment's capabilities have contributed to the expression of the opinions quoted above. This project is now at the point where the confidence and determination of those immediately involved are of paramount importance to the operation's success. Among possible factors to contend with are a mistaken attitude on the part of the crew that their condition of service should resemble those obtaining in Miami Yachting circles. Some evidence of this appears to exist although every effort was made to explain at the time of recruitment that the vessel's mission would involve rather arduous duties at times.

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Pristina

SOFIA

Karlovo

Vranje

Radomir

Panagyurishte

Kumanovo

Samokov

Tatar Pazar

Tetovo

Koçane

Gorna Djumaya

Skopje

Breganište

Peshchero

Gostivar

Stip

Nevoško

Debar

Strumica

Sveti Vrach

Ohrid

Devdelija

Petritoh

Bitolj

Kilkis

Seres

Florina

Edessa

Orama

Koritsa

Edessa (Vodena)

Kavalla

Kastoria

Verina

Kraikitsa

Verina

Kozani

Salonika

Ohrid

Olympos

Knafkidike

Yannina

Tirnavos

Kassandra

Trikkala

Larissa

Longos

Artta

Pharsala

Drepanon

Preveza

Almyros

Meleai

Levkas

Amfissa

Skiathos

Argostolion

Nafpaktos

Skopelos

Zakynthos

Patras

Mantoudi

Zante

Argos

Kyme

Amalias

Corinth

Khalkis

Piraeus

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
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


MAP DEPICTING KM HYMNAL
AREA OF OPERATION

MAXIMUM ADVISABLE



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KM HYMNUS BASE

THE COVERAGE

RANGE

VISIBLE

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