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KAPOK #339

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21 APR 1954

ATTN :  Director, Communications,    
 Chief, SE

*Desensitized authorized  
1 Feb 62 credits 82/4A*

- OSOPUS/OSMUNE
- Comments on Proposed 1954 Operations

REFERENCES: SCAA-5711, KAPOK #2428; SCAA-5547, KAPOK #2109; [ ] 4063, KAPOK #300

1. With regard to the first reference we again wish to call to your attention the views stated in the third reference, especially in respect to mounting missions of brief duration aimed at the recruiting of specific contacts (principal agents) in Albania, and providing them with some sort of communication link. The need to follow these principles is even more apparent now with the reported replacement of the basic identity document in at least a few areas of Albania with a new "Passports", thus making it problematical whether any properly documented agent can be infiltrated as a bona fide resident this season. Past experience has already made it clear that the chances of a team surviving in the "black" in Albania for more than a brief period are slight.

2. In reviewing your plans for 1954 operations we fully realize that the teams "Monday" through "Friday", as far as personnel and objectives are concerned, are only tentative and subject to change depending on circumstances and developments prior to the start of the operational season. However, we do wish to emphasize the need for clearly defining the objectives in detail and limiting any mission to one main and at most one alternate objective. This we feel would apply pre-eminently in the case of a coup-de-main or sabotage mission. Naturally the nature of the main objective will be paramount in deciding whether more than one objective will be attempted.

3. It may be appropriate to expound the limitations on utilizing Yugoslav territory as a base of operations (requested in second reference) in considering the practicability of mounting the "Monday Team" as discussed in first reference. As you are well aware, the conditions set forth by the Yugoslav authorities for providing any support include a prohibition against revealing to our agents that the Yugoslavs are collaborating with KUDARK. This is a clear illustration of the "hands-off" attitude of the Yugoslavs who feel that Albania is their own particular problem. Considering their interest in Albania, it is unlikely that

this attitude

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this attitude will change in the near future. It is also the consensus at Headquarters that we can expect little if any support from the Yugoslavs in returning our agents if they have been forced to flee from Albania to Yugoslavia. Upon arriving in Yugoslavia they would be imprisoned or at least closely watched and controlled, if they were to refuse to work for the USB. For the present, therefore, the Field must treat Yugoslavia as hostile territory in planning any operations.

4. Regarding paragraph 5 of second reference we offer the following suggestions in briefing agents on what action they could take if forced to flee to Yugoslavia:
    - a. They could be told to attempt to pass as legitimate refugees in crossing into Yugoslavia. This would possibly require their being authenticated with some sort of Albanian documents and briefed with a likely cover story before their mission is mounted. An orderly and planned escape to Yugoslavia from their base of operations would also be necessary in view of the need for changing their military clothing, etc., for something more plausible. Assuming that their story and act passed their interrogator they would in time be allowed enough freedom so that an innocent-text letter could be mailed to a pre-arranged letter-drop in Greece informing us of their fate.
    - b. They could be instructed to mail an innocent-text letter to an established letter-drop in Southern Albania informing us of the team's intentions prior to their escape to Yugoslavia. This letter-drop could possibly be serviced by the Wednesday or Friday teams mentioned in paragraph 3 c. and 3 e. of first reference.
    - c. They can be told to make a full statement to the USB and await developments. However, if their status as HUMINT agents is known to the Yugoslavs there is little they can do except wait for an opportunity to mail a letter to the letter-drop in Greece mentioned above. This may take months as pointed out above since they will be closely watched by the USB for some time.
- Once the disposition of the agent(s) is definitely determined through these letters (or even some other source) efforts can then be made to obtain their release. The Yugoslav authorities will probably never notify us of the presence of ONOVIS agents in Yugoslav territory on their own initiative and would probably deny any knowledge of their whereabouts unless we had some definite information to work on.

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5. We might also

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5. We might also add in relation to the "Monday" team that since 3 of the 4 agents tentatively slated for the team (AIRLOCK, Hamit Hana, and Zil Sulamani Filana) are Kosovars and possibly Yugoslav citizens with prices on their heads, it might be advisable to replace 1 or 2 of these men with natives of the Dibra region if the team is eventually mounted. In the case of Zil Sulamani Filana the question arises whether this is the person of the same name who originally made the derogatory charges against AIRLOCK which resulted in the latter being LCFIUTTER tested on 23 December 1952. The name of the accuser was given as Zil Sulamani. If you recall AIRLOCK was charged with being some sort of "trustee" in an internment camp in Albania and in this role of "trustee" it was implied by Sulamani that he played the role of an informer in order to receive preferential treatment. AIRLOCK was also charged with cabling greetings to Stalin on one special occasion. These charges could not be substantiated by the interrogation or LCFIUTTER testing of AIRLOCK and it was eventually decided that Zil Sulamani's charges were false. It might also be worth noting that AIRLOCK, not knowing that Sulamani made these charges, gave the name of the latter as a reference on his activities during his internment in Albania.

6. To sum up our views on the Monday operation, in view of our inability to obtain any substantial support from the Yugoslavs, the prospects of mounting and maintaining (the latter being even more difficult) this proposed team seem poor. If, however, some of these problems are eliminated prior to the start of the operational season it would still be necessary that concrete plans exist for contacting ALLION since it is felt at Headquarters that the other proposed objectives would not justify mounting a resupply drop in view of conditions set forth by Headquarters in paragraph 5 of third reference.

7. With regard to the other project, proposed in first reference (i.e. Tuesday through Friday) aside from the general comments in paragraph 1 and 2 above, we are withholding our views until specific plans have been submitted by the Field.

8. Regarding paragraph 5 of first reference, there are no Headquarters' objections to using former Thunderstorm agents if any appear suitable.

9. In regard to paragraph 7 of first reference we feel that the BOPHEPIX and GRNESS agent assets have been exhausted except for the former Charity agents presently located in Yugoslavia, where for the time being at least they must be considered unavailable.

10. With regard

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10. With regard to paragraph 6 of first reference there is no ban on such missions. However, in general, we feel it best for Albanian operations to concentrate on more basic objectives, leaving missions of this sort for later stages. An exception would be when an operational purpose is involved as existed in the case of GIBBERION. The same limitations concerning insulation of GIBBERION interest which applied to GIBBERION would apply equally to any other similar proposal.

SE/1-jdk  
14 April 1954

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