

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. SCAA-35281
TO Chief, EE	INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 2-126-20/1
FROM Chief of <input type="checkbox"/> <i>✓</i>	DATE 16 APR 1959		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
SUBJECT Operational/OBTEST Review of OBTEST/1 Operations		<input type="checkbox"/>	MARKED FOR INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED Headquarters' Comments as noted in paragraph 9		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
REFERENCE(S)		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 38 CFR NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007</p> <p>Synopsis: OBTEST/1 is a black revisionist program to Albania which has been in operation for two years. Extensive efforts to evaluate the technical effectiveness of the program inside Albania have so far been generally unsuccessful. However, Headquarters has reported that a "liberal" Albanian Communist had knowledge of the program, and we have also learned that Communist Party Secretary Enver Hoxha referred to the program in his 3 March 1959 speech before the Albanian Peoples' Assembly. We feel that the program is now operating at an optimum level given existing circumstances. In the long run we have some doubts about the advisability of broadcasting the same revisionist line as do the Yugoslavs, and we believe that the program content can be improved by widening our attack to include some anti-Communist arguments.</p> <p>1. OBTEST/1 is a black revisionist radio program which was instituted in May 1957. It is directed to middle-level members of the Albanian Workers Party (Communist). At present OBTEST/1 is broadcasting between 220 and 250 hours monthly and is airing one new script every five days. We consider this level of script production to be optimum so long as we have only one script writer. In addition to the script writer and announcer, AIPLEBE, the OBTEST staff also includes one Case Officer and Support Officer <input type="checkbox"/> who is exceptionally well-versed in Albanian matters and who is responsible for the general management and control of program content and for many of the administrative duties incidental to running the program. <input type="checkbox"/> in particular is responsible for monitoring Radio Tirane, Radio Belgrade, and Radio Rome for applicable news items, for the review of the Yugoslav and Albanian press, and <input type="checkbox"/> also provides his own ideas for future programs inasmuch as he was acquainted with many Albanians before World War II who have subsequently held positions in the Albanian Government.</p> <p>2. Generally, we receive our information for use on the program from researching the Albanian and Yugoslav press, radio monitorings, and also from the many suggestions provided by Headquarters in their monthly support dispatches. Other usable information comes via refugee interrogations under Project OBSERVANT, and <input type="checkbox"/> has additionally interviewed Albanian refugees whom we believed had particularly promising PW information.</p> <p>3. One of the two major problems facing OBTEST concerns the proper exploitation of the revisionist line to accomplish the aims of the OBTEST Project. In view of the fact that most of the information we use on the program is not timely, we are unable to make immediately effective arguments on the basis of single happenings or facts that are new in Albania. Therefore we have relied more on repetition of the outstanding evils in Albania with emphasis on "Humanist socialism" and "scientific socialism" rather than upon ideological arguments. We also make use of campaigns to promote change under the revisionist guise of claiming that any improvement is for the good of socialism in Albania. Two specific campaigns utilizing this principle are the campaign to rehabilitate the national poet Gjergj Fishta who was responsible for some of the finest modern Albanian writing (and who, incidentally was violently anti-Yugoslav), and the campaign to have Albania take the problem of Yugoslav persecution of the Albanian Kosovars to the United Nations. When possible, OBTEST/1 also attempts to embarrass selected members of the regime, and has during the past year indirectly attacked Beqir Balluku, Gogo Nushi, and Adil Carcani. In exploiting the revisionist line, OBTEST/1 has had to walk the tightrope between the easier anti-regime approach and the possibility of being labelled as a harbinger of Yugoslav revisionism. On the latter point, one of the bigger problems for OBTEST/1 has been the fact that any seeming socialist argument of ours runs the risk of being called pro-Yugoslav by the Albanian Regime, as an attempt to discredit us by playing on the traditional Albanian fear of Yugoslav encroachment.</p>			
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4. The second major problem facing OBTEST has been that of evaluating broadcast technique and program content. We have initiated several operations inside and on the borders of Albania to determine the audibility of the program. Monitorings from the Greek-Albanian border are performed by [] and are nearly always favorable. We have also made periodic requests to [] for monitoring in Tirane [] (has sent two reports showing unsuccessful monitoring attempts) and we have received one tape monitoring from Belgrade indicating clear reception. Lately we have begun investigating the possibility of monitoring OBTEST/1 through EXCAP personnel inside Albania, and WEMCA has additionally established independent means of monitoring OBTEST/1. To date, however, we have not received any reports from these monitoring operations which conclusively indicate clear reception (or jamming for that matter) inside Albania.

5. In spite of the fact that our monitoring operations are inconclusive, and in spite of the fact that there are probably not more than 25,000 radios in Albania capable of receiving short wave transmissions, we have received two nearly certain proofs that the program is actually heard in Albania, and that it may have some effect. The first report came from Headquarters and stated that they had knowledge of a "liberal" Albanian Communist who claimed to have heard OBTEST/1 but felt that the program was under the agency of some foreign power. The second example occurred on 3 March 1959 when Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party, Enver Hoxha, mentioned OBTEST/1 during the course of his speech before the Albanian Peoples' Assembly. It is also worth noting that since Hoxha's reference to OBTEST/1, WEMCA has noticed a slight increase in jamming of our broadcasts as locally monitored. Although any hypotheses on the basis of the two references would be premature, two items are worthy of notice; (1) the two Albanian references to OBTEST/1 appear to be contradictory; the highest ranking Albanian Communist attacks the program, but the middle level Communist - who is actually our target - dismisses the program as foreign propaganda; (2) although Hoxha implied that the program was propagandizing Yugoslav revisionism, he actually attacked an OBTEST/1 program which called for greater assertion of Albanian rights against Yugoslav encroachment in the Kosmet.

6. As of this moment, we do not contemplate any major changes in the operation of OBTEST/1 as a result of the two Albanian comments noted above. We have slightly re-tailored the program format in order to make clearer to our listeners the platform of OBTEST; we are also investigating more aggressive means of getting the program into Albania. One such means is the cuddling of Radio Shkoder which we began on 3 February 1959. A second possibility concerns the initiation of internal mailing operations through EXCAP personnel to propagandize OBTEST/1. We are also considering the possibility of increasing OBTEST/1 transmission time.

7. In the long run, however, we have some reservations about the effectiveness of strictly revisionist propaganda. The Albanian Communist Regime is clearly dependent upon the Soviet Union just to keep the Government going. We can hardly expect the Communists to change even slightly the manner of government which keeps them in power. Still this does not mean that these same Communists are free from all doubt. Albanian Government and Party functionaries undoubtedly have the same anxieties about their futures and well-being as do their capitalist counterparts. We feel that OBTEST/1 can play effectively upon these anxieties: what happens if Hoxha loses power? who is right in the disagreements between Shehu and Klosi? why do you permit nincompoops such as Balluku and Nushi to stand over you as superiors? In the same manner we can continue to attack Albanian impotence on the Kossovo problem and perhaps even continue the campaign to rehabilitate Gjergj Fishta.

8. Although this is really anti-Communism with a revisionist name, we feel that OBTEST/1 can be effective here provided that we have exploitable information at our disposal. Furthermore, we favor a somewhat anti-Communist content because we doubt the advisability of piping the same line into Albania as do the Yugoslavs. After all, Yugoslav white PW activities are revisionist by definition. The Yugoslavs presumably have an active interest in Albania and they probably have a larger and better fund of information in support of their propaganda activities against Albania. We do not want to simply complement Yugoslav PW operations (and pure revisionism by us would be the same as theirs even though we attack the Yugoslavs on occasion).

9. These opinions by us on the matter of OBTEST content are largely tentative evaluations on the program's future approach. Presently we feel that the program is operating at an optimum level of activity given the existing conditions governing

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manpower, technical capability, and the problems inherent in using the revisionist line. After [] training, we fully expect him to undertake greater supervisory and administrative responsibility for OBTEST thereby reducing the amount of necessary Case Officer time expended on the management of the project. With this in mind we expect OBTEST/1 to continue operating at approximately the same level of activity as it does now. Within several weeks, we will forward to Headquarters our request for the renewal of Project OBTEST for fiscal year 1960. Our request will be generally along the lines of maintaining the program at its present level of output. If Headquarters has any comments relative to the forthcoming renewal request, we will appreciate early notification of same.

VEP
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9 April 1959

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