

1. Project:

a. Date of Initiation: Approved and authorized 22 June 1949 by Frank G. Wisner.

b. Original Objectives:

(1) Ultimate Objective: Overthrow of present regime and establishment of regime friendly to West.

(2) Preliminary Objectives:

(a) Elimination of a base for support of the Greek Communist guerrillas.

(b) Denial to the Soviets of a base for air, land and naval forces in the Mediterranean.

(c) Provision of a psychological stimulus to the Iron Curtain countries by demonstrating the possibility of overthrowing a securely entrenched Communist dictatorship.

c. Current Objectives: The original objectives listed above were modified downward to the following:

(1) To reduce the value of Albania to the Soviets by persistently and constantly undermining Communist authority and by harassing the Hoxha regime with domestic difficulties.

(2) To encourage and assist the Albanian people in their resistance to the Hoxha regime; to maintain hope of eventual liberation; and to prepare the people psychologically for eventual action to free them from Communist tyranny.

(3) To create, foster and support a skeleton resistance organization which could be used as the foundation of a liberation movement if and when such an active operation should seem politically and strategically desirable.

d. Action Through Which Objectives Were To Be Achieved:

(1) Covert establishment and support of an Albanian National Committee composed of representatives of the various emigre groups.

(2) Organization and training of refugee Albanian patriots outside Albania to be accomplished by the Committee with covert supervision and support.

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(3) Organization and training of patriots and sympathizers within Albania to be accomplished by Committee trained agents with covert guidance, supervision and support.

(4) Creation of a provisional government group by the Committee with covert guidance, which would function after the coup d'etat until elections were held.

c. PK 1953 Program:

(1) In the field of political action, to weaken by all available means the internal position of the Hoxha regime while conversely strengthening the relative political position of the NQFA.

(2) In the field of agent operations, to develop one or more small secure underground nets aimed at penetration of the Army and Government. These nets will be gradually developed and expanded with the ultimate goal of undermining the Government and creating a resistance potential to be used in the event of war or revolution. Agent teams will establish E&E nets, safehouses and develop the project PW campaign inside the country. The teams will also recruit agent personnel and collect intelligence. Certain teams will sabotage carefully selected targets and others will perform coup de main operations.

2. Digest of Monthly Status Reports:

a. Period Covered: January 1951 through September 1952.

b. Activities:

(1) Paramilitary: In the spring of 1950 an Albanian Guard Company was formed in Germany to serve as an agent pool. The teams infiltrated during 1950 and 1951 were drawn from this Guard Company. However, since security within the company was poor, this practice was discontinued and the 1952 teams were made up of personnel recruited elsewhere and the Guard Company is now considered as a reservoir of low-level personnel which could be used in the case of an internal uprising in Albania. Since the summer of 1950 a total of 14 agent teams, consisting of 64 agents, have been infiltrated into Albania. At the end of September 1952 there were 10 agents active in Albania. Thirty-six agents exfiltrated, 2 defected to Yugoslavia, 4 were captured, 9 were killed and the status of three is unknown. The teams have been successfully resupplied by air drops and W/T contact has been maintained with the 1952 teams.

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These operations have provided a mass of valuable operational experience. In addition, the teams have been successful in establishing contacts and collecting a considerable amount of operational intelligence. Agent training has been conducted in Germany and the Athens area. Recent arrangements have been made to rent a group of islands in the Gulf of Corinth for use as a training site.

(2) Propaganda:

(a) Shqipëria: An Albanian semi-monthly newspaper with a circulation of 5,000, printed in Rome, published by the National Committee for Free Albania (the organization through which CIA operates). Shqipëria is distributed by mail to Albanian emigres all over the world and is mailed to prominent Communists in Albania. A miniature edition is printed in the United States and is dropped by covert aircraft over Albania.

(b) NGFA News Bulletin: Printed irregularly by the National Committee for Free Albania in English, French, and Italian and distributed by mail.

(c) Leaflets: Dropped at 6-8 week intervals over Albania by covert aircraft. 6,278,000 leaflets had been dropped by the end of September 1952.

(d) Propaganda Supply Drops: A program for dropping from covert aircraft various scarce consumer goods, such as flour, sugar, etc.

(e) Radio: The Voice of Free Albania is a $\frac{1}{2}$ kw transmitter broadcasting from a location near Athens.

(f) Effectiveness: Agent reports indicate that all the above propaganda which reaches its mark is effective. The propaganda supply drops have been discontinued for the present because of fear that Hoxha might tie this program to Soviet charges of use of BW by the U.S. However, agent reports are to the effect that the population did not believe the Communist charges that the food had been poisoned and that the people are in favor of the drops in spite of attempts on the part of the authorities to confiscate all packages found. The radio broadcasts are reported to be heard as far north as Prizren, Yugoslavia although there is considerable jamming in recent weeks. The jamming effort reflects at least a certain

effectiveness. As in all Communist countries the majority of the receivers are under Communist control.

c. Major Problems:

(1) Narrow base of NCFA: As presently constituted the NCFA includes the three major political parties approved by the State Department. Members of one other substantial party were excluded at the time of the formation of the NCFA because of their collaboration with the Italians and Germans; the Yugoslav-sponsored League of Albanian Refugees in Prizren is also not represented. Efforts are currently being made to broaden the NCFA to include members of the former on an individual rather than party basis. These efforts have met stiff resistance from NCFA members. This, however, does not impair the usefulness of the NCFA at this time.

(2) Control of NCFA: Since the NCFA is a joint U.S.-British supported organization, the members have attempted to play one off against the other. Although the NCFA is probably the best controlled and most useful of the various national committees, steps are being taken to tighten control further and eliminate opportunities for this type of maneuvering.

(3) Coordination with British SS: BQFIEND was established as a coordinated enterprise with the British, whose counterpart is called Project VALUABLE. The relationship between VALUABLE and FIEND is based on policy coordination and operational disengagement, with joint exploitation of propaganda and other assets deriving out of use of the NCFA. There is periodic coordination between Washington and London to insure that our covert programs conform to the policy of the State Department and the Foreign Office toward Albania. Propaganda activities conducted through the NCFA are closely coordinated by the British and American representatives. Although complete operational disengagement is provided for by the agreement between FIEND and VALUABLE, there is advance coordination of agent activities to the extent necessary to insure that there is no conflict in recruiting, timing or operational locale. An example of the coordination is the British agreement to postpone their planned propaganda supply drops until the ban on such CIA operations has been lifted, in spite of British disagreement with the CIA reasoning.

(4) Coordination with ex-King Zog: Following consultation with CIA, from exile in Alexandria, Zog has sent emissaries to Tito to discuss Yugoslav intentions toward Albania and to determine what

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Yugoslavia's attitude would be toward an attempt to overthrow the Hoxha regime. Tito reportedly replied that he did not care what form of government Albania had, provided it was friendly toward Yugoslavia. He further intimated that if the Albanians did not have the necessary facilities to overthrow Hoxha he (Tito) would undertake to do so himself. Further conversations between Zog and representatives of Tito are scheduled to take place in the near future.

(5) Coordination with Tito: Since some 700,000 of the world's 2 million Albanians are Yugoslav citizens and there are some 4,000-6,000 bona fide Albanians now resident in Yugoslavia, and since Yugoslavia has more than 200 miles of common frontier with Albania, Tito cannot be ignored in any move to overthrow the Hoxha Government. Yugoslav-sponsored agent activities have increased in recent months and there is evidence that Yugoslavia no longer fears that the U.S.S.R. would use an overthrow of Hoxha, whether sponsored by Yugoslavia or not, as a pretext to invade Yugoslavia. Although there are sharp differences of opinion between the NCPA and the Yugoslav-sponsored Prizren League there are indications of increased interest in the Prizren League on the part of NCPA members, and some have even expressed the belief that it would be well to work with the Yugoslav-sponsored group.

(6) Limited Agent Pool: Although the supply of high calibre Albanian agents is somewhat limited the agents now operating inside the country will attempt to recruit potential agents and exfiltrate them to Greece for training.

(7) Shortage of Albanian Currency: CIA agent operations have been curtailed by a lack of Albanian currency, caused by the virtual cessation of Albanian external trade. An arrangement has now been made whereby Lek will be obtained through French liaison officials and it is hoped that by the time the 1953 operational season is under way it will be possible to supply agent needs.

3. Financial History of Project:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Allotment</u>	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>
1950	\$ []	\$ []	\$ []
1951	[]	[]	[]
1952	[]	[]	[]
1953 (to date)	[]	[]	[]
Total	\$ []	\$ []	[]

* No obligation reporting at this time in OPG; however, have included the expenditure figure for comparability.

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