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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

16 August 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR COP

SUBJECT: Current Status of Project BG FIEND,
With Particular Reference to OPC Organization.

1. The FIEND Project has reached a stage in its development where I strongly believe we should pause to assess the true status of the operation and evolve remedial measures for its control and development if we are to assure its reasonable success.
2. At the outset of this Project it was generally agreed that it occupied a position of great importance for two reasons: a) the significance of the stated aims and objectives of the Project with respect to the implementation of U.S. foreign policy; b) the significance which the success or failure of this Project would have in terms of the development and perhaps even existence of OPC.
3. I believe it was also generally recognized at the time that we embarked on this Project that we were not, in fact, actually prepared organizationally and logistically to implement it. It was none the less decided to proceed with the project for two overriding reasons: a) the outside pressure of events with respect to the target of this Project made it imperative that action be taken as rapidly as possible, and b) it was believed that by actually undertaking an operation of this kind an impetus would be provided for expediting the development of the necessary OPC organization, such as could not be provided except under the pressure of actual operations; and, as a corollary, it was felt that Project BG FIEND as the pioneer, in a sense, of such projects would provide OPC with invaluable lessons for future operations.
4. I am very strongly of the opinion that the lessons which are daily being borne in upon us by the development of this Project are to a considerable extent being neglected in favor of rapidly growing vested interests, and that as a result we stand a very good chance of being faced with a failure the nature and causes of which will be confused in an exchange of recriminations. I am as strongly convinced that this situation need not develop if the factors which have contributed to this situation are subordinated to courage, clear-cut authority and responsibility, and precise and objective assessment of the factors involved.

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- 2 -

5. The ADPC at one time remarked that his concept of OPC was of a focal point within the government which could render service to the entire government through its ability to consider problems and get things done where more overt agencies were unable to act. This implies a focus of power which in turn demands the highest quality of personnel to responsibly and intelligently wield that power. That power none the less is the sine qua non of OPC operations.

6. Not only is this power absent from the present handling of the FIEND Project but there is in fact no central locus of authority for dealing with this Project. As I understand the situation, the appropriate geographic area within Operations, namely EB-I, has, or properly should have, the responsibility for the operation. It does not have the authority. As a matter of fact the geographic areas or branch chiefs do not even, under the existing organization, have the authority to engage the services of agents in their area, even if only for holding purposes.

7. With respect to the FIEND Project there is no chain of command by which the appropriate instructions can be issued and carried out; nor is there one central office where everything about FIEND is known. The legitimate interest of other offices within OPC in being informed as to current developments in that Project is being served by the coordinating system at the expense of the development of the Project itself. There is, for example, no need for a cable concerned solely with a minor personnel action in the FIEND field staff to be coordinated three times within the office of CPP.

8. It was the original concept of this Project that the National Committee involved was by virtue of the Project itself of a nature very different from that of other national committees. It was to be, in effect, a cover for the substance of the Project which is, in fact, special operations. The current trend which seeks to split off the Committee as being a separate entity from the special operations involved has a disruptive and harmful effect on the entire operation.

9. The excessive requirements for satisfaction of the large number of interests which are now contained in this Project seriously jeopardize its security. The question has been raised, for example, as to how a TOP SECRET cable in nine copies can, in fact, be TOP SECRET.

10. In the interests of furthering the success of this operation, which I now consider endangered, I would like to make the following recommendations for the handling within OPC of the FIEND Project:

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- 3 -

a. There be established a Committee to be composed as follows:

- (1) One representative from COP.
- (2) One representative from CPP.
- (3) One representative from COS.

b. This Committee have delegated to it the full authority and responsibility of OPC for Project FIEND.

c. This Committee, and no one else, decide by vote all OPC actions to be taken with respect to FIEND.

d. The chairman of this Committee to be the representative of COP and be entitled to two votes, the other two members to have one vote each.

e. There be a Secretary of the Committee who will prepare minutes of each meeting of the Committee and circulate them as follows:

ADPC
EADPC
COP
CPP
COS
SADO

f. In case of a deadlock within the Committee COP, CPP and COS meet personally to consider the problem and decide its solution on the basis of one vote each.

g. Directives issued by ADPC with respect to FIEND are to be binding on the Committee and/not subject to vote.
obviously

h. SADO and DDO may sit with the Committee whenever they desire in advisory capacity, without vote.

i. Such other persons as any member of the Committee may desire, either within or without OPC, may sit with the Committee at the member's invitation/in a consultative capacity.
with the chairman's concurrence

j. The Committee to meet whenever necessary, presumably at least daily.

k. The instructions to the field are to be coordinated and cleared within this Committee, only except for final clearance by the authenticating officer (COP) and ADPC.


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- 4 -

1. At such time as the Joint Policy Committee is established in the Pentagon the Chairman of this Committee will issue the instructions to the U.S. member of the JPC.

11. I do not believe that the foregoing is in any sense an ideal concept for the handling of the FIEND Project, nor do I recommend that it be adhered to without any possibility of change. I would like to emphasize again, however, that for the sake of the Project itself some such simplification of procedure and modification of organization is imperative.



cc: ADPC via COP
SADO via COP
CFP via COP
COS via COP

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