

2 January 1953

[Attn.]]

Operational

Transmittal of VALUABLE Appreciation - SHAM/BOPTIEND

REFERENCE [] 5157 dated 3 October 1952

Attached under separate cover is a copy of the VALUABLE
Appreciation for 1952 received from AIRCERT.

Attachment (s.c.) []

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Attachment to OELA 227

APPRECIATION OF "VALUABLE" ACTIVITIES FOR THE
OPERATIONAL SEASON ENDING OCTOBER, 1952.

DIRECTIVE FOR 1952.

At the commencement of 1952, the Foreign Office was approached and asked for guidance with regard to our activities in Albania during the forthcoming operational season. The instructions we received were as follows:-

- (1) to maintain our support of the National Committee for Free Albania;
- (2) to engage in propaganda activities against the Communist Regime in Albania to the extent of a leaflet scattering raid over Albania every six to eight weeks;
- (3) the despatch of a small number of intelligence teams into Albania with the task, among normal intelligence activities, of assessing the degree of dissatisfaction among the Albania armed forces.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE.

1. Support of the National Committee for Free Albania.

- (a) A liaison officer has been stationed in Rome, and together with his American colleague has maintained almost daily contact with the Albanian leaders.
- (b) A number of written articles, as also press cuttings, have been despatched to Rome for the inclusion in the official newspaper "SHQIPERIA" published by the Committee.
- (c) Assistance has been given to members of the N.C.F.A. to join such organisations as the European Movement and to attend their councils.
- (d) Very considerable

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- (d) Very considerable effort has been expended in attempts to re-organise the Committee with a two-fold purpose in view:-
- (i) to widen its appeal within the country and among the emigration;
 - (ii) to obstruct the ever-growing tendency of the N.C.F.A. to split into two opposing and powerful groups of the extreme Right and Left.

2. PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN ALBANIA.

- (a) Using R.A.F. aircraft, five leaflet scatters have taken place over Albania during the past 12 months. As a result of these activities 2,500,000 leaflets have been delivered; the general theme of these leaflets has been the maintenance of the spirit of resistance at its present level and advice to the population against the taking of premature action.
- (b) Full preparations have been made for two article scattering operations; the intention of which was to deliver propaganda attached to innocuous but useful articles such as razor blades, soap, etc. At the request of the Americans, these scatters have not taken place owing to the fact that the Americans delivered food and were accused by TIRANA Radio of extending germ warfare into Europe.

3. INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS.

Four missions, each consisting of four men have been despatched to Albania. The code names are SCRUTINY, SAMBO, SATISFACTION, and SALUKI.

(a) "SCRUTINY".

This party, carrying W/T, infiltrated to the Valona area at the end of June and stayed until the end of July when they were forced to leave, exfiltrating overland to Greece. Unfortunately their principal contact was arrested shortly after he had been briefed, for a reason unconnected with SCRUTINY's presence and their other contacts were then unwilling to accept a brief.

TOP SECRET (b) "SAMBO".

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(b) "SAMBO".

This team infiltrated overland from Greece in mid-July to S.E. Albania. They were dislodged after only 3 weeks owing to an unannounced American leaflet raid having alerted the security forces in the area. They then exfiltrated overland to Greece.

(c) "SATISFACTION".

These men entered N. Albania by a sea infiltration towards the end of July. Their objective was to collect intelligence in the Scutari area (hitherto an untouched target), cross east to the DIBER region, and then make their way south along the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier to Greece. We have recently heard from the leader that two members have arrived in Yugoslavia and we are now trying to obtain a full story.

(d) "SALUKI".

This party, carrying W/T, had the ambitious task of establishing a permanent base on the coast south of DURASSO, which could serve as a safe-house for future missions. They hoped either to contact a local guerilla band, known to have been operating fairly recently in this area, or else establish themselves independently through local peasant contacts. After infiltrating by sea, they found the guerilla band had been wiped out some months previously, and that the resultant security measures made it impossible to stay for the winter as hoped. They then exfiltrated by sea.

4. BRIEFS.

Briefs were prepared; these were of a general and specific nature. The specific was to gain intelligence on certain targets in their area; the general was to assess the degree of disaffection which could be expected from the Albanian Armed Forces in the event of an uprising.

5. ASSESSMENT OF

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5. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE.

1. The output of specific intelligence from this year's activities was disappointing. The factors contributing to this are:-

- (a) The low grade of available Albanians. The type of man who is sufficiently robust to escape and then be willing to reinfiltate, does not normally have the intelligence and high-level contacts which are desirable for high-grade reporting.
- (b) The difficulties of clandestine existence in Albania. Our parties are forced to rely on the assistance of friends and relations, who are normally known anti-Communists and therefore watched. To achieve success, effort would have to be directed towards establishing a permanent base of the type that "SALOKI" attempted, and to keep this supplied. This would avoid the dependence on local contacts.
- (c) The difficulty in covering N. Albanian targets. Our main recruiting ground is Greece where the majority of refugees come from S. Albania. N. Albanians escape more to Yugoslavia where we have no recruiting facilities.

2. The dividend from the year's efforts may be summarised as follows:-

- (a) A number of reports, not of a high standard, but on targets on which our only other source of information is from very low grade refugee interrogation. The political reports especially were much more objective.
- (b) One penetration of N. Albania by "SATISFACTION" - no information is yet forthcoming, but something of interest should result. (and! and!)
- (c) The exploration of a promising area for establishing a permanent base (by SALOKI). The terrain is

excellent for

excellent for guerilla existence, within easy reach of both DURASSO and TIRANA, has a first class landing area and dropping zone, and to one whose inhabitants are traditionally anti-government - of whatever regime. The special circumstances which caused this year's lack of success, would, in all probability, not obtain on future occasions.

GENERAL APPRECIATION OF SITUATION IN ALBANIA.

1. From the information we have received only a rough estimate can be obtained of the percentage of the population who are definitely anti-regime. There is no doubt that the vast majority are anti-Communist. We estimate that the active supporters to Communism constitute a very small nucleus.

2. Attitude of the people towards an uprising.

It would seem that faith and allegiance to the N.C.F.A. has been maintained. Our parties have not noticed any marked deterioration in the resistance spirit of the people, but on the other hand they have confirmed that no action can be expected from within until the people are assured of external support and a good chance of ultimate victory.

We estimate that the bulk of the population would probably stay aloof from overt action until they see concrete evidence of support and determination on the part of the West. The fear of the consequences to themselves and their families if the uprising failed is paramount in their considerations.

3. Degree of disaffection within the Armed Forces and Signurimi.

Although the obtaining of information on this subject was one of the primary tasks of our teams, they all failed to make contacts with access to definite information. There are, however, many indirect pointers that leave us in no doubt that the mass of the conscripts are either disaffected, or at least disgruntled, with their conditions and treatment.

The fact that men from KULAK families on conscription are not given weapons, but are set to manual labour, is indicative that the Communists themselves realise the degree of disaffection which exists. Another is the disciplinary methods intended to prevent desertion.

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This assessment applies only to the Armed Forces, and not to the Sigmarini and other special troops whose devotion to the present regime is of course reinforced by self-interest on account of their better conditions.

4. Starvation.

We have received many more reports this year than previously of malnutrition and starvation.

It is considered both by refugees and by our parties that this is deliberate on the part of the authorities in order to curb possible open resistance.

5. NOKHA-SHEHU split.

The rivalry between these two is now openly acknowledged. It is, however, due to personal ambition and is most probably used by the Russians as an effective means of controlling both. There is no sign, however, that either wishes to pursue a different role.

Cases have occurred where a member of the Government, or of a provincial Committee, has turned against the regime, and both have joined in degrading or removing him without regard to whether he was a supporter of one or the other.

CONCLUSION.

1. We have satisfactorily fulfilled points (i) and (ii) of our Directive. We have also fulfilled point (iii), but the straight intelligence dividend obtained from these missions has been disappointing due to the low quality of the agents available, and our inability to establish secure contacts within the country.

2. Although the tangible dividends in the form of intelligence of these missions is small, the intangible benefits should not be overlooked. They include:-

- (a) maintenance of an offensive spirit;
- (b) accumulation of experience of launching technique, etc.;
- (c) the acquisition of a great deal of operational intelligence, i.e., clandestine living conditions within the country, etc.

3. It should

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3. It should be borne in mind that this is a co-ordinated Anglo-American operation and that we have requested our American friends to produce a similar appreciation of their own activities and the situation within the country.

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