

WORKING PAPER
31 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF INT&TA DIVISION

SUBJECT: Request for Special Estimate

1. As a result of recent CPM briefing on Albania and CPM decision to proceed with staff planning studies and preparation of emergency plans for that area, it is essential that a special intelligence analysis and estimate be prepared as a basis for further policy and planning studies by the PMS staff.

2. The inclosure to this memorandum lists questions for which answers are required by PMS in connection with the required intelligence estimate. These questions have been coordinated with PMS/LOG, PMS/OPOT(PL), PP, and SE Division (). Questions are designed to cover matters affecting general policy and planning guidance considerations. Detailed operational intelligence which will be required by SE and other area divisions in preparing their detailed operational plans is not required in this estimate.

3. It is requested that a special NIE covering points listed in inclosure be completed as soon as practicable.

Encl: 1
Sp. Intell Est.
Albania

()
Chief, OPOT

OPOT/OPS/FW/11

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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ALBANIA

INFORMATION REQUIRED

1. Soviet communist opposition capabilities in the event of a coup.

a. Overt opposition.

(1) Do Soviet satellite countries adjoining Yugoslavia have the capability of successfully overrunning that country without participation of Soviet armed forces in reprisal for the launching of an anti-Soviet coup in Albania? What is the minimum period of time which adjoining countries would require to prepare and launch a military invasion?

(2) What is the capability of the Soviet Union and/or satellite countries to provide military assistance for the Soviet controlled regime in Albania? By sea shipments of troops, materiel and supplies? By air shipment? What time factor would be involved?

b. Covert opposition.

(1) What are communist capabilities for launching major paramilitary reprisal attacks (revolutionary action) against areas which are allied with or of vital strategic significance to the U.S. as a "face-saving" action at the time of a coup in Albania?

(2) What are communist capabilities of covert infiltration of arms, materiel, and "volunteer" forces into Albania during a revolution in that country in order to assist the Soviet controlled regime? By sea? By air? What time factor would be involved? From what major sources and areas could such covert assistance be provided by the communists?

2. Soviet-communist intentions in regard to an attempted pro-West coup in Albania.

a. What are probable Soviet military intentions or reactions in the event of a coup in Albania: in regard to open military

intervention

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intervention by USSR or satellite countries in Albania? In regard to military reprisal attack on Yugoslavia by neighboring satellite countries? In regard to launching open military hostilities in Europe with Soviet and satellite armed forces utilizing Albania as a pretext?

b. What are probable Soviet intentions or reactions in regard to major paramilitary action in the event of a coup in Albania? With a view to assisting the Soviet controlled regime in Albania? With a view to major reprisal of "face saving" action in other areas?

c. What are probable Soviet communist intentions in Europe in regard to political-psychological warfare measures to be taken against the West with a view to discrediting motives of anti-communist forces and offsetting pro-West psychological advantages resulting from a coup? With a view to provoking and extending international tension in the Balkans as a result of conflicting national interests in Albania?

d. To what extent would Soviet intentions with regard to 2, a, b and c above be influenced if U.S. participation in a coup became openly apparent through "blowing" of U.S. clandestine operations and support?

3. Yugoslav intentions and capabilities.

a. What are Yugoslavia's probable intentions with regard to:-

(1) Launching a unilateral coup in Albania to overthrow the Soviet dominated regime in that country? At the present time? In the future?

(2) Participating in a coup sponsored multilaterally by Yugoslavia, the U.S. and/or other interested countries?

(3) Attempting to establish unilateral Yugoslav political control of any new regime following a successful unilateral coup? Following a multilateral coup participated in by the U.S. and/or other interested countries?

b. What are Yugoslav capabilities for launching a successful unilateral coup?

c. Can the anti-Soviet complexion of the Tito Government in Yugoslavia be definitely confirmed at this time? Is it possible or probable that the Tito Government, while maintaining an

anti-Soviet

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anti-Soviet pose, is actually engaged in secret collaboration with the Soviets?

4. Greek intentions and capabilities:-

a. What are probable Greek intentions in regard to:-

(1) Participating actively in a multilateral coup if given the opportunity?

(2) Attempting to annex the Northern Epirus area of southern Albania for Greece in the event of a coup not participated in by the Greeks? As a condition to Greek participation in a multilateral coup if proposed?

(3) Encouraging the establishment of an independent government in place of the present Soviet controlled regime in Albania, retaining present Greek-Albanian border?

b. What is the scale of covert paramilitary effort which Greece is capable of mounting into Albania in the event of Greek participation in a multilateral coup?

5. Albanian problems following a successful coup.

a. Could Albania attain economic stability following establishment of a free Albanian government? To what extent would free Albania represent an economic liability to the U.S.?

b. What military assistance if any would free Albania require from the U.S. following a coup in order to maintain internal order and security under an independent regime? To what extent would communist partisan activity following a coup represent an internal threat to the country?

6. To what extent would the establishment of a free pro-West Albania facilitate:-

a. The defense capabilities of Yugoslavia and Greece in the event of war with the Soviets?

b. Closer military collaboration between Greece and Yugoslavia in war planning?

c. Defense of the Adriatic-Mediterranean area in the event of Soviet aggression?

7. Strategic

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7. Strategic time factors.

a. During what time period, short of an open war, will the relative strength of Yugoslav defense forces in comparison with military forces of adjoining Soviet satellite countries be most favorable to Yugoslavia in the event of retaliatory attack on that country by Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria?

b. From the viewpoint of climate and weather conditions what time of the year would be most favorable to Yugoslav defense in the event of a retaliatory military attack on that country?

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