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U.S. Naval Attache, Tokyo
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Kichisaburo NOMURA, Ex-Admiral, I.J.N.
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Personal Observation, Conversation with Subject & Others
EVALUATION
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Ex-Admiral Kichisaburo NOMURA is today one of the most prominent of the pre-war outstanding Japanese politico-military figures. Highly respected and a man of great prestige, he is unchallenged leader of the high-ranking ex-naval officers who are active in rearment thinking and planning. Admiral NOMURA is acutely aware of the Soviet threat to Japan and is alarmed at the physical and mental unpreparedness of his country to meet this menace. While he believes in a balanced armament for Japan, he feels that sea and air power are vital keys to her defense and are being neglected. NOMURA is a conservative and a moderate and has a high regard for Americans and American policy. His physical vigor and mental alertness belie his advanced age. It is possible that future developments will bring NOMURA even more to the fore.

Encl: (1) Three (3) copies of "Japan After Independence", article written by Admiral NOMURA

1. Kichisaburo NOMURA, former Admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy and Ambassador to the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor, is today one of the most active and respected of the prominent pre-war politico-military figures in Japan. Where others have passed into oblivion or jail, NOMURA has busied himself, in a more or less unofficial way, with the problems of the defense of Japan and other thorny issues which beset her. He has done this in a manner which has put him in the public mind as one of the foremost defense "planners" of the country and almost as an "elder statesman". It is difficult to assess the extent of the Admiral's actual influence on the Japanese government but it is fairly safe to assume that if positive decision for real rearment taken by Japan NOMURA has done to date and his subsequent activities are bound to have effect on the course and nature of such a defense effort.

2. Admiral NOMURA's prestige and position are based not only on his wide naval and diplomatic experience, but also on his present almost unchallenged position as leader of the ranking ex-naval officers - a group whose cohesiveness contrasts sharply with

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the other sides of army organizations. Among the other reported members of this so-called "hardcore group" of ex-naval officers are:

- Admiral KUMAHASHI (Admiral; former CISO, Combined Fleet)
- Admiral YAMAZAKI (Admiral; former delegate to Washington, Blackman Commission, President of Pease School)
- Admiral HIRASAKA (Admiral; former Governor General of Formosa)
- Admiral KISHIDA (Admiral; former Chief, Bureau of Military Affairs, Navy Ministry)
- Admiral TAKEMURA (Admiral; former Bureau Chief, Navy Ministry and also recently head of a planning group known as the "Y Committee")

KUMAHASHI, as the accepted leader of this group, acts as the sole channel for the transmission of their ideas on rearmament to the Japanese Government and American authorities. Not only does he speak the efforts of those in whose good judgment he has confidence, but he also sees to it that the more radical and unlettered among the ex-naval officers are kept under wraps.

3. While it is too early to estimate the actual influence of Admiral TAKEMURA on the Japanese Government, it is known that he is a member of a secret advisory council set up by Premier IKEDA about eight months ago to advise him on rearmament. Although IKEDA inherently distrusts professional military men, he realizes that he knows nothing of the technical aspects of this problem and has gathered around him a group of conservative former military leaders whom he respects. These men favor a limited rearmament in close cooperation with the United States, and TAKEMURA represents Navy thinking on this matter. (There are at least two other distinct groups of ex-military men who are attempting to influence political thinking, especially future political developments will determine which will emerge as the mainponent. One group is more or less in the circle of Progressive Party President Nakano SHIMIZU and other politicians who favor a more far-reaching rearmament. The other, led by ex-Colonel Masamoto TSUJI, is composed of radical rightist, "neutralist" and anti-U.S. military men. There is little Navy representation in either of these groups).

4. In addition to formulating plans and comments on rearmament for the benefit of Japanese and American authorities, Admiral KUMAHASHI writes articles for publication of such magazines (1), presented in draft by the writer to Reporting Officer (RO), is an example. Despite the wide range of his knowledge and interests, KUMAHASHI adheres fairly strictly to defense subjects. He informed RO that one publication had requested him to write an article on Japan's future in relation to Southeast Asia. He said with a chuckle that he told the magazine such a subject might smack of the old "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity" idea and offend delicate sensitivities, so he would write only on the subject of Japanese national defense.

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The attached article fairly well summarizes Admiral HOSHIDA's views on the problems facing Japan, although a good deal more can be gained through personal conversation, in which he is very frank and outspoken. His awareness of the strategic threat from Soviet Russia is acute, both as regards actual armed attack and subversion. He feels that Russian aims in this area have always been the same, and characterized the Soviet Naval proposals at the San Francisco Peace Conference regarding the use of the seas and airfields around the country as an attempt to "internationalize Japan." Commonly, he thinks, is only a new instrument in the old quest for domination in the East. Confronted with the internal Communist threat, he seems to realize that while the majority of Japanese is disturbed, the main danger lies in the way in which the ideas and activities of very non-Communist Japanese slip into Communist hands.

6. About 1941, Admiral HOSHIDA is alarmed at the apathy of the public and the unwillingness of the government in the face of this threat. While the difficulties of changing the Constitution to permit rearmament are somewhat pleaded over in the enclosed article, the Admiral frankly admits in personal conversation that a referendum proposal on the subject of rearmament would be defeated by the people. Strong psychological conditioning of the populace would be necessary and the Japanese government has done nothing about it.

The fact that so much time has gone by in inaction particularly galls HOSHIDA, feeling that the government is about as ignorant as the masses on the subject of national defense, and must also be informed. HOSHIDA stands ready and willing to "inform" and "educate". While he has considerable personal respect for Premier HOSHINO and prizes his for his courage on the Treaty and the Security Pact issues, HOSHIDA is somewhat less than charitable to the Prime Minister's entourage. He has no doubt that anyone could expect such a group, which he has characterized as full of petty politicians, bureaucrats and profiteers, to lead the Japanese nation in meeting the problem of defense. The main targets of his contempt, however, are the intellectual "neutralists" of the academic and cultural world.

What further worry to him is the trend of the few steps so far taken in rearmament, particularly the overwhelming concentration on ground forces, which Premier HOSHIDA is prone to favor. HOSHIDA has expressed to Americans his fear that in the development of this trend "we will again be hampered by the ground forces". With obvious reason, he recalls the February, 1936 incident in which the Navy had to threaten force to end the activities in Tokyo of fanatical radical elements of the Tokyo Army. HOSHIDA is a leader of the more moderate and conservative group in old naval circles, but feels the dangers of extremism of any kind and undoubtedly is concerned lest the predominance of army strength give rise to a new militarism. Although he does not favor civilian control of the national defense machinery, he also sees the danger of possibility of radical civilians seizing the civil power and using the armed forces for nefarious ends. But the principal reason for the Admiral's trepidation over present trends is his conviction that sea and air power are the keys to

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Japan's defense, and that Japan should not rely entirely on the U.S. for this strength. However, he is very happy that in the new coastal security force, Japan is taking the first limited steps toward naval rearmament.

9. Admiral NOMURA's admiration and high regard for Americans and for U.S. policy goals appear quite genuine. His contacts with U.S. naval and other officials are most cordial. (Calling on the Ambassador recently, he expressed thanks on behalf of himself and fellow naval veterans for U.S. naval aid to Japan). He has praise for U.S. aims in the world generally and for American policies in Korea and Japan particularly. Although he approves heartily of the decision to prevent Communist capture of Taiwan, he takes an exceedingly dim view of Chiang Kai-shek's regime and his pretensions of returning to the mainland. (He admires the native Formosans however. "You will find the islanders more trustworthy than the mainlanders," he recently remarked).

10. Admiral NOMURA is 77, and retired from active naval service fifteen years ago. When talking with him about his experiences in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and as Assistant Naval Attaché in pre-World War I St. Petersburg and Vienna, one almost has the feeling of being in another world; yet one soon realizes that NOMURA is very much alive in this one, and furthermore, quite conscious of all its complicated problems. He is still an imposing figure for a Japanese (six feet tall), and his physical vigor and mental acuity are remarkable. The Admiral is very convivial; he drinks moderately and smokes steadily. When he lost his right eye in a bombing during the 1937 Shanghai Incident, the Empress personally presented him with a glass eye. The Admiral still wears it and refers to the incident with much good-humored pride.

Premier's Comment: What Admiral NOMURA feels he has to contend with in the Japanese Government is probably not entirely an ignorance of national defense problems, but also a large measure of sensitiveness to both domestic and international political feelings. Premier YOSHIDA is aware of the economic burden of building and maintaining naval and air forces with any real defense potential. Furthermore, the Government probably hopes to see Japan invited into some sort of future regional defense pact and feels that a buildup of strong naval and air arms is premature and might be construed by nations like the Philippines and Australia as aggressive.

The coming Diet elections may affect Admiral NOMURA's position and influence. Should Ichiro MATSUYAMA come to power, he might get a cabinet post, since he is known to be rather close to the former Liberal Party leader. To a lesser extent the Admiral is friendly with Mamoru SHIGEMITSU of the Progressive Party. However, the strong stand for real rearmament previously taken by these men has been toned down since the campaign started and may not necessarily be the basis for their actual policies if brought to power.

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...most direct on domestic front. Even intellectuals are falling
...they become of the Security Treaty and the presence of U.S.
...in Japan. It may be said that the matter as a whole is
...inherent to the danger of direct invasion.

As to indirect invasion, the way by which the main axis of
...and disorder abroad than have given rise to the present
...of a realization of the pertinence of the situation, and the govern-
...is apparently planning to take some appropriate measures to
...such as:

1. Since the late part of the 1930s the U.S. has been steadily
...and steadily. The membership of the Communist Party in
...of about 100,000, and the number of members in Japan is
...by various groups of about 1,000,000 or more. The
...is said to be approximately 100,000.

2. In Japan and the U.S. Communist and Socialist leaders are
...in many places, which will have a very serious effect
...and, taking advantage of their superior position,
...to, these two will direct their activities and efforts by means
...of 500,000, and by concentrating in Japan about 100,000
...of them. They demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
...without reservation, and say for Japan's independence, all in order to
...such as better and progress for the people and stability of Japan to
...control the country.

3. The most troublesome matter is that some men of learning have
...and Japan and speak the possibility in England, yet the same
...the prevailing opinion of the government. They seem possible for recovery
...to this situation.

4. The only reason for our being placed with no defense except a
...and Japan is because we are protected by the U.S. Navy, especially
...in Japan. Our position is not really well protected there.
...that China and Korea have been taken to the extent that a number of
...members of Japanese have already landed in Japan. They are also
...intellectuals are working very actively in Japan.

5. It is extremely urgent that we in Japan should see ourselves
...with the maintenance of the present situation in East Asia and in
...the world, and that we should, first of all, maintain a
...the right for independence and liberty. This is a matter in which
...the U.S. is very much interested.

6. The Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty which Japan will sign
...is the only way to depend on ourselves to keep our independence. By
...the Security Treaty Japan will in fact lose its independence and
...will lose its independence. Therefore, the Japanese people should
...independence, and it is suggested by the U.S. that Japan
...which means the responsibility of preventing Japanese independence
...should direct and indirect through the U.S. and other
...should take a more definite stand in order to prevent the
...the U.S. in order to prevent the U.S. from being able to
...of the terms which are proposed of this plan.

7. In Japan some people think that no conditions are necessary for
...the maintenance of order. There is, in fact, no way they find in
...the plan of the U.S. has generally it is believed that

