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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTERIM RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Research and Analysis Branch
Biographical Report, BB-1461

Name MURAKI Kishisaburo, Admiral

Address Tokyo, Chiyoda-ku, Nishinagai, 60

Major Positions Naval Attache to Washington, 1914-1918
President of Peer's School, 1937-1939
Foreign Minister, 1939
Ambassador to United States, 1941
Member of Privy Council, appointed May 1944

Family History Born December 1877 in Wakayama-ken; the third son of MURAKI Kishisaburo, a Samurai. According to one report he was left fatherless and poor when still very young and had to support himself through school doing various jobs, one of them being fishing for a peddler. About this time he was adopted by the late MURAKI Masatomo, whose name he took, and while he lived while attending the Middle School of Hiroko, younger sister of YAMAGUCHI Tetsuo, a close friend, Tadashi; born about 1915-2/

Career Entered Japanese Naval Academy in 1896 2/
Graduated from Naval Academy in 1898 with Imperial Prize for scholarship.
Embarked on training cruise as a naval cadet that took him overboard 2/
rank of Lieutenant, 1900 1/
Chosen to command the battleship "Mikasa" from England in 1901
Spent a year in Berlin in 1910 2/ other reports list him as naval attache in Austria and Germany, 1908-1911 2/
Commander of "Oyama"
On the Staff of the Naval Affairs Bureau 1/
Lieutenant Colonel, 1911 3/
Made an adjutant and appointed Secretary to the Navy Minister, 1911 2/
Naval Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, during the war 1, 2/ 1914-1918 5/
First World War: Captain of the battleship "Yakumo" in 1918 2/
Member of the Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and Disarmament Conference, 1921-1922 2/
Appointed Commander of the First Overseas Fleet, in China, 1923 2/
Staff officer, General Staff Office

(State: 2 Aug 45)

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

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YAMURA Kichisaburo, Admiral - 2

Career - continued

Attendant to Crown Prince 1/
 Director of Naval Instruction Bureau 6/ 1925-1926 1/
 Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff, 6/ 1926-1928 1/
 Advanced to Admiral, 1926 1/
 In the United States as commander of a training squadron, 1928 1/
 Commander-in-Chief of the Kure Admiralty Port, 3rd Squadron, 1928 1/
 Supreme Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Base, 1932-1933 6/
 Director of Nankai Education Society, 1933
 Supreme War Councilor, appointed November 1933 1/
 Made full Admiral, March 1933 1/
 President of the Peer's School, 1937 6/ - 1939 2/
 Resigned from active service, 1937 1/
 Foreign Minister of the ABE cabinet, September 1939 2/-1940 1/
 Member of the Pacific Institute
 Made an inspection tour of the South seas, 1940 6/
 Succeeded SAITO as Ambassador to the United States, November 1940 8/
 arrived in Washington February 1941 5/
 Returned December 1941 5/ exchanged 1942 9/
 Returned to Tokyo in August 1942 2/
 Appointed President of the Central Federation of Educational
 Associations, June 1943 10/
 Toured northern Japan in July 1943
 Named chairman of a committee to build a memorial hall at a
 meeting of the Mount Koya Advisory Council, July 1943
 Appointed to the Privy Council, succeeding Admiral ARIMA Ryokitsu,
 May 1944
 Vice President of the Japan Cultural Patriotic Service Association,
 January 1945
 Named a member of the "Defense of the Fatherland League," the
 Council established under the Home Defense League, 30 June 1945 10/
 Holder of:
 First Grade of the Second Court Rank
 First Order of Merit
 Second Class Order of the Golden Kite

At the age of 19 YAMURA entered the Imperial Japanese Navy. He was appointed for two years to the Imperial Japanese Navy Academy. His classmate was MIYAMA Hiroshi, who later became a prominent figure in the navy and had to retire because of illness. YAMURA was very interested in the study of the subject of naval architecture. He graduated second in his class and received the Imperial Prize for scholarship. He had such confidence in himself that when he was called to the college who is going to teach me...

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KOMURA Kichisaburo, Admiral - 3

Comments continued

As a naval cadet he went on training cruises which took him over most of the world and during the Russo-Japanese War saw service on several ships. He was navigating officer on the "Gaiyoo" when she hit a mine, and sank, with most of the officers and crew on board. KOMURA was one of the few to survive. 2/

At the conclusion of this war, KOMURA received his first diplomatic assignment when he was sent to Russia and later Germany and Austria as naval attaché. 1/ He returned to Tokyo in 1911 to serve on the staff of the Naval Affairs Bureau and as Secretary to the Navy Minister Admiral Saigo. 3/ During World War I he was assigned to the Japanese Embassy in Washington where, according to one source, he was "the popular card-playing Naval Attaché of a friendly neutral-power," and a student at Annapolis. 4/ It was during this period that he gained his reputation as "a man of good will" and became well acquainted with many of the important officials in the Navy department including its Under Secretary, Franklin Roosevelt. In 1916 he returned home to become captain of the cruiser "Yakumo." 5/

At the conclusion of the war, he was sent to Paris as a member of the peace delegation headed by Marquis SALOMI and Admiral T. KESHITA. In 1922 he again went abroad, this time to the United States, to attend, under Admiral KATO Tomosaburo, the Washington Disarmament Conference where he is said to have played an important part as technical adviser to the Japanese delegation in framing the treaty which suspended naval competition between the United States and Japan for fifteen years. 2/ The following year he was appointed Commander of the First Overseas Fleet which patrolled the Yangtze River and the waters around Shanghai. According to one source, he held this position for two years, learning much about China and making a number of contacts among the American and other representatives in those parts. 5/ From 1925 to 1929 he held various posts under the Navy Ministry in Tokyo, including that of Chief of the Education Bureau; and in 1926 he was advanced to the rank of Admiral. 1/

In 1929 he revisited the United States as commander of the Training Squadron sent there. He returned to become Commander-in-Chief of the Kure Squadron at Port and later Supreme Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Base. 6/ While he was holding the latter post, the first Shanghai incident occurred and he was ordered to proceed to the scene of hostilities as Commander of the Third Fleet. According to Admiral YAMAMASHI Katsunoshin (retired) who has been in a position to know KOMURA both officially and privately, the latter was on "good personal terms" with the heads of the various foreign naval forces stationed at Shanghai at that time, including Admiral Hall of the British Fleet, Admiral Taylor of the United States, Admiral Tassi of the French and Admiral Cavagnoli of the Italian fleet, who was later to congratulate him on his "great victory," when Komura drove back the 19th Route Army exactly to the line where he had asked it to retreat and then promptly proposed a truce. 7/ This same source declares that it is a tribute to Admiral Komura's ability that throughout "that difficult period" he was able

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NOMURA Kichisaburo, Admiral - 4

Comments continued

to maintain friendly relations with the representatives of all the Powers mentioned above. He adds that during the fighting with the forces of the 19th Route Army the situation was particularly tense, as the area guarded by the Japanese was adjacent to that under American guard and "some of our Japanese bullets went astray into the latter area." According to YAMAMASHI's account the temper prevailing among the Americans there at the time was reflected to a degree in Washington, where a section of opinion counselled "a stronger line of action against Japan." That such counsel did not prevail after all, source claims, was due "in no small measure to Admiral Nomura's able handling of affairs on the spot." Morgan Young describing the incident in greater detail, states that the man most responsible for the Shanghai incident and the massacre and atrocities which ensued was Admiral Shiozawa, who consequently was hurriedly replaced by Admiral Nomura, "a man with a level head, popular among American and British naval men, with whom he could talk familiarly and easily." He arrived on 2 February, the account continues, but proved to be as ferocious as Shiozawa and it was not until the arrival of plentiful reinforcements that he consented to a brief truce so that nuns might go into the ravaged area to assist the terrified women and children in getting away. He was just as uncooperative according to source in the negotiations which followed on Admiral Kully's flagship, "Kent", where the Japanese finally agreed in principle to a simultaneous withdrawal, but added so many conditions that it was almost stultified. Young concludes by remarking that Admiral NOMURA's presence at Shanghai did little good after all. "A genial manner and fluent speech find some tasks too great for them."¹¹ A few weeks later, on 29 April 1932, NOMURA was wounded when a Korean terrorist hurled a bomb into a big group of Japanese officers and officials assembled to observe the Imperial Birthday in Shanghai. The Admiral lost an eye, SHIOZUMITSU, Minister to China, lost a leg, and KUBOTA, President of the Shanghai Residents' Association was killed. Generals UEDA and SHIMAZU were also injured, the latter dying a week later.¹²

According to reports, NOMURA's first glass eye was presented to him by the Emperor.¹²

Returning to Japan in 1933 NOMURA was made a full admiral and appointed a Supreme War Councillor in November of that year.¹³ In 1937 he retired from active service desiring that he was an old man and intended to enjoy his retired life in Japan. Shortly thereafter he was appointed principal of the Peer's School in Tokyo. YAMAMASHI states that his appointment as principal of the Peer's School was generally approved. He improved the management and equipment of the school, and was largely responsible for the new auditorium. More important still, source continues, he "knew how to approach the young scholars and convince them to find their own selves." HIDA Kotoya states that unlike General MOGI, his predecessor who had been a "fearful man," NOMURA was likable.¹⁴ NOMURA described his attitude as

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NOMURA Kichisaburo, Admiral - 5

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president in a letter to his old classmate, MIZUNO Hironori in which he said, "General NOGI had his own principle and policy and he personally practiced faithfully as a model to the student. I am not saying that NOGI's policy is mistaken but it is hard for ordinary people to follow his way. I cannot tell the student to practice the things which I myself cannot do, so I'll do the appropriate things with utmost effort." MIZUNO, commenting on this said: "NOMURA is not a man who lacks sincerity and tells people to live on bread and butter while he himself lives on the fat of the land."¹³ YAMAMASHI describes his conduct as head of the Peers' School as follows: "The new principal believed that personal contacts were a great force in character building; he therefore made a point of coming into contact with as many scholars as possible. In summer he went to the seaside with them; when they left on forced marches he accompanied them; he tried, in fact, to be with them as much as possible no matter what activity they were engaged in. His robust constitution stood him in good stead... As a master he was often not easy to please, but he was liked and respected by all. When it became known that he would be leaving the school to become Foreign Minister, he was untreated not to go."¹⁴ One scholar wrote, "Please remain and train us so that we may become worthy pillars of our country."¹⁵

In September 1937 Premier ABE Nobuyuki offered NOMURA the post of Foreign Minister in his cabinet. According to one source, he was reluctant to accept the position and Mrs. NOMURA was strongly opposed to his taking it, feeling that his position as President of the Peers School was more "care-free, healthier, and honorable."¹⁶ However, he finally accepted and was installed on 25 September 1937, relieving ABE who had been holding the post concurrently.¹⁷ According to one source account his appointment came as a surprise to the public for it was generally supposed that ABE would choose a man from among Kawaguchi's (Foreign Office) officials, or an ex-Foreign Minister in accordance with the practice in the past.¹⁸ Although the real reasons for his selection were not given, conjectures as to the cause of NOMURA's appointment were rife. The most frequently given explanation was that the strained relations with the United States at that time, called for a man who could hold his own with American statesmen. NOMURA, it seemed possessed all the necessary qualifications.^{2, 8, 15} He had worked with American statesmen on numerous occasions both in the United States and elsewhere. He had many friends among influential Americans whose acquaintances he made while in Washington as the Naval Attaché of the Japanese Embassy there, and was reputedly a good friend of President Roosevelt's.^{2, 15} According to reliable sources he had long been considered one of the most pro-American of Japanese leaders;⁸ and it was hoped he would be able to forestall the embargo resolution which, it was feared, would be revived in the January session of Congress, and open the way to new treaty negotiations.¹⁵

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NOHURA Kichisaburo, Admiral - 6

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Other reasons given for NOHURA's selection as Foreign Minister were ABE's desire for an "outsider" to head the Ministry in order to prevent a takeover of the revolutionary faction in the Iwasanagasaki from gaining control; a possible surrender to militarist and navalists pressures; ABE's friendship with NOHURA resulting from their work together at numerous "private and exclusive meetings."¹¹ and ABE's conviction that an "outsider" would be a better Foreign Minister than does an "expert."¹¹

According to press accounts, the moment of NOHURA's entrance into the Foreign Ministry was inauspicious, for the controversy between the two factions of the Iwasanagasaki was at its height.¹⁵ He was immediately presented with a bill proposing the establishment of a foreign trade ministry. It is stated that, unaware of the legal technicalities involved and lacking an adequate knowledge of the situation, he was "trapped" by the "bureaucrats," who had everything "arranged" for him, (as they had for Premier ABE) into approving the bill. Later he was persuaded to drop the plan and work for better coordination in the existing set-up.¹¹ HIDA Kotoya declares that the disturbance which occurred in the Foreign Ministry at this time was the result of "a great mismanagement" on the part of Foreign Minister NOHURA.

KIYOSAKI Fiyochi commenting on this disturbance in the Foreign Office declared, "It may be said that the trouble at least was not a demonstration of lack of confidence in NOHURA or a 'strike' against him. It cannot be denied, however, that NOHURA did 'stumble' at the outset of his service at the Foreign Ministry. It is also evident now that the trouble could not be solved by one or two men."¹¹ On the diplomatic front, the situation was just as discouraging. Relations with the United States had been strained by the Wang incident and the abrogation of the 23-year-old commercial treaty.² One source claims that NOHURA made a sincere effort to improve matters, and he held many long talks with American Ambassador Grew toward this end.¹⁶ In December 1939 he announced that Japan was going to open the Yangtze River to foreign trade. According to source he tried too, to establish a general policy for dealing with the United States--to settle all outstanding questions that had arisen during the Japanese Army's operations and so create an atmosphere that might make some sort of peace terms, probably with Wang Ching-wei, acceptable to Americans.¹⁷ In conclusion source states that the ABE cabinet was short-lived and that Nohura's proposals possibly contributed to its downfall. Other hindrances to the success of the cabinet were Parliamentary opposition and the general discontent due to the rise in prices. The entire cabinet was compelled to resign on 14 January 1940.¹⁶ One source asserts that after its fall Japan became a member of the Axis alliance and was totalitarian than ever.¹⁸

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NOHURA Kichisaburo, Admiral - 7

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In July 1940 Admiral NOHURA embarked on a South Seas Tour sponsored by an unofficial organization known as the Pacific Institute. According to a press report the Foreign Office denied rumors that the Admiral's tour had some official nature and the latter asserted that his only purpose in going was to "comfort Nippon industrialists and colonists carrying on their respective enterprises far from their father lands."^{15/} It was also reported that arrangements were being made for "unofficial meetings" with President Quezon of the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre, the United States High Commissioner at Manila; Governor General Tjarda of the N.E.I. at Manila and other leading personalities.

In November of 1940 MATSUOKA, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the NOHARA cabinet appointed him Ambassador to Washington, sending him to America in February 1941 to have "heart-to-heart talks with President Roosevelt on means for improving the situation between our two countries."^{2/} The Minister said that the Admiral had twice refused the Embassy in Washington because he did not wish to be placed in the position of giving assurances to the American Government when those assurances might later be invalidated through the fall of the cabinet and the appointment of a new Foreign Minister who might not support Mr. Matsuoka's views.^{17/} At the time of his appointment he said, "I personally know of no issue impossible of peaceable solution."^{2/} Before leaving he was received by the Emperor and enjoined to work strenuously for peace with America. Source suggests that he may have been deceived as to what was actually occurring in Tokyo when he and Matsuoka were negotiating with Hull on the eve of Pearl Harbor.^{6/}

Setting sail on the "Konakura Maru" NOHURA was given a warm reception in Honolulu where Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, Admiral James O. Richardson was among those to greet him and in San Francisco where he received a 19-gun salute and Nisei feted him. However, the story was different in Washington where he was met by no one of first importance. However Counselor of the German Embassy Dr. Hans Thomsen was among those present. His first sessions with Hull and Roosevelt were extremely brief and although he referred to Roosevelt as one of his "oldest and closest friends" the latter, his source relates, was extremely grave and stated, "There are developments in the relations between the United States and Japan which cause concern."^{18/} The Admiral told reporters that the United States atmosphere was worse than he had expected.^{12/} According to Grew the staff of the Japanese Embassy in Washington was "painfully weak", although Admiral Nohura is himself a very competent man he has no advisers of first class ability.^{17/} Negotiations were little heady in the next few months and on 28 August 1941 Premier HANOYE sent a note which NOHURA according to Grew's account, carried to Roosevelt indicating Japan's willingness to open negotiations in order to avert war. Accordingly talks were begun in great secrecy both in Washington and in Tokyo.^{17/} Of his talks with Cordell Hull, Nohura said, "I believe it possible to alleviate the estrangement between Japan and the

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NUMURA Kichiasuro, Admiral - 8

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United States and it is foolish not to make an effort to that end. Secretary of State Hull and myself discussed various questions as friends rather than as diplomats. We did not arrive at any conclusion today, but I believe it can be done some day.^{19/} Hugh Ryan in a discussion of the Navy's inherent conservatism and caution where radical moves were involved declared, "Numura went to America as the Navy's agent. He wanted to stop this war. So, at least, I believed after talking with him, and I think he was honest."^{23/} However, NUMURA refused to give any concrete proposals for improving Japanese-American relations.^{2/} As one source puts it he stood between the fires, "between a tough Army at home and a tough President in Washington," and the result was an impasse. In Grew's opinion Admiral Numura had not handled his end of the line particularly adeptly. "For on many occasions he has delayed in carrying out his instructions and on at least one occasion he appears to have thrown a monkey wrench into the works by presenting, on his own initiative a new draft agreement which Washington felt had set things back rather than moved them forward, and several weeks were lost before it was understood that this document had not been drawn up in Tokyo and was not known to Tokyo, and it had to be withdrawn."^{17/} Hope revived for a short time when the Japanese Government announced on 5 November that it had dispatched KURUSU Saburo, "one of Japan's most experienced diplomats," to Washington to assist Numura.^{19/} Official quarters said KURUSU was being dispatched in an effort to facilitate amicable American-Japanese negotiations based on Kono's "peace message" to Roosevelt. However, Tolischus points out that even while KURUSU was en route, TOJO reiterated before the Privy Council his Government's "inflexible determination to carry out Japan's immutable policies, aiming at successful conclusion of the China Incident and the establishment of a Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere."^{17/} In a final attempt to arrive at a peaceful settlement Secretary of State Hull presented a memorandum for a general settlement of the Pacific's problems.^{2/} At 2:20 p.m. on 7 December 1941, Hull received Admiral NUMURA and Japan's "peace" envoy, KURUSU Saburo, and read the answer to the Japanese memorandum rejecting American proposals a moment after news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had been received, Hull told the Japanese envoys: "In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortion..." According to source, they walked out "pale and quiet," having done their job.^{2/}

Until the American diplomatic corps could be returned to the United States, NUMURA was kept a virtual prisoner first in the Japanese Embassy and then at Hot Springs, Virginia. On 23 July the formal exchange of the American and Japanese evacuees took place, Tolischus describes the incident as follows: "...we walked with our hand baggage from the 'Asama Maru' to the 'Gripsholm' while the Japanese walked from the 'Gripsholm' to the 'Asama Maru.'" Numura sent a private message to Grew requesting an interview, but Grew declined. Numura was reported to have said: "Oh well, he's a diplomat. I'm just an honest old sailor." They silently lifted their hats as they passed each other.^{19/}

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MEMOR: Kichisaburo, Admiral - 9

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On 21 September 1942 he was reported to have arrived in Istanbul, Turkey, together with Admiral ABE on his way to Berlin as Naval Attache, (while ABE was going to Rome as Naval Attache).^{9/} This does not seem probable however, as a report of December 1942 described him as living in retirement in his home in Tokyo. This same report states that he returned to Japan on 20 August 1942 and was "welcomed heartily by the government and population." Upon his return he declared that he intended to spend his time in the future with reading and private studies, ^{10/} retiring to the country after the bombing of his home in Tokyo.^{21/} In June 1943 he was appointed President of the Central Federation of Educational Associations and in July made a tour of northern Japan, speaking before 2,000 students at Tokoku Imperial University on the subject of, "The way to defeat the United States and Britain."^{22/} In November 1943 he was among those attending a reception held at the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo to celebrate the 26th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union.^{10/} On 2 September 1944 he is reported to have announced a "campaign of destruction against Great Britain and America," and urged an increase in production.^{10/} NOMURA was made Vice President of the Japan Cultural Patriotic Service Association in January 1945 and in March he was rumored to be a possible candidate for the presidency of the new political party, Dai Nippon Seijikai.^{10/} Three months later he was appointed a member of the Council, "Defense of the Fatherland League" (Tokoku Rommei), described by sources as "an ethical movement for promoting the practice of ethics in defense of the honour of our country."^{20/} He was appointed a member of the Privy Council, succeeding Admiral KIDO Ryokitsu on 16 May 1944.^{10/} In a press interview during July he declared according to radio report that the attack on Pearl Harbor, the capture of Singapore and other early victories were nothing but "corner-stones for bleeding the enemy in future operations." If the enemy insisted on unconditional surrender there was no alternative but to make him taste useless blood-letting. The people of Japan must persevere to the last and ultimately the enemy would be terror-stricken when he had suffered "several hundred million bloody casualties."^{20/} In an August broadcast he is quoted as saying, "...we should not take these weak points of the American people at face value. Although they are looking forward for a quick termination of the war, they are not the kind of people who will seek a compromise because of this. Their aim is to bring this war to a quick termination while they fulfill their plan. Keeping this point in mind clearly, the people of our country must not be misled by their sugar-coated words, and must fight to our hearts' content with our own power alone."^{10/} In commenting on the Potsdam Proclamation he declared that it was a carbon copy of the Cairo Declaration, "insignificant, but not unusual...Americans are learning the cost of invasion and trying to end the war..."^{10/}

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MEMOR. Kishisuro, Admiral -10

Comments continued

During a press interview which was held on 20 September 1945 in Tokyo where he was attending a meeting of the Privy Council, HIRERA declared that the Japanese Government's insistence upon remaining in part of China had hampered his long negotiations with the United States Government in 1941 to maintain peace.^{21/} He declared, "I think it would have been better to withdraw from China than to lose this war." He said he was convinced that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull wanted peace; and added that he was "embarrassed" when he received his first word of the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Secretary Hull's office. However he did not protest upon his return to Japan "because everybody was interested in war at that point and there was no use." In conclusion, he commented, "I always thought that if there was a war, neither the American nor the Japanese fleet could win."^{21/} In another press interview he asserted that Japan must rid herself of soldier-statesmen and militarists to prevent the "mistake" of another war, explaining that "No doubt the military people and the navy people want beyond their domain in Japan. They ought to stick to their own service and keep out of politics." He denied that he had engaged in any "double play" in dealing with Secretary Hull; and blamed "young fire-eaters" for committing Japan to war against the Emperor's wishes and those of "responsible men" of Japan. As Ambassador, he added, he tried to avert hostilities, but the situation went beyond his powers.^{21/}

Six feet in height and weighing 190 pounds,^{18/} one source asserts that the admiral strikes even a casual observer as being an impressive figure.^{15/} Described in a press account as taciturn, business-like, and robust, I.M. HASHI outlines his characteristics in greater detail in the following manner: "Admiral Nomura is fair and open minded by nature. His outlook is cheerful; both because he has confidence in his own ability to handle a situation, and because he naturally looks on the bright side of things. He is the same man to everybody; he treats friends or strangers, his own countrymen or foreigners alike, that is, on terms of frankness and cordiality. He is free in expressing his mind, but on the other hand he is always ready to hear what others have to say. The lack of affectation in his manner and of effort in his conversation make it easy for him to win friends. It is not without reason that he found life in America congenial, that he could appreciate its frank and outspoken people, and could be appreciated by them. He won many friends while he was in America; and what is more he has kept up a correspondence with some of them to this day."^{15/} In a Japanese broadcast of 16 May 1944 the following description was given: "He is reticent and strict in character. He is not only a military man but also a virtuous educator as well as a far-sighted statesman."^{22/} Ambassador Crow in a comment on HIRERA made after attending a farewell party given for the latter in January 1941 says, "Even though I sat with him for half an hour on the sofa tonight, he has not said a single word to me about the prospects of his job or of his observations during his recent visit to China. He is clearly not at home in speaking English. I can hardly picture him in a group of hard-boiled American Senators or Congressmen or newspapermen or officials holding

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WAKAMA Michizaburo, Admiral - 11

Comments continued

At his end in a discussion. Yet Bishop Baker, visiting Methodist bishop, told me that he had had a long talk with the Admiral in the latter's home and that he had been impressed by his choice of language and familiarity with long words.... The only potential usefulness I can see in Admiral Hozumi's appointment lies in the hope that he will honestly report to his Government what the American Government and people are thinking, writing, and saying. #17/

Sources

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- 2 Current Biography, 1941
- 3 Jintai Koshin Roku, 1937
- 4 Japan Yearbook, 1930
- 5 Contemporary Japan, November 1939, p. 1070
- 6 OSS, RR-7-180
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- 20 OSS Source X
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- 22 OSS Source F
- 23 Hugh Byas, The Japanese Enigma, 1942

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25 October 1945

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