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N.I.A. 7

12 December 1946

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. The enclosed report, SWPCC 304/1, has been forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority for concurrence.
2. The recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the enclosed report are being prepared and will be submitted for consideration by the National Intelligence Authority after review by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

J. S. BARMAN

Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
26 Aug-2008

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COPY NO. 91

SWNCC 304/1

10 December 1946

Pages 3 - 28, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Reference: SWNCC 304

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the ad hoc Committee in response to the above reference, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. Copies of this report have been forwarded to the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority for concurrence. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority.

H. W. MOSELEY
W. A. SCHULGEN
V. L. LOWRANCE
Secretariat

SWNCC 304/1

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ENCLOSURE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To review World War II efforts in Psychological Warfare, to study and report on the future status of psychological warfare, and recommend:

a. A peacetime organization for keeping psychological warfare in a ready-for-mobilization status;

b. A wartime psychological warfare organization;

both organizations to be assigned such directives as will insure effective planning, coordination and implementation, particularly with respect to the integration of national psychological warfare with military plans.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. Psychological Warfare is defined as the planned use, during time of war or threat of war, of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following objectives:

a. To assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight;

b. To sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy;

c. To improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States. ◀

3. For further Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion, see Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. Psychological Warfare is an essential factor in the achievement of national aims and military objectives in time of war, or threat of war as determined by the President.

b. The State Department has primary interest in psychological warfare policy determination which affects the foreign policy of the United States.

c. The armed services have a vital interest in psychological warfare policy determination which affects the national security and the conduct of military operations of the United States.

d. The National Intelligence Authority has an interest in the intelligence and certain other aspects of psychological warfare.

e. There is need for the immediate establishment of a committee with full-time representation from appropriate governmental agencies to serve as an agency charged with preparation of psychological warfare policies, plans, and studies for employment in time of war, or threat of war as determined by the President.

f. Appropriate agencies of the government should be required to assist in wartime implementation of approved psychological warfare plans.

g. The implementation of psychological warfare plans and directives during wartime in an actual or projected military theater of operations should be an active responsibility of the Theater Commander concerned.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that the SWNCC:

a. Approve Appendix "A" (a charter for the agency proposed in paragraph 4 e), subject to the concurrence of the National Intelligence Authority and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Thereafter, transmit this report to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence, for guidance and appropriate measures of implementation.

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c. Obtain the comments or concurrence of the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when and as appropriate, in connection with psychological warfare plans developed by the Subcommittee provided for in Appendix "A" before acting on them.

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Enclosure

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APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

CHARTER

SWNC SUBCOMMITTEE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (P.W.C.)

ORGANIZATION

1. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.) is hereby established as the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), charged with preparation of policies, plans, and studies for immediate and continuous employment of national psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President). The Subcommittee shall have authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare, to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which might suddenly arise.

2. Psychological Warfare is defined as the planned use, during time of war or threat of war, of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following objectives:

- a. To assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight;
- b. To sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy;
- c. To improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

MEMBERSHIP

3. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare will consist of
- a. Two officials of the State Department, one of whom will serve as chairman.
 - b. Two officials of the Central Intelligence Group.
 - c. One officer of the War Department.
 - d. One officer of the Navy Department.

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Appendix "A"

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4. The members of the P.W.C. will, insofar as practicable, be assigned no other duties.

5. Alternate members shall be designated to act for members in absentia.

6. The P.W.C. will be provided by SWNCC with a permanent Secretariat.

7. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare shall be responsible for the:

a. Preparation of national plans and implementing directives relating to the employment of psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President), and for transmission of subject plans to SWNCC.

b. Preparation of plans for orderly and effective organizational transition of the P.W.C. from peacetime to wartime status, and for transmission of these plans to SWNCC.

c. Coordination of implementation of approved plans and directives as specified in a, preceding, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare.

d. Guidance and supply of necessary information, including implementing requirements therefor, concerning national psychological warfare plans to appropriate policy offices of the State, War and Navy Departments and to the Director of Central Intelligence, and to authorized coordinating agencies of other Departments of the Government of the United States.

PROCEDURE

8. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Maintain close liaison with the appropriate policy offices of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and with authorized coordinating agencies of other Departments of the Government of the United States.

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c. Utilize the services of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) for necessary intelligence in the preparation of plans, studies, and reports.

d. Under authority of this charter, request the presence at committee meetings, as consultants, of representatives from the policy and functional offices of the State, War, or Navy Departments, and the Central Intelligence Group.

e. If unable to reach agreement on policies, plans, or directives, report promptly to SWNCC.

9. Plans and directives specified in paragraph 7 a above, which are to be implemented in actual or projected military areas, theaters or commands, will, following their approval, be transmitted by rapid communication to the military commanders concerned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only. Responsibility for implementation of such plans and directives will be that of the commanders concerned, solely.

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APPENDIX "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The United States organization for psychological warfare in World War II was affected by the following developments:

a. 11 July 1941. The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) was established by Presidential Order to collect, analyze, and correlate information and data bearing on national security, to make such data available to the President and such other officials as determined by the President, and to perform related activities. COI commenced operations on the premise that this agency would not only coordinate all incoming information, but also information flowing from the United States to the rest of the world. The Foreign Information Service was organized as a separate branch of COI, was situated in New York City, and was charged with the responsibility of coordinating international broadcasting from this country.

b. 30 July 1941. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) was created by Executive Order. This office was an outgrowth of the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, created by the Council of National Defense on 16 August 1940. CIAA was assigned broad functions as coordination center of commercial and cultural relations with other American republics, and was responsible for furthering commercial and economic well-being in the Western Hemisphere.

c. 30 July 1941. The Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) was established (originally as the Economic Defense Board) by Executive Order for the purpose of developing and coordinating policies, plans, and programs designed to protect and strengthen the international economic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense. (Eventually BEW was consolidated into the Foreign Economic Administration.)

d. 26 October 1941. The Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) was created by Executive Order for the purpose of facilitating dissemination of factual information to the citizens of this country on the progress of defense efforts and on the defense policy and activities of the government.

e. 3 March 1942. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) created (in JCS 12) the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) which was envisaged as the ultimate authority over both foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations. (This committee's functions later were absorbed by other agencies.)

f. 13 June 1942. The Office of War Information (OWI) was established by Executive Order of the President for the purpose of coordinating into one agency war information functions of the government---foreign and domestic. The Executive Order brought the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) into the new agency, and abolished the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), exclusive of the Foreign Information Service which was transferred to OWI.

g. 13 June 1942. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established by Military Order under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of collecting and analyzing such strategic information as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military operations in planning and in conducting special operations not assigned to other government agencies.

h. 22 February 1943. The Director of OSS sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum enclosing the first "overall strategic plan for United States psychological warfare." This memorandum became JCS 230 dated 1 March 1943. (Certain provisions of the memorandum having to do with the functions of OSS were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 155/11/D on 27 October 1943.)

i. 2 March 1943. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the first basic plan for psychological warfare prepared by OSS. (Basic Plan for Psychological Warfare in Italy, contained in JCS 139/2.)

j. 10 March 1943. The President issued the following clarifying order with respect to the responsibilities of OWI and OSS:

"The Office of War Information will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information. The program for foreign propaganda in areas of actual or projected military operations will be coordinated with military plans through the planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments, and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of the foreign propaganda program which are to be executed in a theater of military operations will be subject to the control of the theater commander. The authority, functions, and duties of the Office of War Information shall not extend to the Western Hemisphere, exclusive of the United States and Canada.

"The military order of June 13, 1942, establishing the Office of Strategic Services, is hereby modified to the extent necessary to make this order effective."

k. 17 March 1943. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized liaison officers for the War and Navy Departments with duties as follows:

To sit as members of the Overseas Planning Group of OWI.

To maintain contact with all planning agencies of the JCS and to furnish the Overseas Planning Group of the Office of War Information with as much of JCS plans as authorized by Joint Security Control (an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and as necessary to insure correlation between military and propaganda plans.

To transmit requests from JCS to OWI relative to propaganda activities desired for the purpose of furthering military operations.

To present to the JCS all propaganda plans which required their approval.

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1. 27 October 1943. In JCS 155/11/D, Joint Security Control was charged with direction of the timing of the strategic service measures initiated from the United States by the OSS.

u. 4 December 1944. In JCS 1178/1, Joint Security Control was directed to bring to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison officers with OWI such JCS papers as were likely to be of interest to OWI.

2. The foregoing directives, in their successive steps, formulated the government's policy with respect to information and foreign propaganda, and established organizations designed to provide for coordinated planning and implementation of foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations. With respect to information, various governmental agencies operated to inform the United States public of our progress in the war. These agencies were subject to voluntary censorship and to cable and postal censorship. With regard to foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations, governmental organizations operated to overcome the enemy's will to fight and to sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy. In addition, there was an attempt, divided between information and propaganda agencies, to improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

3. Foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations were directed so as to discredit the enemy's government and leaders, to stimulate divisions between dissident enemy persons and groups, to persuade the enemy military and enemy civilian population of the hopelessness of their situation, and to meet the enemy propaganda with counter-propaganda. These tasks were accomplished by "white" propaganda and "black" measures. In general, "white" propaganda was overt---issued from reputable, known U.S. official or other sources, or from countries known to be friendly to the United States, and implemented by radio,

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Appendix "B"

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leaflets, pamphlets, and sonic means. "Black" measures were covert---apparently conducted by forces friendly to the enemy or by subversive forces within enemy territory, and implemented by radio "freedom" stations, false rumors, false leaflets or documents, fifth column activities, sabotage, guerilla warfare, and support of underground resistance groups.

4. Directives outlined in paragraph 1 above eventually resulted in the following procedure (also shown on chart, Annex "A") within the organizations dealing with phases of psychological warfare:

a. "White". The Director of the Office of War Information (OWI), in planning and executing the federal program of overseas propaganda, had an Overseas Planning Board, on which were represented OWI, the State Department, and liaison officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CIAA and the British Political Warfare Commission were represented by observers, for purposes of information and coordination. This board, following the general structure of an overall plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared a weekly Central Directive for overseas propaganda which was cleared through agencies of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These directives (and other supporting ones) were transmitted to OWI offices and to major psychological warfare agencies in military commands abroad as the established U.S. government propaganda policy. In London, a combined directive was worked out by U.S. and British foreign propaganda agencies to govern all combined European Theater propaganda operations.

b. "Black". The Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had a Planning Group, on which were represented OSS, the State Department, and the War and Navy Departments. An Advisory Committee served with the OSS Planning Group to consider matters affecting the respective agencies represented on the committee. Representatives on

the Advisory Committee were from the Office of Economic Warfare, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Treasury Department or other appropriate agencies. The Planning Group, following the general directives flowing from an overall plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared frequent directives for overseas operations, the timing of which was under the direction of a Joint Chiefs of Staff agency, Joint Security Control. These directives were communicated to OSS agencies overseas as the established U.S. policy for secret operations.

c. Coordination between OSS and OWI was on a basis of informal cooperation. Approval of OSS and OWI plans for military theaters of operation or projected operations was vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In military theaters, coordination was conducted through the normal military command channels.

d. The Army and Navy conducted psychological warfare operations, partially through OSS and OWI agencies, and partially through their own organizations. Agencies for psychological warfare operations were developed in all theaters of operations, usually on the basis of a special staff section of the theater commander's staff, which maintained close liaison with the intelligence section. In addition, field operating teams for front-line combat psychological warfare were employed by the armed services. OWI and OSS personnel in military theaters were nominally integrated into the military organization, which assumed responsibility for their logistical support.

e. The CIAA operated semi-independently, with "information" measures designed to improve economic and commercial interests between the United States and the countries of Central and South America.

5. The following problems with respect to psychological warfare existed at the end of World War II:

a. Coordination of OSS "black" and OWI "white" plans and operations at the Washington level remained on a basis of informal cooperation, which did not always result in coordination.

b. The national psychological organization was such that there was duplication of effort, competition for available supplies of personnel, slow and limited coordination and integration into the major military, political and economic programs of the government.

c. Directives overseas were subject to delays in transmission which often negated their use.

d. Military theater commanders received psychological warfare directives from OSS or OWI.

DISCUSSION

6. Examination has been conducted by the ad hoc Committee of World War II C.C.S, J.C.S., and J.P.S. papers; executive and other orders of the President; reports from military commanders and their staffs; and personnel with experience in World War II psychological warfare activities. It was noted during the examination that all major nations participating in World War II made use of psychological warfare at various stages and in varied techniques, and that in numerous instances psychological warfare contributed toward strategic and tactical victories. Detailed appraisal of psychological warfare results and future application of techniques will require further and continuous study, including as source material the comprehensive World War II history on the subject which is now under preparation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. Delays in the organization for and in the application of psychological warfare during World War II resulted in large part from different interpretations of terminology. The meanings of "psychological warfare," "information," "propaganda," "white," and "black" measures apparently were not sufficiently

definitive to permit clear presentation or prompt approval of plans and implementing measures. The following definitions are therefore presented as a basis for present discussion, conclusions, and recommendations:

a. Psychological warfare. The planned use, during time of war, or threat of war, of all measures exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following objectives: to assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight; to sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy; and to improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

b. Information. Dissemination of complete factual information on subjects of interest in order to promote the functioning of man's reason.

c. Propaganda. Dissemination of information on subjects of interest, prepared with the intent of persuading, and of dominating man's reason. The information is normally factual, but not necessarily complete.

d. "White" propaganda. Overt propaganda, issued from reputable, known U.S. official or other sources, or from countries known to be friendly to the U.S. "White" propaganda may be implemented by press, radio, leaflets, pamphlets, and voice.

e. "Black" measures. Covert measures, apparently conducted by forces friendly to the enemy or by subversive forces within enemy territory. These may be implemented by radio "freedom" stations, false rumors, false leaflets and documents, fifth column activities, sabotage, guerilla warfare, and support of underground resistance groups.

8. United States psychological warfare has a history of improvisation, without central leadership, control or integration with other methods of attaining national objectives.

Initial U.S. psychological warfare efforts in World War II suffered because there was no organization prior to the onset of shooting war for coordinated advance planning, training of personnel, or perfection of techniques.

9. In analyzing factors bearing on the formation of such an organization, the following have been taken into account:

a. The four instruments for making national policy effective in the international field consist of: (1) diplomacy (negotiation and bargaining among governmental representatives); (2) economic bargaining and pressure; (3) the threat or employment of armed force; and (4) information and propaganda. For maximum effect, information and propaganda must be applied with action in the other three fields. Maximum effectiveness in the management of foreign relations can only be achieved if all four foregoing instruments are used in a planned and coordinated fashion. It is necessary for those in charge of planning, coordination and execution to be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the various techniques offered by all four elements. In time of war, the use of these elements is determined by the war situation and they become instruments of warfare.

b. Three phases in international relations apply with respect to United States foreign policy:

(1) Time of peace with varying degrees of international tension.

During this phase the major U.S. emphasis is on the basis of information; i. e., the explanation and justification of United States foreign policy, a description of America's peaceful pursuits, her natural resources, her industrial and agricultural organization and potentialities, and her scientific and cultural activities and achievements.

(2) Time of international crisis but juridical peace.

This phase appears if and when international relations between the United States and other powers develop to the point where strong political, economic and military pressure may be required to effectuate American foreign policy. It is generally signaled by an act of the President, or of the Congress, or both, or the announcement of a policy to take immediate military action in defense of U.S. nationals against possible foreign aggression. The major emphasis shifts from a purely informational and cultural program to greater reliance upon measures designed to influence a foreign state to act in conformity with the requirements of our foreign policy (which measures usually are designated as "political warfare.")

(3) Time of War.

This phase is characterized by employment of all psychological warfare activities (including political and economic), involving channels and media for dissemination of psychological warfare as adjuncts to military operations or projected operations.

c. The existing peacetime organizations within the governmental structure which are charged with information responsibilities and which might be integrated, at least in part, into a wartime organization for psychological warfare.

d. Personnel in the foregoing organizations who have experience in psychological warfare and who might be assigned to positions within the wartime organization.

10. In the development of an organization for wartime preparedness in psychological warfare, the following factors are considered fundamental:

a. The State Department has primary interest in the foreign policy aspects.

b. The armed services have a vital interest in psychological warfare policy determination which affects the national security and the conduct of military operations of the United States.

c. Other appropriate agencies of the government should be required to assist in planning and implementation of psychological warfare.

d. Coordination of "white" and "black" psychological warfare is a necessity in any national effort.

e. Procedure finally developed during World War II in the planning and implementing of psychological warfare should be used initially as a basis for future wartime organization and procedure, with such minor administrative modifications as appeared desirable at the close of the war,

11. Recommendation is made that a subcommittee of SWNCC be created as:

a. A peacetime agency charged with the responsibility for planning all necessary measures, including firm plans for wartime organization, that will place psychological warfare in readiness for wartime implementation.

b. An agency which, in the absence of any other agency, can be utilized for coordinating implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war, emergency which might suddenly arise.

c. An agency which may either continue as the plans and policy nucleus of a wartime organization or may serve to lend continuous, planned effort to psychological warfare during the transition to a wartime organization of different structure.

12. Membership of the peacetime subcommittee for psychological warfare is recommended on a basis of those governmental agencies having primary or vital interest in the subject, namely, representation from the State, War, and Navy Departments, and the Central Intelligence Group. The latter agency is included in

order that the committee can be supplied with evaluated intelligence concerning target nations and nationals, and in addition, because the Central Intelligence Group appears to be the one existing agency of the government fitted to implement "black" psychological warfare measures.

13. The following tasks are visualized for a peacetime psychological warfare committee:

a. Establishment of definitions, responsibilities and functions for "white" and "black" psychological warfare.

b. Plans to be prepared for use in time of war.

(1) "Strategic" psychological warfare plans, to be directed at potential enemy, enemy-occupied, neutral and friendly nations.

(2) "Tactical", or combat, psychological warfare plans, to be directed against armed forces of potential enemies.

(3) Counter-propaganda plans, determined from an analysis of peacetime and wartime propaganda of potential enemies.

(4) Consolidation of plans for areas occupied by U.S. forces.

(5) Plans for information control activities for occupied, hostile areas.

Plans noted in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), preceding, should be formulated for periods when the United States is on the defensive, when a stalemate exists, and when the U.S. is on the offensive. In addition, such plans should make provision for coordination with similar efforts of possible allies. It is considered that plans should be concentrated against the major vulnerable target of a potential enemy and that plans for subsidiary vulnerable targets should be integrated with plans against the key target.

c. Personnel.

(1) Selection on an inter-departmental basis of personnel for wartime assignment.

(2) Formulation of training and familiarization courses.

In the selection and enrollment of personnel, provisions should be made for waiving physical or age restrictions in the cases of those skilled or trained in psychological warfare. In addition, it is considered necessary to examine the integration into the military organization of such personnel as may be assigned to military theaters of operation. In this latter problem, cognizance should be taken of World War II experience, in which this proved to be a continuing source of difficulty. Between military and civilian personnel serving in the field, problems of pay differentials, standards of responsibility, discipline and privileges were such as to lead those military commands who experienced these difficulties to recommend integration of civilian personnel into the military chain of command. This procedure, it was pointed out, was successful in several branches of the services which required speedy mobilization of technicians in large numbers, some of whom were draft-exempt for physical or other reasons. In planning for recruitment of psychological warfare personnel, it has been suggested that qualified volunteers and draft-exempt individuals be permitted to enlist specifically for psychological warfare, with assured rating as non-commissioned officers, or in the case of qualified personnel, as officers.

d. Techniques.

(1) Study of World War II techniques, including distribution of leaflets by aircraft; distribution of leaflets by guns; operation of radio stations, fixed and mobile; and use of loud speakers in tactical situations.

(2) Development of new techniques applicable to possible new types of warfare.

(3) Organization and operations of psychological warfare combat teams, and other psychological warfare operating agencies, including recommendations for changes in organization and materiel.

e. Communications. Provision for rapid and secure communications between Washington and overseas operating centers.

Lack of rapid transmission during World War II often resulted in receipt of psychological warfare directives after events had overtaken their contents. Provision of rapid and secure communications to remedy this situation is considered of such importance that a separate radio channel or high priority classification for psychological warfare communications is indicated.

f. Intelligence.

Development of an intelligence procedure to insure that intelligence research at home and overseas is made available in time and sufficiency so that sound psychological warfare plans and operational decisions can be made.

g. Wartime Organization. The ad hoc Committee is of the opinion that it is premature to attempt a complete blueprint of a wartime psychological warfare organization. If its recommendations for the peacetime organization are adopted, it would be a function of the peacetime subcommittee to work on the problem of a wartime organization at length and in detail. The ad hoc Committee has indicated the framework and basis for a wartime organization in its recommendations for the peacetime organization (Appendix "A"). Any change in the composition or functions of this organization to conform to possible future changes in the structure of governmental departments or agencies should be based on the principles of: integration with political policy and action, and with military plans and operations, both on the

policy and operating levels; and coordination of "white" and "black" psychological warfare measures. Discussions by the ad hoc Committee developed the following factors for consideration by the peacetime subcommittee recommended in Appendix "A":

(1) Washington Organization and Procedure. Chart of proposed wartime organization and procedure for Washington Headquarters is attached (Annex "B"). This visualizes:

A Director of Psychological Warfare and policy committee (Central Psychological Warfare Committee) with either the Director or policy committee responsible to the President or to a National Security Council, if established. The ad hoc Committee favors the C.P.W.C. as the agency directly responsible to the President (or National Security Council) with the Director acting as executive of the C.P.W.C., similar to the organization for the National Intelligence Authority.

Membership in the C.P.W.C. from the State, War and Navy Departments and the Central Intelligence Group.

An advisory group from other governmental agencies concerned (for example, Treasury and other economic agencies).

The Central Psychological Warfare Committee to formulate long-term "white" and "black" psychological warfare plans and policies, insuring necessary integration with long-term political and military plans.

Final approval of the foregoing plans and policies to be the prerogative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thereafter, a "white" subcommittee and "black" subcommittee to draft regular directives based within the framework of the long-term plans and taking account of the developments of military campaigns, or political policies, and of foreseeable events requiring special handling.

These directives to be approved by a Joint Chiefs of Staff agency in order to insure that they assist in and not interfere with current military operations.

Directives to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to military theater commanders, and by the State Department to its missions and to the Federal agencies concerned.

Provisions to be made to capitalize in a controlled, directed and rapid manner on sudden military or political developments which had not been foreseen either as to scope, effect, or timing.

(2) Military Theater Organization. Chart of a proposed wartime organization for military theaters is attached (Annex "C"), based on developments in the major U.S. military theaters of World War II. Experience in these theaters demonstrated that while psychological warfare originally had been assigned to various staff sections for development and implementation, the diversity of the operations were such that effective use of psychological warfare as an auxiliary operational weapon required that responsibilities for psychological warfare be established in a separate staff section.

h. Fiscal problems in connection with a peacetime and wartime psychological warfare organization.

i. Coordination between psychological warfare and other agencies. One of the major problems in wartime psychological warfare is the necessity of developing a policy that will provide, so far as practicable, continuous coordination in the story of the war told to enemy, neutral, and home populations. Since overseas operations are a part of the major national and military and political operation, release of information concerning overseas operations requires facilities for a constant balance with psychological warfare. A policy to establish such a balance involves

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
close coordination between psychological warfare, security and censorship agencies, together with facilities for briefing overseas press and radio representatives and control of their current communications outside the theaters.

14. Recommendation is made that in view of the scope of exploratory and definitive work confronting a peacetime psychological warfare committee, members on this committee should be assigned, insofar as practicable, no other duties, and should be provided with a permanent secretariat.

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
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES

WORLD WAR II




PROPOSED FLOW PROCEDURE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE POLICIES, PLANS & DIRECTIVES



* Representatives of other governmental agencies having Psychological Warfare interests.

THEATER PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION



*1 Provides liaison with other Divisions, Allies, and Civilian Administrations.

*2 Provides direction and management of.

*3 Provides and manages labor necessary for physical preparation of materials, loading shells, bombs, etc.