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XX 2-107

1 April 1946

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2000

TO: SAINT, WASHINGTON  
FROM: SAINT, LONDON  
SUBJECT: Ludwig NEUBOURG; Fritz LACKNER, etc.  
REFERENCE: XXI-187 of 8 March 1946

1. Enclosed is a copy of a 307th CIC Detachment, 7th Army, IR on NEUBOURG, dated 30 August 1945, which we have just received on loan from the War Room, and have copied.

2. We have received a little information from the BB-landers about the matters discussed in the reference pouch. They have nothing to add to the mention of Organisation GRILLE in War Room Liquidation Report #7, on Amt IV, page 25. They state that Federico CARRUNCHO is well known as one of Johannes BERNHARDT's right-hand men; that they have no confirmation of Fritz LACKNER's statements about General ARANDA, and that they have no record of an Argentinian named Carlos LEON.

3. Since the attached report on NEUBOURG adds some information, and since the matter may be largely of academic interest, we shall not request any further interrogation of LACKNER or NEUBOURG unless asked to by recipients of this pouch.

Attachment (1)

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ABSTRACT INDEX  
DATE 1 April '46

S E C R E T

307TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY  
APO 758

30 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE:

*Ced*  
SUBJECT: NEUBOURG, Ludwig, Dr., German National, Kriminal  
Rat, Chief of sub-section VI-B-4-c RSHA, Berlin,  
SS Obersturmfuehrer; former member of Amt IV  
RSHA and of the GFP.

RE : Report of additional Interrogation in compliance  
with basic communication, Hq USFET, dtd 19 July  
1945.

L. REFERENCES:

1. Memorandum by the 307th CIC Detachment, dated Innsbruck, Austria, 19 May 1945; subject: Apprehension of Ludwig Neubourg and his statements after arrest.
2. Final Report of Interrogation from the 307th CIC Detachment, dated 12 June 1945; subject: NEUBOURG, Ludwig.
3. Report of Preliminary Interrogation from the Seventh Army Internment Camp No. 74, dated 30 July 1945; subject: Dr. NEUBOURG, Ludwig.

II. Pursuant to letter, Headquarters Seventh Army, O/A.C. of S., G-2, APO 758, US Army, dated 26 July 1945, this Agent further interrogated Neubourg, Dr. Ludwig, in line with directive in basic communication, Hq USFET, O/A.C. of S., G-2, APO 757, dated 19 July 1945; subject: NEUBOURG, Ludwig.

III. Interrogation revealed the following information:

A. Amt VI Sources in Spain:

1. Members of the Spanish Cabinet and Leading Political Personalities.

a. SERRANO SUNER, Minister for Foreign Affairs until 1943, when he was dismissed because of his extremely pro-German politics and his opposition to Franco, whose brother-in-law he was. Suñer was first contacted by Germany's top agent, Bernhard (see Paragraph "L"), who, playing hard on Suner's political ambitions and opportunistic leanings based on Germany's rising might, elicited valuable information with regard to Franco's plans. Suñer became an even more valuable source of information in 1943. He stood in direct contact with Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI RSHA, to whom he occasionally reported in person.

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b. Demetris CARCELLER Ségura, Spanish Minister of Economy, contacted through "Bernhard".

c. BAU, former Minister of Commerce and shipyard owner. Contact established through Bernhard and maintained through Mosig. For his information Bau was given special financial benefits resulting from the purchase of boats from his ship-yards by the German Government.

d. General ARANDA, leader of the Spanish opposition party. Aranda was generally known as pro-British and was not a German agent. Under the influence of Bernhard's clever machinations he served indirectly as a source of information.

e. Muñoz Grandes, formerly commander of the "Blue Division", later Franco's Adjutant. Contact maintained through Bernhard. He often received letters of appreciation from Himmler which, as far as it is known, was the only compensation for his services.

2. Schellenberg's Staff of Special Advisors and Persons of Confidence in Spain.

a. "Korrektivlinien des Amtschefs" was a term applied to two members of the German Aristocracy in Spain, Prinz von Hohenlohe and Graefin Podewille, who formed Schellenberg's staff of confidential advisers through which he controlled and cross-checked the work of Section VI B 4 (Spain and Portugal) RSHA. Both Hohenlohe and Podewills were appointees of Schellenberg, received their instructions directly from him and reported to him personally. Both worked in Spain on the basis of their excellent social connections with Diplomats and Aristocracy.

(1) Prinz von HOHENLOHE, alias "ALONZO", had been living in Madrid, Spain, for quite some time. He is a wealthy business man and is said to own vast amounts of land and property in Spain. His knowledge of the Spanish language and his extensive connections to the Spanish and international Aristocracy earned him Schellenberg's assignment, which he carried out "ehrenamtlich" (unpaid). The reports he submitted by way of Singer (see Paragraph "F") directly to Schellenberg were along the lines of wide-range politics as he saw them on the basis of his discussions with well-known politicians, economists and soldiers.

(2) Graefin (Countess) PODEWILLS MECHTILD, alias "CARMEN", was sent by Amt VI to Spain around the first part of 1943. She had lived in Spain before and had acquired excellent social connections. She is about 32 years old, divorced, and mother of two children living with her in Madrid. An elegant and very attractive woman, she is said to play a leading role in

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the society of Madrid. Her intelligence activities have become known, and the English Government demanded her deportation from Spain. Upon the intervention of influential personalities (such as Serano Suner, Secretary for Foreign Affairs) her deportation was averted.

Podewills collected information primarily from members of foreign missions (mainly South American) and also from other political personalities and aristocrats, such as Serano Suner with whom she associated on a very friendly basis. Her reports, submitted directly to Schellenberg by way of Singer (see Paragraph "F"), were very elaborate, and though she was unable to reflect upon important political issues, her detailed account supplied important clues concerning the attitude of foreign representatives toward questions of foreign policy. She was also in a position to report about the relations of political forces within Spain. Countess Podewills' considerable living expenses (4000 - 5000 RM monthly) were covered by Amt VI and paid through Singer or the Polizeiatteche in Madrid.

b. Schellenberg's top agents:

- BERNHARD (see Paragraph "L").
- SINGER (See Paragraph "F").
- MOSIG (See Paragraph "D").

3. Spanish officials.

a. Small employees in offices of the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Furnished copies of important documents and reported results of political interviews with foreign representatives as they appeared in the records and files of the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They were contacted by Singer (Paragraph "F").

b. Members of the Spanish Police: Contacted and reports submitted through Singer.

c. Members of the Spanish Military Intelligence Services: Subject knows only of the case of one "ISABELINO" (see Paragraph "O"), member of the Spanish Military Intelligence Services, whose reports were actually designed for Amt Mil. However, according to agreement between Amt Mil, and Amt VI concerning the exchange of information, Isabellino's findings were also submitted to Amt VI whenever they involved matters falling into the province of Amt VI.

f. Members of the "FALANGE".

Subject disclaims to know their names owing to the fact that they were contacted by way of Mosig (Par. "D").

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B. Whereabouts of Sturmbannfuehrer PAEFFGEN:

Subject denies knowledge of the present whereabouts of Sturmbannfuehrer Paeffgen, head of Amt VI D. Subject had last seen Paeffgen in the middle of April 1945 in the vicinity of Tegernsee, a summer resort in Oberbayern, where Amt VI D was located at that time.

C. Details on Karl ARNOLD (Occasionally used cover name THEO) in Spain;

Subject stated that he had never met Arnold personally. He had heard of him and, of his activities, knows only the fact that he had been working in Spain for VI D on the South American Sector. All incoming mail from him was marked "INCA" (cover name for VI D4) and was relayed unopened through Referat VI B4 to VI D.

D. Details on Sturmbannfuehrer MOSIG:

MOSIG, fmu, SS Sturmbannfuehrer and Kriminaldirektor, was a member of Amt VI RSHA since about the middle of 1942. Up to September 1943, he was in charge of Referat VI B4 (Spain and Portugal). Around that time it had become evident that representatives of Amt VI assigned to the Polizeiattache in Spain (Singer and Krueger) could not carry out intelligence functions successfully due to the official nature of their positions. Consequently, Mosig was ordered to establish a secret link of communications between Spain and Amt VI which would operate independently and even without the German Polizeiattache's knowledge. For that purpose he created the so-called "Organisation GRILLE", which comprised Mosig and 3 to 4 other agents as assistants to Mosig recruited from the members of the Nachrichten Regiment "Kurfuerst" in Berlin. Subject does not know any particulars about the Regiment "Kurfuerst", nor does he recall the names of all of Mosig's assistants, except for one Herr LACKNER, who was called to Germany because of differences with Mosig, and one Fraulein BURECKNER, who acted as Mosig's secretary and operated also the W/T station of the "Organisation Grille" known as Funklinie No. 9.

The "Organisation Grille" was covered and camouflaged through the German organisation "Sofindus" (see Paragraph "L"). The purpose of "Organisation Grille" was to further develop social and commercial leads and connections initiated by Bernhard (Par. "L") and to exploit them from a counter intelligence point of view; to establish new connections and to maintain existing links with sources of information represented primarily in the persons of Carceller, Bau, Munics Grandes and General Aranda (see Par. "A").

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 11/19/01 BY 60322 UCBAW

*Comments*  
HAMMES, fmu, Alias "Fink", Kriminal Kommissar, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, German Polizei Attache (attached to the German Embassy in Madrid) since September 1944, when he succeeded Polizeiattache WINZER, who was killed in a plane crash. Hammes had been in Spain during the Spanish Civil War as Kriminal Kommissar; and, prior to his appointment as Polizeiattache in Madrid, he worked in Barcelona for Amt IV RSHA.

The Polizeiattache represented primarily Amt VI and served as a source of information for Amt VI only insofar as copies of his reports were also transmitted to Amt VI whenever they involved matters falling also into the province of Amt VI. Amt VI was represented in Spain mainly in the person of SINGER (Par. "F"), who was attached to the Polizeiattache.

#### H. Links with South America of Amt VI People in Spain:

Subject states that matters concerning South America had been handled by Gruppe VI D RSHA exclusively, and that he therefore has no knowledge whatsoever about personalities of that section and their links with South America. Reports from Spain concerning South America were sent by Arnold (Par. "C") to Referat VI B4, from where they were forwarded unopened to VI D.

#### I. Mil Amt People in Spain, and VI W1/T:

1. Mil. Amt personalities in Spain and their Activities:

a. KLEYENSTUEBER, fmu, Oberstleutnant (Lt. Col.) Wehrmacht; Madrid, Spain.

b. SCHULZ, fmu, Hauptmann (Capt.) Wehrmacht; Madrid, Spain.

c. Georg Anton KELLER, former Korvettenkapitaen; Madrid, Spain. Descriptive data: Age 53; 1.75 m tall; wide shoulders; stocky build; full face.

Of the above named personalities, Subject claims to know only Keller personally and denies knowing anything about their activities, pointing out that organization and activities of Amt VI B and Amt Mil. B met only in the person of Standartenfuehrer Steimle, who was in charge of both sections.

#### 2. VI W1/T:

Subject denies knowledge of personalities and activities of VI W1/T beyond the fact of their existence.

J. Personalities of VI B-4 sent to Spain in 1944/45:

1. GUMPRECHT, fmu, alias "SEVERIN", is believed not to have an SS rank, was sent to Spain in the Fall of 1944, but returned after a short stay of 3-4 weeks. It is not known to Subject whether he visited Spain again in the Spring of 1945. Subject last saw Gumprecht in Berlin around 10 April 1945. At that time Subject learned that Gumprecht was to leave, upon orders of Sturmbannfuehrer Fendler (Amt VI), with the Spanish Embassy in Berlin, which was about to move to Konstanz am Bodensee. Gumprecht, who had been the liaison man between Amt VI and the Spanish Embassy in Berlin, was to escort the Embassy to Konstanz and, under that pretense, endeavor to obtain some blank Spanish Passports presumably for some members of the RSHA. It is further known to Subject that Standartenfuehrer Steimle had visited Gumprecht in Konstanz on or about 20 April 1945 for reasons not known to Subject. Steimle returned to Tegernsee, Oberbayern, shortly after his visit to Konstanz, but Gumprecht hadn't been heard of since.

Gumprecht was assigned to VI B4 in November or December 1944. It was his job to maintain connections with the offices of Spanish representatives in Berlin; and it was also his task to select 50 Spaniards from a Spanish camp located in Hall, Tirol, later in the vicinity of Vienna. These Spaniards were to receive training in intelligence work and they were expected to be sent to France and Spain as agents. Gumprecht succeeded in the selection of 50 men and concentrated them in Potsdam where IRIARTY (see next paragraph) was to take charge of that group. The quick advance of Allied troops however necessitated the group's moving to Tirol. They arrived in Wattens, Tirol, around 27 April 1945 and were assigned to a front line unit.

Subject states that he had heard of IRIARTY only in connection with the recruitment of above named group of 50 Spaniards. Details about his person and his activities are not known to Subject.

2. SEVERIN, Subject states that the name of Severin is known to him only as a cover name used by Gumprecht.

3. KRUEGER, fhu, SS Obersturmfuehrer, Kriminalkommissar, was sent by VI B4 to Madrid at the end of 1944 to assist Singer in his job. (see Paragraph "F").

4. SCHUMANN, Hstuf., is not known to subject.

K. Other Amt VI People who went to Spain after Sept. 1944:

(Johann Adolf Kowal)  
MEYER, (JAK) former representative and radio operator of Amt VI in Tanger and Tetuan, Spanish Morocco, radio technician by profession, was sent to Madrid in the Fall of 1944 as an employee of the German general electric company (A.E.G. - Allgemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft), which had been supplying the Spanish

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army with technical material. It is pointed out by Subject that the AEG was not incorporated in the German trade organization "Sofindus", and that it did not engage in German intelligence activities. In the case of Meyer the AEG was used as cover for Meyers activities without its knowledge.

Meyer was to recruit Spanish-born radio operators who, by means of their own W/T sets or the ones to be furnished by Amt VI, were to transmit messages conveyed to them by certain contact agents. Meyer was to concentrate especially on radio operators within the Spanish Army whom he, as employee of AEG, could easily contact ~~with~~ while performing periodical checking of technical material previously delivered by the AEG to Spanish Army installations. This net of Spanish-born radio operators was planned for the time when Spain would have broken diplomatic relations with the Allies, or when Spain would have been forced by Allied Nations to deport all German Agents. Subject notes that, to his knowledge, Meyer's activities did not bear the desired results owing to the late date of his mission.

Subject denies knowledge of anyother Amt VI people sent to Spain after September 1944.

L. Details on BERNHARD and SOFINDUS:

1. BERNHARD, fnu, SS Oberfuehrer, was Schellenberg's main representative and No. 1 person of confidence in Spain. The beginnings of his career in the GIS are to be found in the Spanish Civil War. A prominent and wealthy business man and Ship-yard owner in Germany, he lost most of his wealth in the years around 1930. At that time he lived in North Africa and intended to emigrate to South America. In Tetuan, Spanish Marocco, he is said to have met General Franco, who acquainted him with his military and political plans. Franco's main problem at that time was the transportation of troops from North Africa to the Spanish Mainland. Bernhard offered his services to Franco and, thanks to his negotiations with Goering, German transport planes were put at Franco's disposal for the purpose of transporting Moro-troops from Spanish Marocco to Spain. Hethus laid the foundations of his excellent connections in Spanish political and business circles. He became a most influential personality and an important intermediary between the German Government and Franco, especially in all matters of economic and commercial nature. Later he was appointed general director of the "Sofindus" (see Paragraph L-2).

With the inauguration of a political foreign information service (Amt VI RSHA), it was evident that Bernhard's excellent connections in Spain and his extraordinary business abilities should be utilized. Consequently he became Schellenberg's principal contact man and observer in Spain. The most important sources of information in Spain (see Par. A-1) were initiated by Bernhard. For some other important services not known to Subject, Bernhard was promoted by

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Himmler to SS Oberfuehrer.

Bernhard's preoccupation, however, with matters of economical and commercial nature resulted in the neglect of contacts in the field of intelligence. To assist Bernhard in his tremendous task, to maintain contacts established by Bernhard, and to exploit sources of information in Spain, the organization "GRILLE", with Sturmbannfuehrer Mosig in charge, was created.

Descriptive data of Bernhard: Age 48; 1.73 m tall; stocky build; black hair; bushy eyebrows. He is believed to be in Madrid.

2. "SOBINDUS" is the abbreviation of the Spanish name of the German corporation controlling various German commercial firms and enterprises financed to a considerable extent by the German government. It had been founded after the Spanish Civil War and, with its seat in Madrid, it comprised all commercial firms financed and supported by the German government to promote the export from Spain of raw materials, minerals (especially tungston), and other items essential to Germany.

With Bernhard as its general director, it became later a cover for the intelligence activities of Bernhard and the "Organisation Grille". Its counterpart in Berlin, Germany, was the "ROVAK, A.G." (Rovak Incorporated).

M. Members of the German Embassy in Madrid who sent Reports to RSHA.

Subject claims to know only of one member of the German Embassy who sent reports to the RSHA. It was the Titular Ambassador to Spain, holding the title of Legationsrat and responsible to the accredited German Ambassador, Dickhoff. Subject does not recall his name and never met him personally. It is known to Subject that said Legationsrat was formerly an SS leader and chief of the NSDAP (Landesstellenleiter der NSDAP) in Switzerland, and that he was transferred from the German Embassy in Switzerland to the German Embassy in Madrid as "Titular Gesandte" in 1944. The probably reason for his assignment, according to Subject, lay in the bad relationship and distrust that existed between the German Embassy in Madrid and the RSHA (see Paragraph "R"). Said Legationsrat was used by the RSHA as a stool pidgeon and was to report about the working relations between the Spanish Foreign Office and the German Embassy, the latter being distrusted by Himmler. Reports were sent directly to Steimle by way of Singer.

N. Relations with Anti-de GAULLE Frenchmen:

Contact with anti-de Gaulle groups in Spain were, according to Subject, maintained through the agent DOLLAR by way of MOSIG. Details with regard to the type and size of such connections are

not known to Subject owing to the fact that incoming reports were forwarded directly to VI-B-2 (Referat France) for evaluation. Subject admits that occasionally he had the opportunity to read Dollar's reports; he claims, however, that he personally paid little or no attention to Dollar's very extensive and sizeable reports (Subject terms Dollar the most prolific report writer ever known) because of Dollar's reputation for being a bluffer.

O. Working relations between the GIS in Spain and the Spanish IS:

Working relations of a direct or official nature between the GIS in Spain and the Spanish IS have never existed, according to Subject. In 1944, the BSHA, however, found in the person of "ISABELLINO"<sup>CP?</sup> alias "ISA", in Barcelona an excellent informant. Isabellino was a member of the Spanish Military IS and had also good connections with the majority of foreign political representatives accredited in Spain. As such he was in a position to report mainly about the activities of the Hungarian, Rumanian and Turkish Embassies in Spain. His reports were transmitted by way of Singer, although in the first part of 1945 Isabellino operated a separate W/T station.

Beside Isabellino a number of other agents working for Singer maintained connections with the Spanish IS. Subject denies knowledge of their names and stresses the point that, to his knowledge, such connections were of an individual and not of an official nature.

P. Use of the Spanish IS Radio Network by GIS in Spain:

Subject states that, to his knowledge, the Spanish IS radio net-work had never been used by the GIS. The radio net-work of the GIS in Spain completely covered the needs of the GIS. It was comprised of two W/T stations in Madrid (i.e. Singer's W/T station operated by one Dr. WOLETZ, and Mosig's W/T station operated by one Fraulein BRUCKNER); one W/T station in Barcelona for LINDMEYER's use, operated by one Fraulein GAERTNER; and ISABELLINO's W/T station, which was in operation only in January 1945.

Similarly, Subject refutes and even ridicules the possibility that the Spanish IS radio net-work might be employed by the Germans since the end of the war. The former representatives of the RSHA in Spain do not impress Subject as the type of men who would risk such a futile enterprise. Moreover, non-existence of German receiving stations and installations would make any attempt of radio transmission from Spain a failure.

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Q. Connections of the German Military Attache in Spain with Amt VI and active espionage:

The Military Attache in Spain had no working relations with Amt VI. Subject cannot recall a single instance of cooperation between the Mil. Attache and Amt VI. In fact, the traditional aversion of the Military Attache, as representative of the Wehrmacht, against the "Police" came openly to bear in the person of VON CRAMER, German Military Attache in Spain up to the incorporation of the Abwehr into the RSHA.

R. Relations between Amt VI and the German Embassy:

Relations between Amt VI and the German Embassy in Spain were, according to Subject, extremely bad. The German Ambassador Von DICKHOF had been trying desperately to prevent members of the GIS becoming attached to the Embassy. Such efforts on his part were directed against members of both the K.O. and Amt VI in Spain. The Embassy was accused of disregarding the needs of the GIS and of neglecting German interests. It even became known as the meeting place of German traitors. All this led to constant conflict and a complete exclusion of the Embassy from all intelligence activities. Moreover, special men of confidence were employed by the RSHA to secure copies of reports and protocols transmitted by the Embassy to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since the Embassadors's political orientation and attitude did not meet with Himmler's ambition for active engagement in the Iberian peninsula. Ambassador Dickhof had been finally recalled from Spain, but relations between Amt VI and the Embassy have never improved.

S. Lufthansa Co. as cover for German Agents in Spain:

The Lufthansa Co. in Spain was, in Subject's opinion, not used as cover for German agents for fear that the Allies might demand from Spain the discontinuance of the air-lines Barcelona-Berlin, in case such activities on the part of the Lufthansa were discovered. It was merely customary that the pilots deliver especially urgent messages to Amt VI in addition to the authorized delivery of the regular official mail for the Foreign Office.

T. The Iberian Peninsula as a Post-war Center of Espionage:

Subject declares that he was not kept abreast of the newest measures and decisions taken by the RSHA shortly before Germany's collapse, since he had remained in Berlin while the main offices of the RSHA had already moved to Thuringia and later to Tegernsee, Bavaria. In Berlin he had not been receiving any directives of far-reaching consequences. He recalls merely a comment made by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer SCHMIDT shortly before Subject's departure from Berlin in April 1945, according to which Schellenberg would have made the following statement with regard to the Iberian Peninsula: "Wenn alles schief geht, gibt es fuer uns Nachrichtenleute nur eins

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einzigste Moeglichkeit naemlich unseren Apparat auf der iberischen Halbinsel zu der antisowjetischen Weiterarbeit den Westmaechten zur Verfuegung zu stellen." ("If all goes wrong, there is only one single possibility for us members of the Intelligence Service, namely to place our apparatus on the Iberian Peninsula at the disposal of the Western Powers for the continuation of anti-soviet activities.")

Whether or not instructions to that effect have been actually given to the representatives of Amt VI in Spain, Subject denies to know. Subject sees special significance in the fact that Schellenberg himself had not chosen the escape route toward the Southern part of Germany to be occupied by the Americans, but rather preferred to remain in Berlin and then to leave for a territory most likely to be occupied by the British. Subject deduces that such action on the part of Schellenberg would only support the likelihood of Schellenberg's plans to seek contact with the British (rather than the Americans), who appeared to him the most likely partner in the use of the Iberian peninsula as a base for action against communism (see Appendix 2).

Aside from Schellenberg's vague plans, as reflected by above quoted statement, Subject denies knowledge of any other plans with regard to the use of the Iberian Peninsula as a post-war center of espionage.

IV. AGENT'S COMMENTS:

The reluctance to talk freely which Subject displayed during his first interrogation has completely disappeared and has given way to an apparently sincere desire to cooperate, to tell all he is able to recall. Appendix 1 and 2 to this report contain Subject's statements as to certain information transmitted from Spain to Amt VI.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Subject be returned through 7th Army PM channels for internment on the basis of information contained in original arrest report.


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Lt. Col., GAC  
Commanding

V. B. GUTTMAN  
Agent, CIC

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NEUBOURG, Ludwig, Dr. Report of Additional Interrogation (Cont.)

APPENDIX #L.

SUBJECT: Written statement (in translation) of Subject concerning information of Special Interest Transmitted to Amt VI RSHA by its Agent SINGER in SPAIN. ST

SINGER transmitted the more important information; photostats of diplomatic notes of the British and U.S.A. governments to the Spanish government, photostats of the records of the discussions between the British Ambassador, Sir Samuel HOARE, and the Spanish Foreign Minister, also photostats of reports of the Spanish Ambassador in LONDON, Duke de ALBA. These documents were accessible to me only in part.

I can remember seeing the photostat of a British note, sometime during the Spring of 1944, in which, among other things, the following was requested of Spain:

- 1) Closing of the German Consulate at TANGIER.
- 2) Expulsion of German agents from Spanish Morocco.
- 3) Delivery of the interned Italian merchant ships to England.
- 4) Immediate cessation of illegal Wolfram Shipments to Germany and lowering the legal quota, as far as I remember, to 20 tons a month.

If these demands were not accepted, reprisals were to be taken in the form of cutting off oil and food supplies from overseas, i.e., refusing proper navicerto. There was also a note with the same contents from the U.S.A. government.

I also remember the documentary reproduction of a conference between the same persons on the question of the insufficient execution of the above demands, which the Spanish government had accepted in the meantime. The British Ambassador pointed out most emphatically that the Spanish government evidently wanted to repudiate their accepted obligations through delaying tactics and that the Allied would carry out the measures they threatened if the agreement were not adhered to. Upon evidence that was presented, particular objection was made in regard to the further illegal Wolfram Shipments to Germany and the fact that German agents were still located in Spanish Morocco. The negotiations were conducted on both sides with greatest stubbornness.

At a conference that took place shortly before he was recalled, the British Ambassador complained in a sharp form not customarily used by diplomats about an alleged insult, which, as far as I can remember, he received from the wife of the Spanish War Minister. When he spoke to her on the occasion of a banquet, she is alleged to have turned away ostentatiously from the Ambassador and started a conversation with a German diplomat. Although the Spanish Ambassador

repeatedly pointed out that there must have been a misunderstanding, since the woman concerned was very hard of hearing, the Ambassador could not be placated in any way, and took the attitude that this constituted a grave insult to Great Britain. The discussion had unsatisfactory results for both sides.

Among the reports of the Spanish Embassy in LONDON, I came to know of one of the Spanish Ambassador, Duke de ALBA, and one of the Spanish Military Attaches.

Duke de ALBA described in full detail the existing bad feeling on the part of the British Prime Minister about Spanish foreign policy and the personal difficulties that resulted from him through this, which could only be overcome through his personal good relations with the British Prime Minister. The report plainly indicated that he, Duke de ALBA, was also very much dissatisfied with the official Spanish policy. In addition, the statement contained reports of the results of the German V-weapons in LONDON.

The statement of the Spanish Air Force Attache concerned the estimated strength of the British Air Force, the proposed new construction progress, etc. It was pointed out, however, that the figures quoted were only estimates, since it was extremely difficult for the accredited Attache to obtain an adequate survey. I am unable to give details about the report, since I only took a quick glance and it was immediately sent to the military Abwehr authorities.

#### APPENDIX #2

SUBJECT: Written Statement (in translation) of Subject Concerning Communistic and other Political Problems in Spain, as viewed by the RSHA on the basis of reports from Spain.

About the Communistic problem in Spain as it presented itself from the incoming reports, I should like to state briefly the following:

As a basic request of the outbreak of the World War and the resulting aggravation of the economic and particularly the political situation in Spain, at the end of the Civil War FRANCO did not succeed in carrying out the social reforms he had planned, and so they remained in the initial stage. It would take too long to go into the reasons in detail here; only the opposition of the large landowners and clergy, which FRANCO surely would have overcome under more favorable circumstances, should be mentioned briefly. The fact remains that FRANCO, insofar as his power does not, as at the present time, depend only on armed support, urgently needs to pacify the impoverished and socially down-trodden broad masses of Spain for inner stabilization of his power. Since he could not accomplish this without a normal economy, he saw himself forced to attempt to work with the Intelligentsia Monarchists, Nobility, Clergy and Industrialists, whose common fear of Bolshevism led them to give him their support. Since, on the other hand, the Falango, as bearers of FRANCO's ideas, who were supposed to be the absorbing organization for dissatisfied elements, was a complete failure, it was inevitable that the great ~~XXXXXX~~ masses turned further and further to the left. Although in Spain all vital necessities can be bought, the bourgeoisie and workers did not have enough buying power to obtain the minimum for existence.

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The Spaniard, an individualist from the start, and ideologically certainly not open to Communistic ideas, therefore found himself forced into the position of allowing his interests to be represented by the only existing Opposition Party. So, in time, it came to a point where today about 60-70% of the Spanish people are to be considered as Reds, that is, the so-called Hunger Communists. This in turn again led to the fact that in recognizing the danger arising from this, the Intelligentsia, although very much against their will supported FRANCO more and more as a guarantee against a new Civil War. The number of the actual followers of FRANCO was estimated at 5-8% of the Spanish population.

The Communists took thorough advantage of this unhealthy situation in the last years. As we ourselves could determine from various sources, especially from the Spanish Police, with whom, by the way, there was an extensive exchange of ideas on this point (Task of the Police Attache), from about September 1944 the Communists started to infiltrate emissaries to a large extent from North Africa and Italy into Spain. The aim of these elements, who were chiefly landed in groups and who were seldom caught in landings, was to build up Communist cells, Weapon Shipments and to prepare for a new Civil War. Our intelligence agents, like MOSIG and SINGER were able to entrench themselves deeply into the Communistic organization. The Spanish Police tried with all their might to stop this Red infiltration, which, however, for reasons to be given later, only partly succeeded.

Originally the U.S.A. and England were probably completely agreed upon opposing and fighting FRANCO, as the last representative of dictatorship in Europe. Sometime around the beginning of the year 1944, however, important clues seemed to present themselves to the intelligence service about the measures to be taken against Franco-Spain, indicating that there were differences of opinion in the Allied Camp. Apart from the various economic interests, also in the North Africa area, which I only want to touch upon here, differences of opinion arose in the foreign policy dealing with Spain.

England placed special emphasis upon the fact that no inner disturbances should in any case be balled forth through measures aiming at the overthrow of FRANCO. This would necessarily lead, in the shortest order, to taking over the government administration by Communism. Pretender to the Crown, DON JUAN, who was friendly to England and whom England had in mind for a long time for the restoration of the Liberal-Monarchy, faced the same problem. It is clear to him, that a monarchistic government on a liberal basis, in my opinion the right form of government for Spain, is possible only after creating bearable social conditions. He until now he always refused the offers conveyed to him to take over the government. Outwardly he did this with the explanation that he was unwilling to take power through the grace of FRANCO; in ~~xxxix~~ reality, however, he did it because he knew perfectly well that a liberal government is not in a position to rule against the majority of the people and

that the time for restoration of the monarchy, which under the circumstances could only be of short duration, has not yet come. Without regard to his official opposition to FRANCO, he therefore gave his followers in Spain directions to support him at first. England was also satisfied until now, taking these conditions into account, with unofficial influence on Spanish ~~xxx~~ politics and toleration of FRANCO. Naturally, this does not exclude many official attacks and Press campaigns.

The situation was different from the U.S.A. For the United States it was not of the same vital interest to uphold the existing order in Spain as it was for England (Gibraltar). According to the existing reports, the pressure of public opinion for the overthrow of Dictator FRANCO, which was expressed in the Press, appeared to be very strong. The attacks of the U.S.A. in consequence of this were considerably stronger than those of England. From individual sources it was even reported that, on the American side at least, no obstacle was put in the way of the attempts of the Communists Agents to bring about a coup d'etat. On the other hand, FRANCO was hindered in his fight against Communist elements through steady American demands for the release of the interned Red elements. I cannot determine if this attitude, which holds great danger for Europe, still exists after the complete change of the overall situation.

In addition to England, there are also widespread French factions that are interested in ~~an~~ maintaining the Status Quo in Spain, as a neighbour of France; as far as I know, these even include prominent co-workers of DE GAULLE in the Deuxieme Bureau (G-2) (?). GIRAUD, who is now in Spain and engaged in anti-Communist activity, can be looked upon as an exponent of this trend. In this connection I can point out that the imminent election in France, will surely bring about increased Communist activities not only there, but also in Spain.

Under conditions previously mentioned, I do not consider it improbable that the inoperative members of the German intelligence Service, either in recognition of the situation, that is, that only the Western Powers are in a position to save Germany from a worse fate than has already befallen her, or under direct orders from BERLIN, put their working strength at the disposal of the British and French Services. I envisage the probability of such an act from the fact that both countries, at least in their intelligence activities, unlike America, fostered anti-Soviet elements on the Iberian peninsula. Moreover, the fact that the Chief ~~xx~~ of the German Political Intelligence Service did not withdraw to the American Occupied zone, but went to the zone under the British influence, confirms my view.

Personally, however, I am of the opinion that without the support of the U.S.A., the efforts of England and the greater part of France will never prevent the threatening disaster for Europe. I am also convinced that many circles of the former German Political Intelligence Service, in the same recognition of the situation, would still today rather put themselves at the disposal of the American Services than other Services.

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