CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

18 February 1960

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3 B 2 B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2007

ULTRANATIONALISM IN WEST GERMANY


The wave of 685 swastika daubings which recently swept West Germany has aroused alarm both within the country and abroad over the possibility of a neo-Nazi resurgence and over such factors as the number of former Nazis in official positions and the school system's tolerant silence about the Hitler period. It has especially drawn attention to the German Reich party (DRP) -- the largest of the extreme rightist organizations.

The incidents appear largely the work of irresponsible hooligans, rather than of any organized right- or left-wing political campaign. West German prestige has suffered from the official position that the demonstrations were at least partly the result of a deliberate East German plot to discredit the Federal Republic, despite public admissions by security officials that evidence of this was lacking.

German Reich Party

The involvement of two DRP members in the initial desecration of a Cologne synagogue on 24 December immediately raised the possibility that the government might finally have the evidence necessary to have the party banned for un-constitutional activity. Its members -- about 17,000 -- came largely from the blatantly neo-Nazi Socialist Reich party (SRP), which was outlawed in 1952 for violating the constitutional prohibition against parties advocating the overthrow of democratic government. DRP received only one percent of the popular vote in the 1957 national elections, but scored a political success last April in the Rhineland-Palatinate state election when it received just over the 5 percent necessary to obtain representation in the legislature.

On 27 January, the Rhine-land-Palatinate government



LEADERS OF RIGHT RADICAL YOUTH GROUPS

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banned the party as a successor organization to the SRP, but Bonn so far has been unable to build a case strong enough to secure a federal ban. Wilhelm Meinberg, a former SS general who heads the DRP, denies charges that the party is the ideological successor of the Nazis or the SRP, but his organization calls for an end to discrimination against former members of Nazi military units, demands the release of all Germans imprisoned for war crimes, advocates withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany, and protests "preferential" treatment of Jews.

Other Right-Wing Groups

The combined membership of extreme right-wing groups is estimated to be only 60,000, but many of them are fanatical and tightly disciplined, with a strong troublemaking potential. These groups include such organizations as the German Community, led by August Haussleiter, and the German Social Union, led by Otto Strasser, onetime associate and later opponent of Hitler. While differing violently on specific policies and personalities, all of them oppose the democratic order of the

Federal Republic, defend many aspects of Nazism, and emphasize "real leadership," "Germany's destiny," military tradition, and nationalism.

Except for the DRP, the rightist organizations are quarrelsome splinter groups which frequently change their names and purposes, have meager financial resources, and are led by eccentrics who have thus far been unable to find common ground for a united rightist party.

In addition, a number of veterans' organizations such as the Union of German soldiers --with a membership of 100,000 --include vocal antidemocratic elements. Leaders of these groups have successfully kept the development of radical tendencies under control, however, and have generally steered a nonpolitical course.

Some of the loudest nationalistic noise is made by the various regional refugee associations, but the influence and power of these groups have diminished considerably as the refugees have become absorbed into West German social and economic life. Both federal and state security agencies keep close watch on the activities of all right-wing organizations and have banned various groups.

Contrary to exaggerated press estimates, the number of Germans belonging to some 18 right-wing student and youth groups probably is no more than 10,000 at the most--as contrasted with nearly 6,000,-000 in various democratic youth groups. The rightist groups--such as the Federation of National Students, which was recently banned in West Berlin, the Viking Youth, and the Schiller Youth--are short of financial support.



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The right-wing groups are spurred on by an extremely active neo-Nazi press which appeals to old national prejudices, incites hatred of "Bonn democracy," and promotes militant nationalism. There are some 30 dailies and weeklies—none with a large circulation—and also numerous book clubs, lending libraries, and discussion groups, all intent on "correcting the accepted facts" about the Hitler regime and denying Germany's war guilt.

Prominent Former Nazis

One result of the recent incidents has been to focus attention on the number of former Nazis in West German public life. There is pressure for the dismissal of former Nazis holding top government positions, including Refugee Minister Theodor Oberlaender, Interior Minister Gerhard Schroeder, and Adenauer's personal assistant,

Hans Globke. One third of the cabinet, one quarter of the Bundestag members, a large percentage of the civil service and judiciary, and many officials of the Bonn Foreign Ministry--including at least eight ambassadors--were in the Nazi party, although many were only nominal members who joined to keep their jobs.

There are also strong nationalist elements within the established major parties—the Free Democrats, the German party, and even the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.

Attitudes of German People

Publicity given the recent outbreaks has tended to exaggerate the importance of the vestiges of Nazism and the danger of a neo-Nazi or ultranationalist movement. Economic prosperity, a stable and generally respected government, and still-vivid memories of the ultimate

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*These are all Refugee party (I	BHE), 77% of the BHE dele	gation.	18 FEBRUARY 1960

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consequences of Nazism are fundamental factors barring significant political support for rightist extremism in Germany today.

The government has evidently failed to find effective remedies for anti-Semitism. Scattered manifestations
of anti-Semitism have persisted throughout the postwar period, and the courts have come
under some press criticism for
their leniency shown toward offenders.

There has also been some expressed resentment over government restitution payments to Jews and Bonn's indemnity payments to Israel. The Cologne incident—which, unlike previous outbreaks, was followed by similar incidents around the world—may have been motivated by the announcement of West German industrialist Alfried Krupp on 23 December that his company was prepared to compensate Jews forced to work in Krupp factories during World War II.

The average German's apathy toward political de-

velopments, the quietude characterizing the operation of the German parliament, and the general attitude of "let Adenauer do it" indicate vulnerabilities in the Federal Republic's democratic structure. Furthermore, the educational system has failed to teach youths the evils of Nazism, and the "cover of silence" placed over the Hitler period adds to the long-run vulnerability of German democracy.

Prospects

Under present economic and political conditions, ultrana-tionalist forces seem unlikely to show any great resurgence. Such a development would, however, be strongly encouraged by a markedly adverse change in these conditions -- such as a severe economic depression, erosion of the Western position in Berlin, or a general loss of confidence in the West's ability to stand up to the USSR. The ultranationalist threat to the present German order--if it does come--is more likely to arise from authoritarian nationalist elements within the major parties rather than from any of the present neo-Nazi groups. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORM)

THE TURKISH ECONOMY 1959-1960

Turkey's economy, although still far from healthy, has improved substantially since the Western-backed \$359,000,000 stabilization program was adopted in August 1958. Now, however, Prime Minister Menderes, who may call for elections this year, has included in his 1960 budget several politically inspired and inflationary projects which depart from the economic policies recommended by the West. The ability of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and probably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to press Turkey to adhere to the principles of the stabilization

program in coming months has been weakened by disputes between Ankara and the OEEC as well as by Turkey's reluctance to accept economic advice.

In 1958, following almost nine years of Menderes' policy of development regardless of cost, Turkey was close to financial chaos despite substantial US aid. Foreign exchange reserves were virtually exhausted; the Turkish pound, officially set at 2.8 to the dollar, was quoted on the black market at more than 20 to one; and the government was unable to make scheduled payments on its foreign debt, which had soared