

SECRET

DOCUMENT ID: 53279157  
INQNO: GSCANID 00595573  
DOCNO:  
PRODUCER:  
SOURCE: STATE  
DOCTYPE:  
DOR: 19840323  
TOR: 14520000  
DOCPREC: R  
ORIGDATE: 198403231452  
DOCCLASS: S

HEADER  
OO RUEAIIB  
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH  
STU9389  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUESNA #1950 0831201  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 231126Z MAR 84  
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8072  
BT  
EZ1:

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW  
 Retain class'n Change/classify to \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify with concurrence of \_\_\_\_\_  
after \_\_\_\_\_  
EO 12958, 25X \_\_\_\_\_  
IPS/CR/IR by \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

CONTROLS  
SR2

\S E C R E T SANTIAGO 1950\  
EXDIS  
EZ2:

TEXT  
SR3

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2007

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PDIP, PREL, CI  
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT FOR MARIO BARROS VAN BUREN AS  
AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.  
REF: STATE 83540  
1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. WITH NO FILE COPIES OF "ESTANQUERO" MAGAZINE IN THE  
MISSION, WE WERE ONLY ABLE TO OBTAIN SELECTED ISSUES FROM THE  
PERIOD NOVEMBER 1946 (WHEN THE MAGAZINE WAS FOUNDED) THROUGH  
APRIL 1954 (BY WHICH TIME BARROS HAD DISAPPEARED FROM THE  
MASTHEAD). QUICK REVIEW OF CONTENTS OF THESE ISSUES  
INDICATES THAT THE MAGAZINE, INCLUDING THE "SEMANA INTER-  
NACIONAL" SECTION OF WHICH BARROS WAS ONE OF THE THREE  
EDITORS LISTED STARTING IN 1949, WAS A VEHICLE FOR STRONGLY  
NATIONALISTIC AND CONSERVATIVE VIEWS, IMPLACABLY HOSTILE TO  
SOVIET COMMUNISM AND FREQUENTLY CRITICAL OF LIBERAL  
CAPITALISM.  
3. MANY OF THE ARTICLES, INCLUDING COMMENTS IN SOME OF THE  
"SEMANA INTERNACIONAL" PIECES, ARE OPPOED TO BOTH MARXISM  
AND WESTERN LIBERALISM AND FAVORABLE TOWARD WHAT ARE PORTRAYED  
AS THE VIRTUES OF A CORPORATE STATE APPROACH WHICH COULD

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE AC  
2000

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT

SECRET

OVERCOME THE HATREDS OF CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE DEGENERATE MATERIALISM OF CAPITALISM. THERE ARE REFERENCES TO THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AS BEING GRASPING AND SHORT-SIGHTED, SUCH AS THE PORTRAYAL OF THE MARSHALL PLAN AS AN EFFORT TO BUY POLITICAL SUPPORT.

4. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ONE AND CONTENT OF THE ARTICLES INCLUDE FREQUENT ALLUSIONS TO "INTERNATIONAL ZIONISM", THE ALLEGED JEWISH INFLUENCE IN WESTERN MEDIA, AND A SYMPATHY FOR ARAB GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE NEWLY-FORMED STATE OF ISRAEL. SOME OF THE REFERENCES COULD BE TAKEN AS ANTI-SEMITIC, SUCH AS THE REFERENCE TO THE "JEW FUCHS", WHO GAVE UK NUCLEAR SECRETS TO THE USSR. FINALLY, THERE ARE ACCOUNTS WHICH TAKE THE SIDE OF NAZI OFFICERS ACCUSED OF CRIMES AT NURENBERG AND OTHER WAR CRIME TRIBUNALS, AND POINTED REFERENCES TO UNPUNISHED "U.S. CRIMES AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIANS" IN THE NUCLEAR BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI.

5. BACKGROUND: AS BEST WE CAN DETERMINE, "ESTANQUERO" WAS FOUNDED AS A POLITICAL PLATFORM FOR THE SMALL RIGHT-WING GROUP OF JORGE PRAT, WHO SUPPORTED THE SUCCESSFUL IBANEZ PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY IN 1952 AND WAS APPOINTED BY IBANEZ AS PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL SAVINGS FUND (1952-53) AND LATER PRESIDENT OF THE BANK OF THE STATE (1953-55). PRAT WAS BRIEFLY A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN 1964, FORMING HIS OWN PARTY "NATIONAL ACTION" (ACCION NACIONAL) AND ALSO SUPPORTED BY THE AVOWEDLY PRO-NAZI "MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO NACIONAL SINDICALISTA". ACCION NACIONAL, WHICH MERGED WITH CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS TO FORM THE NATIONAL PARTY (PN) IN 1966, INCLUDED SERGIO ONOFRE JARPA, MARIANO ARNELLO AND OTHER PROMINENT POLITICAL FIGURES OF TODAY.

6. COMMENT: ON THE BASIS OF THIS PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE REVIEW, WE BELIEVE THERE ARE MANY REFERENCES WHICH COULD BE USED TO PORTRAY "ESTANQUERO" AND BARROS AS HAVING BEEN PRO-NAZI, ANTI-SEMITIC, OR ANTI-U.S. CHILEAN INTEREST IN AND SUPPORT FOR FASCISM AS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY DURING THE 1930'S AND 40'S WAS NOT LIMITED TO EXTREMISTS. HOWEVER, AND IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT EVEN AS LATE AS 1937 EDUARDO FREI HAD SOME POSITIVE REFERENCES TO HITLER'S GERMANY AND MUSSOLINI'S ITALY IN FREI'S BOOK "THE UNKNOWN CHILE". AND OF COURSE PRO-GERMAN SENTIMENT WAS A POTENT EVEN IF DWINDLING FORCE IN CHILE THROUGH MOST OF THE WAR. HOWEVER, MANY AMERICANS WOULD BE INCLINED NOT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR FASCISM AS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ACCEPTANCE OF NAZI ATROCITIES. ACCORDINGLY, BARROS' APPOINTMENT AS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. COULD BE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE CONTROVERSY WHEN THE "ESTANQUERO" CONNECTION BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, AS IT PRESUMABLY WOULD.

7. OPTIONS: THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE OPTIONS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES:

A. WE CAN TELL THE GOC THAT BARROS AS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS, EXPLAINING THE ADL INTEREST, AND ASK THAT IT BE WITHDRAWN. WE DO NOT RECOMMEND THIS OPTION BECAUSE IT SUGGESTS THAT THE USG ALSO VIEWS BARROS AS SUSPECT AND WOULD THEREFORE BOTH TARNISH AND OFFEND BARROS' FELLOWS, SUCH AS JARPA, WHO ARE VALID PLAYERS IN THE CURRENT FLUID SITUATION.

B. WE CAN PROCEED WITH THE AGREEMENT, AFTER APPROPRIATE

SECRET

REVIEW AT ALL USG LEVELS, ON GROUNDS THAT BARROS HAS NOT BEEN ACCUSED OF A CRIME OR OTHER UNACCEPTABLE ACTIONS, BUT RATHER ESPOUSED EXTREME DOCTRINES AS A YOUTH. THIS OPTION WOULD NOT AVOID ANY CONTROVERSY OVER BARROS IN THE U.S. BUT WOULD CERTAINLY DRAG THE USG INTO IT.

C. FINALLY, WE CAN TELL THE FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY PRIVATE U.S. GROUPS, THE INEVITABLE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY, AND THE HANDICAP THAT A NEW AMBASSADOR WOULD CONSEQUENTLY LABOR UNDER IN TRYING TO GAIN GREATER U.S. UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHY FOR CHILE. IF, AFTER WEIGHING THE RISKS, THE GOC IS PREPARED TO PURSUE THE NOMINATION, THE USG WOULD THEN RESUME ITS CONSIDERATION. ON BALANCE, WE PREFER THIS APPROACH, SINCE IT BRINGS THE ISSUE OUT OPENLY WITH THE GOC, EXPLAINS WHY BARROS COULD BE A LIABILITY RATHER THAN AN ASSET IN WASHINGTON BUT KEEPS US ON A REASONABLE PLANE OF DISCOURSE WITH AN INCREASINGLY HARASSED AND PRICKLY GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH WE ALREADY HAVE LIMITED INFLUENCE. IT ALSO GIVES BARROS A CHANCE TO EXPLAIN OR MODIFY HIS EARLY VIEWS. IF THIS OPTION IS ADOPTED, WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THIS MATTER STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL IT IS RESOLVED.

8. IF WE ADOPT THIS LAST OPTION, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE AGREEMENT IF THE GOC HOLDS TO ITS NOMINATION DESPITE OUR RAISING THIS ISSUE PRIVATELY. TO STILL HOLD BACK THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS AN INSULT AND DAMAGE OUR ACCESS TO SECTORS WHICH CONTINUE TO PLAY KEY ROLES IN THE ONGOING PROCESS.

9. DAS KILDAY, CURRENTLY VISITING POST, HAS READ THIS CABLE AND CONCURS. MATTHEWS

NNNN  
NNDD