



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~



(b)(3)

National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday
17 September 1980

~~Top Secret~~

CO NID 80-2101Y

17 September 1980

Copy 220

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

TURKEY: Outlook for the Military Regime

(b)(3)

Turkey's new military rulers face major risks, but in the short term, at least, they are likely to bring a measure of order and economic revival to Turkey while keeping it on a pro-Western path. Far more difficult to achieve will be their announced goal of laying the groundwork for long-term social, political, and economic health within the context of a democratic state. The complexity of these tasks seems to ensure that the military will be in power for some time.

(b)(3)

To restore order, the generals must control the many armed terrorist groups on the left and right that are tightly knit, well disciplined, and highly committed to disrupting Turkish society. The economy, too, is fragile, and much will depend on how well the regime is able to follow through on the stabilization program begun by the ousted civilian government. The commanders must also be responsive to external economic advice--even when it runs counter to Ataturkist state-capitalist principles--if Turkey is to receive the foreign aid necessary for economic recovery.

(b)(3)

Although the military is now united in a common purpose and morale is high, the choices and decisions that lie ahead may place severe strains on military unity. The commanders, moreover, will need to consider the sensitivities of many allies concerning human rights violations.

(b)(3)

In view of the difficulties of putting the country in the kind of shape Turkey's new military rulers think necessary before returning it to civilian government, the generals risk getting bogged down in managing Turkey for such an extended period that institutional democracy, military professionalism, and relations with allies will be severely damaged.

(b)(3)

--continued

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

17 September 1980

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

Short-Term Prospects Encouraging

Some important assets offset the risks of governing. In a society wracked by the breakdown of authority, the commanders now have a monopoly of power and the will to control terrorism and to impose the sacrifices necessary for economic recovery. In place of the recent opportunism of the political leadership, they bring a moderation that could help substantially to restore law and order and develop a sounder economy. The military leaders' strong domestic position, moreover, will make it easier for them to compromise with the Greeks on such troublesome issues as Greek NATO membership, Aegean rights, and Cyprus. [redacted]

(b)(3)

Although they cannot completely eradicate political violence, the country's military leaders should be able to bring it under control. If, as seems likely, the terrorists seek to provoke harsh reprisals to discredit the commanders abroad, the military initially may try to avoid excesses. The military's first priority, however, will be to establish order and in the end it will use whatever force it believes necessary. Many terrorist groups will be broken up, while the hard core will go deeper underground, but the root causes of extremism are not likely to be significantly affected. [redacted]

(b)(3)

The new military government shows every intention of adhering to the austerity program and free enterprise orientation its predecessor instituted on the advice of external aid donors. The commanders are in a better position than their civilian predecessors to see the economic reforms through. The new regime can and probably will resist future inflationary wage increases and make the inefficient state economic enterprises more self-sufficient. [redacted]

(b)(3)

Reorganizing Turkey's political institutions also is likely to prove manageable. A consensus has developed among most military leaders and some members of the civilian elite in recent years on the need for a less free-wheeling democracy. These groups envision a presidential form of government, abandoning the proportional system

--continued

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

[redacted]
17 September 1980

~~Top Secret~~
[redacted]

(b)(3)

of representation in favor of the majority system, and renewing emphasis in the constitution on the rights of the community over the individual. [redacted]

(b)(3)

International reactions to the commanders' takeover so far suggest that Turkey's foreign ties will not be severely disrupted. Most governments have shown sympathy for the military's goals--even while publicly lamenting the necessity of the takeover and calling for a speedy return to democratic rule. Some governments and many left-of-center political parties within NATO and the European Community may not be responsive to further requests for economic aid from the nondemocratic regime.

(b)(3)

Barring widespread abuse of power, however, and assuming clear, although gradual, moves toward restoring democracy, most of the NATO allies will support the new regime. Even Greek officials seem optimistic that they will be able to establish a productive dialogue with the commanders over longstanding bilateral differences. Preliminary statements by the commanders and their need to show good will toward the Western alliance suggest that the Greeks may be right. [redacted]

(b)(3)

Longer Term Outlook Less Promising

If the military can reduce violence substantially, reactivate the economy, and devise a more effective centralized political system, it will have gone far toward helping the Republic get past one of its darkest periods. But this would by no means ensure that Turkey will henceforth enjoy stable government and economic prosperity.

(b)(3)

The causes of violence in Turkey derive from social cleavages, the dislocations and inequities accompanying modernization, and Turkish political culture. The military will not be able to make much headway against these problems, and extremists will reappear after full democracy is restored. [redacted]

(b)(3)

--continued

~~Top Secret~~
[redacted]

(b)(3)

17 September 1980

~~Top Secret~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Unless Turkish leaders in the future can forgo grossly overvalued exchange rates, huge budget deficits, and price and interest rate controls, Turkey could again get itself into the same economic bind it is in today.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Opposition from those whose political interests are adversely affected--such as the extreme right and left, the Islamic fundamentalists, the universities, and the trade unions--could make it difficult for the military to extricate itself from politics gracefully.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

[Redacted]

17 September 1980

(b)(3)