


03 16

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CPAS NID 90-146JX
23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

28

03 17

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


(b)(3) CIAAct

03 18

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct



Contents

Notes	
In Brief	
Special Analyses	

NR

South Africa: Mandela's Visit to Washington

14

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct



~~Top Secret~~

23 June 1990

03 19

~~Top Secret~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

German Reactions to Shevardnadze's Proposals

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

23 June 1990

0320

(b)(3) NatSecAct


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USSR:

Outlining a Transitional Period for Germany

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


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23 June 1990

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
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USSR:

Russian Party Chief Elected

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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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


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
YUGOSLAVIA:

Centrifugal Forces Increasingly Evident

NR



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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

0323

~~Top Secret~~

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

NR

European Reaction to the Suspension

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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct


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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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PALESTINIANS: Anti-US Rhetoric Escalating

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~~Top Secret~~

23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

0325

~~Top Secret~~


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PAKISTAN: Preparing for Chinese SRBM



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CHINA-PAKISTAN: Trainer Aircraft Problems Persist



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
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
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IRAQ-ARGENTINA: Reviving Condor Missile Project



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YEMEN: Tensions Rising in Unified Military



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~~Top Secret~~

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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

0327

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~Top Secret~~




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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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
23 June 1990

0328

(b)(3) NatSecAct


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ALGERIA: Supporters Demand Ex-President's Return



NR

LIBYA: US Oil Company Claims May Go to Arbitration



NR

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
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~~Top Secret~~

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Soviet Aid to Afghanistan, Pro and Con



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~~Top Secret~~

[Redacted]

23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct


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
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USSR: Defending Continued Aid to Afghanistan




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WEST GERMANY: Calming the Europeans on GEMU



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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

0331

~~Top Secret~~

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NR

~~Top Secret~~

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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

0332

~~Top Secret~~

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
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USSR: More T-64 Tanks Moved East of Urals



NR

USSR: Oil Ministers Heading to "Private" Sector



NR

~~Top Secret~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

0333

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~Top Secret~~

[Redacted]

NR



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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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
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In Brief

USSR

NR



Africa

Americas

South Asia

continued

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(b)(3) NatSecAct


0335

~~Top Secret~~

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Zalman Shoval: Ambassador-Candidate to the US



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[Redacted]

23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

0336

~~Top Secret~~




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Middle East


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East Asia

Europe



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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Strong Economy Strengthens Quebec's Position

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~~Top Secret~~

[Redacted]
23 June 1990


0338

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Special Analysis

CANADA:



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continued

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

0339

~~Top Secret~~

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

NR



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23 June 1990

(b)(3) NatSecAct

0340

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~Top Secret~~

South Africa

**Mandela on the Move**

Mandela has become increasingly comfortable in asserting himself since his release from nearly three decades in isolation. He still defers to the collective leadership of the ANC and remains attentive to the sensitivities of those who have struggled to break the white monopoly on power during his absence. Nonetheless, the notable lack of high-ranking ANC officials accompanying Mandela in the US suggests he enjoys greater decisionmaking independence and the executive leadership's trust. On the other hand, the small, largely working-level delegation may be unable to prepare him properly to address diverse audiences or to respond to unexpected issues.

Mandela is handling well both the stresses and the opportunities of the fanfare surrounding him. He remains unembittered toward those who imprisoned him, focusing on the task at hand rather than dwelling on the past. Mandela reacted with calm indifference to recent press allegations that the CIA had been involved in his arrest in 1962. In meetings with political leaders he is scrupulously polite, listens attentively, acknowledges mutual constraints, and responds to the give and take of negotiations with humor and finesse. Mandela favors consensus decisionmaking and is unlikely to make political promises without soliciting advice from colleagues.

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23 June 1990

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~~Top Secret~~**Special Analysis****SOUTH AFRICA: Mandela's Visit to Washington**

ANC patriarch Nelson Mandela views Washington as the most influential external actor in southern Africa and is seeking continued pressure on Pretoria. At home, he must rally his diverse, multiracial supporters for negotiations with the government; he undoubtedly believes his trip abroad will enhance his credentials and bring moral support and money. ~~(C NF)~~

Mandela and other senior ANC leaders are committed to negotiations to end apartheid and have worked closely with Pretoria behind the scenes. For example, they have cooperated on freeing political prisoners and handling refugee affairs [redacted] Mandela has sought to reassure audiences he envisions peaceful change leading to a new South Africa that:

- Respects both majority and minority interests.
- Protects private property while redressing the inequities of apartheid.
- Encourages private enterprise and foreign investment. ~~(C NF)~~

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Leading the ANC Through New Challenges

Mandela must guide the ANC through an unprecedented era of overt negotiation and political organization that will put a premium on alliance building. The ANC is the most popular political force in South Africa, but it faces rival antiapartheid groups and restive factions within its own ranks. ~~(C NF)~~

Some hardline members of the ANC, other black opposition groups, and township youths are convinced that international sanctions and militant domestic protests have forced President de Klerk to the negotiating table. [redacted] They believe white resolve is weakening and want to increase pressure until Pretoria agrees to an interim government and a constitutional assembly elected on a nonracial basis. These elements are also unwilling to bury grudges with Zulu leader Buthelezi, whom ANC sympathizers regard as a government collaborator and an instigator of the anti-ANC violence in Natal. ~~(C NF)~~

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Mandela is also challenged to control the ANC's externally based military wing, which has resisted talks with Pretoria and has not always obeyed the political leadership. He undoubtedly wants to enhance the ANC's capability to wage an armed struggle should talks with Pretoria collapse, but he does not want unauthorized attacks to disrupt talks or to make it seem the group is not committed to a peaceful settlement. ~~(C NF)~~

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Alleged Plot To Kill Mandela and de Klerk

South African police are playing down press allegations that radical rightwing groups have plotted to assassinate Mandela and de Klerk, [redacted] The police detained 11 men for questioning but reportedly have freed them. Police personnel now view the story as sensationalism and believe the source may have been trying to push extremists to violence, [redacted]

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The allegations stem from a liberal Afrikaans-language weekly, which carried an interview with a former police security agent who infiltrated radical rightwing groups and revealed an alleged plot to kill Mandela on his return home next month. De Klerk and five other Cabinet ministers also were named as targets. A countrywide campaign of sabotage, arson, and terrorism allegedly was planned.

Tape recordings of discussions with members of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement and the Conservative Party and documentary evidence were cited to support the claims. A killer was reportedly lined up to assassinate Mandela, and weapons allegedly were smuggled into the country.

[redacted] As de Klerk and Mandela pursue negotiations, rising rightwing fears of black domination and a growing sense of betrayal almost certainly will intensify calls for action in white supremacist and neofascist groups.

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Rumors of plots against Mandela and de Klerk have persisted ever since de Klerk released Mandela from jail in February and initiated major reforms, and they cannot be discounted in the current environment. The assassination of Mandela would have the most serious implications. De Klerk's most likely successor, Finance Minister Du Plessis, supports his reformist policies. The black opposition without Mandela, however, would be hard pressed to resolve the differences among competing groups and to find a moderate leader who commands the same respect at home and abroad. A Mandela assassination would spark widespread violence among township youths, almost certainly delaying or even stopping the talks.

Of more immediate concern, Mandela's leadership might be threatened by health problems. A grueling schedule on his tour—particularly in the US—has repeatedly been cut back to allow him to rest. Although illness would not have as devastating an effect as an assassination, it would present many of the same problems to the apartheid opposition and to negotiations with the government.

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23 June 1990

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~Top Secret~~**Seeking Support Abroad**

Internationally, Mandela is campaigning to maintain diplomatic pressure on Pretoria and to raise funds. He believes continued pressure is necessary to achieve more tangible results in dismantling apartheid. By persuading the international community to keep sanctions in place, Mandela probably hopes to show his militant supporters he can be an effective leader and a tough negotiator with Pretoria. He is also trying to win the confidence of the ANC's military wing by finding new sources of materiel to supplement reduced aid from Eastern Europe and the USSR. ~~(C NF)~~

Outlook

The ANC probably will make little progress reconciling the often contradictory demands of its constituency until after its national conference in December, when delegates elected from each region will vote for a new executive body. Until then, the ANC will lack a formal platform and will vacillate between moderate and hardline rhetoric. Even while the group labors to find its voice, it most likely will retain the largest following. Nonetheless, Mandela must proceed cautiously toward negotiations with both Buthelezi and Pretoria or risk losing some black support to antiapartheid rivals or Communist Party allies. ~~(C NF)~~

Mandela sees the US as a potentially vital donor of humanitarian, financial, and technical aid the ANC needs to prepare for negotiations, to recruit and train new members, and to resettle exiles. The group's fundraising in South Africa will probably fall far short of its needs, and Mandela undoubtedly hopes Washington will help rally overseas support. ~~(C NF)~~

The Mandela itinerary is being used to show appreciation to longtime allies, and the ANC has scheduled his visits to reward nations, cities, or groups that have long supported its call for sanctions and disinvestment from South Africa. He has delayed meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher, who has campaigned against South African sanctions, even though he visited the UK and spoke at well-attended events organized by British antiapartheid groups. Mandela undoubtedly recognizes US sensitivities on some ANC ties but has nonetheless expressed symbolic support for the PLO, Havana, and Tripoli, regarding them as past or potential supporters of the ANC cause. ~~(C NF)~~

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