CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

30 October 1946.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Attached hereto for your information is an analysis of Mr. Molotov's recent speech prepared by Mr. George F. Kennan, State Department, Special Consultant to the Central Intelligence Group on Russian affairs. The opinions expressed in the subject memorandum are concurred in by the Central Intelligence Group.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

/s/ + sig.

E. K. WRIGHT
Colonel, GSC
Executive to the Director.

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of Navy

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Molotov's speech becomes comprehensible only if it is borne in mind that the Soviet leaders generally speak in algebraic symbols.

When Molotov speaks of plans for "world domination" on the part of others, what he means is this: in the type of world which American and British statesmen are seeking, i.e. a world in which individual nations would bow to the will of the majority, the Soviet Union as things now stand would be out-numbered and therefore condemned to submit to the will of others. Since Soviet leaders would be reluctant to believe that the exercise of political will could ever be modified by a sense of moral responsibility and by the restraints of self-imposed decency and moderation, they view such a prospect as equivalent to "world domination" by others. When they speak therefore of "world domination" what they mean is the fact that they do not have the preponderance of political power in the world today and therefore can not risk a political showdown. They are equally conscious of the fact that they can not afford a military showdown at this time. For that reason, they react with pathological over-sensitiveness to any suggestion of international association for the exercise of armed power in which they do not have full veto power. They are so feverishly preoccupied with the possible applicability of such arrangements in ways detrimental to themselves that they have probably never even given serious attention to any other aspect of such proposals.

Aware, therefore, that they can afford to risk neither the intimacy nor the hostility of the western world at this juncture, they are compelled to play for time and to seek a period of what Molotov calls "peaceful competition of states and social systems" during which it might be possible for them to increase their relative military and political potential. They are confident of their ability, given time and freedom from outside disturbance, to bring about this increase. They are skeptical of the ability of the western countries to emerge from the morass of internal difficulties which face them in the coming period. They suspect that one of the reasons for the reluctance of western circles to face a future in which there is no intimate international collaboration lies in a lack of confidence that by their own domestic efforts they can maintain their previous position in the world; and Mr. Molotov chides us sardonically on this lack of confidence which his agents and admirers in this country are doing their utmost to promote.

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What he is saying in effect is this: "The type of political intimacy you westerners are trying to thrust upon us is one intolerable to us. Why are you so alarmed over the fact that we can not accept it? Do you fear free competition with us? If so, why do you blame us? Blame yourselves."

Molotov's proposals on disarmament and atomic energy are merely tactical moves, within the framework of this major strategy. They represent no departure from Gromyko's previous proposals except that they endeavor to put on the higher plan of general disarmament the Soviet demand that the manufacture and use of atomic weapons be banned. Soviet tactics are still based on the reflection that the freedom of action of the Soviet Government in its own territory can not be effectively restricted by any international agreement to which it becomes a party and which does not provide for international controls, whereas the freedom of action of democratic governments can be genuinely restricted by international engagements which they may enter into, by virtue of the force of public opinion and the subordination of governments to the law. This provides a convenient tactical position for the Russians. And as long as there is no deterioration in their real security with respect to atomic weapons--a security which rests on the peaceful spirit of our people and on our failure to take real measures to reduce our vulnerability to atomic attack or to increase our retaliatory powers--there is no reason for the Russians to move from this position.

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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

Washington 25, D. C.

30 October 1946

Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Director of Central Intelligence
Room 2166, War Department Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Vandenberg:

I enclose a brief analysis of the speech delivered by Molotov yesterday in the United Nations Assembly.

I will be happy if you can make any use of this. In case you are not going to give it any distribution, I would appreciate it if you would have someone on your staff inform me to this effect by telephone, because in that case I would like to send the document direct to several people here in Washington.

I am leaving for New York at 2:30 p.m. and will return tomorrow. It would be all right, therefore, if the answer can be given to my secretary, Miss Hessman, here at the War College.

Sincerely yours,

/s/
George F. Kennan
Deputy for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure:
Analysis, as
stated.

(General Vandenberg informed Mr. Kennan that we would distribute as written. Copies were forwarded to the President and the three secretaries. 1605 - 30 Oct.
/s/ Wright

((Mr. Kennan's original letter and copies of our memo to the President and attached analysis forwarded to ORE--31/Oct.))

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