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EXTENSION NO.

EX-416

DATE

15 Feb 65

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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This fox-lair was no mere phantasy. Eichmann showed it to Kaltenbrunner, who was greatly impressed. He had no intention of using it for the purpose for which it had been constructed. Kaltenbrunner's idea was to go south to some Alpine stronghold which had yet to be built. When the time came, Eichmann too was unable to use the place. He was kept for some weeks on official business in Prague and Vienna during March 1945 and when he was ready to return to Berlin in April, he could no longer get through. The end of the war found him at Alt-Aussee among the Austrian lakes at the foot of the Dead Mountains. Someone else however, moved most gratefully into the underground hide-out—Heinrich Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo and his henchman, Scholz.

Mueller had been left in Berlin by Kaltenbrunner as his Liaison Officer with Hitler. As Chief of the Gestapo he could easily have found a reason for leaving the beleaguered city to which even Hitler could have taken no exception. Apparently he made no attempt to do so. He reported daily to the bunker in the Chancellery and then disappeared, presumably to his office on the Kurfuersten Strasse. Nobody visited him there. With the country tottering to its final collapse no one had any particular reason to contact the Chief of the Gestapo. On the contrary most people preferred to keep well out of the way of this detestable official. As far as can be ascertained he visited the Chancellery for the last time on 29th April. All survivors are unanimous in saying that he certainly was not there when Hitler died and the last attempt was made to break out of Berlin. From that moment Mueller disappeared, and what happened to him is pure conjecture. The most interesting theory is that of Schellenberg.

Since 1944 Schellenberg had suspected that Mueller had exploited certain wireless intelligence links used for deception of the enemy to establish genuine contact with the Russians. He claimed to have obtained proof of the fact, when he set a watch on a number of these wireless sections. At any rate he told Kaltenbrunner that he was prepared to bring proofs of his accusation. Kaltenbrunner did not take the matter seriously and attributed Schellenberg's accusations to professional jealousy. Schellenberg nevertheless insisted, and declared that

if Kaltenbrunner would do nothing, he himself would keep his evidence and in years to come would show that the Chief of the German Gestapo had worked for the Russians. He asserted that after Mueller had taken up his residence in the Kurfuersten Strasse fox-lair, he had continued his wireless communications with the Russians.

If Mueller indeed continued his wireless operations from the fox-hole, that fact itself would go a long way towards substantiating Schellenberg's statement. For what man in his senses—and Mueller was a cold enough realist—would continue in the last days before a final collapse to operate a complicated system designed to mislead the enemy, when that same advancing enemy was already only a mile or so away? So if Mueller were really using his wireless, he was most probably doing so, as Schellenberg claims, in genuine contact with the Russian Secret Service. Nobody knows how Mueller and Scholz eventually got out of Berlin. Statements from senior German officers who took part in the final battle for the city prove that on 29th April the locality in which Mueller had his office was still free of the enemy. He would therefore have had no difficulty in getting back there from the Chancellery, and he could then have made his escape through one of the numerous passages which debouched behind the advancing Russians. Civilian clothes, false papers of every kind were always available for the Gestapo Chief and his henchman. Once in rear of the Russians, he might bide his time. If the suspicions of Schellenberg were founded and he was working for the Russians Mueller probably awaited their arrival quietly in his fox-hole.

Since 1945 there have been certain indications that Mueller is still working for the Russians. That the Russians should have no scruples about using a man who had done them so much harm is nothing new. There are any number of examples of ex-Gestapo officials and senior officers of the Military Security Services—General Bamler for one—working for the State Security Service of the east zone, in spite of previous service against the Russians.

At Gestapo Headquarters in Vienna a man named Sanitzer was working in the close wartime co-operation with Mueller and Scholz. He had quite outstanding success in wireless deception

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The collaboration between the German Army and the Bolshevik leaders of the new Russia had a precedent before the latter came to power, with the famous incident of the 'sealed train' which enabled Lenin and his comrades to cross Germany from Switzerland on their way to Russia to assume leadership of the revolution there. The man who conceived this move was Colonel Nicolai, head of the Kaiser's Military Intelligence Service, who was to play an important role in the relations between the Reichswehr and the Red Army in subsequent years. Indeed, his may be considered one of the decisive influences in this direction. He was an officer of exceptional talents and great political ambitions, who, however, always remained in the background, preferring to operate behind the scenes. He had many connections with the Soviet Secret Service, and we came to recognize his small, inconspicuous office on the Potsdamerplatz as one of the most important and influential centres working for Soviet Intelligence.

In 1943 I finally succeeded in securing agreement from my superiors that Colonel Nicolai should be placed under observation. However, Mueller (whose job it was as head of the Gestapo) failed to organize this surveillance properly. Later, when I discovered Mueller's Russian sympathies I understood why he had failed to keep a check on Nicolai.

In 1923, the year of Rapallo, collaboration with the Red Army was begun under the Minister of War, Gessler, and General von Seeckt. Again the moving spirit was Colonel Nicolai. The first result was that German officers were trained in Russia in the use of weapons that had been prohibited by the Versailles Treaty, such as aircraft and tanks. In return, they passed on to the Red Army the technical and strategical experience and the great store of military knowledge of the German General Staff. In time, this co-operation was extended to the field of armaments. In return for the sharing of certain patents, Germany was allowed to build up her output of arms inside the Soviet Union, in particular by the production of aircraft and aluminium. Certain German war industries were more and more closely integrated with those of Russia; Junkers had aircraft factories operating in Samara and in Fili in south-central Siberia. These operated under the *Gesellschaft zur Foerderung gewerblicher Unternehmen*, the Company for the

Promotion of Industrial Enterprises. This rather comprehensive title masked a cartel whose branches were chiefly engaged in arms production, heavily subsidized by state funds. This was part of the programme for the illegal rearming of Germany after the First World War, another phase of which was the organization of the 'Black Reichswehr'.

Though in the years after 1918 the Soviet government failed in their aim of achieving a Russo-German alliance in Europe, and a similar Russo-Chinese alliance in Asia, they continued to support German nationalism.

Karl Radek—tried and sentenced during the Moscow purge of 1936-1937—was the director and chief exponent of Communist propaganda along this line. His theme was: 'The Struggle of the Comintern against the Versailles Treaty and against the Capitalist Offensive'.

From 1929 Stalin directed the German Communist Party to regard not the National Socialist Party of Hitler but the Social Democrats as their chief enemy, and Party strategy was conducted accordingly. Whether under a nationalist or under a socialist leadership, Stalin's chief aim was to mobilize Germany against the West. And when Schleicher, then Chancellor of Germany, secretly advanced Hitler forty-two million Reichsmarks, at a decisive point in the rise of the Nationalist Socialist movement, it is quite certain that he did this under the influence of Colonel Nicolai, who in this was surely acting again as Stalin's instrument, for Stalin hoped that Hitler would turn Germany against the Western bourgeoisie.

The chief centre of opposition to the pro-Russian party of the German General Staff was among the German industrialists. The chief supporter of Western orientation within the Reichswehr in the years after the War was General Hoffmann, who had headed the German delegation at Brest-Litovsk and had negotiated the armistice of 1918 with the Bolsheviks headed by Trotsky.

General Hoffmann's political adviser was Arnold Rechberg, one of the leading German industrialists. Rechberg's aim was a union of the civilized powers against the danger of Bolshevism. Only thus could Europe be saved. He sought a unification of France, Britain and Germany based on the fusion of their political,

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the conclusion that Stalin does these things better. Just think what his organization has stood up to during the last two years, and the assurance that he's asserted himself with before his people. I see Stalin today in quite a different light. He's immeasurably superior to the leaders of the western nations, and if I had anything to say in the matter we'd reach an agreement with him as quickly as possible. That would be a blow which the West, with their damned hypocrisy, would never be able to recover from. You see, with the Russians one always knows where one is: either they chop your head off right away, or they hug you. In this western rubbish heap they're always talking about God and all sorts of other lofty things, but if it seems to their advantage they'll let a whole people die of starvation. Germany would have been much further ahead if the Fuehrer had really got down to it. But with us everything is only half attempted and half done, and if we are not careful it'll finish us. Himmler is only tough when he knows that the Fuehrer stands behind him. Otherwise he wouldn't make up his mind one way or another. Heydrich was far superior to him in that way; the Fuehrer was right when he called him "the man with the iron heart". Bormann is a man who knows what he wants, but he's much too small to think in a statesmanlike way. And look at him and Himmler—like a couple of snakes fighting: Himmler will have a tough job to come out on top.

I was amazed to hear Mueller express such opinion. He had always said that Bormann was nothing but a criminal, and now suddenly there was this change of attitude. I grew more and more nervous: what was he driving at? Was he trying to trap me? He was knocking back one brandy after another and in gutter Bavarian he began to revile the decadent West and the leaders—Goering, Goebbels, Ribbentrop and Ley—till their ears must have burned. But as Mueller was a walking filing system and knew all the most intimate details about every one of them, this had its amusing moments, though for me they were overshadowed by a most uncomfortable feeling of apprehension. What did he want, this man who was so full of bitterness and hatred, suddenly talking like a book? It was something no one had ever heard Mueller do before. Once, to steer the conversation on to a lighter and more jocular course, I said, 'All right, Comrade Mueller, let's all start

saying "Heil Stalin!" right now—and our little father Mueller will become head of the NKVD.'

He looked at me with a malevolent glint in his eyes. 'That would be fine,' he said contemptuously in his heaviest Bavarian accent: 'and you'd really be for the high jump, you and your die-hard bourgeois friends.'

At the end of this strange conversation I still could not work out what Mueller was driving at—but I was enlightened several months later. The conversation had taken place just at the time when Mueller was making his intellectual somersault. He no longer believed in a German victory and thought peace with Russia the only solution. This was completely in accordance with his methods. His conception of the relationship of the state to the individual, as far as this was shown by his actions, had from the beginning been neither German nor National Socialist, but in truth Communistic. Who knows how many people he influenced at this time and pulled over into the eastern camp?

Mueller knew quite well that he had made no impression on me, that the truce which we had made for this one evening was over. His enmity was to cost me dear in nerves and energy—it was a sort of duel in the dark, in which most of the advantages lay on his side, especially after I discovered towards the end of 1943 that he had established contact with the Russian Secret Service, so that quite apart from his personal antagonism I had to reckon with the objective enmity of a fanatic.

In 1945 he joined the Communists, and in 1950 a German officer who had been a prisoner of war in Russia told me that he had seen Mueller in Moscow in 1948 and that he had died shortly afterwards.

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The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany [Rosenberg wrote Keitel] is a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of the 3,600,000 of them, only several hundred thousand are still able to work fully. A large part of them have starved, or died because of the hazards of the weather.

This could have been avoided, Rosenberg continued. There was food enough in Russia to provide them.

However, in the majority of cases the camp commanders have forbidden food to be put at the disposal of the prisoners; they have rather let them starve to death. Even on the march to the camps, the civilian population was not allowed to give the prisoners food. In many cases when the prisoners could no longer keep up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot before the eyes of the horrified civilian population and the corpses were left. In numerous camps no shelter for the prisoners was provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or snow . . .

Finally, the shooting of the prisoners of war must be mentioned. These . . . ignore all political understanding. For instance, in various camps all the "Asiatics" were shot . . .³²

Not only Asiatics. Shortly after the beginning of the Russian campaign an agreement was reached between OKW and the S.S. Security Service for the latter to "screen" Russian prisoners. The objective was disclosed in an affidavit by Otto Ohlendorf, one of the S.D.'s great killers and like so many of the men around Himmler a displaced intellectual, for he had university degrees both in the law and in economics and had been a professor at the Institute for Applied Economic Science.

All Jews and Communist functionaries [Ohlendorf testified] were to be removed from the prisoner-of-war camps and were to be executed. To my knowledge this action was carried out throughout the entire Russian campaign.³³

But not without difficulties. So many of the Russian captives were so exhausted that they could not even walk to their execution. This brought criticism from Heinrich Mueller, the chief of the Gestapo, a dapper-looking fellow but also a cold, dispassionate killer.*

The commanders of the concentration camps are complaining that 5 to 10 per cent of the Soviet Russians destined

* Mueller was never apprehended after the war. He was last seen in Hitler's bunker in Berlin on April 29, 1945. Some of his surviving colleagues believe he is now in the service of the Soviet secret police, of which he was a great admirer.

for execution are arriving in the camps dead or half dead . . . It was particularly noted that when marching, for example, from the railroad station to the camp, a rather large number of prisoners collapsed on the way from exhaustion, either dead or half dead, and had to be picked up by a truck following the convoy. It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice of these occurrences.

The Gestapo didn't care a rap about the Russian captives falling dead from starvation and exhaustion, except that it robbed the executioners of their prey. But they didn't want the German people to see the spectacle. "Gestapo Mueller," as he was known in Germany, therefore ordered that

effective from today [November 9, 1941] Soviet Russians obviously marked by death and who therefore are not able to withstand the exertions of even a short march shall in the future be excluded from the transport into the concentration camps for execution.³⁴

Dead prisoners or even starved and exhausted ones could not perform work and in 1942, when it became obvious to the Germans that the war was going to last considerably longer than they had expected and that the captive Soviet soldiers constituted a badly needed labor reservoir, the Nazis abandoned their policy of exterminating them in favor of working them. Himmler explained the change in his speech to the S.S. at Posen in 1943.

At that time [1941] we did not value the mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labor. What after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted but is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labor, is that the prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and hunger.³⁵

They were now to be fed enough to enable them to work. By December 1944, three quarters of a million of them, including many officers, were toiling in the armament factories, the mines (where 200,000 were assigned) and on the farms. Their treatment was harsh, but at least they were allowed to live. Even the branding of the Russian war captives, which General Keitel had proposed, was abandoned.*

* On July 20, 1942, Keitel had drafted the order.
1. Soviet prisoners of war are to be branded with a special and durable mark.

spirits and dissolved the doubts of Stauffenberg and his young friends. The threatened collapse of the fronts in Russia, France and Italy impelled the plotters to act at once. Another event helped to speed them on their way.

From the beginning the Beck-Goerdeler-Hassel circle had declined to have anything to do with the Communist underground, and vice versa. To the Communists the plotters were as reactionary as the Nazis and their very success might prevent a Communist Germany from succeeding a National Socialist one. Beck and his friends were well aware of this Communist line, and they knew also that the Communist underground was directed from Moscow and served chiefly as an espionage source for the Russians.* Furthermore, they knew that it had become infiltrated with Gestapo agents—"V men," as Heinrich Mueller, the Gestapo chief and himself a student and admirer of the Soviet N.K.V.D., called them.)

In June the plotters, against the advice of Goerdeler and the older members, decided to contact the Communists.

* This came out in the "Rote Kapelle" affair in 1942, when the Abwehr discovered a large number of strategically placed Germans, many of them from old, prominent families, running an extensive espionage network for the Russians. At one time they were transmitting intelligence to Moscow over some 100 clandestine radio transmitters in Germany and in the occupied countries of the West. The leader of the "Rote Kapelle" (Red Orchestra) was Harold Schulze-Boysen, a grandson of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, a picturesque leader of the "lost generation" after the First World War and a familiar Bohemian figure in those days in Berlin, where his black sweater, his thick mane of blond hair and his passion for revolutionary poetry and politics attracted attention. At that time he rejected both Nazism and Communism, though he considered himself a man of the Left. Through his mother he got into the Luftwaffe as a lieutenant at the outbreak of the war and wormed himself into Goering's "research" office, the Forschungsamt, which, as we have seen in connection with the Anschluss, specialized in tapping telephones. Soon he was organizing a vast espionage service for Moscow, with trusted associates in every ministry and military office in Berlin. Among these were Arvid Harnack, nephew of a famous theologian, a brilliant young economist in the Ministry of Economics, who was married to an American woman, Mildred Fish, whom he had met at the University of Wisconsin; Franz Schelha in the Foreign Office; Horst Heilmann in the Propaganda Ministry; and Countess Erika von Brockdorff in the Ministry of Labor.

Two Soviet agents who parachuted into Germany and were later apprehended gave the "Rote Kapelle" away, and a large number of arrests followed.

Of the seventy-five leaders charged with treason, fifty were condemned to death, including Schulze-Boysen and Harnack. Mildred Harnack and Countess von Brockdorff got off with prison sentences but Hitler insisted that they be executed too, and they were. To impress would-be traitors the Fuehrer ordered that the condemned be hanged. But there were no gallows in Berlin, where the traditional form of execution was the ax, and so the victims were simply strangled by a rope around their necks which was attached to a meathook (borrowed from an abattoir) and slowly hoisted. From then on this method of hanging was to be employed, as a special form of cruelty, on those who dared to defy the Fuehrer.

This was at the suggestion of the Socialist wing and especially of Adolf Reichwein, the Socialist philosopher and celebrated *Wandervogel*, who was now director of the Folklore Museum in Berlin. Reichwein had maintained vague contacts with the Communists. Though Stauffenberg himself was suspicious of them, his Socialist friends Reichwein and Leber convinced him that some contact with them had become necessary in order to see what they were up to and what they would do in case the putsch succeeded, and, if possible, to use them at the last moment to widen the basis of the anti-Nazi resistance. Reluctantly he agreed to Leber and Reichwein meeting with the underground Communist leaders on June 22. But he warned them that the Communists should be told as little as possible.

The meeting took place in East Berlin between Leber and Reichwein, representing the Socialists, and two individuals named Franz Jacob and Anton Saefkow who claimed to be—and perhaps were—the leaders of the Communist underground. They were accompanied by a third comrade whom they introduced as "Rambow." The Communists turned out to know quite a bit about the plot against Hitler and wanted to know more. They asked for a meeting with its military leaders on July 4. Stauffenberg refused, but Reichwein was authorized to represent him at a further meeting on that date. When he arrived at it, he, along with Jacob and Saefkow, were promptly arrested. "Rambow," it turned out, was a Gestapo stool pigeon. The next day Leber, on whom Stauffenberg was counting to become the dominant political force in the new government, was also arrested.*

Stauffenberg was not only deeply upset by the arrest of Leber, with whom he had become a close personal friend and whom he regarded as indispensable to the proposed new government, but he saw at once that the whole conspiracy was in dire peril of being snuffed out now that Himmler's men were so close on its trail. Leber and Reichwein were courageous men and could be counted on, he thought, not to reveal any secrets even under torture. Or could they be? Some of the plotters were not so sure.

* All four, Leber, Reichwein, Jacob and Saefkow, were executed.