




**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**


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# **National Intelligence Daily**

**Wednesday  
3 August 1988**



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
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
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[Redacted]

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**MOZAMBIQUE-  
SOUTH AFRICA:**

**Summit Planned**

(b)(3) *Improving bilateral relations have set the stage for a meeting between Mozambican President Chissano and South African President Botha; the summit is tentatively scheduled for later this month.* [Redacted]

Chissano announced at a meeting of the Frontline States last month that he was prepared to meet with Botha [Redacted]

(b)(1)

[Redacted] He cited evidence of reduced South African support to the RENAMO insurgents and continuing cooperation on several economic projects as indications of Pretoria's willingness to improve relations, [Redacted]

(b)(3)

Over the past year, [Redacted]

(b)(1)

Chissano too has worked to improve bilateral relations. He has kept a tight rein on the African National Congress in Mozambique and has renewed two joint commissions that had been moribund since 1985. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

MU

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Pretoria has long pursued a two-track policy toward Mozambique, using economic incentives as well as military pressure to persuade Maputo to respond to South African security concerns. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted] there is now debate among South African decisionmakers over which approach to emphasize [Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

**Comment:** Chissano's decision to meet with Botha probably reflects his judgment that South African cooperation is necessary to improve Mozambique's security and economic situation. Pretoria has responded to Maputo's overtures in the past year by increasing economic support, probably hoping to demonstrate to the rest of Africa that cooperation with South Africa can yield important benefits. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

Chissano's belief that South Africa has reduced support for RENAMO may be a result of a short-term decision by Pretoria to avoid provocations that might scuttle the planned summit. South Africa is not likely to discard permanently insurgent military pressure. Even though some Foreign Ministry officials might support ending aid to RENAMO, the South African military—which holds the upper hand in foreign policy decision making—probably is not prepared to abandon the insurgency, which serves as a cost-effective way to put pressure on Maputo. [Redacted]

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