


5

1.1



National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday 3 August 1988





CPAS NID 88-180JX TCS 2880/88 3 August 1988

Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06825798

.

•

.

٠





Top Secret_
TCS 2880/88
3 August 1988

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2020/10/29 C06825798			
	Top Secret-	(b)(3)	
MOZAMBIQUE- SOUTH AFRICA: (b)(3)	Summit Planned Improving bilateral relations have set the stage for a meeting between Mozambican President Chiss: no and South African President Botha; the summit is tentatively scheduled for later		
(b)(3)	this month. Chissano announced at a meeting of the Frontline States last month that he was prepared to meet with Botha He cited evidence of reduced Soi th African support to the RENAMO insurgents and continuing coop Fration on several economic projects as indications of Pretoria's willing ness to improve relations, Over the past year, Chissano too has worked to improve bilat Frail relations. He has kept a tight rein on the African National Congress in Mozambique and has renewed two joint commissions that had peen moribund since 1985.	(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)	
(b)(3)	Pretoria has long pursued a two-track policy toward Mozambique, using economic incentives as well as military pressure to persuade Maputo to respond to South African security concerns. there is now debate among South African decisionmakers over which approach to Emphasize	(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)	
(b)(3)	Comment : Chissano's decision to meet v ith Botha probably reflects his judgment that South African cooperat on is necessary to improve Mozambique's security and economic sit ation. Pretoria has responded to Maputo's overtures in the <u>r</u> ast year by increasing economic support, probably hoping to de nonstrate to the rest of Africa that cooperation with South Africa - an yield important benefits. Chissano's belief that South Africa has re luced support for RENAMO		
(b)(3)	chissand's belief that South Africa has refluced support for RENAMO may be a result of a short-term decision I y Pretoria to avoid provocations that might scuttle the plann id summit. South Africa is not likely to discard permanently insurger t military pressure. Even though some Foreign Ministry officials might support ending aid to RENAMO, the South African military—which holds the upper hand in foreign policy decision making—probably is not prepared to abandon the insurgency, which serves as a cost-ef ective way to put pressure on Maputo.		

.

.

.

•

Top Secret TCS 2880/88 3 August 1988