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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #4613-83
24 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Stanley M. Moskowitz
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SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment - USSR-EE

1. Soviet Domestic Political Scene.

A. Discussion.

Andropov emerged from the Central Committee and Supreme Soviet meetings with his authority enhanced, but he did not make the major moves needed to fully consolidate his power. This outcome lends itself to two interpretations. Most analysts believe that Andropov is still operating under important political constraints, may be handicapped by health problems, and lacks strength in the all-important party apparatus. A minority suscribe to the view that Andropov, satisfied with his gradual consolidation of power and growing ability to dictate the policy agenda, deliberately chose not to force the pace by making top-level leadership changes.

B. Implications for Collection.

[redacted] reporting prior to the plenum indicated that Andropov was first among equals and that there were factional disputes in the Politburo. [redacted]

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Continued reporting on this subject is needed. [redacted]

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Pre-plenum speculation about top-level military changes did not pan out, but continued attention should be paid to possible changes in the high command.

2. Soviet Perspective on the Kohl Visit to Moscow (4-8 July).

The pre-visit atmospherics have not been the best and have probably dampened any Soviet hopes of breakthroughs with the new FRG chancellor:

- The Soviets wanted to label the visit an "official friendship visit": but the Germans successfully insisted that it be called simply a "working visit";
- The Germans rejected the Soviet request for a joint communique.

The Soviets probably still see merit in the visit, however, since it will give them an opportunity to pressure Kohl as well as to appeal to the West German public over Kohl's head. They will portray themselves as aggrieved that the Soviet-German relationship is not as good as they would like and express fear that it will get even worse if NATO goes forward with INF deployments. They will stress the advantages to Germany of good ties by alluding to the possibility of economic deals, improved intra-German relations, and possibly increased ethnic German emigration from the USSR. Their main agenda item, of course, will be INF. Although unlikely to make any major initiatives, they may dangle a few teasers -- such as the possibility of some limits on Far Eastern deployments, the physical destruction of SS-20s, a low calculation of UK and British warheads which would entail important Soviet reductions, and some compromise moves on SRINF collateral restraints in which the FRG Foreign Office has been particularly interested. At the same time, the Soviets will probably profess a convergence of Soviet and German interests in convening a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and making progress in MBFR (where the Soviets are currently creating at least the impression of greater flexibility on verification measures.) They will also threaten to make life worse for the West Germans on all the fore-going issues, if INF deployment is not stopped or, at least, postponed.

Overall, though, neither side seems to expect much from the visit. The Soviets will probably be satisfied if they can make it a little harder for Kohl to carry through with deployment.

3. Afghanistan.

A. Discussion.

A brief update of the military situation led to the view that the ephemeral impact of Soviet sweep operations may lead to a reevaluation of Soviet strategy and tactics. On the

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diplomatic front, the Soviets are showing fewer signs of flexibility than they did six months ago. There is little reason to believe that the Soviets want out of Afghanistan on anything significantly short of their own terms. But the group engaged in a speculative discussion of what actions we would expect to see if the Soviets decided to withdraw from Afghanistan.

In the unlikely event that the Soviets were interested in a negotiated withdrawal, analysts expected that the kind of things Moscow might do include:

- Trying to ensure that the government remaining behind in Kabul be as strong and as pro-Soviet as possible.
- Broadening the political base of the Kabul regime.
- Stepping up the UN negotiations by going into continuous sessions.
- Expanding the scope of the negotiations by drawing in more parties (e.g., resistance elements, Iran, India).
- Increasing their contacts with Afghan exiles in Western Europe.
- Suggesting to the Pakistanis that they would loosen their ties with India if Pakistan decreased its support to the Afghan resistance.
- Begin shrinking the Soviet defense perimeter and possibly move to partition the country.
- Proclaiming victory in their domestic press so that they could later claim their troops were no longer needed.

After discussing the evidence, the group agreed that the Soviets were currently making only one of the postulated withdrawal moves -- attempting to strengthen the Afghan regime. But since that action is also consistent with a staying-the-course strategy, in isolation it cannot be considered an indicator of withdrawal preparations. The group therefore concluded that, press speculation to the contrary, the Soviets are not currently preparing to leave Afghanistan.



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


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
4. Poland.

A. Discussion.

Analysts were divided on the impact of the Pope's visit. Most thought that it would revitalize resistance to the regime while not leading to the lifting of Western sanctions that Jaruzelski had hoped for. This would lead to renewed debate and in-fighting inside the regime about the wisdom of allowing the visit and how hard or lenient a policy to follow in the coming months. But a few analysts argued that there would be no immediate aftereffect of the visit: the government would not change policy, the people would realize that the visit had been only a temporary escape from the grim reality of Poland today, and that things would go on much as they had before the visit. All analysts agreed, however, that the visit demonstrated the government's miniscule base of support and showed that a renewed popular explosion was all but certain within this decade, the only unanswerable questions being when it will occur and what the catalyst will be.



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