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(Security Classification)

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	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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


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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

5 November 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John J. Bird  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for October 1984

1. Summary of key warning issues:

USSR

The major role played by Chernenko at the recent plenum has quieted discussion about the General Secretary's near-term departure. Chernenko seems newly invigorated and politically active, and this situation will probably drag on as long as his health does not seriously weaken.

Ogarkov's appearance in East Berlin and Romanov's and other's comments about him have added further to speculation that he will soon assume command of an activated, expanded or reorganized Western theater of military operations. If a new Western theater command becomes a permanent fixture of the Warsaw Pact forces, there might be some reduction in clarity or timeliness of warning.

Berlin

There has been some escalation of Allied negotiating efforts to reach a satisfactory solution to Soviet unilateral actions concerning the air corridors and the possible closing of the Glienicke Bridge. Use of the

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bridge by Allied Military Liaison Missions is frequent and viewed as being important. Reportedly the GDR has been unresponsive to Bonn's offer to negotiate a financial arrangement for repair of the bridge. The bridge closure date of 15 November becomes politically significant if the practical matters of bridge repair financing are being discouraged. Berlin is evidently of mounting concern.

### USSR/Southern Africa

Analysts generally believe the Soviets have suffered a major setback in Mozambique and a lesser one in Angola. Moscow is probably concerned about the possibility of other reversals. Soviet-Mozambican exchanges continue despite Machel's statement that he wants the Cubans out of his country by the end of next year. In Angola, the Soviets are playing to their strength--providing a high level of arms--and do not seem to be seriously pressuring the MPLA on policy or personnel decisions.

### El Salvador

The FMLN remains capable of small-scale attacks, but not of a countrywide, coordinated offensive which could bring the FMLN to power. A larger question is whether Duarte can hold the military leadership behind him in his negotiating initiative.

### Nicaragua

There is no evidence of introduction of advanced aircraft into Nicaragua, but military equipment continues to be received at a brisk pace.

### China

Elements of eight Chinese divisions are in the vicinity of Kunming near the Sino-Vietnamese border. We doubt that the buildup presages further incursions into Vietnam, but it would ensure some control of the pace and scope of the fighting and prevent a recurrence of the counterattacks that occurred in June and July. It probably represents plans to step up pressure on Vietnam to affect Kampuchean operations during the next dry season.

### Korea

[redacted] a nuclear reactor under construction in North Korea is of a type suitable for producing significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium. It could be operational three years from now, and could then produce enough plutonium for one to two nuclear weapons per year. There is no evidence, however, of work on a reprocessing facility that would be required to separate this plutonium from spent reactor fuel, and no evidence of a nuclear explosives design effort.

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Seoul views the developments in North Korea with concern, but probably not as a near-term threat. [redacted]

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Chad

The joint French-Libyan withdrawal is proceeding at a slow pace and is likely to continue into December. Habre can take little comfort from his position in Chad. Violence is continuing in the south amid reports and rumors of harsh retaliation by Habre's northern troops against southern dissidents. The withdrawal may well usher in a new cycle of fighting between Habre and Libyan-backed dissidents.

Africa

There is a growing interest and concern with the food crisis in Africa with much focus on the situation in Ethiopia and southern Africa. The intelligence community must be especially alert to the political impacts of a worsening food crisis throughout the continent and the ability of African governments to effectively absorb and distribute assistance.

2. Trend CommentaryMid East

Despite the recent indications of greater cooperation among the moderate Arab states, most analysts agree that Syria still holds the veto on the peace process and this gives them exceptional regional leverage. Nevertheless, there is a flexibility in the Arab world that warrants our attention. Regional states with close ties to the US, [redacted] have acted on their own without informing us. Such a trend would be counterproductive to US interests.

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Iran-Iraq

The threat of an effective Iranian offensive in the Basrah region is all but ended. Iraqi defensive preparations are strong and signs of Iranian redeployments suggest Iranian troop strength is reduced in the area. The most likely area for further Iranian military action is in the central area. The "Kurdish problem" and recent Turkish-Kurdish clashes may auger larger implications for the outcome of the war and demand our continuing examination.

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Nuclear Proliferation Issues

[redacted]


Recent leaks to the media concerning possible Indian responses to Pakistan's program and speculation that the US was offering Pakistan a "nuclear umbrella" have aggravated the already heightened tensions between India and Pakistan.

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*JJ* John J. Bird

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5 November 1984

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for October 1984

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