

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	NIO/W Chrono		
2			
3			
4			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE
NIO/Warning			


CONTROL NO.

COPY 52 OF 53

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
 Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions



~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . . -	This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

12 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for November 1984

1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:

Poland

The killing of Father Popieluszko will probably galvanize the previously floundering opposition, radicalize the lower clergy, complicate church/state relations and dampen any near-term improvement in Polish relations with the West. Jaruzelski must decide how to conduct a murder investigation without further angering Moscow or stimulating a backlash within the Polish internal security services. He must also contain the opposition without alienating the church even further. Against this background of growing political unrest and potentially adverse Western responses to his methods, he must proceed with a difficult economic problem. The outlook is for renewed instability in Poland.

Yugoslavia

The trial and probable sentencing of six dissidents is likely to result in more opposition activities in Yugoslavia and increased Western criticism of human rights practices which will complicate relations with the West at a time when economic problems make support from the US and the West a critical element for stability.

(b)(3)

Copy 52 of 53

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Western Europe

French sponsorship of a revitalized West European Union (WEU) is motivated by the threat of Congressional action to reduce the US troop level, fears of an FRG drift toward neutralism and interest in improving defense cooperation.

Although the WEU is concentrating on relatively limited objectives, it could pose some challenges to US interests over the longer term. Some West Germans are suggesting it could become a forum for European discussion of arms control issues and some might use the meetings to develop a consensus on security issues prior to consultation with the US.

India

The situation in India is returning to normal, but remains fragile. Rajiv has moved quickly to appoint advisors, put his men in key posts and called elections. The Sikh-Hindu conflict has produced deep tensions in the army, but those affected are primarily junior officers and new recruits rather than seasoned veterans. While there will be severe strains generated, the Indian military will maintain its integrity.

No significant Indian foreign policy changes are foreseen. There could be opportunities for improvement in relations with Pakistan and the US, but Rajiv seems to be expecting others to make the first moves.

Indian debate over security from a Pakistani threat revolves around India's nuclear program. Hawks want to proceed now with developing an Indian bomb. The more cautious wish to wait pending evidence on a Pakistani nuclear bomb. The NIO/Warning notes that in addition to the internal lobbying unconfirmed evidence suggests the Soviets have been encouraging Indian action against Pakistan.

Philippines

Despite General Ver's leave of absence as Chief of Staff and his stepping down as head of national intelligence and security, his access and behind-the-scenes authority remains. We expect Marcos to keep firm control of Ramos rather than allowing him to gain power at Ver's expense. There are rumors that Ramos may retire rather than be a figurehead. The potential for conflict over leadership in the Armed Forces is growing, but we expect Marcos to continue to exercise control of the Armed Forces if he can survive his near-term health problem.

Southeast Asia

Aggressive Vietnamese action during the past wet season resulted in a much more favorable position for an early dry season offensive. The Vietnamese are likely to press ahead with an offensive, the Chinese action on the Sino-Vietnamese or the Sino-Laotian borders notwithstanding.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

Egypt/Libya

New Libyan terrorist acts remain probable and Egypt may be seeking retaliation for the assassination threat against Mubarak. With tensions high and Egyptian deployments toward the common border, a provocation could lead to a limited military encounter.

Morocco/Algeria

Unconfirmed reporting indicates that Morocco expects an escalation in its current conflict with Algeria and is preparing the civil population both logistically and psychologically for such an eventuality.

(b)(1)

NIO/Warning adds that Rabat is concerned over Algerian military intervention in support of the Polisario and a significant escalation between Moroccan and Algerian forces is becoming more likely.

Sudan

Sudan faces an economic crisis in the next two-to-three months that could seriously threaten the Nimeiri regime. Sudan is hopelessly in arrears to the IMF, oil stocks are nearly depleted, food demonstrations have occurred in the outskirts of Khartoum and the low level of the Nile River will cause power shortages. Despite Nimeiri's moderating of the Islamization campaign, he will be politically vulnerable in the near term. He is scheduled to be traveling outside Sudan during December. NIO/Warning notes that conditions of instability are chronic and are likely to worsen if Nimeiri actually leaves the country.

Africa

The community has begun to focus on the political and policy implications of the food crisis in Africa. NIO/Warning notes that the long-term nature of the famine, agricultural policy failures, environmental issues, and overall patterns of economic decline present serious and continuing potential for political instability. Many of the affected countries in Africa are especially susceptible to manipulation by aid donors which could include Libya or the USSR.

El Salvador

Sustained offensive sweeps by the Army have kept the insurgents off balance and generally forced them to revert to smaller unit operations. Nevertheless the guerrillas are still capable of large-scale surprise operations against vulnerable targets.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

2. Trend Commentary:

USSR/Afghanistan

After five years in Afghanistan the Soviets have made little progress against the insurgents and the Karmal regime remains dependent on the Soviet military presence. Despite military morale problems and some civilian grumbling, a negotiated agreement or a Soviet withdrawal are out of the question. The Soviets are likely pursuing a long term favorable outcome. The problems in Afghanistan are probably not well known by Moscow and have not been regularly reported. Analysts anticipate the deployment of more troops, but consider it unlikely that the Soviets would increase troop strength by more than 30 percent in the near future.


Chad

About half of the military force that had been moved out of Libyan garrisons in Chad are back in the old positions. Qadhafi's intentions remain unclear, but suspect, as he continues to take the initiative, leaving the West and others to respond.

Jamaica

Although concerns about violence and instability in Jamaica have eased somewhat recently, the worsening economic situation means trouble for the political future of Seaga as former Prime Minister Manley gathers increasing support.

(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

4

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

(b)(1)



John J. Bird
John J. Bird

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

12 December 1984

(b)(3)

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for November 1984

Distribution:

Cy 1 - DCI (w/att)
 Cy 2 - DDCI (w/att)
 Cy 3 - Executive Director (w/att)
 Cy 4 - SA/DCI/IS (w/o att)
 Cy 5 - Executive Registry (w/att)
 Cy 6 - C/NIC (w/att)
 Cy 7 - DDO/C/EPDS (w/att)
 Cy 8 - DDO/C/PCS (w/att)
 Cy 9 - VC/NIC (w/att)
 Cy 10 - [redacted] DDI Rep/SAC Omaha (w/o att)
 Cy 11 - DDI Rep/OLL (w/o att)
 Cy 12 - D/AG (w/o att)
 Cy 13 - NIO/AF (w/o att)
 Cy 14 - NIO/AL (Hutchinson) (w/o att)
 Cy 15 - NIO/AL (Low) (w/o att)
 Cy 16 - NIO/EA (w/o att)
 Cy 17 - NIO/GPF (w/o att)
 Cy 18 - NIO/LA (w/o att)
 Cy 19 - NIO/NESA (w/o att)
 Cy 20 - NIO/Econ (w/o att)
 Cy 21 - NIO/SP (w/o att)
 Cy 22 - NIO/USSR (w/o att)
 Cy 23 - NIO/Europe (w/o att)
 Cy 24 - NIO/S&T (w/o att)
 Cy 25 - NIO/CT (w/o att)
 Cy 26 - NIO/FDIA (w/o att)
 Cy 27 - D/CPAS (w/o att)
 Cy 28 - D/OCR (w/o att)
 Cy 29 - D/SOVA (w/o att)
 Cy 30 - D/EURA (w/o att)
 Cy 31 - D/ALA (w/o att)
 Cy 32 - D/OIA (w/o att)
 Cy 33 - D/NESA (w/o att)
 Cy 34 - D/OEA (w/o att)
 Cy 35 - D/OGI (w/o att)
 Cy 36 - D/OSWR (w/o att)
 Cy 37 - C/COMIREX (w/o att)
 Cy 38 - [redacted] OD&E/FO (w/o att)
 Cy 39 - [redacted] OD&E/FO (w/o att)
 Cy 40 - C/HRC (w/o att)
 Cy 41 - James Lucas, WHCMF (w/o att)
 Cy 42 - NWS (w/o att)
 Cy 43 - DDI/IPC (w/o att)
 Cy 44 - C/SIGINT Com. (w/o att)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

- Cy 45 - SRP (w/o att)
- Cy 46 - DDI/CRES (w/o att)
- Cy 47 - Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (w/o att)
- Cy 48 - Director, INR (w/o att)
- Cy 49 - INR/IC/RD (S. Kuser) (w/o att)
- Cy 50 - A/NIO/W (w/o att)
- Cy 51 - SA/W (w/o att)
- Cy 52 - NIO/W Chron (w/o att)
- Cy 53 - NIO/W Subject File (w/att)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)