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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

[Redacted]

2 December 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Charles E. Waterman  
 Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : David Y. McManis  
 National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings  
 for November

1. The reports on the NIO Warning and Forecast meetings are attached.

2. Warning highlights follow:

a. INF

(1) Soviets appear resigned to at least initial U.S. deployments, but they will increase pressure to postpone or cause slippage in the 1984 schedule for Western deployments. Soviet officials continue to threaten military countermeasures against Europe and the U.S. without clearly defining what the entire set of measures might be. In Europe they will initiate or continue ongoing programs that they will try to portray as countermeasures. Soviet references to counterdeployments affecting U.S. territory remain undefined, yet most analysts see the most probable response will be to deploy SLCM-equipped submarines off the U.S. coast.

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b. USSR

Andropov's illness is not seen as life-threatening. Nonetheless, his absence has raised questions about his longevity and many Soviet officials may now see him as a transitional figure. Barring death, he will probably remain in power into 1984. Any change in the leadership in the near future, however, would result in a weaker General Secretary, increased factional struggles among the Politburo leaders, and greater immobilism in Soviet foreign policy.

c. Latin American Debts

During 1983 international cooperation avoided any major default on debts owed by Latin American countries. Next year, however, will see growing political tension due to declining domestic tolerance for the kinds of austerity imposed by IMF and U.S. banks. In any case, several major debtor nations will need additional new money in 1984 to service their obligations. There is a danger that U.S. banks, which may either prefer more profitable investments elsewhere or be hampered from making further loans because of regulations governing the banking system, could provoke a financial crisis in one or several Latin American countries. Several Latin American countries may declare a unilateral moratorium on interest and principal payments due to either domestic political considerations or the unacceptability of the terms on further loans.

d. Lebanon

Unless major progress is made in the reconciliation talks in Geneva, the overall security situation will probably deteriorate. Gemayel has made few compromises on internal politics and will seek U.S. support for his government against the Syrians. Radical pressure on moderate Shia leaders is increasing. The Shia are rearming and may seek to stake their claim to a share of power in Lebanon through increased violence and attacks on the MNF. Additional terrorist attacks seem certain.

e. Iran-Iraq

The Iranian war of attrition strategy appears to be succeeding. Although Iraq has suffered no major battlefield setbacks, the cumulative effect of the

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campaign may force Saddam to take action to expand the scope of the war with Iran. Shifts among the Iraqi leadership may presage an effort by Saddam to relieve the pressure within his government by changing the shape of the conflict.

f. Ethiopia-Angola-Cuba


The drawdown of Cuban troops in Ethiopia is apparently aimed at reinforcing the Cuban presence in Angola. If this occurs, a higher-than-usual level of fighting in Angola is likely with the possibility of a confrontation with South Africa.

g. Guyana

A worsening economic situation seems to have set the stage for a coup against the Burnham government. Although Guyana has muddled through in the past, various analytical groups insist there is less support for the government than ever before. Only a weak and disorganized state of the Guyanese opposition seems to favor Burnham's survival. The army remains the key to the future course of Guyana's politics.

h. Argentina's Nuclear Program

The announcement by the outgoing military government of the successful development of a gaseous diffusion process for the production of enriched uranium may be a ploy to secure support for the fledgling nuclear program during the transition to civilian rule. The new Minister of Energy has called for cutting the nuclear program. In any case, the successful production of large quantities of nuclear fuel cannot take place before 1985 and then only if the program proceeds without problems. Argentina may be seeking to establish itself as a supplier of fuel to other Latin countries.

  
David Y. McManis

Attachments:  
As stated (h/w)

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