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AIR

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Operational

CAPRIFORM: Opinions Expressed in Conference  
on 9-11 May 1949

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In the course of conversations held between CAPRIFORM and [ ] on 9-11 May, considerable discussion ensued as a result of three general questions put to CAPRIFORM. (See a., b., and c. below). After this discussion, CAPRIFORM was asked to provide a resume of his answers as they had emerged. A translation of his notes on these questions follows, as supplemental information to reference memoranda:

a. What are your own aims, methods and principles in your relations with Russian national minorities?

The aim of my work is to use the peoples of the Soviet Union as a weapon in the battle against Soviet imperialism. The people are a natural explosive force, which cannot be abandoned as ineffective because of the great area of the Soviet Union. I have no illusions about the present strength of the national movements. The suppression and absolute control in the Soviet Union are so complete that organized opposition groups cannot exist there. The national movements are a latent force which must be nursed cautiously and consistently.

In connection with this, the following should be considered: The population of the Soviet Union is for the most part dissatisfied with the Soviet regime. It wishes for an elimination of the system of terror and for better living conditions (a participation in the prosperity of the West). However, during the 31-year education under the Soviets all western ideals (such as Democracy, Christianity, Tolerance) have been unknown to them or are, at best, phrases without meaning. The general dissatisfaction can therefore be utilized only

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as a means for disintegration; it does not offer a foundation on which something new can be built. Since the Soviet population will not respond to Western ideals, but on the other hand since the cooperation of the population during a war and particularly after a war should not be renounced, effective "rallying-cries" will be needed to win them over.

There is still some national consciousness alive in every Soviet citizen. With all the general Soviet propaganda, he still feels himself to be a Russian, a Ukrainian, a Caucasian, etc. That is why an appeal to the national consciousness even under war-time conditions is very important, if after the war trustworthy, well-regulated forces are desired. The dissatisfaction will not be ended by a war, but through ~~the~~ want - which the war will bring - the dissatisfaction will grow. The displeasure over this want will, however, then be directed not against the MVD or the Soviet system but rather against the "Occupation". It is therefore expedient that the "Occupation" should have allies within the country itself, so that they can prevent the growth of general anarchy. Such allies can, in the present state of affairs, only be the national movements. As a weapon in a "cold" as well as in a "hot" war, and as a regulator after a war, the national movements therefore deserve the most careful consideration.

I would not consider it as my task to support a Ukrainian or a Tatar movement, as such; that is the affair of the movement itself. But if one has come to the view that they are an absolutely essential weapon in the battle against the Soviets, then it will be necessary to study them thoroughly and to support them as much as possible. It is a paradox that the Communist Party has a legal freedom of movement in all the Western countries, whereas the anti-communist liberty movements have been extremely hampered in making their appearance and in their freedom of activity because these movements have no countries behind them, which lend their interests consular or financial support.

b. What is the general line of activities you would propose to undertake under American sponsorship?

The work of gathering information concerning the Soviet Union is a laborious mosaic-work. It is recommended therefore that all official information sources be exhausted systematically, before proceeding to particular undertakings. Among the official sources would be counted the press of the Soviet Union (where possible the provincial press and the Emigrant press), radio listening service with local sending-stations such as Baku and Taschkent, interrogating of deserters and German prisoners-of-war, the obtaining of all information from DPs, etc. Without a certain background investigation -- a knowledge of the legal, social, economical and psychological situations in the Soviet Union -- all intelligence work will remain

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piece-work. The psychological peculiarities of the Soviet population deserve special attention, since they have been conditioned by the 31-year education in Materialism and Communism. (Mistrust, touchiness, hypocrisy, one-sided views with regard to socialization and despotic actions against fellow-men, etc, are too much a part of them.) The so-called new Emigration offers the best means to gain insight into the psychological reactions of the Soviet population.

It would therefore be expedient to set up an office that will concern itself with not only purely intelligence work among the sectors of non-Russian peoples but also "sine ira ac studio" with the official sources mentioned in paragraph above, and that will attempt to compile information and experiences elicited in answer to fundamental questions. For this it would be necessary to establish a very small scientifically working apparatus.

c. Do you consider material support and aid to the anti-communist emigration as advisable?

I hold a coordination of anti-Soviet emigrant organizations to be desirable, in order that through united action a much greater influence may be brought to bear on people living within the iron curtain, which may diminish the feeling they now have of standing in a hopeless position. Technically, great expenditures of time and money could be saved through such coordination.

Any coordination will encounter fundamental difficulties.

Rival group formations - aside from the opposition between Russians and non-Russian minorities - are not based primarily on differences of political belief, but on the universal material need of all the emigrants. Since outside material assistance can never suffice to care for all the emigrants, those groups of the emigration which feel neglected usually immediately form a so-called political opposition. Conflicting claims to leadership depend therefore more on material than on political matters. This explains why, for example, the Ukrainians have constantly split into such small groups so that in the eventual union of all groups they will be considered equal to others and thus obtain a good share of material aid.

In considering the fusion of all the various emigrant organizations, a fundamental difficulty is the fact that Russians and non-Russian minorities, despite their common fight against the Soviets, do not trust one another. The more earnest representatives of the non-Russian minorities struggle against centralization in Moscow as well as against the Soviet system. They take the view that their countries are occupied. Once this occupation is at an end, they will then feel free to unite for a greater international good. All emigrant groups of Russian nationality claim the natural right of Russian leadership - even though the independence of all the various minorities may be recognized on paper. Whether these demands take

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the form of a program for an undivided or a federated Russia, the Russians themselves must maintain leadership because of their greater number and "higher culture".

Similar differences will exist between Russians and emigrant groups from the iron curtain satellite countries.

A union of Russians, Russian minorities and satellite emigrant groups will be possible only if the various national groups are allowed to continue to exist as such, and are united only for work that is clearly anti-Soviet. In this cooperation a truce must be observed with regard to national questions.

A union of all existing organizations has no point. They are of wholly unequal value. Many completely worthless and meaningless groups, if suddenly supported by a union, would be kept alive artificially and would be useless ballast.

Before any kind of material support for the emigration is considered, the various national groups must be thoroughly tested for their seriousness and working ability, each of which must also be judged according to its appeal to its people behind the iron curtain. That group representing each nationality which seems to show the best chances for survival might then be given support. It should not be forgotten that more recent emigrants, who are not yet wholly assimilated within existing organizations, are of the utmost importance. They have the best personal contact with their fellow nationals behind the iron curtain.

By giving support not to a single large organization, but rather to individual national organizations, a better control will be assured of the utilization of the support given.

Such material support might best be disguised as one or several forms of charitable enterprise. It is essential that financial aid be related to a definite end - for example, for a newspaper publication, for the education of young emigrants, for propaganda efforts important to the groups themselves, for scientific work, etc. If money is given without conditions or controls over its expenditure, it will result in the moral disintegration of the emigrations.

Such support can be limited to small circles, i.e., to a few politically important individuals and their staffs of collaborators. For those emigrants who have possibilities but for whom no immediate special tasks are being considered, it would also be a good idea to provide possibilities for work through IRO or other organizations.

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