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April 8, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

Reference: Memo for Assistant Director for Special Operations,
dated 24 March 1948

1. For communication planning purposes, the Office of Special Operations has proceeded on the following bases:

a. To provide secure means of communications for intelligence reports throughout the world during normal peacetime.

b. To provide continuous and secure means of communications for intelligence reports in areas of local political trouble or where normal facilities are inadequate.

c. To train and recommend location of radio operators to stay behind in case of invasion.

d. To establish and maintain communications bases for the control of agent, stay-behind or clandestine radio operators.

e. To provide, in the event of war, continuous and secure means of communications for intelligence reports throughout the world and from the scene of action for the period immediately following the outbreak of hostilities (a matter of weeks and perhaps months). This is to be expanded during the war to long-term strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence in the immediate support of combat units.

2. The basic responsibilities outlined above are met by utilizing existing facilities where such facilities are adequate or approach satisfactory service, by supplementing existing facilities in some cases where such action can be taken, and by providing facilities when non-existent. The practice of not duplicating existing facilities, except when definitely required to afford security for emergency usage, dictates the extent to which CIA installations are made.

3. So far, the Communications Division, OSO, through liaison with State, War, and Navy Departments, has established continuous and secure facilities throughout the world, either by using existing facilities or by supplementing them where necessary. The supplementary stations established to date have been located in an attempt to carry out the basic assumptions. It must be recognized that the job of establishing normal peacetime facilities has had first priority and that wartime aspects of our responsibilities have not been fully met.

4. The problem of having communications bases available to support clandestine radio operations has led to the establishment by CIA of three main communications bases overseas, one in Europe, one in the Middle East, and one in the Far East. The bases in the Middle and Far East have several sub-bases operating under them. The problem is not completely solved by these stations, and it is believed that at least one more station should be added to the networks.

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5. The base station in Europe was to provide a communications control point for Europe, [redacted] and to relay the traffic back to the U. S. To accomplish this, a location under U. S. control had to be found, which meant Germany. For added security and to utilize Army trans-Atlantic facilities, the ultimate location was decided to be the Rhine-Main Air Station. Until this could be activated, a temporary base was established at Heidelberg, which has recently been shifted to Karlsruhe. This base handles the normal daily communications services to OSO installations in Europe and serves as a training area for agents and stay-behind operators for this area. In the event of an emergency, this base would provide an emergency radio terminal and relay point for Europe, and would service clandestine operations until overrun.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

6. The Middle East Base Station, [redacted] controls a network of sub-base stations throughout the area and serves as a relay station to the U. S. The location of this base station was originally planned [redacted] but due to the position encountered, was situated [redacted]. There is now some indication that [redacted] desires the station removed. This base station and its sub-bases handle the CIA and State Department traffic for this area and can, in the event of emergency, service limited clandestine operations in the Middle Near East and the Balkans.

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7. The problem of relocating the Middle East Base Station has been studied with several possible solutions being presented as follows:

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8. Since both the European Base Station and the present Middle East Base station can be expected to be useful only during peacetime, a rear echelon base station should be considered and established. The following locations have been considered with results as follows:

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DONALD H. GALLOWAY
Assistant Director
Special Operations

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
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24 March 1948⁸

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Special Operations

I seem to remember that one of the difficulties in controlling underground and subversive groups in the early stages of the European war was due to the fact that the base communications centers were not located and on the beam with the radio sets in the hands of underground units.

It seems to me we should investigate this condition at once with the view to possibly locating a base radio communication center



(b)(1)

(b)(3)

If I am correct in these assumptions it is suggested that the matter be discussed with the proper Air Force officials and the project initiated as early as possible in order that we may utilize funds now available.

I would like to have your comment or report on this matter as soon as anything can be reported.

R. H. MILLENKOETTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

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