

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

11 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 11 July 1969

Godfrey pointed to the item in today's CIB related to infiltration into Vietnam and briefed on the awkward coordination process which preceded publication.

Godfrey reported on the possibility of a major clash between Israeli and Arab forces over the weekend.

DD/I briefed on problems related to White House NSC staff members' forwarding raw SIGINT material to the President. He added that Dr. Kissinger is acquainted with this problem, and General Cushman noted that General Carter is opposed to this practice.

The Director called attention to the piece by Joe Alsop in this morning's Washington Post on the Sino/Soviet situation and asked whether the facts are essentially as reported. D/ONE noted that an NIE on the Sino/Soviet situation is being drafted.

D/ONE

[redacted] mentioned that an NIE is under way in response to an old White House requirement that an Estimate on this subject be done on a country-by-country basis.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

D/ONE reported that SNIE 4-69 was approved by USIB yesterday and described security conditions as being better in Rumania than in the Philippines.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

[redacted] reported that the DOD response to the [redacted] question raised by Senator Symington is due today. The Director asked [redacted] to see him upon receipt of the DOD response.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

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Carver pointed to the differences in the community on whether to publish on the Vietnam infiltration problem.

Maury noted that yesterday's session with Congressman Hastings Keith did not go particularly well, since the Congressman was more interested in hearing about Soviet missiles than about the political situation in the Soviet Union.

Maury noted that [redacted] briefed Congressman Ogden Reid yesterday on the Middle East.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Maury reported Chairman Rivers has indicated that the weeks of 28 July and 4 August are available for the Director to appear before the full House Armed Services Committee.

Bross reported that [redacted] will join us on Monday.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The Director called attention to various interpretations of our 8 July letter to Senator Stennis as reported in today's Washington Post and New York Times.

The Director called attention to the FBIS translation of the Trud article and characterized it as an extremely distorted report on the PHOENIX program.

The Director noted that Senator Bayh will be here for breakfast on Monday at 0800. He asked General Cushman, the DD/I, the DD/S&T, and Maury to join them and briefly outlined the material to be covered.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

L. K. White

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Joseph Alsop

Iron-Curtained Troop Moves Toward China Still Unclear

LONDON—What is happening along the Soviet Union's frontier with Communist China has begun to look alarmingly similar to what happened along Czechoslovakia's frontiers before the invasion that ended the unhappy Czech bright dream of a freer and better life.

To be sure, it is exactly like watching developments through a thick curtain which could be seen in the open, and in detail, in the period before Czechoslovakia was attacked. The broad pattern appears to be almost identical. But even the pattern is far from easy to discern with real assurance.

In addition, the pattern may not have the same meaning this time that it had last time. In other words, it may not be a pre-attack pattern. It may be no more than a war-of-nerves pattern. All the same, the thing has gone so far that it has to be taken seriously, even if you still believe that a Soviet attack on China is merely a solid possibility rather than a probability, as this reporter still believes.

THE PATTERN'S most striking element is the continuing buildup of Russian forces along the Sino-Soviet border. To avoid redeployment of Soviet divisions from the Eastern European garrisons, large numbers of men have apparently been called to the colors, and reserve divisions have been activated.

Great quantities of the most modern Soviet military materiel—rockets, artillery, transport and so on and on—have been moved into place. In addition to the very large Soviet troop concentrations at the Manchurian and western ends of the long frontier, at least some Soviet troops are now known to have entered Outer Mongolia, thus constituting a third center of threat.

The recent troop buildup and movement of materiel are also the most likely reasons for the long closing of the Trans-Siberian railroad

to normal traffic. In the past, this has happened for periods of up to a fortnight, for various local reasons. But by now the Trans-Siberian has been closed to normal traffic for close to seven weeks.

FINALLY, there is the very curious and striking fact that the Soviets have been engaged in what looks very much like pre-attack stockage of strategically critical raw materials. Wholly unprecedented. Soviet orders for many tens of thousands of tons of rubber have been placed, for instance, in Malaya and Singapore.

All this seems to tie in, moreover, with the mysterious offer of security pacts to various Asian countries that was made by Leonid Brezhnev in his violently anti-Chinese speech at the recent multiparty Communist rally in Moscow. In India and Pakistan, in Laos and Cambodia and elsewhere, Brezhnev's offer has been spelled out by the local Soviet diplomatic representatives, without result as yet, but still in a significant manner.

In China, finally, this curious pattern of Soviet preparations is being taken with deadly seriousness. There is clear evidence from the Chinese provinces that meetings are being held to warn Party cadres to be ready for war before October. Militia are being given extra training, too. In short, the Chinese clearly expect the Soviets to attack, even if the Western experts are still very doubtful about it.

THE WORST of it is that what the Soviets seem to be preparing for will make no sense at all unless they are ready to use nuclear weapons. They cannot avoid using nuclear weapons if their aim is preventive destruction of the Chinese nuclear capability. And this is not only their most natural aim. In addition, it will be most imprudent to attack without prior destruction of the nuclear weapons that might otherwise be used in

a desperate Chinese counterattack.

Altogether, this pattern that can thus be discerned, through the curtain that cloaks the whole Soviet Union, has begun to look quite exceptionally unpleasant. It is easy, of course, to think of a Sino-Soviet war as something that couldn't happen to two nicer fellows.

But a cold-blooded preventive war, including the use of nuclear weapons, cannot really be thought about in this manner. If it comes, the troubled era after World War II will inevitably enter a quite new, much darker phase. That is the clear possibility—though not as yet the probability—that now confronts us.

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Aiken Joins Senate Foes Of ABM Plan

By Warren Unna

Washington Post Staff Writer

George D. Aiken of Vermont, the Senate's senior Republican, yesterday announced he was opposed to the Administration's anti-ballistic missile proposal and warned President Nixon he would never get his bill through the Senate unless he compromised.

It is essential for the Administration to obtain a healthy majority vote in the Senate, Aiken declared, so that when the United States sits down with the Russians to talk about a missile limitation agreement, there will be evidence of national unity instead of division.

He made it plain that the compromise necessary is for the President to withdraw his insistence that ABM hardware be deployed at the two initially designated sites in North Dakota and Montana.

Aiken's Senate speech was considered especially significant in that he not only is a Senate senior but also one of the handful who until now had not committed himself on a key vote that some think might split the Senate 50 to 50.

Asked about Aiken's speech, the White House said it remained confident the ABM would be approved.

Aiken, Senate's GOP Dean, Opposes ABM

ABM, From A1

Since it was first advanced on March 14, said Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, "support has steadily picked up . . . we have gained substantially and lost no support."

"I think the spirit of accommodation still prevails," Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), a leading ABM opponent, said in the Senate. "But because it has not met with reciprocation it has become necessary to prepare for a showdown battle . . . Reciprocation is a two-way street."

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) applauded Aiken's announcement and said that ABM opponents want a compromise that "will indicate to the Russians that the Senate is behind the President on the limitation of armaments and the bringing about of negotiations."

Mansfield said he personally favored the compromise amendment introduced into the Senate Wednesday by Sens. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.). This would permit the Administration's current request for \$759.1 million in ABM authorization money to be used for further research and development—but not for deployment.

Another compromise amendment was introduced yesterday by Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.) that would permit certain on-site radar, computer and electronic work in North Dakota and Montana—but no actual operational missile deployment.

Hart said the McIntyre amendment would allow the Administration to go ahead with just what it intends to do anyway, while the Hart-Cooper amendment would "keep anyone from doubting that it's really testing and not just the first step in deployment."

Aiken, in his Senate speech, voiced interest in both amendments without indicating which he would support.

Sen. Peter H. Dominick (R-Colo.), a leading ABM propo-

nent, said he thought even McIntyre's amendment "would prevent deployment" and he would vote against it.

Hart and Mansfield said the best compromise would be one that would allow the administration to find out if its ABM really works by testing the components far out in the Pacific at Kwajalein and Eniwetok atolls, which would have the same dispersion advantage as North Dakota and Montana.

The ABM concept is to shoot down approaching enemy missiles before they can reach their targets. The administration's proposal so far is limited to placing ABMs around Minuteman missile silos to keep the enemy aware that enough U.S. missiles will survive for retaliation.

The ABM opponents base their case on two arguments:

1. They think there is now sufficient testimony from qualified scientists to make it doubtful that the Administration's Safeguard ABM ever will provide the deterrence it is supposed to—despite costs estimated upwards of \$10 billion.

2. They are persuaded that if the United States now proceeds into ABM construction it will only add to the arms race with the Russians and make a missile limitation agreement more difficult to achieve.

Yesterday, Sen. Jacob K.

Javits (R-N.Y.), in a speech at the Overseas Press Club in New York, criticized Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird's "routine attitude" toward disarmament. He also criticized President Nixon's "advisers" who he said "construe as political weakness the private efforts of Senate Republican moderates, such as myself, to reach a compromise on Safeguard."

Sen. James B. Pearson (R-Kan.), another ABM opponent, suggested a mutual moratorium by the United States and Russia on further testing of both the ABM and the Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), the multi-warhead offensive missile.

Pearson said such a moratorium on strategic weapons development "would allow us to begin these (strategic arms limitation) talks under conditions superior to those (on Vietnam) in Paris, where negotiations must labor under 'fight and talk' conditions."

Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) of the Senate Armed Services Committee tried to buttress the administration's ABM case by introducing letters from Laird and Lt. Gen. R.E. Cushman Jr., deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The letters purported to show that Laird and CIA were in agreement that Soviet nuclear potential

makes it vital that the United States proceed with perfecting and deploying an ABM deterrent.

Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said the Laird-Cushman letters missed the point.

When Fulbright's committee originally aired the matter it was over Laird's hardening his ABM stance by telling Congress that "there is no doubt about it," the Russians are now developing offensive missiles for a "first strike" against the United States. This was disputed by the U.S. intelligence community, of which CIA is a part.

In the letter Stennis put into the record, Fulbright declared, Laird limited his remarks to describing the Russian nuclear buildup, a fact with which the CIA would have no reason to disagree.

Also yesterday, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) called the ABM "a multi-million dollar poker chip."

Kennedy said scientific information suggests that while it would take five years for the United States to build and position its ABM, the Russians, could add to the arms race ante and in six to 12 months build enough new offensive missiles to neutralize the U.S. ABM effort and "make it entirely ineffective and useless."