

21 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

On Saturday night, 17 September, about 9:00 p. m., while I was dining with Mr. and Mrs. John Walker, I received a telephone call from a member of Senator Kennedy's staff, stating the Senator would like a briefing on Monday morning, 19 September, at 10:45 at his house in Georgetown.

I answered that I would be available at the time and place mentioned. The contact was apparently made to me following a call to our Watch Office, as their log shows:

8:15 p. m. Mr. Robert Kennedy called requesting Mr. Dulles' telephone number. Advised Mr. Kennedy that Mr. Dulles presently dining at residence of John Walker ... provided him with number. Mr. Kennedy then requested Mr. Dulles' home telephone number. Provided.

When I reached the Kennedy house on Monday morning, there were no press men or photographers in the neighborhood and there has been no press reference to the briefing.

When I arrived, Senator Kennedy was in conference with Senator Gore and several others and I had a chance to talk with a man who was waiting and who identified himself to me as Prince Sadruddin Khan, the brother of the late Aly Khan and uncle of the Aga Khan. I found we had met some years ago. I expressed deep sympathy at the tragic death of his brother; inquired about the Aga Khan. He told me that he was working with one of the U. N. agencies.

When Senator Kennedy came out, I insisted that he see Prince Sadruddin ahead of me as I knew this meeting would be very brief while I would be with the Senator for some time.

006687
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Following this I had about a half-hour talk with the Senator before he took off for Charleston, West Virginia. He had two questions:

1. What was Khrushchev's basic objective in coming to the U. N. and what was he likely to do, and
2. What were the critical areas which might blow up over the next six or seven weeks prior to the election.

I told the Senator that there were various different prognostications as to Khrushchev's behavior but I thought that basically he wished to try to work out a meeting with the President and would not want to go back if he could help it, without this meeting. I said that despite all that had taken place, the Russian people still consider that the President is a man of great standing and prestige and that it would not help Khrushchev's prestige if he did not have this meeting. I said, of course, that he would make much of this opportunity to contact Bloc and neutralist leaders, and in particular try to influence the African leaders. I had a feeling that he would not be over-belligerent in his public addresses in order not to destroy the possibility of a meeting with the President, although he would not overlook the issue of overflights, etc. I felt that he had been building up crises in various areas - Berlin, Congo, Cuba, as a background to his visit in order to stress the importance of everybody getting together and making pious declarations about disarmament, and the like. Much, of course, would depend upon the treatment and reception he received at the U. N. and he was capable of outbursts in case he were annoyed or thwarted in his objectives.

I then reviewed briefly the troubled areas: Cuba, Congo, Berlin, Laos, Jordan, Syria, Sino-Soviet disputes, the apparent success of the Soviet's orbiting into space of animals, etc.

The Senator asked me if I had read General Medaris' book in which he seemed to take a very great interest. I said that I had not although I had read some articles of his. He asked me whether the UAR was going to be voted in as a member of the Security Council. I said that I did not know, that it was about their turn, but as far as I knew no final decision had been reached.

Before leaving I made it clear to the Senator that I was available for briefing him whenever he desired, although I had some plans for going to Europe in October if the U. N. meeting settled down to more routine work. I said that I would leave it to his judgment as to when he might wish a briefing.

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The Senator was cordial, talked briefly about the campaign. I said I did not think that he had made many mistakes. He laughed and said that well, possibly not, except for his reference to an apology on the U-2 incident, which had been rather misconstrued.

Mr. Earmann advised the White House (Colonel Eisenhower) on Monday prior to the meeting, and I reported on the meeting to Gerry Morgan on the day following.


On 23 September, I also briefed Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President, on the above meeting with Senator Kennedy.



ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

Distribution: None

*P.S. (Dulles) letter. Bureau forwarded
dictated on Sept 21.*



11