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TO : Chief, Foreign Branch M DATE: 11 February 1948

FROM : Chief of Mission, [] *CR*

SUBJECT: GENERAL: *Structure of Polish Intelligence Service in Germany*
SPECIFIC: Report on [] Trip to Munich

Source: []

1. Attached is a translation of [] report on the trip he made to Munich, January 1948, in the company of the Polish Major CHOYNACKI, [] and CHOYNACKI were driven to Munich from the Swiss border, 9 January 1948, by Richard WEATHERBY, British Vice-Consul in Zurich. Also present in the car was Mme. PRZYBYLSKA, apparently the wife of CHOYNACKI's war-time Lieutenant PRZYBYLSKI.

2. CHOYNACKI's contacts in Munich were Roy LINK, British Vice-Consul, and von GODIN, president of the Bavarian "Landespolizei", and Captain JANUSZEWSKI, member of the London Polish IS, stationed in Munich to work with DPs. [] states that WEATHERBY makes the trip Zurich/Munich twice a month and generally takes CHOYNACKI with him.

3. In Munich CHOYNACKI uses the name Jack ZAREMBA, member of the BIS. He is trying to organize a network for gathering information on the Red Army. Inasmuch as most of his war-time organization has been "burned" today he is forced to start from the beginning and is asking for the cooperation of the Ukrainians.

4. Source has been asked to keep us fully informed of CHOYNACKI's relations with the British and to try to get himself recruited either directly by WEATHERBY or through CHOYNACKI. This offers an interesting possibility of keeping track of WEATHERBY's activities in the American Zone. Source maintains that CHOYNACKI does not know of Source's connections with the AIS.

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FORM NO. 14-20
APR 1947

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

My Trip to Germany and Major CHOYNACKI's Plans

My trip to Germany was technically arranged by Major CHOYNACKI, who insisted - per contra - that I put him in contact with various Ukrainian military organizations in Germany.

The Major obtained for me through H. Marshall, (British MPC), an entry permit in the U. S. Zone. Since we did not wish to abuse our relations towards the Swiss, and considering the power of the Major in this region, it was he who had his Swiss friends, officers in the "2eme Bureau", intervene on my behalf for a return visa to Switzerland. Thus we know that the Major has influence in military circles and the cantonal police of Vaud.

M. CHOYNACKI also arranged for my trip from the Swiss frontier (Constance) to Munich. The first plan was to have a car put at my disposal, but at the last minute he informed me that we would use the car of the British Vice-Consul in Zurich, Mr. Richard WETTERBY (since we do not know the exact spelling of this name, we will refer to it in the text with the initials M.R.W.).

We left Kreuzlingen (which we had reached by train to meet Mr. CHOYNACKI) the morning of 9 January. M.R.W. was driving the car, and the other passengers were CHOYNACKI, Mrs. PRZYBYLSKA, and myself. The Major and I crossed the border on foot, and M.R.W., accompanied by Mrs. PRZYBYLSKA, picked us up in the car at 100 meters beyond the German border. We went directly to the British Consulate in Munich where M.R.W. accompanied by the Major delivered the diplomatic pouches. It was only after that that I was helped in looking for my compatriots. In order to avoid needlessly disclosing addresses, I went directly to Mr. Vladimir STACHEIV at 9 Bauerstrasse. Our group in Switzerland had put Mr. CHOYNACKI in touch with him last summer.

In the course of the trip, Mr. CHOYNACKI had asked me for permission to hold a technical meeting in Munich with our specialists on the Red Army and anti-Soviet espionage. He told me that he had full authorization from Generals ANDERS and WYSNIOWSKI to make concrete proposals of collaboration to my compatriots. The Major spoke in a low voice so that M.R.W. could not hear us, because the latter knows Polish fairly well. The Major said that in his opinion Poles and Ukrainians, together with Swiss, Spanish, and Belgian support should form a sizable network for military espionage against the Red Army so that they could present themselves to the British and the Americans with a first class organization. With such a group on hand, one could ask for anything that we want from the British and Americans. The Major added that he will use the technical services of his British friends, but that his projects should not be known to them. The Major stated that he had at his disposal a practically unlimited budget to organize this network for military espionage.

M.R.W. talked a great deal during the trip. His conversation was cultured and pleasant. He showed a lively interest in all demographic, ethnographic and linguistic questions of Eastern Europe. He never approached any current practical subject. The Major told me that M.R.W. was interested in all eastern questions, that he was anti-Soviet, and that he was more or less connected with a British intelligence network working on Russia. But the Major added emphatically that M.R.W.'s work

did not interest him because he had no confidence in the British superiors of the Vice-Consul, and that what interested him particularly was the frequent trips the Vice-Consul took to Munich (about every two weeks). The Major and H.R.W. use the familiar "you" form, just as the Major and Mr. Roy LINK, British Vice-Consul at Munich, formerly a colleague of the Major when LINK was Vice-Consul at Zurich.

M. CHOYNACKI had promised, as we were leaving Switzerland, to obtain a car for me in Munich from his adjutant Mr. Ludwig PREYBYLSKI, with whom he wished to have a technical conference. Being unable to procure this car, for reasons unknown to me, he considered it a point of honor to obtain a car for me in spite of everything.

Mr. CHOYNACKI lived in Munich under the name of Jack ZAREMBA, at the residence of his friend Mr. von GODIN, President of the Bavarian Land Police. He asked Mr. von GODIN to lend him one of the police cars (with an ordinary number). Mr. von GODIN declared that he was not authorized to lend a car to ZAREMBA, but on the other hand he could lend it to the British Consul, Mr. Roy LINK, if the latter would make an official application for one. Mr. Roy LINK then telephoned to Mr. von GODIN and asked for a car for the Consulate, to which Mr. von GODIN readily answered and "rented" for a fictitious sum of eight marks a BMW car (number By 115 316) to the British Consul from twelve to sixteen January inclusive. The car was rented with a letter from Mr. von GODIN, authorizing the British Consul to use the car. Major CHOYNACKI added at the bottom of this letter a statement that the British Consul had put the car at my disposal. The letter bore seals of the Land Police and of H.M.'s Consulate, and was signed by Messrs. von GODIN and Roy LINK.

As for relations between Mr. von GODIN and the Major, I learned that this fall the American occupation authorities gave von GODIN, in the capacity of President of the Land Police, the task of contacting a group of thirty-five Ukrainian UPA partisans on the Czech frontier. His first report on this subject was addressed to Mr. Jack ZAREMBA, who contacted Mr. STANCHIV to check and correct it. The corrected report was submitted to the American authorities. This case is cited as a concrete example of GODIN-ZAREMBA relations.

It was not until Wednesday, 14 January that I was able to organize the meeting for the Major which he had asked to have with our experts in military espionage: Captain KALYNA (Georges LOPATYNSKI) and Commander HUCUL (M. FAVORSKI). The Major said that Generals ANDERS and WYSNIOWSKI gave him the task of organizing collaboration with the Ukrainians along technical lines. The following are notes that we took at the meeting, which took place in a very friendly atmosphere:

"The Major stated that he has the technical means (actual assistance of British, Spanish, Belgian and Swiss Consulates) and the material means (unlimited budget) to organize a systematic study of the Red Army, of its movements, equipment, capabilities, technical equipment, and the industrial power in back of it. The Major admits he is no expert as far as the Soviet Union is concerned (until that time he had almost completely specialized in military espionage in Germany) and that he is almost completely lacking in military intelligence "directives." In organizing this service he is

counting on the active collaboration of the UPA Ukrainians, of whom the Polish service has the highest opinion. The UPA is in contact with the country (Ukraine); they have the means of penetrating; they have the basic records; but they are short of technical means and materials. The Major understands that the UPA is afraid that by accepting technical means and materials from a great power that they will become dependent upon it. However, in the case of the Poles in London, there is no such danger. A loyal partnership must be formed. What would the Major like to obtain from the Ukrainian organizations? CHOYMACKI asked questions on the following subjects:

1. Movements of Soviet armies (particularly the general transferral of troops from north to south).
2. Fortification lines, especially in the Caucasus.
3. Activity of the German officers in the Paulus Army:
 - a. Number of German officers working as instructors in Soviet training centers (list of centers).
 - b. Number of German officers taking the course at the Soviet War College.
 - c. Results of recruiting activity by General EINSIEDEL.
4. Concentration of Soviet forces of the Bug-San line and possibly fortification work.
5. All Soviet concentrations in the Ukraine; enumeration of divisions (order of battle) and fortification work.
6. Communication lines in Lena-Ienissei-Ob regions. Communications between these regions and Turkestan and Kouznetsk.
7. Order of battle of Soviet armed forces; reorganization of large units.
8. Order of battle of the Soviet navy on the Black Sea (all maritime problems are of primary importance at the present time).
9. Further details on instruction centers already reported by UPA (Samara and Tschita).
10. Air Forces, paratroopers, and airborne troops.
11. The "Fern Ost Korps" of Marshal Paulus.
12. Soviet industry: principal industrial stores, production in 1947, number of workers, working schedule, methods of production.
13. Armament.
14. Types of planes.
15. Names of Soviet officers.

These questions were incorporated in a memorandum written by Major CHOYNACKI. Captain KALINA and Major HUCUL called CHOYNACKI's attention to the fact that the Red Army has nothing in common with the Wehrmacht, that it is basically somewhat chaotic which although detrimental to the general organization of the army, protects it to a certain extent against enemy espionage activities. In general the Ukrainians will be able to answer the questions of the major (taken for granted a certain reorganization within our own services). Our delegates asked CHOYNACKI to define the utilization of intelligence communicated by the Ukrainians. In other words they questioned the reason that the Ukrainians had to use Polish channels to pass material to the British or Americans. Major CHOYNACKI then earnestly explained that it is not just a matter of delivering information neither to the British nor to the Americans, but of building up a study center for Polish-Ukrainian groups (a general staff), specialized in matters concerning the Red Army and supported in this work by small countries. At a moment chosen by both parties, this center would submit material to the British and Americans. Our delegates noted this declaration by the Major and added that the Ukrainians would request, according to the technical Polish-Ukrainian pact concluded in Italy June 1946, that the Poles be representatives of the group to the British while the Ukrainians would make all contact with the Americans. In any case this proposal by Mr. CHOYNACKI would have to be studied more closely by competent persons, and no answer could be given immediately. Our delegates again asked the Major to define the technical means at his disposal. Major CHOYNACKI listed the following:

1. Possibility of having as many Ukrainian specialists or couriers as we wished work in Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Spain, France and Great Britain, with ample living expenses assured them.
2. Possibility of gaining support from all British Consulates in Europe and outside of Europe and from all Spanish Consulates and from certain Swiss, Belgian and Dutch Consulates.
3. Foundation of a center for studies in the Montreux (Switzerland) area under the Swiss and Polish flags.
4. Foundation of a Polish-Ukraine-Spanish center in Spain.
5. Keeping the Ukrainians in contact with all official relations of the Major and with his agents.
6. Obtaining unlimited military permits for Germany.

The Major added that by way of a trial, initial collaboration would be limited to Swiss-German territory, and that Generals ANDERS and WESNIOWSKI feel that this technical Polish-Ukrainian collaboration should become general, the first test is a gauge of the honesty of Polish intentions.

The Ukrainian delegates then asked Major CHOYNACKI to repeat his declarations before a Ukrainian political representative of the trilogie, Mr. Vladimir STACHIV. The meeting was set for the next day, 15 January, at the home of Mr. STACHIV.

In the course of this meeting, Mr. CHOYNACKI repeated his propositions

exactly. Mr. STACHIV promised to study the Major's plans broadly, and he added that technical collaboration would in no way influence Polish-Ukrainian political negotiations, which are still at a tentative stage.

The following day, 16 January, the Major left Munich in the morning with his friend M.R.W. and Mrs. PRZYBYLSKA (who had come to visit her mother and sister).

I returned the car to Mr. von GODIN (or more exactly to his wife) on the 16th, and I mailed the accompanying letter to Mr. Roy LINK. On 17 January I left Munich.

The Major's proposal will be studied by the complete foreign representation of the UHWR (perhaps this has already been done), but the final decision will be taken in Switzerland by Mr. WRECIONA and myself who are the only persons qualified to decide on the timeliness of a technical collaboration with the Poles.

Because of our ties with you, our decision will be made only after having come to a mutual agreement with you.

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