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INTERROGATION REPORT

THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT 6, 6499TH SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF).

COUNTRY	: SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)	NIC REPORT NO	: 259/68
SUBJECT	: Location and Description of "B.3" Headquarters of the NFLSVN's Western Highlands Tactical Area (KONTUM, PLEIKU, and DARLAC Provinces)	NIC CASE NO	: 027/2/68
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DATE OF INFO	: 2 - 28 December 1967	REF:	None
DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION	: 27 February 1968 (W) SAIGON, Vietnam		

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SUMMARY

The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam's (NFLSVN's) Central Headquarters for the "Western Highlands Tactical Areas", designated as "B.3" was located in the southwestern portion of KONTUM Province, SVN, in an area bordered on the northwest by coordinates YA 830900, on the northeast by YA 850900, on the southeast by YA 850890, and on the southwest by YA 830890. It was responsible for the conduct of the NFLSVN's military operations throughout KONTUM, PLEIKU, and DARLAC Province. It was under the command of a NVA Lieutenant General. "B.3" was located in a heavily forested and

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mountainous area, considered perfectly safe from all aerial and ground surveillance and detection. It consisted of five separate sections and a total of 31 buildings. GVN/U.S. aircraft regularly flew over the area, but it had never been bombed or strafed. One security battalion of NVA soldiers guarded the headquarters area. Southeast of the base camp was a "newly built" road leading to the Cambodian border. It was being used to transport food and ammunition from CAMBODIA to the Western Highlands Tactical Area.

MAP REFERENCE:

AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6537IV, Scale 1/50,000, Edition 1.
AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6538III, Scale 1/50,000, Edition 1.

1. The Central Headquarters of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam's (NFLSVN's) "Western Highlands Tactical Area" had been given the code designation "B.3." It was located in the southwestern portion of KONTUM Province, SVN, in an area bordered on the northwest by coordinates YA 830900, on the northeast by YA 850900, on the southeast by YA 850890, and on the southwest by YA 830890.
2. As the headquarters for the Western Highlands Tactical Area, "B.3" was responsible for the conduct of the NFLSVN's military operations throughout KONTUM, PLEIKU, and DARLAC Provinces. It was under the command of a NVA Lieutenant General (name unknown). "B.3" received orders directly from the NFLSVN and gave directives such as attack orders to its subordinate units throughout the Western Highlands Tactical Area.
3. Infiltration Group 314, consisting of approximately 240 men of NVA Sapper Battalion 316 (formerly NVA Battalion 1702), reached "B.3" on 2 December 1967, after walking for three days (8 hours per day) from their last commo-liaison station, Station 80. It was located near the SVN/LAOS/CAMBODIAN border in the vicinity of coordinates YB 750260 (exact location unknown). Prior to arriving at "B.3", the group crossed the HODRAI River (coordinates of crossing point unknown) by boats, since the river was over 30 meters wide, extremely swift, and appeared to be very deep. Infiltration Group 314 remained in "B.3" until 28 December 1967.
4. "B.3" was located in a heavily forested and mountains area. (See Attachments 1 and 2.) Branches of the KROI stream ran throughout the base camp area. The camp was divided by the mountains and streams into five separate sections. The northern half of the area consisted of a large "troop receiving area" and four separate groups of barracks buildings used to house infiltrating troops (see figures 1, 5, 6, and 7 of Attachment 1). There were a total of 22 barracks buildings in this portion of the base camp area. The southern half of the area consisted of the 9 buildings which housed the personnel and officers of the "B.3" Headquarters (See Figure 4 of Attachment 1). All buildings throughout the entire base camp area were of varying sizes, build of tree trunks with bamboo roofs, and have been constructed on the mountain slopes and were hidden by large trees and dense foliage. They were considered completely secure from all aerial and ground surveillance and detection. GVN/U.S. aircraft regularly flew over the area, but it had never been bombed or strafed. Personnel of B.3" were so sure of their safety during aerial overflights that they continued their normal activities, not stopping to seek better cover. Due to the irregular terrain,

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
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it was impossible for persons in one section of the base camp area to see the other sections. In addition, movement between sections was extremely difficult. For example, it took approximately 45 minutes to walk from the "troop receiving area" (Figure 1 of Attachment 1) to the "B.3" Headquarters area (Figure 4 of Attachment 1). As a result, the area was considered safe and secure.

5. The entrance to the "B.3" Headquarters area was "kept in secrecy". To reach this area, it was necessary to follow the trail which led from the northwest corner of the entire base camp area south between mountain ridges on the east and west. The trail crossed a stream south of the "troop receiving area". It was necessary at that point to walk upstream (west) in the knee-deep water of the stream for approximately 15 minutes. Only at that time was it possible to climb over a ridge and enter the headquarters area. It was protected at all times by one battalion of NVA soldiers.
6. According to hearsay information, the base camp area had been in danger of enemy attack only once (date unknown). At that time, GVN "commandos" had been secretly "dropped" in an area west of the mountains which formed the western border of the area. However, they had been defeated before actually entering the base camp area.
7. With the exception of the security battalion located directly in the "B.3" Headquarters area, there were no full-time security units stationed throughout the remainder of the camp. However, there was a watch tower (see Figure 2 of Attachment 1) on the top of a mountain on the east side of the camp. It was manned 24 hours per day.
8. There was a "newly built" road extending from the border of CAMBODIA to a place southeast of the "B.3" Headquarters area about three-days travel time. The road was 4 meters wide and was being used to transport food and ammunition by "modified bicycles" from CAMBODIA to the Western Highlands Tactical Area. The road crossed many streams which were forded by small bridges made from the trunks of trees. One portion of the road had formerly been bombed.

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Attachment: 1
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FIGURES USED IN ATTACHMENT II

1. Troop receiving area and group of 7 barracks buildings.
2. Watch tower on top of a mountain.
3. Stream crossing trail, providing "Secret entrance" to "B.3" Headquarters.
4. "B.3" Headquarters area, consisting of 9 buildings.
5. Group of 5 barracks buildings.
6. Group of 5 barracks buildings.
7. Group of 5 barracks building.
8. Area west of "B.3" base camp where GVN "commandos" reportedly launched an attack in former times.

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