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MEMORANDUM FOR

The Director
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Questions Generated by SNIE
"The Outlook for Cambodia"

I would like a memorandum addressing the following questions which arose from a reading of the latest SNIE on Cambodia. The responses need not represent an interagency position. An ONE memorandum will suffice. It should be completed, if possible by opening of business 13 August 1970.

-- On page 6, Combat Effectiveness . . . how large a Cambodian army will be needed to handle the hit-and-run tactics of the present communist force it faces. i. e. an advantage of 2-1, 10-1, etc.

-- On page 12 the statement is made that "if the military situation does not soon improve, Lon Nol's support might begin to dissipate and his policies come under open attack." What are the chances of this happening - 50-50?, 80-20?

-- There is a seeming discrepancy between the statement on pages 15-16 that there is no way of knowing the depth of peasant commitment to the regime and the statement on page 4 that youths are "flocking to enlist from all parts of the country and all walks of life." Are peasant youths among them and if so, does that not tell us something of their commitment to the regime?

-- On pages 32 and 33 the statement is made that Hanoi may see an opportunity in Cambodia "to tie down South

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Vietnamese [redacted] forces . . . without excessive cost or risk," to the Communists. I would appreciate a fuller argumentation on the judgment that Hanoi believes its Cambodian operations can be run at "relatively " low cost and risk (page 38).

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[Signature]

Henry A. Kissinger

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