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C11011

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
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INFORMATION
April 4, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG
FROM: TOM LATIMER
SUBJECT: Evidence that NVA has Directly
Crossed the DMZ

General Pursley has sent the attached DIA memo to HAK on the evidence we have that NVA units have directly crossed the DMZ into Quang Tri Province. Although there is no series of ARDF fixes showing the north-south movement of NVA infantry units, there is abundant indirect evidence that both men and material have moved directly across the DMZ.

Among the best pieces of evidence are:

- One intercepted North Vietnamese message which stated:
"At the Ben Hai River we have finished building a bridge.
Our vehicles are crossing freely."
- On 1 April a string of sensors near Route 606 in the DMZ detected 27 instances of activity associated with the movement of enemy vehicles and armor.
- Finally, the position of friendly bases immediately south of the eastern portion of the DMZ, the speed with which they were overrun, the absence of any evidence that they were attacked from the flank or rear, all indicate that the enemy force came directly across the DMZ.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SI-S-3015/DI-4A2

3 APR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evidence of Enemy Attacks across the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (C)

(C/NFD) The following developments could have a significant bearing on military and political developments in Southeast Asia.

North Vietnam - Republic of Vietnam

The absolute confirmation of the passage of enemy infantry elements through the DMZ provided by a series of north-to-south ARDF fixes is lacking. Units have, however, been noted preparing for activity on both sides of the DMZ. Although only one artillery element has been fixed south of the DMZ by ARDF, the heavy shelling of Quang Tri Combat Base, beyond the range of artillery fired from north of the DMZ, indicates that some NVA artillery has deployed south. Previous locations of 308th NVA Division elements committed to combat make it likely that they too deployed through the DMZ. An unidentified enemy element has also explicitly referenced crossing the Ben Hai River. Sensor activations provide further evidence that the enemy has crossed the DMZ. Finally, the speed and direction of the enemy attacks south of the eastern DMZ indicate that he came directly across the DMZ.

(Sgd) D. V. Bennett

1 Enclosure
DIA Intelligence
Appraisal, Subj:
Evidence of Enemy
Attacks Across DMZ
(SCW)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

D. V. BENNETT
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

205153

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense

APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

REGRADED *Conf/NFD* WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES.

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8 APR 1972

DIA INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

Evidence of Enemy Attacks Across the Demilitarized Zone

1. (SS) There is substantial intelligence available indicating that the enemy has moved both men and materiel directly across the Demilitarized Zone in support of the current offensive in Quang Tri Province.
2. (SS) In the case of infantry units, absolute confirmation in the form of a series of north-to-south ARDF signal intelligence plots indicating passage of these units through the DMZ cannot be established. However, the 27B and 31st NVA Infantry Regiments have been noted in activity on both sides of the DMZ while in the process of conducting reconnaissance, stockpiling supplies and ammunitions, and preparing staging areas for future activity.
3. (SS) In the case of artillery units, elements of the 164th NVA Artillery Regiment, long confirmed as operating north of the eastern DMZ, has been detected by ARDF in new locations south of the DMZ. Additional indirect evidence of the staging of artillery through the demilitarized zone is noted in the fact that Quang Tri Combat Base has been subjected to heavy incoming artillery fire. As this base is beyond the range of artillery fired from north of the DMZ, it is very probable that some NVA artillery has been deployed through the DMZ to new firing positions to the south.
4. (SS) While unable to establish their presence by either ARDF or MRDF fixes, the National Security Agency has reported that their analysis of the communications of the 36th and 102d Regiments of the 308th NVA Division indicate that these units have been tactically committed to operations in the Quang Tri area. Last identification of these regiments in the vicinity of Dong Hoi makes it unlikely that these units were deployed via NVN and Laos rather than directly through the DMZ.
5. (SS) Hard evidence of the use of the DMZ as a direct route of passage was noted in an enemy message intercepted at 020517Z April (021317H). An unidentified rear service element reported: "At the Ben Hai River we have finished building a bridge. Our vehicles are crossing freely."
6. (S/NFD) An examination of recent sensor activations in northeast Quang Tri has positively identified one corridor used by enemy forces. On 1 April sensor string 40-200 (see map attached) detected 27 instances of activity which can

be associated with movement of enemy vehicles and armor. This sensor string is located one mile from an abandoned ferry crossing of the Ben Hai River and one-half mile from Route 606. It is likely that other entry corridors for foot troops have also been used. The eastern DMZ area is generally flat with numerous trails and roads, many not monitored by sensor strings.

7. (SS) In addition, there is overwhelming circumstantial evidence of a direct thrust by the enemy across the DMZ. The position of friendly bases immediately south of the eastern DMZ, the speed with which they were overrun, the absence of any evidence that these positions were attacked from the flank or rear, all indicate that the enemy force came directly across the DMZ.

Approved by:



J. F. BARLOW
CAPT, USN
Senior Duty Officer

Date Prepared: 2 Apr 72

