

CTS-45-E8763

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

~~TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE~~

URGENT INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

PO Phil Odeen/Hal Sonnenfeldt *HS/son*

SUBJECT:

SALT -- Verification Panel Meeting, 9 February

The purpose of this meeting is to review the status of the negotiations now that the Vienna session is over. (The talks ended last Friday.) Moreover, the meeting should consider how to prepare for SALT VII in Helsinki, which starts on March 28 after this seven-week recess. Finally, the meeting provides a good opportunity to discuss again the OSD Hard-Site Defense proposal.

The last Verification Panel meeting was on December 23, during the Christmas recess. You will probably want at least one more Verification Panel meeting and an NSC meeting before the talks resume on March 28. These other meetings could best be scheduled after mid-March.

What You Should Get From This Meeting

You should:

-- Get agreement that the Working Group begin work on any new papers which will be needed. These should include: (1) a paper on the language of the Joint Draft Texts and any accompanying interpretations; and (2) a paper on the unresolved issues at SALT which have not been recently studied (e.g., mobile ICBMs, soft-pad ICBMs).

-- Make it clear that there will be adequate opportunity for everyone to present their views on the substantive issues in March. Hence, the President and you do not want anyone in the meantime to wage a campaign in Congress or the press for particular viewpoints.

-- Get discussion of the Hard-Site ABM proposal pushed by OSD and also supported, though in different form, by the JCS.

MORI/CDF C03323034

NSS, DOS, JCS, OSD Reviews Completed

~~TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE~~

c Attached to Ts identifying cover sheet 9 Feb. 1972 J

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

2

NEW INTELLIGENCE

The important intelligence issues at this point are:

-- Have the Soviets started any new ICBM silos?

-- When and what will the Soviets test at Tyuratam -- modified SS-9s and SS-11s or new missiles? 25X1

-- What is the meaning of the ABM R&D at Sary Shagan?

25X1

At the Verification Panel meeting, you should ask CIA to give a briefing on the latest intelligence. Carl Duckett suffered a mild heart attack last week and is hospitalized. Bruce Clarke will probably give the briefing.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT-KEYHOLE

3

REVIEW OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations since the recess did not result in any change in the Soviet position on ABM levels or on excluding SLBMs from the freeze. There was some progress on minor issues; the remaining differences in the Joint Draft Texts are mostly on major issues such as ABM levels.

The key remaining issues are:

A. Defensive Limitations

1) ABM levels. We have stuck on our 2-or-1 proposal. The Soviets reaffirmed their December 15 proposal of two sites for them (Moscow plus ICBM defense) and one site for us.

However, in informal meetings of Garthoff with Kishilov and Semenov, the Soviets have hinted strongly that an acceptable compromise is 2-for-2 in which each side would get protection of NCA and one ICBM field.

-- When asked about 2-for-2 in which the U.S. had protection of two ICBM fields and not Washington, Kishilov said this would encounter greater difficulties because it would allow the U.S. a greater advantage in the number of ICBMs defended. However, Kishilov did not reject it. (Semenov did not address this variant.)

The Soviets proposed equal interceptor levels of 150 and ruled out higher levels of ABM interceptors. They also termed inappropriate more than two ABM sites for each side.

Additionally, Kishilov and Semenov told Garthoff that a 1-for-1 deal in which the Soviets get Moscow ABM and we get Safeguard would not be feasible. The argument is that the Soviets must have ICBM defense (other than that provided by Moscow) if we get ICBM defense.

2) Radar constraints. We continue to press for limiting ABM radars to four modern ABM radar complexes (MARC) for each side (though the Soviets would also be able to retain their existing Try Add radars). The Soviets have finally accepted the MARC concept and hint that they will agree to 6-8 MARCs.

On other large phased array radars (OLPARs), we continue to press for veto rights over construction of new OLPARs with a power-aperture product of greater than 10^6 watt-meters squared. The Soviets resist any

TOP SECRET/TALENT-KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

4

constraints on OLPARs, but some on our Delegation believe Soviets might be flexible.

B. Offensive Limitations

1) Freeze on SLBMs. We modified our proposal to freeze number of tubes and not boats. We would explicitly allow replacement of old SLBMs with new SLBMs. The Soviets continue to resist any freeze on SLBMs.

We have not proposed allowing freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs. The Delegation (less Allison) requested authorization to explore this, but we never acted on the request.

2) Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs). We seek a strict limit preventing increases in the number of MLBMs. The Soviets say they will promise not to convert "light" ICBMs to "heavy" ICBMs, but they balk at any definition of terms.

3) Soft-fixed ICBM Launchers and Mobiles. We want a freeze on all ICBMs (which implies a ban on mobile ICBMs since neither country now has any). The Soviets position is to freeze only ICBM silo launchers, but not soft pads or mobiles. They have implied that they will agree to include soft-pads, but suggest that it will be more difficult to get mobiles included.

4) Freeze dates. We proposed July 31, 1971 as the date after which no new construction on ICBMs or SLBMs can be started. The Soviets proposed July 31, 1972 or the effective date of the agreements, whichever is later.

-- If the Soviets have not begun any new ICBMs since last July, then the difference in the freeze dates for ICBMs would not be important. (They have so hinted in Vienna.)

-- As for SLBMs, the Soviets will have started about 9 more Y-class submarines in the period between our proposed date and theirs.

5) Duration and Withdrawal. We have not yet said what we think should be a minimum duration for the offensive agreement, but have argued that termination should not be automatic and should be tied to progress in the follow-on negotiations. The Soviets have proposed automatic termination after 2 years.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

5

At the Verification Panel meeting, you should call on Ambassador Smith to bring everyone up to date on events in Vienna.

PREPARATION FOR SALT VII

The present concern over preparations for SALT VII should focus on:

- Getting the necessary analytical work done prior to the Verification Panel and NSC meetings starting in mid-March.
- Insuring that the confidentiality of the Talks is respected.

A. Inter-agency Papers

We have recently completed interagency papers on:

-- "SLBM Launcher Limits." While this examines the possibility of allowing freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs, it focuses on the issue of how essential is it to include a freeze on SLBMs in the interim agreement.

-- "Higher Level ABM Options in SALT." (See Tab F.) This examines in considerable detail ABM options which involve increases over our present proposal in the number of ABM sites and interceptors. It includes much discussion on Hard-Site Defense.

-- "Alternative ABM Levels." (See Tab G.) This summarizes all the ABM options which have any agency support, briefly summarizing the pros and cons. It was designed mainly to answer potential criticism that we recently had looked only at higher-level ABM options.

Probably no rewrite of these papers is needed.

Two additional papers would seem to be needed. They are:

1. Consideration of Unresolved Issues. We have already studied adequately the issues of ABM levels and the inclusion of SLBMs. But, there is a need to consider the strategic implications, negotiability, and agency views on other issues which are still unresolved -- e. g., mobile ICBMs, soft-pad ICBMs, the freeze dates, duration and withdrawal.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

6

2. Review of the language in the Joint Draft Texts and accompanying interpretations. The JDTs and the interpretations are ad referendum to the Delegations and to the governments. We should smoke out as soon as possible any latent problems with the agreed language in the present drafts, rather than to wait until the agreements are ready to be signed.

This paper could also examine the issue of how to handle the accompanying interpretations -- e.g., by a joint statement in a plenary meeting, by each side initialling them. This issue caused considerable confusion and debate among the agencies the past two weeks.

-- Some (including OSD and JCS) thought that the interpretations should be as formal as possible, i. e. they should be initialled.

-- Others apparently thought a plenary statement was sufficient.

Agency Views. Except for ACDA, the informal views of members of the V. P. Working Group essentially track with the suggestions above. (Tab D)

ACDA did question whether a paper was needed on the agreed language of the Joint Draft Texts. It argued that such a paper might be an excuse for other agencies to raise old substantive issues again.

-- The JCS and OSD would like to look at the JDT simply to make sure that the language does what the Delegation thinks it does. We can control them from reopening old substantive issues. Moreover, the White House never has had a chance to review the language carefully; it would help to have the benefit of agencies' views.

If the decision is made to do a paper on the JDTs, ACDA would like the paper to be done in the Backstopping Committee (which Smith would chair), rather than by the Verification Panel. ACDA says that this would keep you a little removed from any battles over details.

-- The JCS would prefer the V. P. Working Group. We also believe the Working Group would be a better forum. Phil Odeen chairs that group and we consequently have better control over the timing and content of the papers done there. Hence, you will have better control over what issues are surfaced for your decision and which are not. At a minimum, you will probably want to have a voice on how to handle the interpretations accompanying the JDTs.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

7

At the Verification Panel Meeting, you should ask Ambassador Smith how he thinks we might proceed during the recess. You might also ask if the Delegation would like an opportunity to present written views on this. After soliciting other views, you ought to direct the Verification Panel Working Group to undertake the necessary studies (noted above). These studies should be completed by early March when you return from China.

B. Protecting Confidentiality

As we get nearer to the SALT agreements, pressures are sure to mount from Congress and the press for more information. And, those who fear their views have a dim future within the bureaucracy might try to generate some outside support.

At the Verification Panel meeting, you might remind everyone that there will be a fair hearing of the issues and everyone's views during the Verification Panel and NSC meetings in March.

You might then get tough and emphasize that the President and you are very concerned about any leaks during the coming months. You should remind everyone that Congressional briefings, if requested, should deal only with the formal SALT sessions and not speculate about possible U.S. fallbacks. Moreover, Congressional briefings and public statements on SALT are to be cleared through the White House.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Any of the substantive issues listed earlier could be raised by someone during the meeting. You should be able to defer discussion of them by pointing out that the meetings in March provide the more appropriate forum.

-- The Delegation a few weeks ago did request authorization to explore on a non-committal basis the following: 1) the principle of equal ABM interceptors; and 2) allowing freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs. However, these issues can be treated in March like the others.

On the other hand, you might want to discuss the OSD Hard-Site Defense proposal at this time. As you recall, Secretary Laird is seeking an ABM arrangement (Tab B) whereby:

1. For now, the U.S. would get the one Safeguard site at Grand Forks and the Soviets would get Moscow ABM.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

8

2. After three years or upon mutual agreement:

-- The U.S. could deploy an ABM defense of Washington.

-- The U.S. could deploy Hard-Site Defense (HSD) at Grand Forks.

-- The Soviets would be allowed to deploy HSD at one ICBM field which meets agreed geographical limitations. (OSD had earlier proposed that the Soviets be allowed to protect equal numbers of silos as the U.S., i. e., 150. This would have meant that the Soviets would be allowed to protect as many as 3-4 ICBM fields. OSD now believes that the Soviets would accept defenses of one ICBM field.)

-- For each side, Hard-Site Defense would include 1000 short-range interceptors or more. Many short-range radars would also be allowed.

Before the U.S. would make the detailed ABM proposal, OSD thought the Delegation should first be directed to explore whether the Soviets were willing to accept four fundamental principles of the Hard-Site approach.

The Delegation, of course, was never directed to undertake such explorations. However, Paul Nitze and the OSD staff in Vienna pursued much of the desired exploration without receiving guidance. This activity caused Gerry Smith and others considerable distress on occasion.

The OSD principles and the Soviet responses are discussed below:

-- (1) Acceptable geographic limits on location of the ICBM defense. In response, the Soviets have indicated that they will accept some geographic constraints, though the exact form is still uncertain.

-- (2) Strict qualitative limits on the capabilities of the Hard-Site Defense interceptors and radars. In response, the Soviets have advocated some qualitative limits on HSD interceptors and radars. What they will accept is still not clear, but OSD believes that it would be acceptable.

-- (3) Strict controls on Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs), i. e., those situated elsewhere about the country. In response, the Soviets continue to oppose any controls in their official statements, including one by Shchukin in a recent mini-plenary. The informal statements of everyone, except possibly Shchukin, also oppose such controls.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

9

However, OSD is optimistic. Their rationale is that the Soviets now argue for control over ICBM defense components, including ABM radars. It would be illogical for the Soviets to allow all other radars to be unconstrained. Hence, the Soviets will come around to OLPAR constraints. And, in a conversation with Nitze, Shchukin implied that the issue would be discussed again in Moscow over the recess.

-- (4) The numerical levels on ABM interceptors for ICBM defense would be open after a given period, unless a limit was agreed to on the follow-on agreement. No one on the U.S. Delegation has probed whether the Soviets would accept unlimited interceptors for HSD. Such probing would have been a clear breach of the instructions.

However, in discussing the Soviet proposal of 150 total interceptors, Garthoff reports that Kishilov said that there should not be higher levels of ABM interceptors. Moreover, it would reflect a major shift from the recent trend of the negotiations toward lower numbers of interceptors.

In summary, there is evidence that the Soviets would accept the first and second principles, -- i. e., geographic limits and qualitative limits on HSD-components. The evidence would suggest that the Soviets will resist controls on OLPARs, though OSD sees reasons to be optimistic. Finally, there is little evidence to predict the Soviet reaction to the fourth principle of unlimited interceptors.

Putting aside the OSD principles and focusing on the detailed OSD proposal, the ABM deployments essentially boil down to the issue: is assuring the survivability of an additional 100 Minuteman (and possibly less) worth the probable negotiating and political problems as well as the uncertainties of allowing the Soviets Hard-Site Defense?

The remaining negotiating problems were described above.

The political problems include:

-- This is a one-to-one arrangement in the short-term. (We would have to stop construction at Malmstrom; the Soviets would not have to stop anything.)

-- We would be vulnerable to the political argument that we were increasing ABM deployments in the long term, not limiting them.

-- We would have to obtain Congressional approval for ABM defense of Washington and for HSD.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

10

As for the strategic issues, this system (when deployed in 1979-80) would be able to assure at a maximum the survival of about 100 additional Minuteman, and possibly less. This number would be in addition to the about 100 or more Minuteman which would survive without HSD.

As we have written you in detail earlier (Tab E), the actual number of additional survivors would be smaller if some technical difficulties with HSD are not solved or if the Soviets make determined efforts to develop an effective counterforce threat.

-- The Soviets could by the 1980's develop and deploy a counterforce threat which could reduce the number of Minuteman down to less than 50, even if we deployed OSD's proposed HSD. (This would involve extensive MIRVing, accuracy improvements, and increased yield-to-weight ratios.)

Assuming that an additional 100 Minuteman were saved, the strategic significance of this incremental number is questionable.

-- If Minuteman alone were used to retaliate against the Soviets, 100 more Minuteman could account for about 5-8% more Soviet fatalities. (Against zero or NCA ABM, 100 Minuteman could cause about 15% fatalities, 200 about 20% and 300 about 25%.)

-- However, we presumably would also have some surviving bombers and SLBMs. In most cases the addition of 100 or more Minuteman survivors would increase Soviet fatalities by about 1-5%.

HSD for the Soviets at one ICBM field would give them some protection of those ICBMs at the field. And, by cheating which we could not detect, the Soviets would be able to provide protection of about 12% of their total population if the ICBM field were east of the Urals.

-- If the Soviets were allowed to defend an equal number of silos (150), then they could also provide protection of about 23% of the Soviet urban population. This percentage would grow to 45% if the Soviets were not limited by geographical restrictions and deployed HSD west of the Urals.

Agency Positions. Any further exploration of the OSD principles or any eventual proposal of Hard-Site Defense would have to be directed over the strong opposition of ACDA (including Ambassador Smith) and State Department. (See letter from John Irwin at Tab C) CIA has taken no general position, but raises questions about the verifiability of the OSD proposal.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

11

The JCS have recently modified their 3-for-3 ABM proposal to include a vague Hard-Site Defense option. The JCS representatives have been very hesitant to spell out any details, essentially saying only that each side should have the right to deploy, after consultation, an agreed number of additional "limited-range" ABM interceptors and radars in defense of two ICBM fields.

However, there are differences between the JCS and OSD. The JCS would like 3-for-3 ABM sites initially (versus 1-for-1 of OSD) and would like the option of HSD defense of two ICBM fields (versus one for OSD). Probably more important than the numerical differences, the JCS would (contrary to OSD):

-- Probably be against strict qualitative controls on ABM radars and ABM interceptors;

-- Almost certainly be against each side having a veto power over the other side's construction of Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs).

At the Verification Panel meeting, you should point out that any authorization to explore Hard-Site Defense further or to make a specific proposal would require an NSC meeting and Presidential consideration.

In discussing the substance of OSD's Hard-Site Defense proposal, you should focus on whether there is a need to obtain qualitative controls on ABM radars, on ABM interceptors, and on Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs). This issue still marks the major area of difference between OSD and JCS.

-- OSD has said in the past that it would not support the mutual right to deploy HSD unless such controls were agreed to.

-- The JCS is very chary of qualitative controls.

You might specifically address OLPARs since there is considerable uncertainty whether the Soviets will accept any constraints here. Moreover, the JCS has been particularly opposed to controls on OLPARs.

Conduct of the Meeting

Your talking points bring out the issues and analysis contained in this memorandum.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE

12

^ The order of the meeting might be as follows:

1. A CIA briefing on the latest intelligence.
2. Gerry Smith reporting on the Vienna negotiations.
3. Discussion of the preparations needed for SALT VII.
4. Your reminder of the confidentiality of the Talks.
5. Discussion of the OSD Hard-Site Defense proposal.

-- On this issue, Arch Wood (of OSD) has a presentation on the OSD proposal. Secretary Laird directed this after his breakfast meeting with you, and Gardiner Tucker reports that Laird has asked often about preparations for the briefing. You might feel that this briefing is unnecessary since we have just completed an interagency paper which extensively examines the OSD proposal and since Tucker spent some time discussing the proposal at December's Verification Panel meeting.

Your talking points are at Tab A.

TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE