

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12-21-70

ACTION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

[Redacted]

2525X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Disclosure of Classified Material

On December 15th, Admiral Anderson wrote you commenting on a series of unauthorized disclosures of classified and sensitive information (Tab B). He recommended in his letter that you reaffirm to the Departments and Agencies the necessity for stringent adherence to provisions of law and regulations governing the handling and release of classified information. The last formal expression of Presidential concern over the unauthorized disclosure of classified information was issued by President Eisenhower in May 1960.

The most recent example of a serious breach was the publication on 16 December of the current Soviet ICBM programs. Admiral Anderson has expressed deep concern over these articles (Tab C). Director Helms also called me to express his concern and Gerry Smith has cabled his surprise that these revelations could have been made without the Delegation's knowledge. The statement to the press made by the Department of Defense was one of the most fundamental announcements affecting our SALT negotiations yet made during this Administration. Beyond the foreign policy implications of the announcement, there is also the probable serious affect upon our ABM program. We will be hard-put to defend an extension of that program in the face of an announcement that the deployment of the weapon system against which it is to defend is being slowed down or stopped. The announcement was made with neither warning to us nor clearance at the White House.

The Attorney General is looking into the matter of security leaks and what can be done

OSD review completed

I am undertaking a study

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

PFIAB review completed.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

-2- 25X1

in the NSC system concerned with the classification and declassification process. Meanwhile, however, the problem of controlling highly classified and sensitive material has become so serious that I believe it is time that you express your concern to the Heads of Departments and Agencies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and sign the memorandum at Tab A which includes the thoughts of a memorandum sent you by Admiral Anderson (Tab D) and which also reaffirms the directive you issued on September 1, 1969. (Tab E)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

25X1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

December 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, U. S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration

SUBJECT:

Disclosures of Classified Information
and Coordination and Clearance of
Official Statements

I am becoming increasingly concerned about the disclosure in public media of classified information bearing upon important aspects of national security, particularly that which tends to jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Such disclosures present a serious threat to our national interests and I am determined that the practice of releasing such information without proper authorization will be brought to an end.

Executive Order 10501, of December 15, 1953, as amended, established regulations and procedures for safeguarding classified information, while especially sensitive data are protected by special systems of clearances.

I direct that immediate steps be taken within the jurisdiction of each addressee to ensure that existing regulations and procedures

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary. These regulations and procedures should assure that only those individuals with a demonstrated "need-to-know" receive classified information and that all recipients are constantly aware of the necessity to protect it from public disclosure. They should provide for an adequate security review of all statements and documents made public on subjects with important security connotations. Further, I wish responsible officials to take firm disciplinary action against individuals under their jurisdiction found responsible for careless or deliberate mishandling of classified information.

The Director of Central Intelligence has the statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly, I shall look to him to provide guidance in this field, especially through the machinery of the intelligence community. I shall expect him to keep me informed of developments and I wish department and agency heads to cooperate fully with him.

I also reaffirm the following instructions which I issued on September 1, 1970 concerning coordination and clearance of public statements and press releases and the necessity for White House clearance of all official communications having policy implications:

--"Public statements and press releases: Prior to release, all public communications on matters of known or potential Presidential interest must be carefully cleared by the White House (Assistant to the President for National Security) for consistency with Presidential policy and for coordination with the departments and agencies who share overlapping interests and responsibilities. Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or interdepartmental interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance."

--"Official communications: All official communications with policy implications must be cleared by the White House. When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared. This procedure requires close and confidential staff relationships at all levels between the White House and your department as well as among departments."



SECRET

101
SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

December 15, 1970

Dear Mr. President:

Your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is deeply concerned by the increasing frequency with which highly classified and sensitive information is disclosed in the press and other open literature. At the Board's December meeting it was clear that our concern is shared by the entire intelligence community.

Examples of recent unauthorized disclosures include a 19 October 1970 "New York Times" article by Neil Sheehan which leaves little doubt that the author had access to a May 1970 CIA publication, "Viet Cong Covert Agencies in South Vietnamese Territory." A 21 September 1970 item in "Aviation Week and Space Technology" accurately described the delay in the new [redacted] reconnaissance satellite. There have been others. Equally damaging to the national interest are public statements or testimony by high government officials which utilize intelligence information without due regard for protecting the source, its technical capabilities, or both.

25X1

In the last decade, the pace of scientific development and technical sophistication of the public have increased enormously. This, coupled with the climate of controversy in the Congress surrounding such matters as the size and nature of our strategic forces and our support to friendly governments in Southeast Asia, has tended to obscure in the minds of many, particularly those concerned only peripherally or with limited aspects of complex technical intelligence matters, just which items or aspects of a problem are classified and which are properly in the public domain.

The problem of deliberate disclosures has been exacerbated by changing moral and ethical standards in the United States. Many now believe it is their duty to question authority at every turn and, security oaths notwithstanding, show little compunction about revealing classified information which they personally believe should be known to the public in general.

[redacted]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET


-2-

In assessing the informational and even human losses caused by security breaches, the economic losses have, in the past, been considered only secondarily, if at all. Present U. S. dependence on satellite-borne sensors and computer analytical techniques have placed the cost of many individual technical intelligence systems in the realm of millions of dollars. U. S. security is clearly dependent on continued technical intelligence collection. What is perhaps less clear is that the cost of a single collection system is now so great that, from a strictly dollars and cents standpoint, we can no longer afford to have its effectiveness nullified by unauthorized disclosures. From a technical standpoint, we may not be able to replace it even with unlimited funds.

The last formal expression of Presidential concern over the unauthorized disclosure of classified information was issued by President Eisenhower in May 1960. We believe a strong expression of Presidential concern is imperative at this time. Such an expression will do much to tighten up departmental security practices and have a very salutary effect on careless or inadvertent disclosures. Additionally, it will again serve notice on those who willfully disclose classified information that their actions will be dealt with severely. It is the unqualified view of the Board that strong punitive action should be taken against such individuals.

Appended for your consideration is a draft of a Presidential memorandum on the disclosure of classified information.

Respectfully,


George W. Anderson, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.



25X1

SECRET

SECRET SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

December 17, 1970


My dear Mr. President:

Your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is gravely concerned over unauthorized, unwise or unintentional disclosure of highly classified intelligence information. This was a subject of a Board memorandum to you dated 15 December 1970, and delivered by hand to Dr. Kissinger.

This morning the press carries front page articles which reveal intelligence on Soviet ICBMs derived from sensitive sources and the brand new National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Forces for Inter-continental Attack dated 24 November, but distributed on 11 December. These articles stemmed from an authorized Department of Defense release but contained a great deal of sensitive data not in the release itself. The lid of Pandora's box was lifted and we can now anticipate that before long all of the contents will be out.

As its Chairman and on behalf of the Board, I would appreciate the opportunity to speak to you at your early convenience in regard to the seriousness of the situation pertaining to such disclosures of sensitive information and the urgent necessity for corrective action.

Very respectfully,


George W. Anderson, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

SECRET SENSITIVE

U.S. Data Indicate Moscow Is Slowing ICBM Deployment

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 — American reconnaissance satellites have picked up evidence that the Soviet Union has slowed the construction of long-range strategic nuclear missiles and is dismantling a modest number of intermediate-range missiles.

Senior Administration analysts are uncertain whether these two developments are motivated primarily by military or economic considerations or by a desire by Moscow to influence the talks with the United States on the limitation of strategic arms. Negotiators for the two nations wound up the Helsinki phase of those discussions today and prepared to adjourn on Friday with the issuance of a brief communiqué. [Page 3.]

Jerry W. Friedheim, a Defense Department spokesman, disclosed today that the Russians appeared to have slowed the deployment of their giant SS-9 intercontinental missiles, the weapons that American planners fear would pose the

Continued on Page 8, Column 1

8

C

SHIFT BY MOSCOW ON MISSILES SEEN

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5

greatest potential threat in the event of a surprise attack on United States land-based missiles.

Other officials said that the Russians appeared to be dismantling some older intermediate-range missiles among approximately 70 weapons deployed in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. These weapons, while believed to be primarily aimed at Communist China and Japan, could hit military bases in Alaska as well.

In a statement that he said had been authorized by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Mr. Friedheim said that some analysts believed the Russians were "approaching what might be called leveling-off phases" in their missile programs.

Specifically, he said, "preliminary indications" suggested that the Soviet Union had started slowing its SS-9 construction and might now have "somewhat fewer than 300 SS-9's operational or under construction."

Slower Deployment Seen

Mr. Friedheim said the Pentagon statement was in response to questions about recent published reports that the Russians were slowing their SS-9 program.

Last year at this time, intelligence information indicated that the Soviet Union had about 280 SS-9's. The pace in recent years appears to have been to build about 50 to 60 a year. The new estimate, which conflicts with the estimate of "more than 300" Mr. Laird has talked of in recent months, seems to indicate a reduced deployment effort.

Qualified sources explained that the Russians had apparently stopped construction work already at a small number of SS-9 sites, leading to the reduced estimate.

Mr. Friedheim offered two cautionary comments, however.

"I want to point out that there have been previous years of low activity in the SS-9 construction program, followed by years of increased activity," he said. "We cannot yet tell exactly where the Soviet's SS-9 force level will come out after this year."

He also spoke of an accelerated Soviet program of testing multiple warheads for the SS-9 and smaller SS-11 missiles and raised the possibility that the Russians might have slowed deployments of new missiles so as to replace some of their earlier weapons with new ones containing multiple warheads.

The United States is now replacing about 500 Minuteman-1 intercontinental missiles with Minuteman-3 missiles carrying three-part warheads and is replacing 496 submarine-borne Polaris missiles with Poseidon missiles carrying 10 to 14 warheads each.

Mr. Friedheim said the Russians now had more than 2,500 land-based intercontinental missiles in place or under construction, compared with 1,054 American ICBM's.

Old Weapons Retired by U.S.

The United States has consistently retired old weapons as modern replacements have been developed. But, until now, the Soviet pattern apparently has been to keep adding newer ones to the old.

The Soviet Union's intercontinental missiles have ranges of 6,500 to about 8,000 miles. Its intermediate missiles have ranges of 1,200 to 3,500 miles.

One school of analysts here feels that the slowing of the ICBM program and the limited dismantling of intermediate missiles may represent the first sign that Soviet leaders have concluded they are approaching the point of having enough nuclear weapons and may therefore genuinely be prepared to agree with the United States to an over-all freeze on weapons.

American experts, it is said, have long expected the Russians to reach such a point and so to start to retire some of the older, less efficient, less well-protected and costly-to-operate systems.

"There comes a point," one official suggested, "where even for the Russians inefficient old systems must be retired if they are to free funds for the consumer side of the economy."

So far no dismantling has been discussed in the European part of the Soviet Union, where the Russians reportedly have the bulk of their 700 to 800 intermediate-range missiles. On the contrary, it is said, the Russians have been installing for about a year approximately 100 SS-11 intercontinental missiles in complexes in the southwest that have previously contained nothing beyond intermediate-range weapons.

Another group of analysts, on the basis of the same reconnaissance-satellite data, is concerned that the limited dismantling may be motivated by a Soviet desire to strengthen an argument their negotiators have been making in Helsinki. If this is the case, the analysts say, it could signal a tougher Soviet stance that could dim the prospects of ultimate agreement.

Their reasoning focuses on the fact that the missiles reportedly being dismantled in Soviet Asia have a range sufficient to reach targets in Alaska.

DO NOT FORGET THE NEEDIEST!

WASH POST 17 DEC 70 2.1

Soviets Slow ICBM Buildup

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The massive build up of Russian nuclear-tipped ICBMs that has helped fuel the arms race for the past five years is now slowing down, according to the Pentagon.

A cautiously worded statement issued yesterday by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird reported "some preliminary indications" that the Soviet Union may have recently started slowing somewhat the level of activity associated with SS-9 missile construction.

The SS-9, able to carry a single 25-megaton warhead or three 5-megaton multiple warheads, has been portrayed by the Pentagon as the big threat to survival of U.S. Minuteman ICBMs and the main reason for building the Safeguard ABM system.

Laird's statement, issued by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jerry W. Friedheim, comes on the heels of a just completed national intelligence estimate which points to a dramatic halt in Soviet missile construction.

Informed government officials say that the Soviets have actually halted work on 12 of 18 underground SS-9 silos that were started last May and have not begun any new SS-9

silos construction for seven months.

In addition, these sources say the Russians have also not started any new silos for the smaller and more numerous SS-11 ICBMs since October, 1969. There are indications that some work on silos started even earlier will not be completed.

Friedheim yesterday was re-

luctant to draw any conclusions about the meaning of the Soviet slowdown. He noted that there have been previous periods of low activity.

Should the construction remain suspended, however, some government officials think it may have a dramatic effect on halting the arms race and lowering Pentagon spending.

See SOVIET, A15, Col. 7

Laird Says Soviets Slow Arms Buildup

SOVIET, From A1

Several big Pentagon programs have been linked directly with the Soviet buildup. These include Safeguard, an expanded ABM known as "Hardsite", a new missile firing submarine, and an Air Force plan, approved by Deputy Secretary Packard just last Saturday, to harden about half the 1,000 Minuteman silos.

As recently as Oct. 9, Laird credited the Russians with "more than 300 SS-9s" deployed or under construction. Yesterday, Friedheim said the Pentagon now believes the Soviets "could have fewer than 300."

Informed officials say the current estimate is 294.

Some U.S. strategists believe that the Soviets, in the past year have continued to deploy small numbers as a bargaining counter at SALT to the U.S. Safeguard ABM.

The Soviets are reported to be most interested in halting Safeguard, and the size of the SS-9 force is the key limitation proposed by U.S. negotiators.

If the Soviets do stop at below 300, some strategists believe this could set the stage for a future agreement since the figure is close to the 250 missile SS-9 limitation that American negotiators were said to be asking for.

Defense officials have said repeatedly that a force of 420 SS-9s equipped with independently-targetable multiple warheads could wipe out 95 per cent of the Minuteman force in a first strike without Safeguard protection. Officials admit that the urgency for Safeguard would be reduced with only 300 of the big missiles ready to fire but say the Pentagon will not propose abandoning Safeguard without a specific SALT agreement.

Friedheim said he was reluctant to associate the Soviet developments specifically with SALT. But other administration planners believe the slowdown may well be a tacit signal that the Russians are prepared to negotiate seriously, perhaps following the 24th

Communist Party Congress which begins March 30.

Defense officials say privately that they are encouraged that the Soviets themselves did not mention the slowdown at the Helsinki arms talks and thereby put U.S. negotiators immediately on the spot to promise something quickly and publicly about Safeguard.

Friedheim also pointed out that the lull in Soviet activity could simply mark the normal, planned end of SS-9 and SS-11 deployment, or that it might just be a pause to allow them time to install multiple warheads on those missiles.

In any case, yesterday marked the first time that the Pentagon, under Laird, has publicly acknowledged a slowdown in Soviet ICBM activity. The admission reportedly was prompted by news leaks on the Soviet slowdown.

Friedheim said the Soviets now have 250 SS-9s operational. He also upped the total of SS-1s ready or under construction to more than 900; some of these, however, have been shipped into bases that formerly contained medium-range missiles targeted on Europe.

The latest U.S. intelligence estimate is also said to have put on the record for the first time some serious doubts about SS-9 performance.

Some weapons experts contend the big missile may not be as long-ranged as once estimated. In fact, some say it may not be able to reach the southernmost U.S. Minuteman bases.

Current accuracy of the missile has also been tagged as between 0.5-0.7 tenths of a mile. This would give a single 5-megaton warhead only a 50-50 chance of knocking out a Minuteman silo — not deadly enough to be relied on for wiping out U.S. missiles in a surprise attack.

The SS-9 is deployed at six big missile bases in the USSR, each containing several groups of six missiles each.

The SS-11s are deployed at 10 bases, each with several groups of 10 missiles each.

SS-9 COMMENTS

Secretary Laird has authorized me to state that there are some preliminary indications that the Soviet Union may have recently started slowing somewhat the level of activity associated with SS-9 missile construction. As a consequence, we now believe that the Soviet Union could have somewhat fewer than 300 SS-9's operational or under construction. There are more than 250 SS-9's operational.

I want to point out that there have been previous years of low activity in the SS-9 construction program, followed by years of increase activity. *We* cannot yet tell exactly where the Soviet's SS-9 force level will come out after this year.

There has been some thought among some of our strategic weapons analysts that both the SS-9's and SS-11's are approaching what might be called levelling-off phases.

Also, it is most important to note that we have seen the Soviets conduct, during the past year, an accelerated test program of multiple reentry vehicles for both these strategic missiles. We cannot tell yet whether the current construction slow-down means that they intend to retrofit existing SS-9 and SS-11 missiles with multiple warheads. The Soviet Union in addition to the SS-9, has more than 900 SS-11's operational or under construction.

By the time of Secretary Laird's Defense report early next year it may be possible for us to make a better judgment about the significant

of this year's Soviet ICBM effort, including construction and multiple re-entry vehicle progress.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, U. S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT : Disclosures of Classified Information

I am becoming increasingly concerned about the disclosure in public media of classified information bearing upon important aspects of national security, particularly that which tends to jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Such disclosures present a serious threat to our national interests and I am determined that every effort be made to prevent the appearance of such information in the public domain.

Executive Order 10501, of December 15, 1953, as amended, establishes regulations and procedures for safeguarding classified information, while especially sensitive data are protected by special systems of clearances. It is evident, however, that some authorized recipients of such information have been careless in their handling of it or have exercised bad judgment in drawing on it for use in the public domain.

I direct that immediate steps be taken within the jurisdiction of each addressee to ensure that existing regulations and procedures designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary. These regulations and procedures should assure that only those individuals with a demonstrated "need-to-know" receive classified information and that all recipients are constantly aware of the necessity to protect it from public disclosure. They should provide for an adequate security review of all statements and documents made public on subjects with important security connotations. Further, I wish responsible officials to take firm disciplinary action against individuals under their jurisdiction found responsible for careless or deliberate mishandling of classified information.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

The Director of Central Intelligence has the statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly, I shall look to him to provide guidance in this field, especially through the machinery of the intelligence community. I shall expect him to keep me informed of developments and I wish department and agency heads to cooperate fully with him.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET EYES ONLY

SENT 6:12 P.M.
MONDAY
SEP 69

NODIS

CSA020
OO WTE
DE WTE17 0020 (COLORADO SPRINGS)

FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CITE CSWH90020

S E C R E T/EYES ONLY/NODIS

I HAVE BEEN DISTURBED IN RECENT DAYS BY THE LACK OF TEAMWORK IN THE CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. CONSEQUENTLY, I AM REAFFIRMING MY POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THIS MATTER.

1. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRESS RELEASES: PRIOR TO RELEASE, ALL PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS ON MATTERS OF KNOWN OR POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST MUST BE CAREFULLY CLEARED BY THE WHITE HOUSE (ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY) FOR CONSISTENCY WITH PRESIDENTIAL POLICY AND FOR COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WHO SHARE OVERLAPPING INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. SHOULD THERE BE ANY UNCERTAINTY AS TO PRESIDENTIAL OR INTER-DEPARTMENTAL INTEREST, IT WILL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF CLEARANCE.

2. OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS: ALL OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH POLICY IMPLICATIONS MUST BE CLEARED BY THE WHITE HOUSE. WHEN IN DOUBT, THE RULE IS THAT MESSAGES WILL BE SO CLEARED. THIS PROCEDURE REQUIRES CLOSE AND CONFIDENTIAL STAFF RELATIONSHIPS AT ALL LEVELS BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND YOUR DEPARTMENT AS WELL AS AMONG DEPARTMENTS.

/S/ RICHARD NIXON

DTG 012255Z SEP 69

GPS 360 IMI 360

SECRET EYES ONLY

NODIS

TS - HK - D3656

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 17, 1970

25X1

HAK:

Here is revised memorandum to the President recommending he approve and sign the memorandum to the Department and Agency Heads bucking them up on security of classified information.

I have classified the memorandum proposed for the President's signature "confidential" on the grounds that this would prevent its immediate dissemination to the entire press corps nationwide. (Admiral Anderson, in forwarding the proposed memorandum to you, had not classified it). I think we must expect that it will get to the press and then there may be press comment that the President obviously has lost control, is angry about the reports of intelligence agents shadowing political figures, is reconstituting the hardline against the press and running afoul of the Moss Committee.

These charges are inevitable if the President is to express himself on this question at all other than in private communication to each of the Heads of Departments and Agencies. The President, however, would certainly be on defensible ground. He would be merely re-affirming his own concern for our national security and exhorting his Department and Agency Heads to remind all concerned of their responsibilities to protect that security.

Before forwarding the paper to the President, I recommend that you discuss this with Bob Haldeman. He, too, has been interested in the control of leaks problem. John Dean recently has asked the Attorney General to look into ways of controlling leaks.

Should you prefer that the communication be forwarded as a personal letter from the President to each of the addressees, I have drafted one drawing directly from the memorandum proposed by Admiral Anderson.

Dick Kennedy

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear _____!

I am becoming increasingly concerned about the disclosures in public media of classified information bearing upon important aspects of national security, particularly that which tends to jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Such disclosures present a serious threat to our national interests and I am determined that every effort be made to prevent the appearance of such information in the public domain.

Executive Order 10501, of December 15, 1953, as amended, establishes regulations and procedures for safeguarding classified information, while especially sensitive data are protected by special systems of clearances. It is evident, however, that some authorized recipients of such information have been careless in their handling of it or have exercised bad judgment in drawing on it for use in the public domain.

I want immediate steps to be taken to ensure that existing regulations and procedures designed to safeguard classified information be reviewed and strengthened where necessary. These regulations and procedures should assure that only those individuals with a demonstrated "need-to-know" receive classified information and that all recipients are constantly aware of the necessity to protect

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

it from public disclosure. They should provide for an adequate security review of all statements and documents made public on subjects with important security connotations. Further, I wish that firm disciplinary action be taken against individuals under their jurisdiction found responsible for careless or deliberate mishandling of classified information.

The Director of Central Intelligence has the statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly, I shall look to him to provide guidance in this field, especially through the machinery of the intelligence community. I shall expect him to keep me informed of developments and I wish that you cooperate fully with him.

CONFIDENTIAL