

*Pres. has seen
H22 7-16-69*

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7-7-69

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NGA, DIA, OSD
Reviews
Completed

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger */g/*

SUBJECT: Soviet ABM Developments

Dave Packard has forwarded to me a [redacted]

[redacted]

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This new network, if tied in with existing ABM deployments, would give the Soviets some ballistic missile defense against a Chinese attack. If additional radars and ABMs were deployed, this system would "substantially increase the capability for defense against China."

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The DIA reasons that the two radar sites under construction near China and the possible site near Moscow furnish a basis to postulate that the Soviets are building an early warning radar network against China. This evidence is not yet conclusive, however, for the following reasons:

-- Once completed, the two new radars near China would not offer complete coverage of China. To fill the gap in coverage, these radars would have to have twice the coverage of the older radars of the same type, and one existing radar would have to be doubled in capacity. DIA believes that this increase in capability is possible. However, there is as yet no evidence that it will in fact occur.

-- The possible new radar near Moscow could supplement the two new radars near China if it is of the type DIA suspects. However, because the radar has not been constructed, its characteristics are largely unknown. Moreover, if it were constructed on its present site, it alone would offer incomplete coverage of China, and it would be partially redundant with the southern face of a similar radar located near the new site. This radar face has never been used by the Soviets as far as we know, but we do not know why.

I believe that DIA has provided the most plausible explanation for the new Soviet radar developments, i. e. that the Soviets are deploying a ballistic missile early warning system oriented toward China. Other possible explanations are that the Soviets are:

- adding to their space surveillance capabilities,
- building a capability to monitor Chinese missile test activities,
- adding an early warning capability against the possibility that U.S. Poseidon submarines might deploy in the Indian Ocean and in the Sea of Okhotsk near Japan.

They could, of course, have some or all of these four purposes in mind.

DIA goes on to postulate that the existing ABM system around Moscow could be expanded to cover a Chinese ICBM attack tracked by the new radar system. The existing ABM system has, according to DIA, some

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capability against the Chinese. The Soviets could increase its capability by completing portions of their ABM network that were suspended some years ago. There is no evidence as yet of additional ABM deployments. However, Soviet testing of ABM interceptors continues.

DIA notes, however, that if air defense missiles could be supplied with adequate data by the new radars, they might be utilized against Chinese missiles. However, "the capability of the air defense missiles in an ABM role is still unclear."

This evidence is strong enough to suggest that the Soviets will probably agree with us in SALT that both countries should maintain a ballistic missile defense capability against China and third countries. It seems obvious that the Soviets have a stronger incentive to build a light ABM than we do, faced as they are with the British and French strategic forces and with the prospect of early Chinese deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles which could hit large areas of the Soviet Union.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

19 June 1969

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Henry:

We have discussed the capability of the Moscow
ABM system to meet a CPR threat. I asked DIA to
review our information on this system to determine
whether we could add to the estimate contained in
NIE 11-3-68. Their enclosed brief summarizes our
estimate.

The principal change to the NIE concerns the
latest HEN HOUSE radars at Sary Shagan and
Mischelevka. These radars are consistent with a
Soviet objective of developing a China oriented ABM
system.

Sincerely,

David Packard

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

*This memo has been informally
discussed but not coordinated with
CIA.*

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POSSIBLE REORIENTATION OF SOVIET ABM EFFORTS TOWARD CHINA

1. Summary - While there is no conclusive evidence of a Soviet reaction to the Chinese missile threat, a chronological correlation of Soviet HEN HOUSE radar deployment with Chinese missile development indicates, with a reasonably high degree of confidence, that the Soviets are building a ballistic missile radar network against the Chinese (see enclosed map). The ABM-1 system presently deployed around Moscow (GALOSH missiles, TRY ADDS radars, and the DOG HOUSE radar at Naro Fominsk) is primarily directed toward the U.S. ICBM and SLBM threats. However, the present ABM launch sites are assessed to be able to defend against an unsophisticated Chinese threat. In addition, completion of the suspect DOG HOUSE-type radar at Chekov and the ABM would substantially increase the capability for defense against China. The SA-5 missile system widely deployed throughout the Soviet Union could, if it has an ABM role, be used to defend against an unsophisticated and light ballistic missile attack from China, if provided with adequate radar data from the HEN HOUSE radars.

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2. HEN HOUSE Deployment - The Soviets built the R&D HEN HOUSE at Sary Shagan prior to April 1960. Since then they have deployed

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four slightly different configurations. The first type, the "bowed" type, were started in mid-1963 at both Olenegorsk, on the Kola Peninsula, and at Skrunda in Latvia. Both are considered operational and cover the CONUS ICBM and the North Atlantic POLARIS threat. The second and third types, i.e., the "THIN BOY," with low elevation coverage and "FAT BOY," with high elevation coverage, were started during the 1963-64 time frame with what appeared to be a [redacted]

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[redacted] the two in combination providing coverage from near 0° to 90°. Only the western looking THIN BOYS are assessed to have emitted signals, while the easterly looking THIN BOYS, apparently completed in 1966, have never emitted. The FAT BOYS appear to have a lower priority in construction than the THIN BOYS, and to date only the westerly FAT BOYS at Sary Shagan are assessed to have emitted signals. Before the rest of this type HEN HOUSES were completed, a fourth type, similar to the bowed type, were started at Skrunda in 1967 and, about one year later,

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two new ones were started at [redacted] The only plausible postulation at Skrunda is that the new type has a 56° azimuthal sector, which, when combined with the older ones which have 32°, will give the Soviets complete coverage from

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roughly Gibraltar to 35° East. Extending this postulation to Sary [redacted] and including modifying the easterly 25X1 looking "THIN BOYS" for 56° sector coverage with the radars at Sary Shagan and Mishelevka, the Soviets would have complete coverage of China as shown on the enclosed map. Both MRBM and ICBM trajectories from likely locations in China were flown on a computer against Soviet targets, Results indicate on the order of eight minutes warning time is available for most targets in eastern USSR.


3. Time Correlation with HEN HOUSE Deployment versus Chinese

Missile Threat - On 27 October 1967, the Chinese tested a missile-borne nuclear weapon. Throughout 1967, there was apparently a large number of possible troop missile firings. Photographic coverage to date has not revealed a Chinese missile deployment. However, it must be realized that the HEN HOUSE is a long lead time item, i.e., three years, and if the decision to react was made, it would have happened probably in 1967 or 1968. It should also be pointed out that while the Soviet missile complexes would be vulnerable to a Chinese MRBM attack, the Soviets could not launch ICBMs at the Chinese from these short ranges and, in addition, they would have to hold a large reserve for possible attack against the U.S.

[redacted]

time three SA-5 sites are located at Sary Shagan and one at Mishelevka. Also, SA-5 sites have been deployed at many areas, such as the highly industrialized center at Sverdlovsk. If this missile system could be provided with adequate radar data by HEN HOUSE radars, it might be utilized, especially against a less sophisticated and light MRBM, IRBM, or ICBM attack from China.

1 Enclosure (map, TSCW)



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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/04/11 : LOC-HAK-553-4-7-6

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 May 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Soviets Mark Time on ABM Deployment

Summary

The Soviets apparently have decided to await the results of further research and development before expanding their ABM defenses beyond the four launch complexes currently being completed around Moscow.

These four complexes--comprising a total of eight launch sites and 64 launchers--were all started between 1962 and 1966. Five or six of the launch sites are probably operational, and the last two are expected to be phased into the system in late 1969 and early 1970.


Plans have changed several times during the course of deployment. Four additional complexes were included in the original planning but have since been dropped. Two of these were abandoned in 1964, and the other two were stopped in varying stages of completion by the fall of 1967. Now, some modification of several tracking radars may be under way.

The Soviets have moved slowly in providing a second acquisition radar in the Moscow area to supplement the coverage of the existing Dog House radar. Site preparation and construction of support facilities began more than three years ago, but the first footings for the radar itself have only recently been installed.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Offices of National Estimates and Scientific Intelligence.

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Meanwhile, ABM developmental efforts are moving ahead at the Sary Shagan missile test center. Construction is continuing on large new radars, work has begun on a new ABM launch facility, and an improved interceptor missile--probably a modified Galosh--is being tested.



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The Soviets may still plan some future expansion of the ABM defenses at Moscow. Despite the curtailment of launch site construction in the fall of 1967, the Soviets went ahead and completed support buildings at two of the suspended complexes. In addition, rocket fuel storage at the support facility for the Moscow ABM sites exceeds current needs.

In contrast to the halting progress on the Moscow ABM facilities, the ballistic-missile early-warning system has continued to expand. Three additional radars for this purpose have been started since mid-1967. One is at Skrunda on the Baltic Sea coast, where it will supplement the coverage of two existing early warning radars in the northwestern USSR. The other two are in the southern USSR, facing China and a possible Polaris threat from the Sea of Okhotsk. All three new radars probably will be operational in 1971.

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