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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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to Kennedy

JCS REVIEWED 29-Nov-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

REFER TO OSD

REFER TO DOE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: JCS Post Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST II)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 28 October 1974, which requested Volume I of a JCS study entitled, "Post Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST II)" for review by the NSC Staff.

2. The requested document is attached.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in releasing this document, have invited your attention to their comments which are appended to the front of the volume. They additionally request that its use be restricted to the review by the NSC Staff and that it be returned upon completion of the review to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Attention: Documents Division).

DOE REVIEWED 15-Dec-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

for *Wickham, LTC, USA*
John A. Wickham, Jr.
Major General, USA
Military Assistant

OSD REVIEWED 02-Dec-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

Attachment

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
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
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ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



STUDIES, ANALYSES,
AND CURRENT AFFAIRS

POST NUCLEAR ATTACK STUDY (CONTRACT II)

VOLUME I - SUMMARY

23 MAY 1973

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE SUBJECT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS.
HANDLE AS RESTRICTED DATA IN FOREIGN
DISSEMINATION. SECTION 1442B, ATOMIC
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COMMENTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REGARDING
POST NUCLEAR ATTACK STUDY II (U)

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the subject study and consider it to be a source of useful information, subject to the cautions listed herein.

2. (TS) The study focuses on major problem areas involved in national recovery which are likely to confront national political and military leaders following a strategic nuclear exchange. In order to provide a basis for study of these areas, three hypothetical nuclear exchanges, using SIOP-4 Revision I/ RISOP-71 simulation results, were used. It is emphasized that the hypothetical exchanges and SIOP/RISOP simulation results are not themselves the focus of the study; they only provide the basis from which study of major problem areas involved in national recovery can proceed.

3. (TS) There are, consequently, important cautions which must be observed in order to avoid erroneous conclusions when using the study. For proper understanding, the study's principal observations and response to objectives, as summarized in Volume I, must be viewed in context with the assumptions and analyses contained in the detail portions of the study, Volumes II-V. The following are specific cautions:

a. To the extent that any scenario used approaches "worst case" simulation results, it is useful in sharpening the focus of problem areas involved in national recovery.

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b. The study was constrained to a particular point in time (January 1971) and therefore cannot reflect the significant developments made by the United States/USSR in strategic weapons, warning systems, and defenses during subsequent years.

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c. It was not intended that the study wargame theater wars or the tactical war at sea, assess the ultimate outcome of conflict under any scenario utilized, nor constitute a definitive statement of the damage-inflicting capabilities of the United States/USSR. The study is not a net assessment.

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4. (S) The study results are useful under the 1971 scenarios specified and for the assumptions and methodology employed. Among these assumptions were no US tactical warning of Soviet attack, while the Soviets were credited with such warning. The different targeting philosophies of SIOP-4 and RISOP-71 produced differing weights of effort against various categories of target systems. These factors, together with the qualitative differences (political, economic, institutional, monetary, and sociological) between the United States/USSR, determine the context within which PONAII results can be properly considered. Care should be exercised that study findings are not employed out of this context, and access should be limited to those persons having a genuine need to know.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND GAMING AGENCY

23 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR ADDRESSEES AT ENCLOSURE

Subject: Completion of the Second Generation Post Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST II) (U)

1. References:

- a. DJSM-382-70
- b. JCS 2280/52-17

2. The Second Generation Post Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST II) was completed on 23 May 1973. The study report consists of five volumes. Volume I which is the overall Summary of the study contains the Executive Summary. Volume II presents Preattack Measures. Volume III is the analysis of National Survival and Volume IV of National Recovery. Volume V discusses the Methodology utilized in PONAST II and identifies means for improving and facilitating post nuclear attack analysis.

3. The Planning Board believes that the PONAST II study provides useful information concerning the detailed effects of a massive nuclear exchange. The utility of this information is developed in a special Observations section at the end of each volume.

4. The study has been distributed to those departments, agencies and organizations that participated directly in its preparation: the Joint Staff; the Services; the Office of Emergency Preparedness; Central Intelligence Agency; the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis); Defense Civil Preparedness Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Defense Communications Agency; and Department of State. Subsequent distribution will be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The study has the concurrence of the entire Planning Board except for the OASD(SA).

6. The OASD(SA) comments appear at the end of the Executive Summary along with a statement by the Planning Board members (other than Systems Analysis) in response to the comments by Systems Analysis.

Charles F. Strack, Jr.
CAPT, USN

for

H. A. STRACK
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief, Studies, Analysis,
and Gaming Agency
Chairman, PONA II
Planning Board

Enclosure
a/s

ENCLOSURE

OJCS DISTRIBUTION "B"

Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)	6 copies
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	2 copies
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) (OSD(SA))	2 copies
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA)	2 copies
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)	7 copies
Defense Communications Agency (DCA)	1 copy
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PONAST II

VOLUME I
SUMMARY

23 May 1973

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure
subject to administrative
and criminal sanctions.
Handle as Restricted Data
in foreign dissemination.
Section 144b, Atomic Energy
Act, 1954~~

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(U) Although this JCS study involved the participation of OSD, OEP, CIA, DCPA, DIA, DCA, and State Department, with contributions from 24 other departments and agencies, it does not necessarily represent the views of the Secretary of Defense or the heads of the other participating or contributing departments and agencies.

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PONAST II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. (S) Objectives. The objectives of PONAST II, which examined the effects of simulated strategic nuclear exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union assumed to have taken place in January 1971, were: (a) to assess the capability of the US and USSR to survive, continue the conflict, and recover; (b) to provide a basis for improved US planning to enhance survivability, reconstitution, and rehabilitation in the event of nuclear war; and (c) to continue the development of the analytical procedures for this kind of study. The response to these objectives follows:

a. Capability to Survive, Continue the Conflict, and Recover. In all three scenarios considered, each country retained the capability to survive, continue the conflict, and recover. Sufficient population remained to constitute national entities, and each had sufficient inventories and production capacity to meet basic survival requirements. Nuclear weapons and their means of delivery survived in both countries, giving each a potential to continue the conflict to some extent. National recovery would require the will to do so, and the absence of constraints such as a breakdown of government or other critical institution, or constraints due to external factors such as continuing major combat operations. Granting these conditions, recovery to preattack force levels* and per capita consumption was shown to be possible. However, recovery could have been made more difficult for each side if selected industries critical to postattack

*A goal selected as a test of recovery capability, not as an indication of what actually should or might be done (see page 27).

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:


John A. Wickham, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army
Military Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: JCS Post Nuclear Attack Study
(PONAST II)

As you know, there are a number of reviews concerning the adequacy of our crisis management procedures currently underway within the Executive. In this regard, the NSC Staff participates on a number of crisis management groups and is responsible for reviewing and coordinating several others.

We have recently become aware of a JCS study entitled, "Post Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST II)", dated May 23, 1973. I believe it could be helpful to us in accomplishing our crisis management responsibilities if we could review Volume I of that study.

Review of the study will be confined to the NSC Staff and the volume will be returned directly to you when we are finished.


Brent Scowcroft
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 22, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY *RTK*
SUBJECT: JCS Post Nuclear Attack Study
(PONAST II)

The attached proposed memorandum for General Wickham (Tab A) requests that Defense forward Volume I of the PONAST II study for our review.

This is the same study that Chairman Burns, in his October 9th letter to Administrator Sampson (Tab B), suggests the NSC Staff look at in order to determine the validity of the basic assumption and their appropriateness for non-military preparedness planning.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call General Wickham and request the document. Alternatively, you could use the attached memorandum.

Dick Boverie concurs. *B*

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B



CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20551

October 9, 1974

The Honorable Arthur F. Sampson
Administrator
General Services Administration
18th and F Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20405

Dear Mr. Sampson:

A little over a year ago I suggested to Mr. Ash that the general assumptions underlying the Government's civil preparedness plans for a nuclear exchange be reexamined. It has been over fifteen years since these plans were developed, including the postattack financial policies upon which the Federal Reserve System's planning is based.

In the meantime the international political climate has changed greatly, and there have been radical changes in the military capabilities of leading world powers. It was my thought that some of these programs have outlived their usefulness and, if so, their termination could serve to effect some expenditure reductions.

Mr. Ash responded to my proposal by suggesting that the Federal Reserve Board, as the operating agency primarily responsible for developing emergency financial and stabilization plans, prepare a position paper on the emergency plans in the financial area. Mr. Ash suggested that the position paper be reviewed by the Office of Preparedness, with guidance as appropriate from the National Security Council.

The position paper, which includes an assessment of the effects on the financial system of a hypothetical attack, has been completed and forwarded to the Office of Preparedness. The staff judgment that evolved from a study which included representatives from other Federal financial agencies is that the postattack financial plans are still viable and should be retained.


The Honorable Arthur F. Sampson

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I have been informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently completed a classified study of the country's ability to survive a nuclear attack, using current department and agency plans as a basis. Some of my colleagues and I on the Board of Governors wonder, however, whether the assumptions on which these plans are based should not be reexamined in the light of the current military and political environment.

Therefore, I would like to suggest that the results of the JCS study be reviewed by the National Security Council to determine whether the earlier assumptions are still appropriate as a basis for non-military preparedness planning, and whether Federal expenditures in this area can be reduced without jeopardizing national security.

Sincerely yours,



Arthur F. Burns

cc: Mr. Ash, OMB
National Security Council