

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSA (pages 1-6) , DIA (all pages)
reviews completed

INFORMATION

October 19, 1973

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(CONTAINS CODEWORD)

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: MORI/CDF C03234551 WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*


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SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Military and Economic Imports

CIA/DIA, at our request, prepared a report (Tab A) on North Vietnamese military and economic imports which concludes that Sino-Soviet military aid continues at reduced rate but that such a cutback has only a minimal effect on Hanoi's immediate offensive capabilities. The report emphasizes that our information is extremely sketchy and contains only the best indicators of recent imports. While stipulating that there is no conclusive proof of post-cease-fire deliveries, it acknowledges that Hanoi probably still is receiving "some" military equipment. Drawing on somewhat weaker information not cited by the report, we are more confident that possibly substantial military imports are continuing. George Carver, in his covering memorandum (Tab A), comes to the same conclusion.

The CIA/DIA study at Tab A notes the following non-categorical evidence indicating that Hanoi still is receiving equipment:

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-- Intercepted communications in April and June revealing the presence of two new types of significantly improved radars (TALL KING and FLAP WHEEL) and between January and August the import of some 4,000 trucks (800 more than observed being delivered last year in the same period).

-- The high rate of NVA logistic activity within Indochina and the resulting circumstantial evidence that Hanoi would not be sending so much equipment and ordnance south unless it were being replaced in the north

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with recent imports. (A related National Intelligence Estimate on Vietnam's short-term prospects concluded that Hanoi now has moved sufficient supplies into the South and adjacent areas to support intense fighting through an entire dry season.)

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-- PRC-DRV military aid protocol, signed on October 5; signature of a DRV-Soviet economic aid agreement which, however, omitted all mention of military items. (On the other hand, the Deputy Defense Ministers of both parties attended the ceremony.)

On the civil import side, Hanoi's total imports of economic goods in 1973 may reach a new high of 2.8 million tons, roughly 55% over the 1972 level and 400,000 tons greater than the peak 1971 year. Seaborne imports will probably account for 1.3 million tons while 1.5 million tons are expected to arrive overland. Highlighting the scarcity of information on overland imports, we have so far actually detected only 140,000 tons arriving overland versus nearly 1.1 million tons delivered by sea.

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(Foodstuffs constitute 70% of the observed overland deliveries and 33% of the seaborne shipments, for an observed total of over one half million tons. The installation of pipelines from China since 1971 has greatly increased the capability for overland POL deliveries to the DRV.)

In the area of reconstruction, the report notes that most of Hanoi's imports represent commodities to maintain consumption and to rebuild war damaged stocks. Hanoi's recovery efforts have been slow moving, and progress has been limited (electric power is at about 2/3 of pre-bombing levels while most other industries have recovered only a fraction of their pre-war capacity.)

Comment

By admission of its own drafters, the CIA/DIA report is a very conservative estimate of DRV military imports and includes only the surest evidences of recent deliveries. Even on this basis, we would conclude that Moscow and Peking may well have replaced most, if not all, of Hanoi's losses in the 1972 offensive, thus allowing the DRV to pursue a military option. Other

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less definitive evidence, however, does exist which reinforces the judgment that Hanoi has again replenished its rear stocks of heavy equipment (at a time uncertain) and suggests (but does not prove) that very substantial military deliveries are continuing.

We cite the following instances to support our somewhat stronger conclusion:

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-- Intercepted references on September 21 to an improved model of the SA-7 missile being tested fired in the North (improvements very possibly were conducted in-country).


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-- A DIA analysis of August 23 that doubled our estimates of existing tank storage capacity at the NVA's principal armor park and thus concluded that the DRV's armor inventory in the North now stands at least at 200-220. (CIA carries a higher inventory -- 300 armored vehicles -- and privately speculates that there may be even more tanks in storage.)

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From the above and the information provided by the attached report, we are inclined to believe that Hanoi has been receiving very substantial military imports and is probably not concerned about its logistics pipelines from Moscow or Peking.

In any case, the report points up the urgent need for improved intelligence coverage -- especially photo reconnaissance -- of Hanoi's military imports.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

17 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Soviet and Chinese Aid to North
Vietnam Since the Signing of
the Paris Agreement

1. Attached are five copies of a memorandum on Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam prepared at your request as relayed through Mr. William Stearman of the NSC Staff. As the "Key Points" on page one of the memorandum indicate, the extent of our hard data and factual information on this subject leaves a good deal to be desired. Nevertheless, in the several months since we last memorialized you on Soviet and Chinese aid

[redacted] we have acquired an appreciable volume of evidence which -- while not conclusive -- strongly suggests that a substantial amount of military as well as economic aid is still flowing into North Vietnam.

2. As Mr. Stearman requested, this study was prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Both agencies are in full agreement with the conclusions and all specifics of the report.

3. I am sending other copies of this report to Secretary Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary Clements, Admiral Moorer, Deputy Secretary Rush, Deputy Assistant Secretary Hummel and the Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency and INR.

G. A. Carver, Jr.
George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

[redacted] Copies 1 through 5

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- Copy No. 6 - Secretary Schlesinger
- Copy No. 7 - Deputy Secretary Clements
- Copy No. 8 - Admiral Moorer
- Copy No. 9 - Deputy Secretary Rush
- Copy No. 10 - Deputy Assistant Secretary Hummel
- Copy No. 11 - Vice Admiral de Poix
- Copy No. 12 - Mr. Cline

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
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Intelligence Memorandum

*Communist Military and Economic Assistance to North Vietnam
Since The Paris Agreement Was Signed*

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